

VOL. 2

ABHIDHARMAKOSABHASYAM.  
VASUBANDHU | POUSSIN | PRUDEN



# ABHIDHARMA KOSA BHASYAM

OF  
VASUBANDHU

TRANSLATED INTO FRENCH BY LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN  
ENGLISH VERSION BY LEO M. PRUDEN



**Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam**

**Volume II**





# Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam

*of Vasubandhu*



Volume II

*Translated into French by Louis de La Vallée Poussin*

*English Version by Leo M. Pruden*



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# Translator's Introduction

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This work is Volume II of a translation of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, a work first translated into French by the great Belgian scholar Louis de La Vallée Poussin, and now here translated into English from the French and the Sanskrit.

This present volume contains Chapter III and Chapter IV of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*.

Chapter III, the *Loka-nirdeśa* of "Instruction concerning the World" is a description of the physical world, its inhabitants, and its various hells and the heavens of the gods.

Some interesting topics are raised in Chapter III: how rebirth or transmigration takes place; an analysis of each of the parts of the schema of dependent origination; whether there can be such a thing as premature death in a world ruled by *karma*; the various measurements of time and space; the cosmic cycle or *kalpa*; and the career of the Bodhisattva. There is also a discussion of whether there are one or many Buddhas in the cosmos, a recurring debate topic in Far Eastern Buddhism. This chapter also contains a discussion on whether the intermediate state of existence (*antarābhava*) exists or not. This intermediate state is well known to students of Tibetan Buddhism as the *bardo* state, a state discussed at length in the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*. Chapter III is a very interesting chapter.

Chapter IV, the *Karma-nirdeśa* or "Instruction concerning Karma" is, as its title indicates, a presentation of the Buddhist teaching of *karma*, or consciously willed action, its moral tone, and its subsequent results. This Chapter contains the teaching on the precepts for the seven types of Buddhist believers, both lay and clerical; it also contains a discussion of *avijñaptirūpa*, the physical matter that does not inform anyone of its presence except through the cultivation of morality. The concept of *avijñaptirūpa* later became an important topic of discussion in Far Eastern Buddhism.

Vasubandhu was also concerned with the nature of *karma* and of the problem of the subsistence of the influence of *karma*, given the

Buddhist teaching of the non-substantiality and perpetual impermanence of all things. In order to discuss this matter further, Vasubandhu also composed a work, the *Karmasiddhi-prakarana*, which has recently been published in an English translation.<sup>1</sup>

Chapter IV is a very important chapter, detailing as it does the moral life of the Community, and its related philosophical problems.

Leo M. Pruden

1. See the *Karmasiddhi Prakaraṇa, the Treatise of Action by Vasubandhu*, by Etienne Lamotte, English translation by Leo M. Pruden, Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, 1988.

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## C H A P T E R   T H R E E

### *The World*

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**O**m. Homage to the Buddha.

The author wishes to explain the diverse topics of mind that are produced in Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu, and Ārūpyadhātu, the realms of desire, physical matter, and no physical matter (ii.66-73).

What are these three realms?

1a-c. Kāmadhātu consists of hell, the Pretas, animals, humans, and six gods.<sup>1</sup>

Kāmadhātu consists of four complete realms of rebirth (*gati*, iii.4) and one part of the heavenly realm of rebirth, namely the six groups of gods, the Cāturmahārājikas, the Trāyastriṃśas, the Yamas, the Tuṣitas, the Nirmāṇaratis, and the Paranirmitavaśavartins; plus the physical world (*bhājanaloka*, iii.45) that contains these beings.

How many places (*sthāna*) are there in Kāmadhātu?

1c-d. Twenty, through the division of the hells and the differences in the continents.

The twenty places are eight hells (iii.58): Saṃjīva, Kālasūtra, Saṃghāta, Raurava, Mahāraurava, Tāpāna, Prātāpāna, and Avīci; four continents (iii.53): Jambudvīpa, Pūrvavideha, Avaragodānīya, and Uttarakuru; and six heavenly abodes as above (iii.64). And the Pretas and animals. Hence, from Avīci hell up to the heaven of the Paranirmitavaśavartins, there are twenty places which constitute, with the physical world which rests on the circle of wind (iii.45), Kāmadhātu.

2a-b. Above is Rūpadhātu, of seventeen places

The seventeen places of Rūpadhātu are above Kāmadhātu,

2b-d. made up of *dhyānas* which are each of three stages. But the fourth is of eight stages.<sup>2</sup>

Each of the *dhyānas* contains three stages or spheres, with the exception of the fourth.

The First Dhyāna is made up of the Brahmakāyikas, the Brahmāpurohitas, and the Mahābrahmanus.

The Second Dhyāna is made up of the Parittābhas, the Apramānābhas, and the Ābhāsvaras.<sup>3</sup>

The Third Dhyāna is made up of the Parittaśubhas, the Apramāṇaśubhas, and the Śubhakṛtsnas.

The Fourth Dhyāna is made up of the Anabhrakas, the Puṇya-prasavas, the Bṛhatphalas, [and the five Śuddhāvāsikas:] Avṛhas, Atapas, Sudṛśas, Sudarśanas, Akanisthas. These seventeen places constitute Rūpadhātu.<sup>4</sup>

But the Kāśmīrians say that Rūpadhātu is made up of only sixteen places.<sup>5</sup> In the heaven of the Brahmāpurohitas there rises, they say, a lofty dwelling which is named the Heaven of Brahmā,<sup>6</sup> inhabited by a single ruler<sup>7</sup>—such as a terrace or a high place<sup>8</sup>—but which does not constitute a stage (*bhūmi*).

3a. Ārūpyadhātu is not a place.<sup>9</sup>

In fact non-material *dharma*s do not occupy a place: likewise the material *dharma*s when they are past or future, *avijñāpti* and the nonmaterial *dharma*s, do not occupy a location. But

3b. It is fourfold through its mode of existence.

Ākāśānantyāyatana, Vijñānāntyāyatana, Ākīncanyāyatana, and Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana (or Bhavāgra) constitute Ārūpyadhātu which is thus of four types. "Existence" means the appearance of the *skandhas* in a new existence by reason of action: it is not through one and the same action that one obtains these different *āyatanas* that are superior to one another. But this superiority does not imply difference of stage. Where a person exists who possesses an absorption [which produces an existence in Ārūpyadhātu], here the existence in question begins; here too, at the end of this existence, the intermeditate being who is called to take up a new existence will be formed [in Kāmadhātu

or Rūpadhātu] (See below, note 36).

\*\*\*

The mental series, the mind and mental states (*citta* and *caitta*, ii.23) of material beings is supported on physical matter, *rūpa*, and in this way can exist. What is the support of the mental series of beings in Ārūpyadhātu?

3c-d. Here the mental series exists supported by the *nikāya* and the vital organ.<sup>10</sup>

According to the Ābhidhārmikas, the mental series of beings in Ārūpyadhātu has for its support two *dharma*s disassociated from the mind, *nikāyasabhāgatā*, genre or genus, and *jīvitendriya*, the vital organ (ii.45).

<sup>11</sup> The mental series of material beings is not supported by these two *dharma*s, because they lack force; but the mental series of nonmaterial beings possess the necessary force, because they proceed from an absorption from whence the idea of physical matter has been eliminated.

But, one would say, genre and the vital organ of material beings is supported by physical matter: but what is the support of genre and the vital organ for nonmaterial beings?

These two support one another. Among material beings, genre and the vital organ do not have the force necessary to support one another, but they have this force among nonmaterial beings, because they proceed from a certain absorption.

According to the Sautrāntikas, the mental series, mind and mental states, does not have, among nonmaterial beings, any support which is external to it. This series is strong and can serve as a support.

Or rather, we say that the mind is supported by the mental states, and the mental states by the mind, in the way that you say that genre and the vital organ support one another.

The series of minds of a new existence is "projected" by a certain cause (action-defilement, *karma-kleśa*); if this cause is not free from attachment to physical matter, the mind will be reborn with matter, and its series will be supported by matter; if this cause is free from

attachment to physical matter—as in the case for absorption which is the cause which projects an existence in Ārūpyadhātu—the mind will be reborn and will exist without relation to physical matter.

\*\*\*

What is the meaning of these terms, Kāmadhātu, etc.,<sup>12</sup>

*Dhātu* is that which carries (*dadhāti*)<sup>13</sup> a *svalakṣaṇa* (namely the *kāmas*, etc.); or *dhātu* signifies *gotra* as has been explained above (i.20a, English trans. p. 78).

1. Kāmadhātu can be understood as “a *dhātu* associated with *kāmas*,” by omitting the middle word “associated with” (*samprayukta*), as we say “diamond ring” (*vajravālaka*) for “a ring decorated with diamonds” (*vajrena samprayukto’ngulīyakah*), or “pepper potion” (*maricapānaka*) for “a potion mixed with pepper.”

In the same way Rūpadhātu signifies “a *dhātu* associated with matter.”

We have the adjective *arūpa* or “free from matter,” from whence the abstract noun *ārūpya*, absence of matter.<sup>14</sup>

Or rather *rūpa* is that which is susceptible to being struck (*rūpaṇa*), to resistance (i.24, English trans. p.85); *arūpa*, by absence of *rūpa*; *ārūpya*, the fact of being such. Ārūpyadhātu is that which is associated with *ārūpya*.

2. Or rather these terms are compounds the first term of which is a genitive: Kāmadhātu, the receptacle of *dhātu* of the *kāmas*; Rūpadhātu, the receptacle of matter; Ārūpyadhātu, the receptacle of *ārūpya*.

What is *kāma*?

Concupiscence, the desire to eat by mouthfuls (*kavaḍḍikārāhāra*, iii.39) and sexual desire. [*Kāma* does not signify the object of desire, which is called more exactly *kāmaguṇa*, but “that which desires,” *kāmyata aneneti kāmah*]. We will see this by the following stanzas.

Śāriputra said to an Ājīvika, “The fine things of this world are not *kāmas*; *kāma* is the desire that the imagination nourishes among humans. The objects of the universe are of little importance: the sage overcomes all desire with regard to them.” The Ājīvika answered, “If the fine things of this world are not *kāmas*, if *kāma* is the desire that is nourished by the imagination, the same Bhikṣu would be a ‘taster of the *kāmas*’ when he produces bad imaginations.” Śāriputra answered, “If the

fine things of this world are *kāmas*, if *kāma* is not desire which the imagination nourishes, then the Master himself would be a taster of the *kāmas* when he sees objects.”<sup>15</sup>

\*\*\*

Should one consider as “integral” to one Dhātu [= as being of the domain of a Dhātu], all the *dharma*s that are produced in this Dhātu?<sup>16</sup>

No, but merely the *dharma* with regard to which there develops, and in which there resides craving (*rāga*) proper to this Dhātu, craving of Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu, and Ārūpyadhātu.

What is the craving proper to each Dhātu?

The craving that develops, that resides in the *dharma*s of this Dhātu.

This is the example of the tether: “To whom does this tether belong?” “To the owner of this horse.” “To whom does this horse belong?” “To the owner of this tether.” This answer does not teach us anything.

We have enumerated the places that constitute Kāmadhātu. “Craving proper to Kāmadhātu” is the craving of the being who is not detached from this place, who has not rejected craving with regard to the *dharma*s of this place. The same for the other two Dhātus.

Or rather, “craving proper to Kāmadhātu” is the craving of a being who is not absorbed (*samāhita*); “craving proper to Rūpadhātu, to Ārūpyadhātu” is craving relative to the absorption of *dhyāna*, to the absorptions of *ārupya*.

\*\*\*

The mind<sup>17</sup> by which one creates magical objects in the sphere of Kāmadhātu is the result of a *dhyāna*.

But this mind is produced only among beings detached from Kāmadhātu.

How can one say that this mind is of the sphere of Kāmadhātu? In fact this mind is not produced among a being not detached from Kāmadhātu, and, when this mind is produced among a being detached from Kāmadhātu, it cannot be for him the object of a craving of the order of Kāmadhātu. This mind is hence of the sphere of Kāmadhātu



without there being, with regard to it, any craving of the order of Kāmadhātu: this is a difficulty that contradicts your definition of the Dhātus.

This mind is of the sphere of Kāmadhātu because a craving of the order of Kāmadhātu is produced with regard to it in a person who intends to speak of this mind as belonging to another, or who remembers having possessed it previously, or who sees magic creations. Or rather because this mind creates some odors or tastes: now a mind of the sphere of Rūpadhātu cannot create odors or tastes because beings in Rūpadhātu are detached from both of these.

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Is this triple Dhātu unique?

The triple Dhātus are infinite, like space;<sup>18</sup> although there has not been any production of new beings, and although innumerable Buddhas convert innumerable beings and cause them to obtain Nirvāṇa, the beings of innumerable Dhātus are never exhausted.<sup>19</sup>

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How are the three Dhātus arranged?

Horizontally,<sup>20</sup> as the Sūtra proves,<sup>21</sup> “as when the cloud Īṣādhāra<sup>22</sup> rains, there is no interval or discontinuity of the drops of water that fall from space, so too towards the East there is no interval or discontinuity of universes (*lokadhātus*) in a state of creation and of dissolution; as towards the East, the same towards the South, the West and the North.” The Sūtra does not add “toward the zenith and the nadir.”

According to another opinion,<sup>23</sup> the universe superimposes itself toward the zenith and the nadir, for, according to other Sūtras,<sup>24</sup> the universes are arranged towards the ten cardinal points. There is then a Kāmadhātu above Akaniṣṭha and an Akaniṣṭha below Kāmadhātu.<sup>25</sup>

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Whoever is detached from one Kāmadhātu is detached from the Kāmadhātus of all the universes; the same for the other two Dhātus.

Whoever produces the *abhiññā* or higher knowledge of magical power in the First Dhyāna, creates a magical being that can only be the Brahmaloṇa of the universe wherein the creator of this magical being is born; not in the other universes (vii.50b).

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4a-b. In these Dhātus, there are five realms of rebirth that have been designated by their names.<sup>26</sup>

The five *gatis* or realms of rebirth are hellish beings, animals, Pretas, humans, and gods. In Kāmadhātu there are the first four realms of rebirth and a part of the heavenly realm of rebirth; the other parts of the heavenly realm of rebirth exist in the other two Dhātus.

The stanza speaks of "five realms of rebirth" in the Dhātus. Is there then a part of the Dhātus that are not included in the realms of rebirth?

Yes. The good, the bad, the physical world, and intermediate existence are included in the Dhātus. Whereas, as for the five destinies

4b-d. They are undefiled-neutral, they are the world of beings, and they do not include intermediate existence.<sup>27</sup>

The realms of rebirth are undefiled-neutral, being the result of retribution (ii.57).<sup>28</sup> In the contrary hypothesis, the five realms of rebirth would be confounded: [in fact, a person can do actions which are repaid through a hellish rebirth, or by a heavenly rebirth: but if action were to be intergal to the realms of rebirth, the human realm of rebirth would be at one and the same time hellish and heavenly. A being born in Kāmadhātu is filled with the defilements of this sphere (*bhūmi*) and can be filled with the defilements of higher spheres.]

They are *sattvākhyā* (i.10b), only pertaining to living beings: the physical world is not included within the realms of rebirth.

Intermediate existence is not a realm of rebirth (see below p. 373, line 12; iii.10).

The nature of the realms of rebirth is illustrated by many texts: 1. The *Prajñāpti* says, "The four wombs (*yoni*, iii.8c) exist in the five realms of rebirth; but do the five realms of rebirth contain all four wombs? Intermediate existence, which is an apparitional womb, is not

included within the five realms of rebirth.”

2. The *Dharmaskandha* (TD 26, p. 498b23-c11) says, “What is the eye-element (*cakṣurdhātu*)? Subtle matter derived from the primary elements which, in hell, among animals, among the Pretas, among the gods, among humans, among beings born in an absorption, and among intermediate beings, is eye, eye-organ, eye-source of knowledge, eye-element.”

3. The Sūtra itself says that intermediate existence is not included among the realms of rebirth: “There are seven *bhavas* or existences: existence in hell, animal, Preta, heavenly, human, plus *karmabhava* and intermediate existence (*antarābhava*).” This Sūtra<sup>29</sup> indicates the five realms of rebirth (hellish, etc., existences) with their cause, namely action or *karmabhava* (iii.24a), and their access, namely intermediate existence through which a being arrives at a realms of rebirth. At the same time this Sūtra shows that the realms of rebirth are undefiled-neutral, since it distinguishes the realms of rebirth (hellish, etc., existences), from the causes of these realms of rebirth, namely action which is non-neutral (=good, bad).

4. This last point is again proved by a Sūtra which the Kāśmīrians<sup>30</sup> read: “Śāriputra said, ‘Venerable One, when the hellish cankers (*āsravas*) become active, one does and one accumulates actions which should be renumerated by hell. These action of the body, voice, and mind, tortorous, corrupted, ‘tainted’ (iv.59) action have for retribution *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāras* and *vijñāna* in hell. When this retribution is realized, there is what is called hell. Venerable One, outside of these five *dharma*s, one cannot maintain the existence of any being in hell.” [This says that a being in hell does not exist outside of these five *dharma*s which are retribution, thus undefiled-neutral].

But how can this thesis accord with the declaration of the *Prakaranagrantha* (according to Saeki, this is a summary of TD 26, p. 702a8-711b5): “All the latent defilements (*anuśayas*) reside in and develop in realms of rebirth?”<sup>31</sup>

The answer is that this declaration refers to the initial mind (*saṃdhicitta*) of the realms of rebirth,<sup>32</sup> which can be of five types, abandoned through Seeing the Four Noble Truths or through Meditation: hence all the latent defilements can reside there.<sup>33</sup> As one says ‘village’ for ‘the confines of the village,’ the *Prakaranā* can express itself

as it does.

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According to another opinion, the realms of rebirth are both good and defiled. In fact, say the followers of this opinion, the argument quoted from the *Sūtra of the Seven Existences* (note 29) does not hold: it is maintained that action is separate from the five realms of rebirth, but this does not prove that it is excluded from them. Among the five corruptions (*kaṣāya*) the corruption of defilements (*kleśakaṣāya*) and the corruption of views (*dṛṣṭikaṣāya*, iii.95a) are quoted separately: shall one say that views are not a defilement? Action (*karmabhava*) is also included within the realms of rebirth.<sup>34</sup> It is quoted separately because it is the cause of the realms of rebirth.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] Does your reasoning apply to the intermediate existence which would then be a realm of rebirth?<sup>35</sup>

No. The word *gati* or realm of rebirth signifies "the place where one goes." Now the intermediate existence begins in the place where death has taken place.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] This is also the case for the existences of Ārūpyadhātu which then are not included among the realms of rebirth.<sup>36</sup>

We say then that intermediate existence is so called because it is intermediate between two realms of rebirth, but it is itself not a realm of rebirth. If it were a realm of rebirth it would not be intermediate, and so it would not be called an intermediate existence.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] Admitting that you have refuted the argument taken from the *Sūtra of the Seven Existences*, what do you make of the declaration of Śāriputra (above, p. 372, line 20)?

Śāriputra says that there is a being in hell when the retribution of hellish actions is realized; it does not say that the realm of rebirth is part retribution, part non-retribution. The text says that there does not exist any being in hell outside of these *dharma*s, *rūpa*, etc.: its intention is to negate the reality of any person passing from one realm of rebirth into another, not to affirm that the *skandhas* (*rūpa*, etc.) of the beings in hell are solely retribution.

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For the Vaibhāṣikas, the realms of rebirth are exclusively undefiled-neutral *dharma*s. Among the Vaibhāṣikas, some think that they are *dharma*s of retribution (*vipākaja*); others think that they are *dharma*s of retribution and accumulation (*aupacayika*).<sup>37</sup>

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In the three Dhātus with their five realms of rebirth, there is, in ascending order,

5a-6a. Seven abodes or types of consciousnesses (*vijñānasthitis*), namely: 1. beings different in bodies and ideas; 2. beings of different bodies but similar in ideas; 3. beings similar in body but different in ideas; 4. beings similar in body and ideas; and 5. - 7. three classes of non-material beings.<sup>38</sup>

According to the Sūtra (*Madhyama*, 24, 11):

1. "Material beings different in bodies and ideas, namely humans and certain gods, are the first *vijñānasthitis*."

What are these certain gods?<sup>39</sup> The six gods of Kāmadhātu (i.1) and the gods of the First Dhyāna (world of Brahmā) except the *prathamābhīnirvṛttas*.<sup>40</sup>

They are of different bodies, because their color, their marks (clothes, ornaments, etc.), and their figures (height, etc.) are not identical. They are of different ideas, because their ideas, ideas of pleasure, displeasure, neither-pleasure-nor-displeasure, are not identical.<sup>41</sup>

2. "Material beings different in bodies but of similar ideas, namely the *prathamābhīnirvṛtta* Brahmakāyika<sup>42</sup> gods, are the second *vijñānasthitis*."

All these *prathamābhīnirvṛtta* gods are of similar ideas, for all have the same idea of a single and same cause, Brahmā, who thinks, "They are created by me," and the associates of Brahmā who think, "We are created by Brahmā;"<sup>43</sup> there is diversity of body, for one is Brahmā, and the others his followers through their height, their greatness, their bodies, their speech, their clothing and their ornaments.<sup>44</sup>

We read in the Sūtra that these gods remember, "We have seen this being of great sight, who lasts so long," and so on to "when he made the

vow, 'May other beings be born here in my company!', we were born in his company."<sup>45</sup> (See iii.90c-d.). We ask then where were these gods when they saw Brahmā?<sup>46</sup>

According to certain masters [who take their authority from the Sūtra that teaches that the Brahmakāyikas are reborn in the world of Brahmā after dying in Ābhāsvara Heaven], they saw Brahmā when they were in Ābhāsvara Heaven.

But, we would say, when they fell from Ābhāsvara Heaven, a heaven of the Second Dhyāna, they lost the Second Dhyāna, and the Second Dhyāna is necessary to the memory of a past existence in the heaven of the Second Dhyāna (vii.44a). Further, they have not re-acquired the Second Dhyāna since they have fallen into the erroneous view (e.g. *śīlavrataparāmarśa*) of considering Mahābrahmā as a creator: one cannot say that this erroneous view can accompany the Second Dhyāna, since no erroneous view (or any defilement, *kleśa*) of a certain sphere has ever had a lower, inferior sphere as its object.

According to another opinion, they saw Brahmā when they were in the intermediate existence (*antarābhava*) which proceeded their birth in the world of Brahmā.

But one would object that this intermediate existence is very short for it cannot have any slowing down of birth in this world.<sup>47</sup> How then can they say, "We have seen this being of great sight, who lasts so long?"

As a consequence, a third opinion, one would say: It is in the world of Brahmā itself that these gods remember the past of Brahmā. At the moment when they are born there, they saw him who being born before them, who lasts a long time. Having seen him, they think: "We have seen this being . . .;" and they know the vow that he made through memory of the sphere of the First Dhyāna which they obtained through the very fact of their birth; or rather because Brahmā told them.<sup>48</sup>

3. "Material beings similar in body but of different ideas, namely the Ābhāsvara gods, are the third *viññānasthiti*."

The Sūtra, in naming the highest gods of the Second Dhyāna, the Ābhāsvaras, also designates the Parīttābha and the Apramāṇābha gods. If it were otherwise, to which *viññānasthiti* would these two classes belong?

There is no difference of color, mark, or figure among them: thus

these gods have similar bodies. They have ideas of pleasure and of neither-pleasure-nor-displeasure: thus there is diversity of ideas.

In fact, it is said (*Vibhāṣā*, TD, p. 707b6),—wrongly according to us (*kīla*),—that these gods, fatigued with the sensation of mental pleasure—which is the sensation proper to the Second Dhyāna—pass into the threshold (*sāmantaka*) absorption of this Dhyāna, an absorption which allows the sensation of neither-pleasure-nor-displeasure (viii.22). Fatigued from this second sensation, they again take up the Second Dhyāna and the sensation of mental pleasure. In this same way kings fatigued with the pleasures of lust (*kāmasukha*) take up the pleasure of government (or of *dharma*), and fatigued with *dharma* take up again the pleasure of lust.

One would object that it should hold for a god of the Third Dhyāna (*Śubhakṛtsnas*, etc.: fourth *vijñānasthiti*) as for the gods of the Second Dhyāna: yet the gods of the Third Dhyāna do not pass into *sāmantaka*, and always possess the sensation of pleasure.

But this objection is in vain. The *Śubhakṛtsnas* do not become fatigued with the pleasures of the *Ābhāsvaras*, since they are calm, whereas the pleasures of the *Ābhāsvaras*, being mental pleasures, trouble the mind and are not calm.

The *Sautrāntikas* are of a different opinion. They quote the *Sūtra* (*Saptasūryavyākaraṇa*, *Dīrgha* TD 1, p. 138b25, and *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 429a22):<sup>49</sup> "Beings that are born for a short time in *Ābhāsvara* Heaven know poorly the laws of the destruction of the universe. When the destruction of the universe takes place through fire, they see the flames rising and destroying the palace of the world of *Brahmā*: they are frightened, grieved, confused, 'May these flames not rise up to here!' But the beings who have lived for a long time in *Ābhāsvara* Heaven know of these cosmic changes and reassure their frightened companions, 'Do not be afraid, friend! Do not be afraid, friend! Already previously this fire, having burnt the Palace of *Brahmā*, disappeared.' Then one sees indeed how the gods of the Second Dhyāna have different ideas: at the burning up of the worlds in the First Dhyāna, they have ideas of the arriving or the non-arriving of the flames amongst them, and they have ideas of fear and no fear. The explanation of the *Vaibhāṣikas* then, that these gods exchange the sensation of pleasure and indifference, is not good.

4. "Material beings of similar bodies and ideas, namely the



Śubhaktṛtsnas, are the fourth *vijñānasthiti*."

They have the same ideas, because they have the sensation of pleasure.

In the First Dhyāna, there is uniformity of ideas, ideas defiled since they are associated with *śīlavrataparāmarśa*; in the Second Dhyāna, there is diversity of ideas, namely good ideas of the Dhyāna proper and of its threshold absorption; and in the third Dhyāna, there is uniformity of ideas, ideas arisen from retribution.

5. - 7. The first three Ārūpyas are the last three *vijñānasthitis* as it says in the Sutra.<sup>50</sup>

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What are the *vijñānasthitis*? The five *skandhas* of Kāmadhātu or Rūpadhātu for the first ones (see iii.7c), and four *skandhas* for the last three.

Why are not the rest *vijñānasthitis*?

6b. The rest reduce the *vijñāna*.<sup>51</sup>

The "rest" refers to the painful realms of rebirth (*durgati*, *apāya*: hell, etc.), the Fourth Dhyāna, and the Fourth Ārūpya (=Naivasa-mññānāsamññāyatana) which is called Bhavāgra or the summit of existence.

Here, in these realms, the *vijñāna* is reduced, or cut off:<sup>52</sup> in the painful realms of rebirth, painful sensation damages the *vijñāna*; in the Fourth Dhyāna, an ascetic can cultivate *asamññisamāpatti*, the absorption of unconsciousness (ii.42), and in this Dhyāna there is also *āsamññika*, namely the *dharma* (ii.41b) that creates the Unconscious Gods (*Asamññisattva*); in Bhavāgra, the ascetic can cultivate *nirodhasamāpatti* (ii.43a), the absorption of the cessation of ideas and sensations.

According to another explanation (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 708a14), *vijñānasthiti* is "the place where those who are here desire to go, the place from whence those who are there do not desire to fall." These two conditions are absent in the painful realms of rebirth. As for the Fourth Dhyāna, all those who are in it desire to leave it: Pṛthagjanas desire to pass to the realm of the *Asamññisattvas*; Āryans desire to pass to the

Śuddhāvāsikas [or to the Ārūpyāyatanas; and the Śuddhāvāsikas desire to realize the calm of extinction, *śāntanirodha*].<sup>53</sup>

Bhavāgra is not a *viññānasthiti* because there is little activity of the *viññāna* in it.<sup>54</sup>

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The seven *viññānasthitis*,

6c-d. With Bhavāgra and unconscious beings, are the nine "dwellings of beings."<sup>55</sup>

For creatures dwell therein as they will.

7a. There are no other dwellings of beings, for elsewhere one lives without desiring it.

"Elsewhere" refers to the painful realms of rebirth. Beings are brought there by the Rākṣasa which is Karma and live there without desiring it. This is not one of the "dwellings" in the same way that a prison is not a dwelling.<sup>56</sup>

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If one Sūtra says that there are seven *viññānasthiti*, according to another Sūtra

7b. There are four other *sthitis*.<sup>57</sup>

These four are: *rūpa* as an abode of *viññāna*, (*rūpopagā viññānasthitiḥ*), *vedanā* or sensation as an abode of *viññāna* (*vedanopagā viññānasthitiḥ*), ideas as an abode of *viññāna* (*saṃvijñopagā viññānasthitiḥ*), and the *saṃskāras* or forces as an abode of *viññāna* (*saṃskāropagā viññānasthitiḥ*).

7c-d. They consist of the four impure *skandhas*, which are of the same sphere as the *viññāna*.<sup>58</sup>

The consciousness or *viññāna* can grasp visible things and the other *skandhas* of a different sphere as its object: but it cannot grasp them as object under the impulse of craving; thus they are not considered as *its*

abode or *sthiti* (see above, note 16).

But why is the fifth *skandha*, the consciousness itself (mind and mental states), not considered as an abode of the consciousness?

The Vaibhāṣikas observe that the *sthiti*, "that upon which, or within which one grasps" is opposed to *sthātar*, "he who grasps." Devadatta is opposed to the horse that he is sitting on. The king is not the throne. Or again *viññānasthiti* signifies an abode of the mind, and the *dharma*s upon which the mind rides in order to move forward, are like the sailors on the ship: now the mind does not ride on the mind in order to move; hence the mind is not an abode of the mind.

But another Sūtra says, "There is delight (*nandī*=*saumanasya*=satisfaction) and attachment with regard to this food which is the consciousness" (iii.40a). If there is delight and attachment with regard to the consciousness then the consciousness rides in it and resides in it.<sup>59</sup> On the other hand, you teach that the five *skandhas* (including the consciousness) constitute the sevenfold abode of consciousness (iii.5a); why do you not add the consciousness to the fourfold abodes of consciousness?

The Vaibhāṣikas answer: When we consider, without making any distinction between the *skandhas*, the process attached to the consciousness with regard to its arising which is made up of the five *skandhas*, then we can say that the *viññāna* is a *viññānasthiti*. But, if we consider the *skandhas* one by one, we see that matter, sensation, ideas, and the *saṃskāras*—which are the support of the consciousness, and are associated or coexistent with the consciousness—are the causes of the defilement of the consciousness: but the consciousness is not, in this way, the cause of the defilement of the consciousness, since two consciousnesses do not coexist. Thus

7d-8a. Taken separately, the consciousness is not defined as an abode of the consciousness.

Further, the Blessed One described the four abodes of consciousness as "a field," and he describes the consciousness, accompanied by desire, as "a seed."<sup>60</sup> He does not give the seed as a field of the seed; and we see indeed that the *dharma*s that coexist with the consciousness merely serve as its field.

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Do the four *sthitīs* contain the seven, and do the seven contain the four?

No.

8b. The correspondance admits of four cases.

First case: the consciousness is included among the seven, but not among the four.

Second case: the four *skandhas* (excluding the consciousness) of the painful realms of rebirth, the Fourth Dhyāna and Bhavāgra, are included among the four.

Third case: the four *skandhas* are included among the seven, and are also included among the four.

Fourth case: the other *dharma*s are included neither among the seven nor among the four, [namely the consciousness of the painful realms of rebirth, etc., and the pure *dharma*s].

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We have said that the three Dhātus include five realms of rebirth, etc.

8c-d. There are here four “wombs” of beings, beings born from eggs, etc.<sup>61</sup>

*Yoni* or womb signifies birth. Eytmologically, *yoni* signifies “mixture”: in birth—birth being common to all creatures—beings are mixed together in confusion.<sup>62</sup>

“Womb of beings born from eggs” are those beings who arise from eggs, geese, cranes, peacocks, parrots, thrushes, etc.

“Womb of beings born from wombs” are those beings who arise from a womb, elephants, horses, cows, buffalos, asses, pigs, etc.<sup>63</sup>

“Wombs of beings born from moisture”<sup>64</sup> are those beings who arise from the exudation of the elements, earth, etc.,—worms, insects, butterflies, mosquitos.

“Womb of apparitional beings”<sup>65</sup> are those beings who arise all at once, with their organs neither lacking nor deficient,<sup>66</sup> with all their

major and minor limbs. These are called *upapāduka*, apparitional, because they are skillful at appearing (*upapādana*), and because they arise all at once [without an embryonic state, without semen and blood]; such as gods, beings in hell, or beings in an intermediate existence.<sup>67</sup>

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How are the wombs distributed among the realms of rebirth?

9a. Humans and animals are of the four types.

Humans can be born from an egg, such as Śaila and Upaśaila who were born from the eggs of a crane;<sup>68</sup> the thirty-two sons of (Viśākhā), the mother of Mṛgāra;<sup>69</sup> and the five hundred sons of the King of Pañcāla.<sup>70</sup>

Humans can be born from moisture, such as Māndhātara,<sup>71</sup> Cāru Upācaru, Kapotamalini,<sup>72</sup> Āmrāpālī,<sup>73</sup> etc.

Apparitional humans (ii.14) are humans at the beginning of the cosmic period (*prāthamakalpika*, ii.14, iii.97c).

Animals are also of four types. These types are known through common experience. Nāgas and Garuḍas are also apparitional (see below, note 83).

9b-c. Beings in hell, intermediate beings, and the gods are apparitional too.<sup>74</sup>

These three classes of beings are exclusively apparitional.

9d. Pretas are also born from a womb.

They are of two types, apparitional and born from a womb. That they are born from a womb results from a discourse that a Preti had with Maudgalyāyana, "I gave birth to five sons a night, to five sons a day: I ate them and was not satisfied."<sup>75</sup>

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What is the best womb?

The apparitional womb.

But the Bodhisattva in his last birth evidently possesses "mastery

relating to arising" (*upapattivaśitva*).<sup>76</sup> Why did he then choose to be born from a womb? (See iii.17)<sup>77</sup>

There are two answers to this question. 1. The Bodhisattva sees great advantage in it: by reason of their relationship with him, the great Śākya clan enters into the Good Law; and, recognizing in him a member of the family of the Cakravartins, persons experience a great respect towards him; persons are encouraged seeing that, being a man, he has realized this perfection. If the Bodhisattva were not born from the womb, we would not know his family, and persons would say, "What is this magician, a god or a Piśāca?" In fact non-Buddhists masters calumniously say that at the end of one hundred cosmic periods there would appear in the world such a magician who devours the world through his magic.<sup>78</sup>

2. Others<sup>79</sup> explain that the Bodhisattva has taken up the womb in order that his body remains as relics after his Nirvāṇa:<sup>80</sup> through the adoration of these relics, humans and other creatures by the thousands obtain heaven and deliverance. In fact, the bodies of apparitional beings, not having any external seed (semen, blood, bone, etc.), do not continue to exist after their deaths, like a flame which disappears without remnant.<sup>81</sup> But we see indeed that this explanation cannot be admitted by the masters who attribute *ṛddhi ādhiṣṭhānikī* to the Buddha.<sup>82</sup>

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One question arises from another.

If the bodies of apparitional beings disappear at their deaths, how can the Sūtra say, "The apparitional Garuḍa seizes the apparitional Nāga in order to eat it?"<sup>83</sup>

The text says that he seizes the Nāga in order to eat it, not that he does eat it.

Or rather he eats the Nāga as long as the Nāga is not dead: but he does not feast on the dead Nāga.

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What is the least desirable of the wombs?

The apparitional womb, for it embraces all hellish realms of rebirth,

all heavenly realms of rebirth, plus one part of the three other realms of rebirth, plus intermediate beings.<sup>84</sup>

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What is an intermediate being, and an intermediate existence?

10. Intermediate existence, which inserts itself between existence at death and existence at birth, not having arrived at the location where it should go, cannot be said to be born.<sup>85</sup>

Between death—that is, the five *skandhas* of the moment of death—and arising—that is, the five *skandhas* of the moment of rebirth—there is found an existence—a “body” of five *skandhas*—that goes to the place of rebirth. This existence between two realms of rebirth (*gati*) is called intermediate existence.<sup>86</sup>

This existence is produced: why not say that it arises (*upapanna*); why not attribute birth (*upapatti*) to it?

We say that it is arising (*upapadyamāna*); but it is not born (see iii.40c). In fact as its etymology indicates (*pad*=*gam*, *upapanna*=*upagata*), to be born is to arrive. Intermediate existence (or intermediate being), when it begins, has not arrived at the place where it should go, namely to the place where the retribution of actions is manifested and achieved.<sup>87</sup>

According to other sects,<sup>88</sup> there is a cutting off, a discontinuity between death and birth: but there is no intermediate existence.

This opinion is false, as reasoning and Scripture prove.

lla-b. Being similar to the series of rice, existence does not reproduce itself after having been interrupted.

The momentary *dharma*s exist in a series; when they appear in a place distant from that in which they have been found, it is because they are reproduced without discontinuity in intermediate places, such as the series that constitutes a grain of rice and which one transports to a distant village by passing through all the villages in the interval. In the same way, the mental series takes up birth after being reproduced without discontinuity (intermediate existence) from the place where death took place.<sup>89</sup>

But, one would say, a reflection (*pratibimba*) arises on a mirror, on

the water, etc., without being continuous to the image (*bimba*) with which it forms a series. Hence the elements of arising do not depend on the elements forming an uninterrupted series between the place of death and the place where they reappear.

llc-d. The existence of the reflection is not proved; should it be proved, the reflection is not similar; hence it does not serve as an example.

A reflection is a thing in and of itself (*dravya*) namely a certain type of color (*varṇa*). The existence of the reflection is not proved.

12a. For two things do not exist in the same spot.

a. In one and the same spot, a person placed to the side of a mirror perceives the *rūpa* or physical matter of this mirror, matter derived from the primary elements (*upādāyarūpa*); a person placed facing (the mirror) perceives his own reflection, which is a "certain type of color," derived matter. Now one can admit only that two derived matters exist at the same time in the same spot, for each of them should have as its support two distinct groups of primary elements.

b. Two persons who both look at the same object, a jar, etc., see it at the same time. Now two persons placed at the two sides of a pond see the reflection of the object that faces them: the same reflection is not seen at the same time by both of them.

c. Shade and sunlight do not coexist in the same spot. Now, if one places a mirror in the shade (i.10a), in a shed situated close to a pond lit by the sun, one would see in this mirror the reflection of the reflection of the sun on the surface of the water.

It is thus proved, by these three observations, that a reflection is not a real, substantial thing (*dravya*).

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The Kārikā is liable to another interpretation. "For the two things do not exist in the same spot": the "two things" are the surface of the mirror and the reflection of the moon. We do not see, in the same spot, the surface of the mirror and the reflection of the moon, reflected in the mirror: this reflection appears recessed, at a depth, like the water in a



well.<sup>90</sup> Now if a real physical matter, the reflection, should arise, it would arise on the surface of the mirror, and would be perceived as being on the surface of the mirror. A reflection is thus only an illusory idea taking the form of the reflection (*pratibimbākāraṁ bhrāntaṁ vijñānam*). Such is the power of this complex, mirror and object, that it produces the seeing of a reflection, of an image resembling the object. Incomprehensible is the power of the *dharma*s and the variety of this power.

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Let us admit nevertheless the real existence of the reflection. It still cannot serve as an example in your reasoning, for it cannot be compared to arising. It is not similar to arising:

12b. For it does not form a series.

The reflection does not form a series with the object reflected, because the reflection arises supported by the mirror, and because the reflection is simultaneous to the object reflected. But on the contrary death and arising form a series, the second being later to the first and being produced in another place than the first without there being a cutting off between them [due to intermediate existence].

12b. For it arises from two causes.

It is by reason of two causes that a reflection arises, by reason of the mirror and of the object. The principal of these two causes is the cause upon which it takes its support in order to arise, namely the mirror. But it happens that arising, or birth, proceeds from only one cause; and it never has a principal cause which is not death. Arising has no external support in the case of apparitional beings, because they appear suddenly in space. And these external elements cannot be the principal cause for the beings that arise from semen, blood, or mud, since these items are absent from the mind

Reasoning thus proves the existence of an intermediate being since arising proceeds from death without there being any discontinuity between these two existences.

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Scripture also proves the existence of an intermediate being.

12c. The intermediate being is called by its name.

The Sūtra says, "There are seven existences (*bhavas*): existence in hell (*naraka*), as an animal (*tiryagyoni*), as a Preta, as a heavenly being (*deva*), and as a human (*manuṣya*), as well as *karmabhava* and *antarābhava*."<sup>91</sup>

If the school that we are combating does not read this Sūtra, at least they read the texts pertaining to Gandharvas.

12c. It is the Gandharva.

We read in the Sūtra, "Three conditions are necessary for an embryo to descend, [in order for a son or daughter to be born]: the woman must be in good health and fertile, the pair must be united, and a Gandharva must be ready." What is the Gandharva if not an intermediate being?<sup>92</sup>

But our opponents do not read the Sūtra in these terms! They replace the third condition by a text that says, "a dissolution of the *skandhas* [that is, one dying] must be made ready."<sup>93</sup>

Very well, but one doubts if they could explain the *Āśvalāyana-sūtra*,<sup>94</sup> which says, "This Gandharva which is made ready,—do you know if it is a Brahmin, a Ksatriya, a Vaiśya, or a Śūdra? Do you know if it comes from the east, the south, the west, or the north?" This expression "to come" shows that it refers to an intermediate being, not to a "dissolution of the *skandhas*."

If our opponents do not read this Sūtra,

12d. An intermediate being is proved by the text relative to the Five.

The Blessed One teaches that there are five types of Anāgāmins: one who obtains Nirvāṇa in an intermediate existence (*antarāparinirvāyin*), one who obtains Nirvāṇa as soon as he is reborn (*upapadyaparinirvāyin*), one who obtains Nirvāṇa without effort (*anabhisamāskāraparinirvāyin*), one who obtains Nirvāṇa by means of effort (*anabhisamāskāraparinirvāyin*), and one who obtains Nirvāṇa by going higher (*ūrdvasrotas*).<sup>95</sup>

Certain masters (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 357b21) maintain that an *antarāparinirvāyin* is a saint who obtains Nirvāṇa after having been

reborn among some so-called Antara gods. But they should then admit the existence of Upapadya gods, etc. An absurd opinion.

12d. And by the Sūtra of the *gatis*.

By the Sūtra of the Seven *Satpuruṣagatis*.<sup>96</sup> This Sūtra teaches that one should distinguish three types of *antarāparinirvāyins* on the basis of their differences of duration and place: the first is similar to a spark that is extinguished as soon as it arises; the second to a fragment of reddened mental which enlarges in its flight; the third to a fragment of reddened mental which enlarges in its flight, but later, and without falling back into the sun. Given this text, it is pure fantasy to suppose that an *antarāparinirvāyin* is an inhabitant of a heaven of the Antara gods, for these Antaras cannot be divided into three classes by reason of duration and place.

But yet other scholars—the Vibhajyavādins as the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 357a4-358a25 testifies—present the explanation here. An *antarāparinirvāyin* obtains Nirvāṇa, that is, eliminates the defilements, either in the interval of his lifetime, or in the interval of his cohabitation with the gods. He is threefold: he is termed a *dhātugata* if he obtains Nirvāṇa having just arrived in the Dhātu [that is, in a heaven of Rūpadhātu, and as a consequence if he eliminates the defilements that cause him to be reborn in Rupadhatu whereas they (the defilements) are still in a seed-like state]; he is called a *saṃjñāgata* if he obtains Nirvāṇa later, at a moment when the idea (*saṃjñā*) of the objects of Rūpadhātu is active in him; and he is called a *vitarkagata* if he obtains Nirvāṇa still later, at a moment when the *vitarka* (volitions, etc.) produced by these objects is active. In this way we would have three *antarāparinirvāyins* conforming to the definitions of the Sūtra and who obtain Nirvāṇa in the interval of the duration of their life, that is, without achieving the end of their life as gods of the heaven where they were reborn. Or rather, the first *antarāparinirvāyin* obtains Nirvāṇa as soon as he has taken possession of a certain divine existence; the second after having experienced a heavenly bliss; and the third, after having entered into company or conversation with the gods.

An objection: if an *antarāparinirvāyin* is a saint who is reborn, experiences bliss, and enters into the company of the gods, what will an *upapadyaparinirvāyin* be, literally “one who obtains Nirvāṇa as soon as

he is reborn?"

We answer that an *upapadyaparinirvāyin* enters entirely into their company; and, as this answer is not conclusive, we further answer that an *upapadyaparinirvāyin* reduces the duration of his life by much [and more than an *antarāparinirvāyin*]: [*he is called an upapadya* because he obtains Nirvāṇa *āyur upahatya*].<sup>97</sup>

But we must observe that all these persons, the *dhātugata*, etc., go to the same place. Thus they do not correspond to the examples of the Sūtra. On the other hand, there are saints in Ārūpyadhātu who obtain Nirvāṇa without having fully lived their lives to the end (iii.85a),<sup>98</sup> and yet no *antarāparinirvāyins* are there. This point is illustrated in the metrical formula,

By the *dhyanas*, four decades;  
by the *ārūpyas*, three heptades;  
by ideas, one hexade:  
thus is the group bound.<sup>99</sup>

Yet if our adversaries do not read this Sūtra, what can we do about it? The Master has entered Nirvāṇa, and the Good Law no longer has a leader. Many sects have been formed that change the meaning and the letter to their fantasies.<sup>100</sup> We say that, for the masters who admit these Sūtras, the existence of an intermediate being or the "*skandhas* in the interval" is proved both by Scripture and reasoning.

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Yet there are some difficulties:

a. We must reconcile the doctrine of an intermediate being with the *Sūtra on Māra*. This Sūtra says, "The Māra called Dūṣin, [having struck the head of Vidura, the disciple of Krakucchanda,] fell, with his own body, into great Avīci Hell."<sup>101</sup> Actions very grave (by intention and in scope) and complete (that is, "accumulated," iv.12) ripen before death itself. Māra then felt a retribution in this life before feeling a retribution in hell. The text thus means that Māra was enveloped, while still alive, by the fires of hell; that he dies; and that he then takes up an intermediate existence which leads to hell where birth in hell takes place.

b. According to the Sūtra, there are five *ānantarya* transgressions: he who commits them is immediately born in hell (*samanantaram narakeṣūpapadyate*, iv.97). We hold that the expression "immediately" signifies "without intermediary," without passing through another realm of rebirth (*gati*): which is an action "retributable in the next existence" (*upapadya*, iv.50b). If you take the Sūtra literally, you come to absurd conclusions: you would have to say that one must have committed the five crimes in order to be reborn in hell and you would have to say that the transgressor is reborn in hell immediately after the transgression, or that he is reborn there without dying here. Moreover, according to our doctrine, rebirth in hell is immediate; it is not preceded by a "birth" as an intermediate being. We maintain that, by its nature, the intermediate being is "arising" (*upapadyamāna*) because he is turned towards the birth (*upapatti*) that follows death; we do not say that he is born (*upapanno bhavati*) (iii.10d).<sup>102</sup>

c. You should explain the stanza, "Your life is approaching its end, Oh Brahmin; you are old and sick; you are in the presence of Yama; there is not for you any intervening (*antarā*) dwelling (*vāsa*) and you have no provision."<sup>103</sup>

[Vasubandhu:] You think that this stanza shows that there is no intermediate existence. But we understand the words *antarā vāsa* in the sense of dwelling among humans: "Once dead, you shall not reappear here;" or rather, the text means that "No one can retard the progress of the intermediate being that you are going to become on the way to the place of your rebirth in hell."

The one who denies the existence of intermediary beings asks us upon what do we base ourselves in order to for us to say that such is the intention of this text, or that such is not its intention.

We would reply with the same question.

If, in this manner, the two objections are made equal, what proof can you come to? Let us observe that for the *Sūtra on Māra*, etc., the explanation of the person who denies the existence of intermediate beings, and our explanation, are not contradicted by the text itself. The texts are thus not conclusive for or against intermediate beings. Texts that are conclusive and which serve as proof are those which can be interpreted in only one way: [as we have quoted, pp. 386-387.]

What is the form of an intermediate being?

13a-b. Being projected by the same action that projects the *pūrvakālabhava*, an intermediate being has the form of this being, that is, the being of the realm of rebirth to come after his conception.

The action that projects the *gati* or the realm of rebirth—an existence in hell, etc.—is the same action that projects the intermediate existence by which one goes to this realm of rebirth.<sup>104</sup> As a consequence *antarābhava* or intermediate existence has the form of the future *pūrvakālabhava* (p. 39, line 19) of the realm of rebirth towards which he is going.

Objection: In the womb of a dog, a sow, etc., there can die in its embryonic stage a being who should then be reborn in any one of the five realms of rebirth. Let us suppose then that this embryo is replaced by an intermediate being destined to go to hell.<sup>105</sup> This intermediate being, if he has the form of a being in hell, will burn the womb of the dog.

Answer: Even in a perfect state (*pūrvakālabhava*), beings in hell are not always incandescent, for example the “annexes” (*utsadas*, iii.58d). But even if one believes that intermediate beings bound for hell are incandescent, as their bodies are “ethereal” (*accha*, transparent, viii.3c), they are not any more tangible than they are visible. There is thus no adherence of the intermediate being.<sup>106</sup> Thus the womb is not burned; moreover the influence of actions is opposed to this.

The dimensions of an intermediate being are those of a child of five or six years of age, but his organs are perfectly developed.

The intermediate being of the Bodhisattva is similar to the Bodhisattva in the fullness of his youth; he is adorned with the major and minor marks;<sup>107</sup> that is why, when this intermediate being comes to enter his mother’s womb, he illumines a thousand universes with their four continents.

But we know that the mother of the Bodhisattva saw in a dream a small white elephant enter her side. This was only an “omen,” because for a long time the Bodhisattva has been disengaged from animal rebirth.<sup>108</sup> King Kṛkin also saw ten dreams: an elephant, wells, a pole, sandalwood, a park, a young elephant, two monkeys, cloths, and

contests, which were omens.<sup>109</sup> Furthermore, intermediate beings do not enter into the womb by splitting open the side, but rather by the door of birth: this is why the eldest of twins is the one born last.

But how do you explain the stanza of the Bhadanta Dharma-subhūti,<sup>110</sup> "Changing his body into that of a white elephant having six tusks and four feet, he enters the womb and lies therein in full consciousness as a Ṛṣi entering a forest?"

There is no reason to explain this text: it is neither Sūtra, nor Vinaya, nor Abhidharma; it is a personal composition.<sup>111</sup> But if it demands an explanation, we would say that this stanza describes the Bodhisattva just as his mother saw him in a dream.

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An intermediate being in Rūpadhātu is complete in size and is dressed by reason of his great modesty (iii.70c).<sup>112</sup> The Bodhisattva in his intermediate existence

who, through the force of her vow, was clothed in her intermediate existence: she entered the womb and left it dressed, and she remained dressed until her Nirvāṇa and cremation.<sup>113</sup> But lacking modesty, other intermediate beings of Kāmadhātu are nude.

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What is the *pūrvakālabhava* which is parallel to *antarābhava*?

13c-d. This is before death, after conception.

*Bhava* is existence, the *skandhas*.

In intermediate existence, the five *skandhas* enter two realms of rebirth: *upapattibhava*, which is the *skandhas* at the moment of their entry into a realm of rebirth, at the moment of their *pratisamdhī* (iii.38 and p.); and *pūrvakālabhava* which is all the *skandhas* of the following moments until death, the last moment of the realm of rebirth and which will be followed by a new *antarābhava*.<sup>114</sup>

There is no *antarābhava* in Ārūpyadhātu.

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Let us return to the intermediate being:

14a-b. He is seen by the creatures of his class, and by the divine eye.

He is seen by the intermediate beings of the class,—heavenly, etc.,—to which he belongs. He is also seen by the pure divine eye, that is, by the divine eye that is obtained through higher knowledge (*abhiññā*, vii.55d), for this eye is very pure.<sup>115</sup> He is not seen by a natural divine eye or a divine eye obtained through birth, such as the divine eye of the gods.

According to other masters, a heavenly intermediate being sees all intermediate beings; a human intermediate being sees all intermediate beings with the exception of heavenly intermediate beings, and so on.<sup>116</sup>

14b. He is filled with the impetus of the supernormal power of action.<sup>117</sup>

He is a *karmaraddhivēgavān*: endowed (-*vān*) with the impetus (*vega*) which belongs to supernatural power (*raddhi*)—that is, the movement through space—which issues from action (*karman*) (vii.53c). The Buddhas themselves cannot stop him because he is endowed with the force of action.

14c. His organs are complete.

He is *sakalākṣa*; *akṣa* signifies *indriya*.

14c. No one can resist him.<sup>118</sup>

He is an *apratighavān*: a *pratigha* is a strike that repels; an *apratighavān* is one in whom there is no *pratigha*. Even a diamond is not impenetrable to him. For, they say, when we split open a mass of red hot iron we find that some small animals are born inside it.

When an intermediate being is to be reborn in a certain realm of rebirth, from this realm of rebirth, by force,

14d. He cannot be turned away.<sup>119</sup>

A human intermediate being, ceasing to be such, will never become a heavenly intermediate being. He will go to be born in the realm of rebirth with a view to which he has been formed.



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Does an intermediate being of Kāmadhātu eat, like the other beings of Kāmadhātu, solid food (iii.39)?

Yes, but not coarse food.

14d. It eats odors.<sup>120</sup>

From whence it gets its name of Gandharva, "he who eats (*arvati*) odors (*gandham*)."<sup>121</sup> The meanings of the roots are multiple: *arv*, if one takes it in the sense of "to go," justifies "he who goes to eat odors" (*arvati gacchati bhoktum*). We have *gandharva*, and not *gandhārva*, as we have *sakandhu*, or *karkandhu*.

A Gandharva of low rank<sup>121</sup> eats unpleasant odors; a Gandharva of high rank eats pleasant odors.

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How long does an intermediate being exist?

a. There is no fixed rule, says the Bhadanta.<sup>122</sup> It lasts as long as it does not encounter the coming together of the causes necessary for its rebirth. In fact an intermediate existence and the existence that follows are projected by the same action and form part of the same *nikāyasabhāga*, [of the same existence, ii.41]:<sup>123</sup> it is for this reason that, when the life (or the vital organ, *jīvitendriya*) of an intermediate being comes to an end, there is no death.

Objection: There is a mass of meat as big as Mount Meru which, in the summer rains, changes into a mass of worms. It is in this spot that intermediate beings arrive, being reborn in these worms arising together in such a large number; or rather, from whence do these intermediate beings come?

There exists an infinite number of small animals having short life, coveters after odors and tastes; perceiving an odor, they remember the taste that was associated with it, and they eventually die, coveting these odors and tastes. When they die, they had in their minds (*vibodhya*) an action the nature of which was to produce an existence among worms; and, by their desire for odors and tastes, they are reincarnated among worms. Or rather it is only when the external causes necessary for the

birth of worms (namely, a great mass of decomposition) is brought together in a great amount that the action which should produce existence among worms enters into activity with a view to their retribution.<sup>124</sup> In the same way a certain being accomplishes actions which should be remunerated as a Cakravartin: these action will not enter into activity before the moment of the cosmic period has come when human life is twenty-four thousand years in length (iii.95). It is for this reason that the Blessed One declared that the retribution of actions is incomprehensible (*Samyukta*, 21).

b. The Bhadanta Vasumitra says: An intermediate being lasts seven days. If the complex of causes necessary to reincarnation has not been realized, then the intermediate being dies and is reborn.<sup>125</sup>

c. Other scholars say that it lasts seven weeks.<sup>126</sup>

d. The Vaibhāṣikas say:<sup>127</sup> As it desires birth, it lasts only a short time and then its life is reincarnated. If the complex of external causes is not realized, then one of two things happens: either old actions are such that a birth should take place in such and such a place, and should be of such and such a nature, and, in this case, these actions cause the complex of causes to be realized;<sup>128</sup> or rather this determination is absent, and, in this case, birth takes place in another place, and it is of another nature.<sup>129</sup>

According to others (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 360c25), if the causes have not come together, the intermediate being is born in conditions analogous to those where he would have been reborn. Cattle are not born during the rains, nor gods in autumn, nor black bears in winter, nor horses in summer. But on the other hand, there is no season for buffalos, etc. The intermediary being who, if it is the season of rains, would be reborn a cow, is reborn a buffalo; in the same way a jackal instead of a dog, a brown bear instead of a black bear, or an ass instead of a horse.<sup>130</sup>

But we admit a similar theory. We know in fact that existence and intermediate existence are projected by the same action. One cannot say that an existence as a buffalo is preceded by an intermediate existence as a cow.

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How does reincarnation take place?

15a-b. The mind (*mati*) troubled by defilements, goes, through

its desire for sex, to the place of its realm of rebirth.

An intermediate being is produced with a view to going to the place of its realm of rebirth where it should go. It possesses, by virtue of its actions, the divine eye. Even though distant he sees the place of his rebirth. There he sees his father and mother united. His mind is troubled by the effects of sex and hostility. When the intermediate being is male, it is gripped by a male desire with regard to the mother; when it is female, it is gripped by a female desire with regard to the father; and, inversely, it hates either the father, or the mother, whom it regards as either a male or a female rival.<sup>131</sup> As it is said in the *Prajñāpti*, "Then either a mind of lust, or a mind of hatred is produced in the Gandharva."

When the mind is thus troubled by these two erroneous thoughts, it attaches itself through the desire for sex to the place where the organs are joined together, imagining that it is he with whom they unite. Then the impurities of semen and blood is found in the womb; the intermediate being, enjoying its pleasures, installs itself there. Then the *skandhas* harden; the intermediate being perishes; and birth arises that is called "reincarnation" (*pratisaṃdhi*). When the embryo is male, it remains to its right in the womb, with its head forward, crouching; female, to the left of the womb, vagina forward;<sup>132</sup> with no sex, in the attitude in which one finds the intermediate being when it believes it is having sex. In fact, when an intermediate being possess all the organs, it then enters as a male or female and places itself as befitting its sex. It is only after reincarnation that a developing embryo can lose its sex.

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What is the support (*āśraya*) of this matter which is from the primary elements, the organs of the new being, its eyes, etc.<sup>2133</sup>

According to one opinion, the primary elements of the blood and semen. According to another opinion, their support are some primary elements different from these, arisen from actions, and which repose (*saṃniśraya*) in the semen and blood.

First opinion: Semen and blood do not have any organs. When an intermediate being perishes, it has some organs and so constitutes what is called the first embryonic stage, or *kalala*. In the same way the arising

of a bud takes place at the same time as the destruction of its seed.<sup>134</sup> In this same manner the Scriptural texts are justified which say that "the body is produced from the *kalala* which consists of semen and blood"<sup>135</sup> [*mātāpitrāsucikalalasambhūta*, literally: in the impure wombs of the father and mother], and that "after a long time, Oh Bhikṣus, you increase the cemetery and grasp the drop of blood."<sup>136</sup>

Second opinion: The organs have different primary elements for their support, as is the case for the organs of leaf worms [for these, through the force of their actions, repose on the primary elements of the leaves, and there arises other primary elements that take on the nature of organs.]

One would object that the phrase in the Sūtra, *mātāpitrāsucikalalasambhū* is not explained in this hypothesis. According to the Sūtra, the body (with its organs) comes from the *kalala* which is semen and blood (*mātāpitrāsuci*). But the word *kalala* is placed there to designate some other primary elements that arise reposing on the semen and blood: [reposing on semen and blood they arise, together with the semen and blood, from other primary elements that are called *kalala* and which include the organs.]

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It is in this manner that beings who are born from wombs and eggs go to the places of their rebirth (*gati*). For other beings, say the masters of the Abhidharma, the modes vary according to the case.

15c. Other go in their desire for odor or in their desire for residence.

Beings which arise from moisture go to the place of their rebirth through their desire for its odors: these are pure or impure by reason of their actions. Apparitional beings, through their desire for residence there.

But how can one desire a residence in hell?

[The mind of an intermediate being is troubled by lust and hatred, as we have seen, when it goes to be reincarnated in a womb.] In the present case, an intermediate being is also troubled in mind and misunderstands. He is tormented by the cold of rain and wind: he sees a place burning

with hot fires and through his desire for warmth, he runs there. Or he is tormented by the heat of the sun and hot winds: he sees a cold place of frozen fires, and through his desire for coolness, he runs there. According to the ancient masters,<sup>137</sup> he sees these things in order to experience the retribution of actions that should be retributed in hell;<sup>138</sup> he sees beings similar to him and he runs to the place where they are.

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Intermediate heavenly beings—those who go towards a heavenly realm of rebirth—go high, like one rising up from a seat. Humans, animals, Pretas, and intermediate beings go in the manner in which humans, etc., go.

15d. Beings in hell hang from their feet.

As the stanza says, "Those who insult Ṛṣis, ascetics and penitents fall into hell head first."<sup>139</sup>

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We have said that the intermediary beings who are reincarnated in a feminine womb (*jarāyuja* and *aṇḍaja*) go there troubled in mind, through their desire for sex. Is this a general rule?

No. The Sūtra teaches that there are four ways to descend into, (abide and leave) the womb (*garbhāvakrānti*).<sup>140</sup>

16. The first enter in full consciousness; the second, further, dwell in full consciousness; the third, further, leave in full consciousness; the fourth accomplishes all these steps with a troubled mind. Beings born from eggs are always of this last class.

The first do not dwell and do not leave in full consciousness; the second do not leave in full consciousness; the third, in all these moments, are in full consciousness; the fourth are, in all these actions, without full consciousness. Here are the four *garbhāvakrāntis* that the author teaches, in his *śloka* in an order different from that of the Sūtra.<sup>141</sup>

Beings born from eggs are always troubled in mind.

But can we say that a being born from an egg enters into a womb?

Without doubt. One who is born from an egg is now entering into a womb. Or rather we have here an anticipatory designation.<sup>142</sup> In the same way that the Sūtra says *saṃskṛtam abhisamśkaroti*, and, in the world, one says, “to cook the rice porridge,” or “to grind the flour.”

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What does the full consciousness and the absence of full consciousness in the entering, in the abiding, and in the leaving consist of?

A being with little merit enters because he thinks, “The wind blows, the heavens rain; it is cold; it storms; people are in an uproar,” and because, wishing to avoid these wearinesses, he believes that he is entering into a shelter, a thicket, a hut of roots and leaves, or rather he takes shelter at the foot of a tree or against a wall. Then he imagines himself resting in this thicket, in this hut, and eventually leaves it. There is an error of ideas and resolution. The same for a being rich in merits, who believes he is entering a park, a garden, a palace, a terrace, or a pavilion; he believes this and he rests there and eventually leaves it.

A being who has full consciousness knows that he enters into the womb, that he dwells there, and that he leaves it.<sup>143</sup>

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The Sūtra also teaches

17. Three *garbhāvākṛāntis*,—the Cakravartin and the two Svayambhūs,—by reason of their great purity of action, of knowledge, and of action and knowledge.<sup>144</sup>

The two Svayambhūs are the Pratyekabuddhas and the Saṃbuddha. All these designations are “anticipatory”: one means to speak of a being, who, in this existence, will become a Cakravartin, etc.

The Cakravartin enters in full consciousness, but does not reside in full consciousness and does not leave in full consciousness. The Pratyekabuddha resides in full consciousness, but does not leave in full consciousness. The Buddha is always in full consciousness.

The first has a great outflowing of merit and he is made resplendent

through actions; the second has knowledge obtained through instruction, reflection and mediation; and the third has merit, instruction, etc.: both action and knowledge.

The fourth *garbhāvakrānti*, that of not full consciousness, pertains to beings without great actions and great knowledge.

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The non-Buddhists, who believe in an *ātman*,<sup>145</sup> say, "If you admit that a being (*sattva*) goes to another world, then the *ātman* in which I believe is proved."

In order to refute this doctrine, the author says,

18a. The *ātman* does not exist.<sup>146</sup>

The *ātman* in which you believe, an entity that abandons the *skandhas* of one existence and takes up the *skandhas* of another existence, an internal agent of action, a Puruṣa,—this *ātman* does not exist. In fact the Blessed One said, "Actions exist, and results exist, but there is no agent who abandons these *skandhas* here and takes up those *skandhas* there, independently of the casual relationship of the *dharma*s. What is this causal relationship? Namely, if this exists, then that exists; through the arising of this, there is the arising of that; *pratītya-samutpāda*." (French trans. v. p. 57, ix. p. 260).

Is there then, ask the non-Buddhists, a type of *ātman* that you do not negate?

18a-d. Only the *skandhas*, conditioned by defilement and action, go reincarnating themselves by means of the series of intermediate existences. As an example: the lamp.

We do not deny an *ātman* that exists through designation, an *ātman* that is only a name given to the *skandhas*. But far from us is the thought that the *skandhas* pass into another world! They are momentary, and incapable of transmigrating. We say that, in the absence of any *ātman*, of any permanent principal, the series of conditioned *skandhas*, "made up" of defilements and actions (i.15a, on *abhisamskṛta*), enters into the mother's womb; and that this series, from death to birth, is prolonged and displaced by a series that constitutes intermediate existence.

19a-c. In conformity with its projecting cause the series grows gradually, and, by virtue of the defilements and actions it goes again to another world.

Actions the nature of which is to be retributed in life (*āyuṣya karman*, ii.10a) differ according to beings: all the series of *skandhas* are not then projected at the same time in the existence where they have arisen. The series continues then to increase to the extent that it was projected. This growth is gradual, as Scripture teaches: "There is first the *kalala*; the *arbuda* arises from the *kalala*; the *peśin* arises from the *arbuda*; the *ghana* arises from the *peśin*; and from the *ghana* there arises the *praśakhā*, hair, body-hair, the nails, etc., and the material organs with their supports."<sup>147</sup> The *kalala*, etc., are the five stages of the embryo.

Then,<sup>148</sup> when the embryo, this throne, is ripe, there arises within the womb winds arisen from the maturity of action which causes the embryo to turn and places it towards the portal of its birth: it is difficult to move like a great mass of hidden impurity. Sometimes, either through the unfavorable conditions of the mother's eating, or by reason of actions, the embryo perishes. Then an expert woman, after having anointed them with all sorts of drugs, puts her hands filled with a sharpened blade into this wound hideous, bad-smelling, and wet with all sorts of impurities which is the womb. She pulls out the embryo after having cut it up limb by limb. And the series of the embryo, by virtue of *aparaparyāyavedanīya* action (iv.50b), goes somewhere else.

Or else the birth is fortunate. The mother and the servants take the new-born baby into their hands which are like knives and acids for this body now as sensible as an open wound. One washes the child;<sup>149</sup> one nourished it with milk and fresh butter, and later with solid foods: thus does he grow. By reason of this development,<sup>150</sup> the organs mature and the defilements enter into activity, from whence actions arise. And when the body perishes, the series passes into another existence by reason of these defilements and actions, through the medium of the intermediate existence, as mentioned previously.

19d. In this way the circle of existence is without beginning.<sup>151</sup>

Arising by reason of the defilements and actions; defilements and actions by reason of arising; arising by reason of the defilements and



actions: the circle of existences is thus without beginning. In order for it to begin, it would be necessary for the first item to have no cause: and if one *dharmā* arises without a cause, then all *dharma*s would arise without causes. Now the determination of time and place show that a seed produces a shoot, that a fire produces cooking: hence there is no arising that does not have causes. On the other hand, the theory of a single and permanent cause has been refuted above (ii.65): hence the cycle of existence has no beginning.

But birth, coming from causes, would not take place if its causes are destroyed, in the same way that a shoot would not arise if its seed is burned.

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The series of *skandhas* develops in three existences,

20a. *Pratītyasamutpāda* or dependent origination has twelve parts in three sections or time periods.<sup>152</sup>

The twelve parts of dependent origination are ignorance (*avidyā*), the *saṃskāras*, the consciousness, *nāmarūpa*, the six *āyatana*s, contact, sensation, desire, attachment, existence, birth, and old age and death.

20b. Two for the first, two for the third, and eight for the middle.

Ignorance and the *saṃskāras* existed in a past existence, birth and old age and death will exist in a future existence, and the eight other parts exist in the present existence.

Are the middle parts to be found in the present existence of all creatures?<sup>153</sup>

No, they are not.

Why is this?

20c. At least to consider the series that has all of its parts.

This refers to a "complete person," a *paripūrin*, that passes through all of the states that constitute these parts. Such persons are not beings who die before their time, [for example, in the course of their embryonic life], nor are they beings of Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu. It is certain that the Sūtra that enumerates these eight parts refers to beings in

Kāmadhātu: the *Mahānidānaparyāyasūtra* says, "Ānanda, if the consciousness were not to descend into the mother's womb . . ." (*Dīgha*, ii.63).

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*Pratītyasamutpāda* can be divided into two parts: past existence (1-2) and its effects (3-7); and the causes of future existence (8-10) and future existence (11-12).

What are, in this conception of *pratītyasamutpāda*, its different parts?

21a. Ignorance is, in a previous life, the state of defilement.<sup>154</sup>

[Ignorance does not refer to an isolated state of ignorance, iii. p. 87, 90, v.12, nor merely to the totality of the defilements, "all the *kleśas*,"] but rather, in a previous life, the series (with its five *skandhas*) which is defiled, the condition of defilement (*kleśa-avasthā*). All the defilements in fact accompany ignorance, and are activated through ignorance. In the same way, when one says that the king is coming, one understands that his courtiers are accompanying him.

21b. The *saṃskāras* are, in a previous life, the state of action.

The series of the previous life, which does good, bad, or neutral actions, constitute the *saṃskāras*.

21c. The consciousness is the *skandhas* at conception.

The five *skandhas*, in the womb, at the moment of reincarnation (*pratisamdhī*) or arising constitute consciousness.

21d-22a. *Nāmarūpa* (is the series) from this moment on, until the production of the six *āyatanas*.

*Nāmarūpa* is made up of the five *skandhas*, in the womb, from arising, as long as the six organs are not manifested. It is proper to say, "as long as the four organs . . .," [for the *mana-āyatana* and the *kāya-āyatana* exist from arising or conception, *pratisamdhikṣane*];<sup>155</sup> it is now at the moment when the four organs, eye, etc., appear that these two preexisting organs are found to be "arranged" [in a group of six].<sup>156</sup>

22b. Six *āyatana*s before coming together of the three or contact.

The six *āyatana*s are the five *skandha*s from the first appearance of the organs until the moment when the coming together of the organ, the object of consciousness, and the consciousness takes place.

22c-d. There is *sparsa*, or contact, until the moment when the capacity to distinguish the cause of pleasure, of suffering, etc., is acquired.

Contact [which begins at birth] lasts until the moment when the infant becomes capable of distinguishing, "This is a cause of pleasure. . ."

23a. There is contact before sexual union.

Contact, which the Kārika terms *vitti*, exists for as long as desire for sexual union is not in action. [This state is termed *vedanā*, sensation, because one experiences the cause of *vedanā*: it is hence *avasthā vedanāprakarṣiṇi*.]

23b. Desire ("thirst") is the state of one who desires pleasure and sexual union.

There is then in activity concupiscence relative to the objects of desire (*kāmaguṇa*s, iii. p. 6), visible things, etc., and sexual union. This state of "thirst" or desire ends when one begins, under the influence of this desire, to search out these pleasures.

23c-d. *Upādāna* or attachment is the state of one who runs around in search of the pleasures.

One runs everywhere in order to acquire these pleasures (v.40). [Or rather *upādāna* is the fourfold defilement (v.38): the period during which this fourfold defilement is active is called *upādāna*]. Running around in this manner

24a-b. He does actions which will have for their result future existence (*bhava*): this is *bhava*.

[*Bhava* signifies "action," for existence takes place by reason of it, *bhavaty anena*.] Action done and accumulated in the search for pleasures will produce reexistence. The period during which one does this action

constitutes *bhava*.

24c. *Jāti* is the new reincarnation.

The five *skandhas* at the moment when reincarnation takes place after death is *jāti*. The "part" that receives the name of consciousness in a present existence is called *jāti* in a future existence.

24d. Old age-and-death lasts until sensation.

From *jāti* until sensation,—which is here termed *vid*—there are four parts of the present existence, *nāmarūpa*, the six *āyatana*, contact and sensation which are, in a future existence designated by the expression old age and death, the twelfth part of this twelvefold series.

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It is also said that *pratītyasamutpāda* is fourfold: momentary or of one moment (*kṣanika*); prolonged (*prākaraṣika*: extending over many moments of many existences); serial (*sāmbandhika*, through the union of causes and effects); and static (*āvasthika*: embracing twelve states, or periods, of the five *skandhas*).<sup>157</sup>

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How is *pratītyasamutpāda* momentary?

When a person in prey to the defilements commits murder, the twelve parts are realized in one and the same moment: 1. his *moha* (aberration) is ignorance (*avidyā*); 2. his "volition" (*cetanā*) are the *saṁskāras*; 3. his distinct consciousness of a certain object is consciousness; 4. the four *skandhas*<sup>158</sup> coexisting with the consciousness is *nāmarūpa*; 5. the organs in relation to *nāmarūpa* are the six *āyatanas*;<sup>159</sup> 6. the application of the six *āyatanas*<sup>160</sup> is contact; 7. to experience contact is sensation; 8. desire (*rāga*) is thirst; 9. the *paryavasthānas*<sup>161</sup> associated with thirst are attachment; 10. bodily or vocal action that proceeds [from sensation or thirst] is *bhava*; 11. the emersion (*unmajjana*=*utpāda*=production) of all these *dharma*s is *jāti*; 12. their maturity (*paripāka*) is old age; and their rupture is death.

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It is also said that *pratītyasamutpāda* is both momentary and serial at the same time. The *Prakaraṇa* says, "What is *pratītyasamutpāda*? All the conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) *dharma*s. What are the *dharma*s produced through dependence (*pratītyasamutpanna*)? All the conditioned *dharma*s." <sup>162</sup>

Static (*āvasthika*) *pratītyasamutpāda* is made up of the twelve states (*avasthā*) embracing the five *skandhas*.

It is also prolonged (*prākaraṣikā*), extending itself over three consecutive existences.

Among these four, what is the type of *pratītyasamutpāda* that the Blessed One has here—in the *Sūtra of the Twelve Parts*—the intention to teach?

25a. According to the School, it is static *pratītyasamutpāda*. <sup>163</sup>

According to the School the Blessed One distinguishes the twelve parts only with respect to static *pratītyasamutpāda*.

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But if each of the parts is a complex of the five *skandhas*, why use the designations "ignorance," etc.?

Because the *Sūtra* expresses itself in an intentional manner, whereas the *Abhidharma* teaches the characteristics of things. <sup>164</sup> On the one hand *pratītyasamutpāda* is given as static, prolonged, and pertaining to living beings (*sattvākhyā*); and on the other hand, as momentary, serial, and pertaining to both living and non-living beings (*sattvāsattvākhyā*).

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Why does the *Sūtra* teach *pratītyasamutpāda* as only pertaining to living beings?

25c-d. In order to have aberration cease with regard to the past, the future, and the interval in between.

And it is for this same reason that it teaches a *pratītyasamutpāda* in three sections.

Ignorance or aberration relating to the past, as when one asks, "Did I exist or not exist in the past? How and as what did I exist?" Relating to the future: "Will I exist in the future? . . ." Relating to the interval in between: "What is this? How is this? What are we? What will we be?"<sup>165</sup>

This threefold aberration is destroyed by the teaching of the succession: ignorance . . . old age and death. For its is said in the Sūtra, "Whoever, Oh Bhikṣus, knows, through *prajñā*, *pratītyasamutpāda* and the *dharma*s produced through dependence, will not turn himself towards the past by asking if he existed . . ."

According to others, the last three terms of the middle section, —thirst, attachment, and *bhava*,—are also taught in order to cause aberration relating to the future to cease; for they are the causes of future existence.<sup>166</sup>

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This twelvefold *pratītyasamutpāda* is also threefold, defilement (*kleśa*), action (*karman*), and foundation (*vastu*); it is twofold, cause and result.

26a-b. Three parts are defilement, two are action; seven are foundation and also result.<sup>167</sup>

Ignorance, thirst, and attachment are, by their nature, defilements; the *saṃskāras* and *bhava* are action; consciousness, *nāmarūpa*, the six *āyatana*, contact, sensation, *jāti*, and old age and death are foundation, so called because they are the support (*āśraya*=*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the defilements and action. The parts that are foundation are result: the five that are not foundation are cause, being both defilement and action in nature.

Why are cause and result taught at length in the section of present existence—two parts of defilement, two parts of action, five parts of foundation—whereas, a similar exposition is absent for the past and future?

In the future, one has two parts for result.

26b-c. In two sections, cause and result are abbreviated, for one can infer them from the teaching of the middle.

From the teaching of the defilements, action and foundation, relating to present existence, one can deduce the complete exposition of cause and result in past and future existences. All useless descriptions should be omitted.

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But if *pratītyasamutpāda* has only twelve parts, transmigration would have a beginning, since the cause of ignorance is not indicated; and it would have an end, since the result of old age and death is not indicated. Thus one must add new parts, and to infinity.

No, for the Blessed One has implicitly indicated the cause of ignorance and result of old age and death.

27. From defilement there arises defilement and action; from whence foundation; from whence a new foundation and defilement: such is the manner of existence of the parts of existence or *bhavāṅgas*.<sup>168</sup>

Defilement arises from defilement, as attachment arises from desire.

Action arises from defilement, as consciousness from attachment, or the *saṃskāras* from ignorance.

A foundation arises from action, as *viññāna* from the *saṃskāras*, or birth from existence.

A foundation arises from a foundation, as *nāmarūpa* from consciousness; the six *āyatanas* from *nāmarūpa* . . . sensation from contact, or old age and death from birth.

Defilement arises from a foundation, as desire from sensation.

Since such is the manner of existence of the various parts of dependent origination it is clear that ignorance has either a defilement or a foundation for its cause; it is clear that old age and death (=the rest of the foundation from consciousness to sensation, above, p. 404, line 6, has defilement for a result.

Thus the teaching is complete. That the Blessed One wanted to

illustrate this manner of existence of the parts results from the conclusion of the Sūtra, "Thus there takes place the production of this great mass which is nothing but suffering."<sup>169</sup>

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But there is another explanation:<sup>170</sup> a. It is said, in another Sūtra,<sup>171</sup> that ignorance has incorrect judgment (*ayoniśo manasikāra*) for its cause, and, in still another Sūtra, that incorrect judgment has ignorance for its cause.<sup>172</sup>

Consequently ignorance is not without a cause and one avoids the objection of infinite regression.

b. But incorrect judgment is not named in the Sūtra in question, the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*.

Without doubt; but it is included in attachment: thus one does not have to separately name it here.<sup>173</sup>

This explanation is without value. How is incorrect judgment included in attachment? Indeed, it is associated (*samprayukta*) with attachment, but it can as equally well be associated with ignorance or with desire. Let us admit that it may be included in attachment, but can one draw from this the conclusion that the Sūtra, by naming attachment, says that incorrect judgment is the cause of ignorance? In other words, I indeed hold that incorrect judgment is included in attachment; but it does not follow that the Sūtra could dispense with terming it a separate part, the cause of ignorance. One could just as well omit ignorance and desire.

Another master speaks next.<sup>174</sup> A Sūtra teaches that ignorance has incorrect judgment for its cause.<sup>175</sup> A Sūtra teaches that incorrect judgment has ignorance for its cause and observes that it is produced at the moment of contact, "By reason of the eye and a visible thing there is produced a defiled judgment which arises from error (*moha=avidyā*)."<sup>176</sup> A Sūtra explains the origin of desire, "Desire arises by reason of a sensation which itself arose from a contact wherein there is ignorance."<sup>177</sup> Hence the ignorance that coexists with sensation proceeds from the incorrect judgment which is produced at the moment of contact. Hence ignorance is not without a cause; there is no reason to add a new term: incorrect judgment, the cause of ignorance, arise itself from



an ignorance designated as aberration (*moha*). [This is circular reasoning, *cakraka*.]

Well and good, says the author; but this is not explained in the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* and it should be explained there.

There is no reason to explain it in clearer terms, for one reaches these conclusions through reasoning. In fact, to the Arhats, sensation is not a cause of desire: from whence we conclude that sensation is a cause of desire only when it is defiled, associated with ignorance. Contact, when it is not accompanied by error, is not a cause of this defiled sensation; contact accompanied by error is not produced in an Arhat, who is free from ignorance; thus the contact that *pratītyasamutpāda* indicates as the cause of sensation, a cause of desire, is the contact that is accompanied by ignorance. [We then have *sāvidyasparsapratyayā vedanā* / *sāvidyavedanāpratayā tṛṣṇā*: sensation conditioned by contact associated with ignorance, desire conditioned by sensation associated with ignorance]. From there we again take up the reasoning indicated above: we prove that, according to the Sūtra, incorrect judgment is produced at the moment of contact.

But, says the author, the idea that reasoning, supported on occasion by Sutras, permits omitting indispensable terms—in the incorrect judgment in question, with the reciprocal causality of incorrect judgment and ignorance—leads to absurdity. [One could just as well omit contact, sensation, the *saṃskāras* or birth].

The true answer to this objection—that, since there is no indication of any other parts before ignorance and beyond old age and death, *saṃsāra* is without beginning or end—is the following: the enumeration of the parts of dependent origination is complete. In fact, doubt with reference to the question of knowing how present existence is conditioned by preceding existence, and how future existence is conditioned by present existence, is the only point that the Sūtra wants teach: thus it says, "In order to cause error relating to the past, the future, and their interval to cease" (iii.25c, p. 68).

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The Blessed One said, "I shall teach you, Oh Bhikṣus, *pratītyasamutpāda* and the *dharma*s produced in dependence (*pratītya-*

*samutpanna*).<sup>178</sup> What difference is there between *pratītyasamutpāda* and these *dharma*s?

None, according to the Abhidharma. For, as we have seen above (p. 405), both are defined as being "all the conditioned *dharma*s."<sup>179</sup>

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A difficulty. "All the conditioned *dharma*s" means the *dharma*s of the three periods. How can future *dharma*s which have not yet arisen, be termed "produced in dependence," *pratītyasamutpanna*?

We would ask you how future *dharma*s which are not yet "created" (*kṛta*) are called "conditioned" (*saṃskṛta*)?

Because they are "thought" (*cetita*) by the volition (*cetanā*) which is termed *ābhisaṃskārikā*, that is, "executing a retribution."<sup>180</sup>

But if this is so, how will future pure *dharma*s (the *dharma*s of the Path) be conditioned?

They are thought by a good mind with a view to acquiring them.

But then Nirvāṇa itself will be conditioned, for one desires to acquire it.<sup>181</sup>

When one calls future *dharma*s "produced in dependence," one uses an inadequate expression, justified by the identity of nature of future *dharma*s with past and present *dharma*s that are "produced," in the same way that future *rūpa* is called *rūpa* by reason of the identity of its nature with *rūpa*, even though one cannot qualify it as *rūpyate* in the present.<sup>182</sup>

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What is the intention of the Sūtra in distinguishing *pratītyasamutpāda* from the *dharma*s produced in dependence?

28a-b. *Samutpāda* is the cause, whereas *samutpanna* is the result.<sup>183</sup>

The part that is a cause is *pratītyasamutpāda*, because, there takes place arising from it. The part that is a result is *pratītyasamutpanna*, because it arose; but it is also *pratītyasamutpāda*, because, from it, arising takes place. All the parts, being cause and result are at one and the same

time both *pratītyasamutpāda* and *pratītyasamutpanna*. Without this distinction, nevertheless, there would be non-determination and confusion (*avyavasthāna*), for a part is not *pratītyasamutpāda* through connection to the part through connection to which it is also *pratītyasamutpanna*. In the same way a father is father through connection to his son; and a son is son through connection to his father; in the same way cause and result, and the two banks of a river.

But the Sthavira Pūrṇaśa<sup>184</sup> says: What is *pratītyasamutpāda* cannot be *pratītyasamutpanna*. Four causes: 1. future *dharma*s [which are *pratītyasamutpāda* because they are a cause of future *dharma*s, but not *pratītyasamutpanna* because they are not *utpanna*]; 2. the last *dharma*s of the Arhat [which are solely *pratītyasamutpanna*]; 3. past and present *dharma*s, with the exception of the last *dharma*s of the Arhat, [which are both *pratītyasamutpāda* and *pratītyasamutpanna*]; and 4. the unconditioned *dharma*s, [which are neither *pratītyasamutpāda* nor *pratītyasamutpanna*, because they have no result and they do not arise, ii.55d].

The Sautrāntikas criticize: [All this teaching, from "Static *Pratītyasamutpāda* . . . (p.405)" to "What is *pratītyasamutpāda* cannot be *pratītyasamutpanna*,"]<sup>185</sup> —are these personal theses, fantasies, or the sense of the Sūtra? You say in vain that it is the sense of the Sūtra. You speak of a static *pratītyasamutpāda* of twelve parts which are so many states (*avasthā*) made up of the five *skandha*s: this is in contradicton to the Sūtra wherein we read, "What is ignorance? Non-knowledge relating to the past . . ." <sup>186</sup> This Sūtra is of explicit sense, clear (*nītārtha=vibhaktārtha*); you cannot make it a Sūtra whose sense is yet to be deduced (*neyārtha*).<sup>187</sup>

[Answer of the Sarvāstivādins:] Nothing proves that this Sūtra is of clear sense; the fact that it expresses itself by means of a definition does not prove anything; for the Blessed One gives definitions which solely bear on the essential or major elements of the object to be defined.<sup>188</sup> For example, in the *Hastipadopamasūtra*, to the question "What is the internal earth element?", the Blessed One answers, "The hair, the body-hair, etc."<sup>189</sup> Certainly hair, etc., are still other *dharma*s,—visible things, smells, etc.,—but the Blessed One refers to their principal element, which is the earth element. In the same way, the Blessed One designates a state in which ignorance is the major element as ignorance.

[Answer of the Sautrāntikas:] This example proves nothing. In fact, in the *Hastipadopamasūtra*, the Blessed One does not define hair, etc., by the earth element; he does not say "What is hair, etc.? The earth element," in which case the definition would be incomplete. But he defines the earth element through the hair, etc.; and his definition is complete, for there is no earth element in the body which is not included in the description, hair, etc. In the same way, the definition of *pratītyasamutpāda* is complete; there is nothing to add to it.

[Answer of the Sarvāstivādins:] The definition given in the *Hastipadopamasūtra* is not complete. In fact there is earth element in tears, mucus, etc., as one can see by another Sūtra.<sup>190</sup> Yet the earth element of tears is not indicated in the *Hastipadopamasūtra*.

[Answer of the Sautrāntikas:] Perhaps the definition of the *Hastipadopamasūtra* is incomplete, seeing that you are able to show that there is something lacking in it. It remains for you to say what is lacking in the definitions that the Sūtra gives for ignorance, etc. Why define ignorance as "a state with five *skandhas*" by introducing heterogeneous *dharma*s [the five *skandhas*] into ignorance? One can only consider as a part of dependent origination a *dharma* the existence or nonexistence of which governs the existence or nonexistence of another part. Thus a state having five parts is not a "part." The five *skandhas* (sensation, etc.) exist in the Arhat, but he does not possess any *saṃskāras* which could produce a consciousness part of dependent origination, that is, a *punyo*paga, *apunyo*paga, or *āninjyo*paga *vijñāna*.<sup>191</sup> And thus following. Hence the Sūtra (note 186) is not to be taken literally.

As for the four cases of Pūrṇāśa, his first case—that the future *dharma*s are not "produced by dependence"—is contradicted by the Sūtra which gives birth and old age and death as "produced by dependence": "What are the *pratītyasamutpannas*? Ignorance . . . birth, and old age and death." Would one say that birth and old age and death are not future states? This is to take away the three sections from the theory of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

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Certain schools<sup>192</sup> maintain that *pratītyasamutpāda* is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) because the Sūtra says, "Whether the Tathāgatas

appear or not, this *dharma* nature of the *dharma*s is unchanging."

This thesis is true or false according to the manner in which one interprets it. If one means to say that it is always by reason of ignorance, etc., that the *saṃskāras*, etc., are produced, but not by reason of any other thing, and not without cause; that, in this sense, *pratītyasamutpāda* is stable, and eternal (*nitya*), we approve. If one means to say that there exists a certain eternal *dharma* called *pratītyasamutpāda*, then this opinion is inadmissible. For *utpāda*, production or arising, is a characteristic of anything that is conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*, ii.45c); an eternal *dharma*, as arising or *pratītyasamutpāda* would be by supposition, cannot be a characteristic of a transitory or conditioned thing. Moreover arising is defined as "existence succeeding upon nonexistence":<sup>193</sup> what relationship (*abhisambandha*) can one suppose exists between an unconditioned arising and ignorance, etc., a relationship that would permit one to say "*pratītyasamutpāda* of ignorance, etc.?" Finally the expression *pratītyasamutpāda* would become absurd: since *prati-itya-samutpāda* signifies "production by having gone to the cause" (*pratyayam prāpya samudbhavaḥ*), how could a *dharma* be both eternal and *pratītyasamutpāda* at one and the same time?

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What is the meaning of the word *pratītyasamutpāda*?<sup>194</sup>

*Prati* has the sense of *prāpti*, "to obtain, attain": the root *i* signifies *gati*, "to go;" but with the prefix modifying the sense of the root, *prati-i* signifies "to attain", so *pratītya* signifies "having attained;" *pad* signifies *sattā*, "existence;" and following are the prefixes *sam-ut*, "to appear, *prādubhāva*." Thus *pratītyasamutpāda* signifies "having attained appearance."

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This explanation is not admissible; the word *pratītyasamutpāda* is not good, [say the Grammarians]. In fact, of two actions by one and the same agent, the previous action is shown by the verb in the gerundive: *snātṛvā bhunkte* = "after having bathed, he ate."<sup>195</sup> Now one cannot

imagine a *dharma* that, existing before having been produced,<sup>196</sup> goes first towards the *pratyayas*, and is then produced. There is no action (going towards) without an agent. One can put this objection in verse: "Do you say that it goes towards the *pratyayas* before its production? This is inadmissible because it does not exist. Do you say that it goes and is produced at the same time? The gerundive is not justified, for the gerundive indicates priority."

The objection of the Grammarians<sup>197</sup> is without value.<sup>198</sup> Let us ask them if that which arises is present or future. "Do you say that a present thing arises? If it has not already arisen, how can it be present? If it has already arisen, how could it be reborn without being reborn indefinitely? Do you say that a future thing<sup>199</sup> arises? How can you attribute to that which is future, and non-existent, the quality of agent in this action of arising? Or how can you admit an action without an agent?" Consequently we would answer the Grammarians that the *dharma* goes towards the *pratyayas* in the same condition in which, according to them, the *dharma* arises.

In what condition, ask the Grammarians, is the *dharma* to be found, in your opinion, that arises?

The *dharma* that arises is "the future *dharma* disposed to be born" (*utpādābhimukho'nāgatah*).<sup>200</sup> So too the *dharma* that goes toward the *pratyayas*.

Yet the theory of the Grammarians and the manner in which they oppose an agent and action, is not tenable. For them there is an agent (*kartar*) which is "he who arises" (*bhavitar*), and an action (*kriyā*) which here is the action of arising (*bhūti*). Now one does not maintain that the action of arising (*bhūti*) is distinct from the one who arises (*bhavitar*) (ii. English trans. p.247). There is thus nothing wrong in using, of course as conventional expressions, the words, "it arises, it is produced after having gone to the *pratyayas*." The meaning of the expression *pratītyasamutpāda* is as indicated in the Sūtra,<sup>201</sup> "If that exists, then this exists; through the arising of that, there is the arising of this." (See below, p.415). The first phrase ("If that exists . . .") refers to *pratītya*, and the second ("Through the arising of that . . .") to *samutpāda*.

Thereupon one can say in verse, "If you admit that it arises at first nonexistent, nonexistent it also goes to the *pratyayas*. If you admit that it arises at first existent, arisen, it will continue to rearise; hence there is

regression *ad infinitum*; or rather we shall say that, for us also, it is preexistent to its arising."<sup>202</sup> As for the gerundive, it also indicates concomitance: "Darkness, having attained the lamp, perishes," or rather: "Having bathed, he lies down." One does not speak in this manner of anyone who bathes, closes his mouth and lies down.<sup>203</sup>

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Some other masters avoid the objection relative to the use of the gerundive by giving a very different explanation of the word *pratītyasamutpāda*: *prati* has a distributive meaning; *sam* signifies "coming together"; *itya* signifies "good at leaving," "that which does not last;" and the root *pad* preceded by *ut* signifies "appearance," "arising." We then have *pratītyasamutpāda* which signifies "arising together, by reason of such and such a coming together of causes, of perishable things."<sup>204</sup>

This explanation holds for the expression *pratītyasamutpāda*; but it does not take into account texts such as: a visual consciousness arises "By reason (*pratītya*) of the eye and visible things."<sup>205</sup>

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Why does the Blessed One define *pratītyasamutpāda* in two ways, "1. If that exists, then this exists;" and 2. "From the arising of that, this arises?"<sup>206</sup>

i. For many reasons:<sup>207</sup> 1. to be more specific. In the first formula, it results that the *saṃskāras* exist when ignorance exists; but it does not result that the *saṃskāras* come into existence through the sole existence of ignorance. The second formula specifies that it is the arising of ignorance that precedes the arising of the *saṃskāras*; 2. in order to indicate the succession of the parts of dependent origination: if that (ignorance) exists, then they (the *saṃskāras*) exist; from the arising of that (*saṃskāras*)—and not from any other thing—this (consciousness) arises; 3. in order to indicate the succession of existences: if previous existence existed, then there is present existence; from the arising of present existence future existence arises; 4. in order to indicate the nature of causality which differs according to the case: the causality of the

parts is either immediate: "if that exists, then this is," or not immediate: "from the arising of that, this arises." For example, defiled *saṃskāras* can immediately succeed ignorance; or they can be separated from it by good *saṃskāras* (ii.62a). But ignorance is the immediate cause of the *saṃskāras*, and a mediate cause of consciousness.

ii. According to another explanation,<sup>208</sup> the Blessed One taught in this manner in order to refute the theory of non-causality (*ahetuvāda*), the thesis that a thing exists in the absence of a cause, and the theory of one non-arisen cause, such as Prakṛti, Puruṣa, etc.

This explanation is not good, for the second formula suffices to refute these two theories.

iii. But certain non-Buddhist teachers imagine that "since the *ātman* exists as a support (of ignorance), then the *saṃskāras*, consciousness, etc., exist, being produced; that if ignorance is produced, then the *saṃskāras* are produced," and so on. In other words, they posit an *ātman* which serves as a substrate to the successive causation of the *dharmas*. In order to refute this opinion, the Blessed One specified, "That which arises (the *saṃskāras*) through the arising of such a thing (ignorance) exists by reason of the existence of this one thing that arises, and not by reason of the existence of a certain substrate." The first formula would permit us to say, "If the *ātman* exists as a support and if ignorance, etc., exists, then the *saṃskāras*, etc., exist." This second formula permits us to say, "It is true that the *saṃskāras*, etc., arise by reason of the arising of ignorance, etc.; but this is on the condition that there exists a certain substrate." The two formulas together make these explanations untenable: "The *saṃskāras* have ignorance for their cause [that is: if ignorance alone exists . . . ] . . . thus the production of this large and autonomous mass of suffering takes place."

iv. The Masters<sup>209</sup> think that the first formula indicates non-abandoning, non-cutting off: "If ignorance exists, not being abandoned, then the *saṃskāras* exist, are not abandoned," whereas the second formula indicates arising: "Through the production of ignorance, the *saṃskāras* are produced."<sup>210</sup>

v. According to another opinion,<sup>211</sup> the first formula indicates duration, and the second indicates arising: "As long as the flux of causes lasts, the flux of results exists; by the sole production of a cause, its result is produced."



We observe that it is a question of arising: the Blessed One said in fact: "I shall teach you *pratītyasamutpāda*." Further, why would the Blessed One first teach duration and then arising?

Another explanation (of the same master):<sup>212</sup> The formula: "If that exists, then this exists," signifies: "If the result exists, then the destruction of its cause exists." But let us not think that a result arises without a cause: "From the arising of that, this arises."

But, in order to express this sense, the Blessed One should have said, "If that exists, then this does not exist;" and he should have first indicated the arising of the result. Once the result arose, he could say, "When the result has arisen, the cause is no more." If the Sūtra should be understood as this master understands it, how does it happen that, wishing to explain *pratītyasamutpāda*, the Blessed One first explained the destruction of its cause?

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How do the *saṃskāras* exist by reason of ignorance? How does old age and death exist by reason of birth?<sup>213</sup> Let us briefly answer this question.

The fool or Pṛthagjana does not understand (*aprajāna*) that *pratītyasamutpāda* is merely the *saṃskāras*,<sup>214</sup> that is, conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) *dharma*s—[this lack of *prajñā* is *avidyā āvenikī*, only non-wisdom, not associated with desire]—and this produces a belief in an *ātman* (v.7, 12), and egotism (v.10a); it accomplishes the threefold action,—bodily, vocal, mental,—with a view to agreeable sensation, and to the sensation of indifference; non-meritorious action, with a view to agreeable sensation in this life; meritorious action, with a view to agreeable sensation in a future life in Kāmadhātu; and "unmoveable" (*āniñjya*)<sup>215</sup> action, with a view to agreeable sensation of the first three Dhyānas and the sensation of indifference of the higher stages (iv.46a). These actions are the *saṃskāras* that exist by reason of ignorance.

Given the force of the projection of action, the series of the consciousness, due to the series of the intermediary existence, goes into such and such a realm of rebirth, as long as it may be, in the manner in which a flame goes, that is, in a perpetual renewing. That is the consciousness which exists by reason of the *saṃskāras*: in thus

understanding the consciousness, we are in agreement with the definition that the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* gives for the consciousness: "What is the consciousness? The six groups of consciousnesses."<sup>216</sup>

With the consciousness as an antecedent, *nāmarūpa* arises in this realm of rebirth. This is the five *skandhas*, conforming to the definition of the *Vibhaṅga*:<sup>217</sup> "What is *nāman*? The four nonmaterial *skandhas*. What is *rūpa*? All *rūpa* . . . These two,—the *nāman* and the *rūpa*,—are called *nāmarūpa*."

Then, through the development of *nāmarūpa*, there arises in their times, the six organs: these are the six *āyatanas*.

Then, encountering their object, a consciousness arises, and, through the coming together of the three (consciousness, the six *āyatanas* and a *viṣaya*), there is contact, which is susceptible of being experienced agreeably, etc.

From that, the threefold sensation, agreeable, etc., arises.

From this threefold sensation, there arises a threefold desire; desire for *kāma* or desire for agreeable sensation of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, in a being tormented by suffering; desire for *rūpa*, or desire for agreeable sensation of the three Dhyānas and the sensation of indifference of the Fourth; all desire for *Ārūpya*.

Then, from the desire relating to sensation, there arises a fourfold attachment (*upādāna*): attachment to the object of sense pleasure (*kāmopādāna*), attachment to views (*dṛṣṭyupādāna*), attachment to rules and rituals (*śīlavratoṣādāna*), and attachment to theories concerning the soul (*ātmavādoṣādāna*).<sup>218</sup> The *kāmas* are the five objects of pleasure (*kāmaguṇa*, iii.3, p. 368). The views, sixty-two in number, are as explained in the *Brahmajālasūtra*. *Śīla* is rejecting immorality (*daubhūṣīya*, iv.122a); *vrata* is the vow to act like a dog, a bull, etc.;<sup>219</sup> for example the Nirgranthas and their nudity, the Brāhmanas with their staffs and antelope hides, the Pāśupātas with their tuft of hair and their ashes, the Parivrajakas with their three staffs and their nudity, and the rest: to tie oneself down to the observation of these rules is *śīlavratoṣādāna* (v.7). *Ātmavāda* is the person himself, and *ātmabhāva*, is that relating to which one says *ātman*.<sup>220</sup>

According to another opinion,<sup>221</sup> *ātmavāda* is both a view of soul (*ātmadṛṣṭi*) and thoughts pertaining to a soul (*asmimāna*), for it is by reason of these two that one says *ātman*, that one affirms the existence

of an *ātman* (*ātmavāda*): if Scripture uses the word *vāda*, "affirmation," it is because the *ātman* does not exist. It is said in fact, "The fool, the ignorant, the Pṛthagjana, conforming to the manners of vulgar speech, thinks 'me,' or 'mine;' but there is not any 'me' or 'mine.'" <sup>222</sup> Attachment to the *kāmas*, views, etc., is *chanda* or desire, and *rāga* or craving, with regard to them. As the Blessed One said in the *Sarva*, <sup>223</sup> "What is attachment? It is *chandarāga*." <sup>224</sup>

Because of attachment, accumulated action produces a new existence: this is *bhava*. The Sūtra says, "Ānanda, action that produces a new existence is the nature of *bhava*." <sup>225</sup>

By reason of *bhava*, and by means of the descent of the consciousness, <sup>226</sup> future arising (*janman*) is birth, which is made up of the five *skandhas*, being *nāmarūpa* in nature.

Because of birth, there is old age and death as defined in the Sūtra. <sup>227</sup>

It is in this manner that, sufficient unto itself (*kevala*)—that is, without any relation to an *ātman*—there is produced this great mass of suffering, great because it has neither beginning nor end.

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The theory that has just been taught—according to which the twelve parts of dependent origination are twelve states made up of the five *skandhas*—is a theory of the Vaibhāṣikas.

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What is *avidyā* (ignorance)?

The non-*vidyā*, that which is not *vidyā*.

Impossible; for the eye is also non-*vidyā*.

It is an absence of *vidyā*, "ignorance."

This is also impossible, for an absence is not a thing (*dravya*) (iv. 2b-3b) and *avidyā* must be a thing, since it is a cause (*pratyaṃ*). Thus

28c-d. *Avidyā* is a separate entity (*dharma*), the opposite of *vidyā* or knowledge, like a non-friend, the untrue, etc. <sup>228</sup>

The non-friend (*amitra*) is the opposite of a friend, not a non-friend, that is, anyone other than a friend, not the absence of the friend. *Rta* or

*satya* is truth; non-truth (*anṛta*) is speech contrary to true speech; so too non-righteousness (*adharma*), non-useful (*anartha*) and the not-to-be-done (*akārya*) are the opposite of righteousness, useful, and duty.<sup>229</sup>

Thus *avidyā*—"non-knowledge"—is the opposite of *vidyā*, a real separate *dharma*. The Sūtra defines it as the cause of the *saṁskāras*, from whence it results that it is not a mere negation. Further,

29a. Because it is declared to be bound (*saṁyojana*), etc.<sup>230</sup>

The Sūtra regards ignorance as a separate yoke (*saṁyojana*), a bond (*bandhana*), a latent defilement (*anuśaya*), a canker (*āsrava*), a torrent or flood (*ogha*), and a yoke (*yoga*). Thus ignorance cannot be a mere negation; it cannot be everything that is not *vidyā*, the eyes, etc.

Yet the prefix *nañ*—the privative *a*—has a pejorative sense. One terms a bad wife a "non-wife" (*akalatṛa*), and a bad son, a "non-son" (*aputra*). Should we not think then that *avidyā* is bad *vidyā*, that is, bad *prajñā*?

29b. *Avidyā* is not bad *prajñā*, because this is seeing (*darśana*).<sup>231</sup>

Bad *prajñā* (*kuprajñā*) or defiled *prajñā* would be a type of seeing (*dṛṣṭi*); one of the five bad views (v.3). Now *avidyā* or ignorance is certainly not seeing, for ignorance and seeing are two distinct yokes (*saṁyojanas*).<sup>232</sup>

[The Sautrāntikas:] *Avidyā* would be the defiled *prajñā* which is not seeing by nature, [for example *prajñā* associated with *rāga* or craving].

This is impossible,

29c. Because views are associated with ignorance,

In fact *moha* (error or aberration), which is defined as *avidyā* (ignorance) is among the *mahābhūmika kleśas* (defilements which are found in all defiled minds, ii.26a); now all the *mahābhūmika kleśas* are associated with them, thus *avidyā* (under the name of *moha*) is associated with seeing (fivefold bad view) which is *prajñā* in nature; thus *avidyā* is not *prajñā*, for two items of *prajñā* cannot be associated.

29d. and because ignorance is defined as a defilement of *prajñā*.

The Sūtra says, "The mind defiled by desire is not liberated; *prajñā* defiled by ignorance is not purified."<sup>233</sup> Now *prajñā* cannot be defiled by

*prajñā*: if desire is a defilement of the mind, then desire is not the mind; if ignorance is a defilement of *prajñā*, then ignorance is not *prajñā*.

[Reply of the Sautrāntikas]. Good *prajñā* can be mixed with defiled *prajñā*, as when moments of good and defiled *prajñā* succeed one another. In the same way, when one says that a mind defiled by desire is not liberated, one is speaking of a mind that is not necessarily associated with craving, but which is oppressed by craving [craving is not active, *samudācaran*; but its traces remain and the mind is oppressed]. When an ascetic avoids craving, [that is, by suppressing its traces and repairing the bad state, *dausṭhulya*, of the mind], then the mind is liberated. In the same way *prajñā*, defiled by ignorance (bad *prajñā*), is not pure: it is oppressed, even when it is good, by ignorance.

What is capable<sup>234</sup> of arresting the imaginations of a scholar? Ignorance is not, in its nature, *prajñā*.<sup>235</sup>

The scholar who maintains that ignorance is all the defilements (*kleśas*) is refuted at the same time.<sup>236</sup> If ignorance is all the defilements, it cannot be named separately among the yokes (*saṃyojanas*), etc.; it is not associated with views and with the other defilements; Scripture should not say, "The mind, defiled by desire, is not liberated," but rather, "The mind defiled by ignorance . . ." Do you say that one expresses oneself in this manner in order to be more specific, and that the Sūtra should say, "The mind, defiled by ignorance which consists of desire, is not liberated?" In this hypothesis, Scripture should specify what type of ignorance it is that hinders the purity of the *prajñā*: now it says, "*Prajñā* defiled by ignorance is not purified."

If you hold that ignorance is a separate *dharma*, and not merely a certain type of *prajñā*, you should define it.

Ignorance is the non-*saṃprakhyāna* of the Four Truths, the Three Jewels, of action and its result. [*Samprakhyāna* is the same thing as *prajñā*, discernment, or *jñāna*, knowledge].<sup>237</sup>

What is non-*saṃprakhyāna*?

It is not-*saṃprakhyāna*, nor absence-of-*saṃprakhyāna*, in the same way that *avidyā* is not non-*vidyā* or absence-of-*vidyā*. It is then a certain separate *dharma*, the opposite of *saṃprakhyāna*.

Good enough; but as for ignorance, you have not told us the nature of *asaṃprakhyāna*.

Definitions are often thus, that is, not definitions through self nature or essence, but definitions through function. For example, the eye is defined as "the pure *rūpa* that serves as a support for the eye consciousness" because one does not know this invisible *rūpa* except through inference (Chap. ix, French trans. p. 231.). [In the same way the unique nature of *avidyā* is known through its action (*karman*) or activity (*kāritra*); this action is contrary to *vidyā* so it is thus a *dharma* contrary (*vipakṣa*) to *vidyā*].

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The Bhadanta Dharmatrāta defines ignorance in the following terms: *asmūti sattvamayānā*.<sup>238</sup>

Does this *mayānā* differ from *asmimāna* (v.10)?

The Bhadanta answers: As the Sūtra says,<sup>239</sup> "I know, I see—through the perfect abandoning and the perfect knowledge of desire, of views, *mayānās*, attachments and latent defilements to the idea of self (*ātmagrāha*); to the idea of mine (*mamagrāha*), to *asmināna*,<sup>240</sup>—without shade,<sup>241</sup> Parinirvāṇa." [This Sūtra shows that *mayānā*—in the singular since it is a genre—is distinct from *asmimāna*].

So be it, there is *mayānā*; but from whence do you hold that it is ignorance?

The Bhadanta answers: Because one cannot identify *mayānā* with any other defilement, since it is named separately from desire, views, and *asmimāna*.

But could it not be a *māna* other than *asmimāna*? [*Māna* is in fact six or sevenfold, v.10]. However we would have to say too much in order to complete this examination. Let us stop here.

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As for *nāmarūpa*,<sup>242</sup> *rūpa* has already been explained (i.9).

30a. *Nāman* are the *skandhas* that are not *rūpa*.<sup>243</sup>

The four nonmaterial *skandhas*,—sensation, ideas, *saṃskāras*, and consciousness, are called *nāman*, for *nāman* signifies "that which bends, yields," (*namatīti nāma*).

The nonmaterial *skandhas* bend, [that is, "are active," *pravartante*, "arise," *utpadyante*], towards the object (*artha*) by reason of name (*nāman*), the organs, and the object.<sup>244</sup>

In this phrase, "by reason of name," one takes the word "name" in its popular sense, (*samijñākarāṇa*, ii.47a, English trans. p. 250), as a "designation," which designates and causes to be understood either a collection, "cattle," "horses," etc., or a single thing, "*rūpa*," "taste," etc.

Why is *samijñākarāṇa* termed "name?"

Because the *samijñākarāṇa* causes the nonmaterial *skandhas* to bend (*namayatīti nāma*) towards their object.

According to another explanation, the nonmaterial *skandhas* are termed *nāman*, because, then the body dissolves, these *skandhas* bend, that is, go towards another existence.<sup>245</sup>

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We have already explained the six *āyatanas* (i.9).

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30b. There are six contacts. They arise from encounter.<sup>246</sup>

The first is the contact of the eye, and the sixth is contact of the *manas* or mind (*Dīgha*, iii.243, etc.)

They arise from the coming together of three things, an organ, its object, and a consciousness.

One can see indeed that there can be a coming together of the five material organs, with their objects and their corresponding consciousnesses, for the three are simultaneous. But the mental organ or *manas* (*manodhātu*) is destroyed when a mental consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*) arises (i.172); and the object (i.e., *dharma*s) of this consciousness can be future: how can there be a coming together of the three?

There is a coming together because the organ (the *manas*) and the object (the *dharma*s) are the causal conditions of the mental consciousness; or rather because the organ, the object and the consciousness produce the same single effect, namely the contact.

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What is the nature of contact?

The masters are not in agreement.

Some—[the Sautrāntikas]—say: Contact is merely the coming together itself. According to the Sūtra, "The coming together, the encounter, the meeting of these *dharma*s is contact."<sup>247</sup>

Others—[the Sarvāstivādins]—say: Contact is a *dharma* associated with the mind (ii.24, English trans. p. 190), distinct from any coming together.<sup>248</sup> According to the *Sūtra of the Six Hexades*,<sup>249</sup> "The six internal sources of consciousness (*āyatana*s, eye, etc.), the six external sources of consciousness (visible things, etc.), the six consciousness, the six contacts, the six sensations, and the six desires." The Sūtra thus knows of the six contacts, together with the six categories of internal *āyatana*s, external *āyatana*s, and the consciousnesses: [thus the contacts are separate *dharma*s, for the Sūtra does not contain any repetition or double usages].

[The Sautrāntikas explain this Sūtra:] If the Sūtra does not contain any repetition, it follows that sensations and desires exist apart from the *dharma-āyatana* which is the sixth internal source of consciousness (the object of the *manas*), since you can hold only that the first two categories (six organs and six objects) refer to the organs and their objects without any relation to the consciousness.

[Reply of the Sautrāntika, the Bhadanta Śrīlābha:] Every eye and visible thing is not the cause of a visual consciousness, as all visual consciousness is not the result of the eye and a visible thing.<sup>250</sup> Thus what is defined as contact in the Sūtra, "Six collections of contacts," is the eye, a visible thing and the consciousnesses which are cause and effect. (See p. 428, line 13a).

But how do the Sarvāstivādins, who maintain that contact exists apart from the coming together of any eye, a visible thing and a consciousness, explain the Sūtra, "The coming together (*samigati*), the encounter, the meeting of these *dharma*s is contact?"

They do not read the Sūtra in this form;<sup>251</sup> or rather they say that the expression is metaphorical:<sup>252</sup> when the text says "the coming together," it means "the result of the coming together."

But this discussion is taking us too far afield.<sup>253</sup>



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The Ābhidhārmikas think that contact is a *dharma*, a separate entity.

30c-d. Five are contact through (actual) contact; the sixth is so-called through denomination.<sup>254</sup>

The contact of the eye, the ear, etc., have *sapratigha* organs (i.29b) for their support (*āśraya*); thus they are termed *pratigha sparśa* taking their name from their support.<sup>255</sup>

The sixth, the contact of the mental organ, is called *adhivacanasaṃsparśa*.<sup>256</sup>

What is the meaning of the term *adhivacana*?

*Adhivacana* is a name.<sup>257</sup>

Now name is the object (*ālambana*) *par excellence* of contact associated with the mental consciousness. In fact it is said, "Through the visual consciousness, he knows blue; but he does not know, 'It is blue;' through the mental consciousness, he knows blue and he knows, 'It is blue.'" <sup>258</sup>

Thus the contact of the mental organ takes its name—a contact of denomination—from its characteristic object.

According to another opinion,<sup>259</sup> one takes into account the fact that only the mental consciousness is activated (*pravartate*) with regard to its objects (color, etc.), or applies itself to its object, by reason of expression or speech (*adhikṛtya vacanam = vacanam avadhārya*):<sup>260</sup> mental consciousness is thus *adhivacana*. The contact (*sparśa*) that is associated with it is thus called *adhivacanasaṃsparśa*.

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The sixth contact is of three types:

31a-b. Contact of knowledge, non-knowledge, other: which are respectively pure, defiled, other.<sup>261</sup>

These are the contacts associated with *vidyā*, that is, with pure *prajñā*; with *avidyā*, that is, with defiled non-knowledge; and with *naivavidyā-nāvidyā*, that is, with good, but impure *prajñā*.

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In considering the contact of non-knowledge which is associated with all the defilements and which is always active,<sup>262</sup> one distinguishes the two:

### 31c. Contacts of antipathy and sympathy

which are associated with hatred and with desire.

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Contact in its totality, is threefold.

### 31d. Three contacts, leading to pleasure (*sukhavedya*), etc.<sup>263</sup>

These are contacts that lead to the acquisition of pleasure, of suffering, and of neither pleasure nor suffering. These contacts are so called because they are beneficial to pleasure, to suffering, and to neither pleasure nor suffering [that is: propitious to the sensation of pleasure, etc., = *sukhavedanīya*, etc.] (*Pāṇini*, 5, 1.1); or rather because “that” is felt or can be felt (*vedyate tad vedayitum vā śakyam*) (*Pāṇini*, 3, 1.169).

“That” is sensation, *vedanā*. The contact where a pleasure should be felt (*sukham vedyam*), is a contact that is called *sukhavedya*. There is in fact an agreeable (*sukha*) sensation there.

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We have defined the sixfold contact, contact of the eye, etc.

### 32a. Six sensations arise from contact.<sup>264</sup>

That is: sensation arisen from contact with the eye, etc.

### 32a-b. Five are bodily sensations and one is mental.

The five sensations that arise from the contact of the eye and from the other bodily organs, having for support (*āśraya*) the bodily organs, are bodily. The sixth sensation arises from contact with the *manas*: its support is the mind (*manas*) so it is mental or *caitasī*.

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[The Sautrāntikas] ask if the sensation is later than, or simultaneous to contact.

The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that sensation and contact are simultaneous, being *sahabhūhetu*, "reciprocal causes" (ii.50a).

[The Sautrāntikas:] How can two things arisen together be "that which produces" (*janaka*) and "that which is produced" (*janya*)?

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] Why would they not be?

[The Sautrāntikas:] When two things arise together, how could the *dharma* "which produces" have any efficacy with regard to the *dharma* "to be produced," which has already arisen?

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] This argument (*sādhana*) only repeats the thesis (*pratijñā*) that two things arisen together cannot be "that which produces" and "that which is produced."

[The Sautrāntikas:] We would say then that, in your hypothesis, there would be reciprocal causality of two *dharma*s arisen together.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] But this is not a fault, for we admit this consequence. We define *sahabhūhetu* as *ye mūṭhaḥphalāḥ*, "The *dharma*s that are results of one other are a *sahabhū* cause" (ii.50c).

[The Sautrāntikas:] So be it, that is your system. But the Sūtra condemns this system. It says, "By reason of the contact of the eye, there arises a sensation which arises from the contact of the eye;" it does not say, "By reason of the sensation which arises from the contact of the eye, the contact of the eye arises." And again the thesis that "Two things arisen together can be cause and result" is in contradiction to the characteristics of a cause. It is taken for granted that the *dharma* which produces another *dharma* is not simultaneous to this other *dharma*: a seed precedes its shoot; milk precedes *dadhi*; a blow precedes the noise; and the *manas* (the mental organ) precedes the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) (i.17).

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] We do not deny that a cause is sometimes earlier than its result; but we affirm that a cause and its result can be simultaneous: for example, the visual organ and color, and the visual consciousness; or the primary elements (*mahābhūtas*) and "secondary (*bhautika*) matter."

[The Sautrāntikas:] We do not admit your examples: the visual organ and color precede the visual consciousness; but the primary elements and derived matter, which are simultaneous, arise together from a complex of earlier causes.

The Vaibhāṣikas: Contact and sensation are simultaneous, like the shoot and its shade.<sup>265</sup>

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According to another opinion, [the Bhadanta Śrīlābha]: Sensation is later than contact. There is first the organ and the object (first moment), then the consciousness (second moment); contact is the “coming together,” that is, the quality of cause and result of these three: organ and object, and consciousness; finally (third moment) there arises sensation which has contact for its cause.

The Vaibhāṣikas: In this theory, there is no sensation wherever there is consciousness: for there is consciousness in the second and third moment, but sensation only in the third. And all consciousness is not contact, for there is contact only in the first two moments.

[Śrīlābha:] No. One sensation, having for its cause an earlier contact, exists at the moment of a later contact: thus all contact is accompanied by sensation.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] According to you, there would thus be simultaneous contact and a sensation of different objects: a sensation produced by earlier contact of color would exist at the moment of a second contact of sound. Now a sensation produced by a contact of color should have this color for its object, for a sensation cannot have an object different from the object of the consciousness with which it is associated [and this consciousness, produced by color, should have color for its object]. Thus you are forced to an inadmissible conclusion.

[Śrīlābha:] Let us say then that consciousness is not always contact, and that it is not always accompanied by sensation. The consciousness of color, contemporaneous with the contact of sound, is not contact, but is accompanied by sensation. The consciousness of the sound is contact, but it is not accompanied by sensation.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] This theory is incompatible with the rule of the universal (*sarvatraga*) or *mahābhūmika dharmas* (ii.23c-d). This rule

establishes that ten *dharma*s,—sensation, contact, idea, etc.—are associated with every mental state.

[Śrīlābha:] Upon what authority does this rule rest?

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] On the Śāstra or Abhidharma.<sup>266</sup>

[Śrīlābha:] We recognize Sūtra and not Śāstra as authority. For the Blessed One said that recourse is to the Sūtra.<sup>267</sup> Or rather we propose for the doctrine of the *mahābhūmikas* an interpretation different from yours.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] What then is the meaning of the expression *mahābhūmika*?<sup>268</sup>

[The Sautrāntikas:] There are three *bhūmis* or spheres, 1. *saṁvīṭṭa-savicāra*: Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna, 2. *avīṭṭa-savicāra*: the intermediate *dhyāna*, and 3. *avīṭṭa-avicāra*: the Second Dhyāna, etc. (viii.23c); three other *bhūmis*, good, bad, and neutral [that is, the good, bad, and neutral *dharma*s]; and three other *bhūmis*, of Śāikṣas, Aśāikṣas, and neither-Śāikṣa-nor-Aśāikṣa [that is, the pure *dharma*s of the Śāikṣa and Aśāikṣa, and the impure *dharma*s, ii.70c].<sup>269</sup> The mental *dharma*s which are found in all these *bhūmis*<sup>270</sup> are called *mahābhūmika* [these are sensation, volition, as ii.24]; those which are found only in a good *bhūmi* are called *kuśalamahābhūmika* [these are faith, etc., as ii.25]; those which are found only in a defiled *bhūmi* are called *kleśamahābhūmika* [these are ignorance, etc., as ii.26]. But all these *dharma*s are called *mahābhūmika*, *kuśalamahābhūmika*, and *kleśamahābhūmika*, because they can be found in the *bhūmi* proper to them: but it is false that they are necessarily found all at once. Sensation, for example, exists in all the *bhūmis*, as too ideas, volition, etc.: but this does not mean that every mental state includes all these *dharma*s, sensation, etc.<sup>271</sup>

Certain masters observe that the category of the *akuśalamahābhūmikas*, at first unknown, has been added later;<sup>272</sup> and the Sūtras would suggest this idea.<sup>273</sup>

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] If sensation is later than contact, you have to take into account the Sūtra, "By reason of the eye and visible things there arises visual consciousness; the coming together of the three is contact; together there arises (*sahajāta*) sensation, ideas, volition."<sup>274</sup>

[The Sautrāntikas:] This Sūtra say that sensation, ideas and volition arise together; it does not say that they arise together with contact: we say that they arise together among themselves.<sup>275</sup> Let us observe also

that the word "together" (*saha*) is used, not only to indicate simultaneity, but also to indicate immediate succession. The Sūtra, for example, says, "He cultivates the part of Bodhi called mindfulness together (*sahagata*) with compassion."<sup>276</sup> Now compassion, which is always "worldly," evidently cannot be simultaneous to a part of Bodhi: for the parts of Bodhi are always transworldly. Thus the Sūtra not only does not prove that sensation is simultaneous to contact; it does not even prove that sensation, ideas and volition are associated with, and simultaneous to consciousness (visual consciousness, etc.).

[The Sarvāstivādins:] But the Sūtra says, "The *dharmas* of sensation, ideas, volition, and consciousness are mixed; they are not separate."<sup>277</sup> "Mixed" signifies "arisen together." From this Sūtra we conclude that there are no consciousnesses, sensations, ideas or volitions which are not simultaneous.

[The Sautrantikas:] But what is the meaning of the word "mixed", *saṁsṛṣṭa*? We read in the Sūtra that you have just quoted,<sup>278</sup> "That which he feels (*vedayata*), he thinks of (*cetayate*); that about which he thinks, he grasps an idea of (*saṁjñānāti*); that about which he grasps an idea of, he discerns (*viññānāti*)."<sup>279</sup> In other words, the same thing is the object (*ālambana*) of sensation, volition, and consciousness. The question is thus posed whether sensation, volition and ideas are called mixed because they have the same object—which is our opinion—or because they are simultaneous, as you say.

[The Vaibhasikas:<sup>280</sup>] The word *saṁsṛṣṭa* refers to simultaneous things. It is said in fact that life (*āyus*) and warmth (*uṣmaka*) are *saṁsṛṣṭa*.<sup>281</sup> They cannot be *saṁsṛṣṭa* except through simultaneity, not by the fact that they would have a common object, since they do not have any object. Furthermore the Sūtra says, "The coming together of the three is contact." How could there be a consciousness without there being a coming together of the three? How could there be encounter of the three without there being contact? Thus all consciousness is accompanied by contact and all contact is accompanied by sensation, etc.

But this discussion is carrying us too far afield. Let us return to our subject.

We have explained, in summary, mental (*caitasī*) sensation.

32c-d. This same sensation is of eighteen types by reason of the objects of the mind (*manopavicāras*).<sup>282</sup>

Mental sensation is made up of eighteen types, because there are six *upavicāras* of satisfaction (*samanasya*), six of dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*), and six of indifference (*upekṣā*) (ii.7): these are the *upavicāras* of satisfaction relating to visible things, sounds, color, tastes, tangible things, and the *dharma*s; the same for the *upavicāras* of dissatisfaction and indifference.

How does one distinguish these eighteen?

In considering their nature, their quality of being sensation, the *upavicāras* are three: of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference; considering their quality of associates, they are one, all being associated with the mental consciousness; and considering their objects, they are six: having visible things, sounds, etc., for their objects. We answer then that one must take into account, at one and the same time, these three qualities.<sup>283</sup>

There is no variety in the object of the first fifteen *upavicāras*: the object of *manopavicāra* relating to visible things is only these visible things . . . But, as for the three *dharmopavicāras*—the three *upavicāras* (satisfaction, etc.) relating to the *dharma*s—one would distinguish: they can arise relating to the distinct *dharma*s of the five sense objects; in this case, their object presents no variety, and is not mixed; they can bear on one, two, three, . . . six categories of *dharma*s (visible things, sounds, . . . *dharma*s); in this case, their object is mixed.<sup>284</sup>

What is the meaning of the expression *manopavicāra*?

Why are the different types of mental sensation (satisfaction, etc.) called *manopavicāra*?

The Vaibhāṣikas say wrongly, "Because satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference are supported by the *manas* in order to grasp visible things, etc., as an object (*upavicaranti* = *ālambante*)."<sup>285</sup>

According to another opinion, "Because satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference cause the *manas* to reconsider (*upavicārayanti*) visible things, etc."<sup>286</sup> For it is by reason of sensation (sensation of satisfaction, etc.) that the *manas* repeatedly considers visible things, etc.

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Objections or difficulties. 1. Why not define bodily (*kāyikī*) sensation as *manopavicāra*.

Without doubt bodily sensation has the *manas* for its support, but it also has the material organs (eye, etc.) for its support. It is free from *vikalpa* (like the visual consciousness, etc., to which it is associated, i.33, trans. p. 97); and it is no longer *upavicārikā*, [that is, susceptible of "consideration," *saṃtīrikā*].<sup>287</sup>

2. But why is the *sukha* of the Third Dhyāna (viii.9b), which is of the sphere of a single *manas*, not placed among the *manopavicāra*?

[The Vaibhāṣikas say (wrongly),<sup>288</sup>] "Because, initially, that is, in Kāmadhātu, there is no *sukha* which is of the sphere of the *manas*. [In Kāmadhātu, *sukha* is solely bodily sensation]; and because there does not exist any *duḥkha-upavicāra* which would oppose the *sukha-upavicāra* that you imagine."

3. But, if the *upavicāras* are only of the sphere of the *manas*, you have to take into account the Sūtra which says, "Having seen visible things through the eye, he considers (*upavicāraṭi*) the visible things which satisfy (*saumanasyasthānīya*)."<sup>289</sup> The relationship is characterized, in the Sūtra, by the visual organ and by *upavicāra*.

[The Sarvāstivādins answer:] 1. The Blessed One expresses himself in this manner because he takes into consideration the fact that the *upavicāras* can be produced by the five sense consciousnesses. The *upavicāras* are no less than the sphere of the single *manas*: in the same way, for example, that the *aśubhās* (meditation on a cadaver turning blue, etc., vi.9), which are produced by the visual consciousness, are of the sphere of the *manas*: these meditations, in fact, suppose absorption; 2. on the other hand, the Sūtra says, "Having seen visible things . . .," it does not say, "Seeing visible things . . .," which would justify your objection; 3. there is *upavicāra* of the visible things, etc., without having seen them, etc. (For example one can "consider" the visible things that one intends to speak of, with satisfaction). If it were otherwise, a being in Kāmadhātu could not "consider" the visible things, sounds and tangible things of Rūpadhātu [which he does not perceive], and a being of Rūpadhātu would not be able to consider the smells and tastes of Kāmadhātu; 4. the Sūtra says, "Having seen visible things . . . he



considers visible things," because his "consideration" is "clearer" when it bears on an object which is "experienced." It is not doubtful that, having seen a visible thing, one cannot consider the sound [which accompanied the visible thing]; there is here "consideration" or *upavicāra*, of a sound not experienced: but the text, in order to avoid any confusion, makes a correspondence between the organs and the objects which correspond to them.

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The objects are given, in the Sūtra, as *saumanasyasthānīya*, etc., "which produce satisfaction, dissatisfaction, or indifference." Are they such by their natures?

No. The same object can be *saumanasthānīya* for one person, but *daurmanasyasthānīya* for another. It all depends on the "series," on the dispositions of the mind itself.

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Among the *manopavicāras*, how many are in Kāmadhātu? Which Dhātu takes the *manopavicāras* of Kāmadhātu for its object? The same questions for the other two Dhātus.

33a. In Kāmadhātu all of the *manopavicāras* have their own Dhātu for their object.

The eighteen *manopavicāras* are produced among beings in Kāmadhātu, but all can have Kāmadhātu for their object.

33b. Rūpadhātu is the object of twelve.

Twelve of them can have Rūpadhātu for their object, with the exception of the three *manopavicāras* (of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference) relative to odor and the three relative to taste, since odors and tastes do not exist in Rūpadhātu (i.30b).

33c. The highest Dhātu (=Ārūpyadhātu) is the object of three.

Three, namely the *dharmanopavicāras*, can have Ārūpyadhātu for their object, but not the fifteen others, since visible things, etc., do not

exist in Ārūpyadhātu (viii.3c).

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In Rūpadhātu, one must distinguish the first two Dhyānas and the last two.

33d. In two Dhyānas, twelve.

In Rūpadhātu the *upavicāras* of dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*) are completely absent. [In the first two Dhyānas there exists six *upavicāras* of satisfaction and six of indifference].

34a. All have Kāmadhātu for their object.

These twelve can have Kāmadhātu for their object.

34b. Eight have their own Dhātu for their object.

Eight of them can have Rūpadhātu for their object, with the exception of the *upavicāras* of odor and taste.

34c. Two have Ārūpyadhātu for their object.<sup>290</sup>

Two can have Ārūpyadhātu for their object, namely the *dharmopavicāras* of satisfaction and indifference.

34d. But, in the other two Dhyānas, six.

The *upavicāras* of dissatisfaction and satisfaction are absent in the last two Dhyānas.

34e. Kāmadhātu is the object of six.

There remains then the six *upavicāras* of indifference which have the visible things, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible things, and *dharma*s of Kāmadhātu for their object.

34f. Of their own Dhātu, four.

The visible things, sounds, tangible things, and *dharma*s of Rūpadhātu.

34g. The highest Dhātu (=Ārūpyadhātu) is the object of one.

## The *dharmas* of Ārūpyadhātu.

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In Ārūpyadhātu, one must distinguish the preliminary absorption of Ākāśānantyāyatana and the absorption which follows it:

35a. In the preliminary stage of Ārūpyadhātu

In the Kārikā, the word "*arūpisāmanta*" signifies Ākāśānantyāyatanasāmantaka (viii.22). Four *upavicāras*: the *upavicāras* of indifference (*upekṣa*) with regard to visible things, sounds, tangible things and *dharmas* of the Fourth Dhyāna are produced in this absorption.

35b. four have Rūpadhātu for their object.

This is the opinion of the masters who think that the mind of this absorption is *vyavacchinālambana*, that is, that it considers visible things, sounds, etc., separately.

According to other masters, this mind is *paripīṇḍitālambana*: it considers the five *skandhas* of the Fourth Dhyāna without any distinction; for these masters, this absorption is thus made up of only one *upavicāra* which has for its object the Fourth Dhyāna, namely the *dharmopavicāra* of mixed objects.

35c. One has the highest sphere for its object.

In this same absorption, in Ārūpyadhātu, there is only the *dharmopavicāra*.

35d. In Ārūpyadhātu itself, one,

In the principle (*maula*)<sup>291</sup> Dhātu, or Ārūpyadhātu itself, there is only one *upavicāra*, *dharmopavicāra*

35e. which has its own Dhātu for its object.

which has Ārūpyadhātu for its object. As we shall see, the mind, in the principle absorption of Ārūpyadhātu, does not grasp lower Dhātus for its object (viii.21).

35f. All of these eighteen are impure.

There is no *upavicāra* which is pure.

A being born in Kāmadhātu who has not taken possession of a good mind of Rūpadhātu [by penetration into Anāgamyā, viii.22; who is all the more not detached from Kāmadhātu and who has not entered into the Dhyānas], is in possession of (*samānvāgata*; ii.36b): 1. the eighteen *upavicāras* of Kāmadhātu; 2. the eight *upavicāras* of the First and Second Dhyāna (four of satisfaction and four of indifference, having visible things, sounds, tangible things and *dharma*s for their objects). The *upavicāras* of satisfaction and indifference, having for their object the odors and tastes of Kāmadhātu, which are produced in the Dhyānas, are not defiled [since the possessor of the Dhyānas is in Kāmadhātu]: hence the being in question is not filled with these *upavicāras* [for a being in an lower sphere is filled with the defiled *dharma*s of the superior spheres]; 3. the four *upavicāras* (of indifference) of the last two Dhyānas [same remark as for 2]; and 4. an *upavicāra* (*dharmopavicāra*) of the sphere of Ārūpyadhātu, also defiled.

When this being has obtained a good mind of Rūpadhātu [by penetrating into Anāgamyā], but is not detached from Kāmadhātu, he is filled with: 1. the eighteen *upavicāras* of Kāmadhātu; 2. the ten *upavicāras* of the First Dhyāna: four *upavicāras*, defiled, of satisfaction, by omitting the *upavicāras* of odor and taste, and the six *upavicāras* of indifference of the sphere of Anāgamyā; 3. as above for the other Dhyānas and Ārūpyadhātu.

One can decide any other case on the basis of these principles.

A being in one sphere of Dhyāna is in possession of a single *upavicāra* of Kāmadhātu, the *dharmopavicāra* of indifference associated with a mind capable of creating fictive beings (*nirmāṇacitta*, vii.49c).

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Another master:<sup>292</sup> It is in this way that the Vaibhāṣikas understand the *upavicāras*; but we understand the Sūtra in a different way. One cannot say of one who is detached (*vītarāga*) from an object, a visible thing, etc., that he produces *upavicāras* with regard to this object. All the satisfactions, etc. (*saumanasya*, etc.), are not *upavicāras*, though they are impure. They are *upavicāras* when they are "defiling" (*sāṃkleśika*), following the expression of the Sūtra, "when one has sympathy,

antipathy, or indifference not proceeding from exact consciousness." And it is in order to combat these *upavicāras* that the six "manners of being, or perpetual methods" (*satatavihāra*) are taught,<sup>293</sup> "Having seen a visible thing with the eye, there is no sympathy and no antipathy: he remains indifferent in full mindfulness and conscious . . ." <sup>294</sup> We can show that our interpretation is correct by observing that the Arhat is not without experiencing a satisfaction of a worldly order (and consequently impure), but good, having a *dharma* for its object<sup>295</sup> (that is, the *dharmayātana*, i.24, or the *adhiḡama* or *āgama*, viii.39a). What he arrests is the satisfaction which, being defiled, is *upavicāra*.<sup>296</sup>

By distinguishing those states of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference on the basis of those which have craving for their principle component and those which have "leaving" (the desire for liberation) for their principal component, we have the thirty-six "points of the Master" (*śāstrīpada*), so called because this distinction has been taught by the Master.<sup>297</sup>

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The divisions of the parts of existence (*bhavāṅga*) called sensation, and which we have just described, are still very numerous.

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The other parts of existence will not be explained here.

36a. The others have been explained or will be explained later.

The consciousness and the six *āyatana*s have been explained in the First Chapter (i.16,9); the *saṃskāras* and existence will be explained in Chapter Four; desire and attachment, in Chapter Five.

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We have said (iii.26) that *pratītyasamutpāda* is defilement (*kleśa*), action (*karman*) and a "substantial entity" (*vastu*).

36b-d. It is explained that defilement is like a seed, a Nāga, a root, a tree, a husk of grain.<sup>298</sup>

As a stalk, leaves, etc., arise from a seed, so too defilement arises from defilement, action, and a real, substantial entity.

A pond where Nāgas live does not dry up; in the same way the ocean of births where this Nāga which is defilement remains does not dry up.

The tree whose root is not cut off continues to grow even through one cuts and re-cuts its greenery; in the same way, as long as this root, defilement, is not cut off, the realms of rebirth continue to grow.

A tree gives forth flowers and fruits at different times; in the same way it is not at one and the same time that this tree, the defilement, gives forth a defilement, action and a substantial entity.

Grain, even though intact, does not germinate when it is stripped of its husk; in the same way action must be associated with this husk which is defilement in order to bear fruit in a new existence.

37a-b. Action is like grain with its husk, grass, flower.

Action is like grain with its husk. It is like grass that dies when the fruit is ripe: in the same way, when the action has matured, it no longer matures any more. It is like a flower, the immediate cause of the arising of the fruit: in the same way it is the immediate cause of retribution.

37c. The substantial entity (*vastu*) is like food and drink.<sup>299</sup>

Food and drink are not reproduced in food and drink: they are not good except by being consumed: so too the "entity" which is retribution. A new retribution does not preceed from retribution, for, in this hypothesis, deliverance would then be impossible.

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The series (*saṃtāna*) of the *skandhas*, in its continual process, is only a succession of the four existences (*bhava*) that we have defined (iii.10 and foll.), namely intermediate existence (*antarābhava*), existence as arising (*upapattibhava*), existence in and of itself (*pūrvakālabhava*), and existence at death (*naraṇabhava*).

37d-38b. Among the four existences, existence as arising is always defiled, and by all the defilements of the sphere to which it belongs.

It is always defiled, never good or neutral. When arising takes place in a certain sphere (*bhūmi*: Kāmadhātu, First Dhyāna, etc.), all the defilements (*kleśa*)<sup>300</sup> of this sphere defile it. The Ābhidhārmikas say, "Among the defilements, there is not a single one that does not defile the mind at rebirth (*pratisaṃdhibandha*); but rebirth takes place solely through defilements, not by the wrappings (*paryavasthānas*) called *svatantra* [, through jealousy, egoism, anger, or hypocrisy, which are only associated with ignorance] (v.47).

Although this state—the state of death—is bodily and mentally "weak" (*mandikā*),<sup>301</sup> when a person has habitually practiced a certain defilement,<sup>302</sup> this defilement, thus "projected," becomes active at the moment of death.

38c. The other existences are of three types.<sup>303</sup>

Intermediate existence (*antarābhava*), existence in and of itself (*pūrvakālabhava*), and existence at death (*maranābhava*) can be good, bad, or neutral.

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Are the four existences produced in all the Dhātus?

38c. Three in the Ārūpyas.<sup>304</sup>

With the exception of intermediate existence. All four existences exist in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu.

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We have finished the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

Now how do beings, once they are born, last?

38d. Everyone lasts through food.<sup>305</sup>

A Sūtra says, "A *dharma* has been proclaimed by the Blessed One who knows and sees, that all beings last through food."

There are four foods, food by the mouthful (*kavaḍḍikāra āhāra*),

contact (*sparśa*), mental volition (*manasāvicetanā*), and consciousness (*viññāna*).<sup>306</sup>

Food by the mouthful is coarse or subtle. Food by the mouthful of intermediate beings (who nourish themselves on odors, from whence their name of Gandharva, iii.30c), the food of the gods, and the food of humans at the beginning of the cosmic age (*prāāthamakālpika*, iii.97c) is subtle, because this food, like oil poured out into the sand, completely penetrates into the body and does not give forth any excrement (*niṣyandāābhāvāt*).<sup>307</sup> Or rather the food of subtle beings is subtle, for example a being born from moisture (*yūka*, etc.), one newly-born (*bālaka*), [the embryonic being,] etc.

39a-b. Food by the mouthfuls exists in Kāmadhātu; it consists of three *āyatana*s.

Only beings free from desire with regard to this food arise in the two higher Dhātus; thus this food exists only in Kāmadhātu.

It consists of odors, tastes, and tangible things. In fact, odors, tastes and tangible things are put in the mouth—that is, in *piṇḍa*s or small balls—and then swallowed. This twofold operation is made by the mouth and the nose which separate the morsels.

But how does one attribute the quality of food to odors, etc., which are also found in shade (*chāyā*) and warm light (*ātapa*, i.10a), in flames (*jvalā*), and in the light [of gems, etc.] (*prabhā*)?<sup>308</sup>

But such odors, etc., are not put in the mouth and swallowed.

According to the School, the definition, "Food consists of three *āyatana*s," refers to the generality of the cases. [The odors which are found in the shade, etc., are not food; but, in the majority of cases, odor pertains to food].

But<sup>309</sup> we think that, even though they are not swallowed, like the others, since they contribute to the duration of a being, these odors are included in the category of subtle food; as for example bathing and unguents (*snānābhyaṅgavat*; see i. trans. p. 103).

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But why is *rūpāyatana*, a visible thing (color and figure) not a food? In fact, one swallows it by the mouthfuls.



39c-d. *Rūpāyatana* is not food, for it comforts neither its organ nor those delivered.<sup>310</sup>

Food is that which comforts the organs and the primary elements (the *mahābhūtas*) which are the support of the organs. Now a visible thing, at the moment when it is swallowed—when this food, introduced into the mouth, is eaten—does not comfort either its organ (the eye), or the primary elements which are the support of the eye. Nor does it comfort the other organs, since it is not their object. Without doubt, as long as one sees it, it causes pleasure and satisfaction, it comforts: but, what is comfort and food in this case is not the visible thing, but the agreeable contact which has the visible thing for its object. The explanation that we formulate here is confirmed by the fact that an agreeable visible thing does not comfort those liberated beings who see it. [If a visible thing were to perform the function of food when one sees it, it would comfort persons delivered from the desire for mouthfuls of food, namely the Anāgāmins and Arhats, as odors, tastes, etc. comfort these same liberated beings when they partake of them.]

40a-b. In the three Dhātus, contact, volition, and consciousness, when they are impure, are food.<sup>311</sup>

Contact is what arises from the cooperation of the three (iii. p. 97); mental volition is mental action (*mānasa karman*, iv.1c); and consciousness is the consciousness *skandha*.<sup>312</sup>

Why are they not food when they are pure?

The Vaibhāṣikas say, "Food signifies that which makes existence (*bhava*) grow; now if it were pure, it have the destruction of existence for its result." It is a doctrine conforming to that of the Sūtra, that food has for a result causing to endure (*sthiti*), causing to go (*yāpana*) "those that exist" (*bhūta*), of favoring (*anugraha*) "those desiring re-existence (*sambhavaśin*)."<sup>313</sup> Now contact, volition, and consciousness, when they are pure, do not produce any of these two results.

"Those that exist" signifies beings who have been born; but what is the meaning of the expression "desiring re-existence?"<sup>314</sup>

It refers to *antarābhava*, intermediate existence or being, which the Blessed One designated by five names:

40c-41a. Mind created (*manomaya*), desiring re-existence (*sam-*

*bhavaṣin*), Gandharva (an eater of odors), intermediate existence (*antarābhava*), and arising (*nirvṛtti*).

An intermediate being is called *manomaya*,<sup>315</sup> because he is produced by the *manas* alone, and because he exists without being supported by any exterior element, semen, blood, flower, etc.

He is called *abhinirvṛtti*, because his *nirvṛtti* or arising is with a view (*abhi-mukhī*) to arising proper (*upapattibhava*, existence of arising).<sup>317</sup> That *abhinirvṛtti* signifies an intermediate being results from the Sūtra "After having realized (*abhinirvartya*) a painful body, he will be reborn in a painful world;"<sup>318</sup> and also from the Sūtra that says, "Such a person has abandoned the bonds which cause *abhinirvṛtti*, without having abandoned the bonds which cause *upapatti* or existence."<sup>319</sup> in a painful world;"<sup>318</sup> and also from the Sūtra that says, "Such a person has abandoned the bonds which cause *abhinirvṛtti*, without having abandoned the bonds which cause *upapatti* or existence."<sup>319</sup>

There are four cases: 1. An ascetic detached from Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu, when he is an Anāgāmin:<sup>320</sup> he has abandoned the bonds which cause *abhinirvṛtti* or intermediate existence, since he will no longer be reborn in the Dhātus where existence itself is preceded by an intermediate existence; but he has not abandoned the bonds which cause *upapatti*, existence proper, for he will be reborn in Ārūpyadhātu; 2. an Anāgāmin destined to obtain Nirvāṇa in an intermediate existence (an *antarāparinirvāyin*, iii. p. 387): he is bound with the bonds of *abhinirvṛtti*, but freed from *upapatti*; 3. an Arhat, who has abandoned the two types of bonds; and 4. all other persons who are not included in the preceding categories, who have not abandoned any of the two types of bonds.

According to another explanation, the *bhūtas* (p. 441, line 31) are the Arhats: the word *saṁbhavaṣin* designates all beings who desire (*saṁsṛjā*), and who are as a consequence reborn.

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What are the foods that fulfill these two functions of causing to last and "favoring [re-existence]?"<sup>321</sup>

According to the Vaibhāṣikas,<sup>322</sup> the four foods perform these two functions.<sup>323</sup> Food by the mouthful has for its result the re-existence of

those who are attached to it. This is proved by the Sūtra. The Blessed One said, "The four foods are the root of sickness, abscesses, and thorns. [Sickness, abscesses, and thorns signifies the five *upādānaskandhas* of a new existence]; and are the condition (*pratya*) of old age and death. [And old age and death is the old age and death of a future existence, see above, p. 404]." <sup>324</sup>

[It is evident that food by the mouthful causes living beings to last.] But how does mental intentional action, or volition (*manasam-cetanā*), possess this power? <sup>325</sup>

Once upon a time there was a man, who in a time of poverty desired to go to another land. But he was exhausted by his hunger and his two sons were young. Feeling that he was going to die, he filled a sack with ashes, placed this sack on a wall, and encouraged his sons by telling them that this sack contained grain. The two children, through hope, lived a long time. But another man came and took the sack and opened it. The children saw that it was ashes, and their hope being crushed, they died.

So too once upon a time some merchants travelled by ship on the open sea; tormented by hunger and thirst, they saw in the distance a mass of foam and believed that it was a river; hope gave them the force to go to that place and prolong their life; but, arriving, they found out what it was, and their hopes being crushed, they died. <sup>326</sup>

We also read in the *Samgūtiparyāya*, <sup>327</sup> "Large marine animals reach firm ground, lay their eggs on the beach, bury them in the sand, and go back to the ocean. If the mother forgets the eggs, they will perish."

This edition cannot be correct, <sup>328</sup> for it is impossible that the mind of another would be food. Thus we should read, "If the eggs think of their mother, they will not perish; but if they forget their mother, they will perish."

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Yet one cannot doubt that all the impure *dharma*s increase *bhava* or existence. Why did the Blessed One teach that the foods are four in number?

Because he refers to the essentials:

41. Among the foods, two have for their result the growth of the

*āśraya* (the body) and the *āśrita* (the mind), and two have for their result the projection and the production of a new existence.<sup>329</sup>

The *āśraya* is the body with its organs, which is the support (*āśraya*) of what is supported (*āśrita*) by it: namely the mind and its mental states. Food by the mouthful makes the body grow, while contact makes the mind grow.<sup>330</sup> These two foods which cause that which is born to live, and which are similar to a wet-nurse, are the major items for the duration of a being who is born.

Mental volitional action (*manasamīcetanā*) which is active, projects a new existence; this new existence, thus projected, is produced (*nirvṛtta*) from the seed which is the consciousness "informed" through action.<sup>331</sup> Mental volitional action and the consciousness are thus the two foods which cause birth, which are similar to a mother, and which are the major items for the production of the existence of a being who has not yet been born.

Is everything which is "by the mouthful" (*kavaḍīkāra*) food?<sup>332</sup>

There are "mouthfuls" which are not food. Four cases: 1. *kavaḍīkāra* which is not food: that which, being taken in the mouth, has for its result the diminution of the organs and the destruction of the primary elements which support them; 2. food without being *kavaḍīkāra*: namely contact, mental volitional action, and the consciousness; 3. *kavaḍīkāra* which is food: that which, being taken in the mouth, has for its result the growth of the organs and the increase of the primary elements; and 4. neither *kavaḍīkāra* nor food: sound, etc.

The same, by changing the terms, for the other foods.

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Is there contact, mental volitional action, and consciousness, which has for its result the growth of the organs and the increase of the elements, without this contact, etc., being food?

Yes: those which belong to a sphere different from the sphere in which the being in question is born, and, in all the spheres, those which are pure.<sup>333</sup>

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That which consumed (*paribhukta*) is harmful to one who has consumed it (*praibhoktar*) nevertheless receives the name of food. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, in fact, it is for two moments that the thing consumed performs the function of food: 1. as soon as it is consumed, it dispels hunger and thirst; and 2. digested, it increases the organs and the primary elements (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 676c25).<sup>334</sup>

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This leads to another question.

How many foods are there in the different realms of rebirth, and in the different wombs?

All are in all.

How can you say that there is, in the hells, food by the mouthful?

The red balls of fire and molten copper are food.<sup>335</sup>

If this is the case, if that which is harmful is food, then the theory of the four cases [of the *Saṃgītiparyāya*, note 332] is rejected, as well as the definitions of the *Prakaraṇagrantha* (7.5; see also *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 674a1, 676a26, and 779c4) which says, "What is food by the mouthful? Mouthful by reason of which there is increase of the organs, and the increase and maintainance of the primary elements," and the rest.

The doctrine of the existence of food by the mouthful in the hells is not in contradiction with the definitions that you appeal to. These definitions, in fact, are applied to food insofar as it increases.<sup>336</sup> But the objects of consumption which have for their result to diminish, nevertheless possess, in the hells, the characteristics of food:<sup>337</sup> they dispel, at least for a time, hunger and thirst. Further, in the *prādesika* hells (iii.59c), food by the mouthful exists as among humans. Hence food by the mouthful exists in the five realms of rebirth.

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With respect to food by the mouthful, let us examine the Sūtra: There is one who feeds one hundred non-Buddhist Ṛṣis detached from

Kāmadhātu, and there is one who feeds a single *jambuṣaṇḍagata prthagjana*: but this last gift is much more fruitful than the first." What does the expression "*jambuṣaṇḍagata prthagjana*" mean?

[Three opinions in the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 678a26] 1. According to the first opinion, *jambuṣaṇḍa* signifying Jambudvīpa,<sup>338</sup> so this signifies, "All beings inhabiting Jambudvīpa who have a stomach."<sup>339</sup>

This explanation is inadmissible; for the expression "a *Prthagjana* . . ." cannot designate "all beings . . ." Were it to have such a value, we do not see why the Sūtra would teach that a gift made to an infinite number of *Prthagjanas* is more meritorious than one made to a smaller number, to one hundred *Ṛṣis*: for such would stand of itself, and there would be nothing surprising about it.<sup>340</sup>

2. According to the second opinion, the *Prthagjana* in question is the Bodhisattva close to Bodhi.

3. According to followers of the third opinion, the second opinion is unsustainable: in fact a gift made to such a Bodhisattva is of incalculable merit, and is of a merit superior to a gift made to one hundred *koṭis* of Arhats. The terms of the comparison would be much too low. Thus, say the *Vaibhāṣikas*, this *Prthagjana* is the person who has obtained the so-called *nirvedhabhāgīya* roots of good.<sup>341</sup>

In our opinion, the expression *jambuṣaṇḍagata* does not etymologically signify "possessor of the *nirvedhabhāgīyas*;" the usage does not give that sense to this expression; neither the Sūtra nor the Śāstra uses it in this sense: the word *jambuṣaṇḍagata*, "seated under the Jambu tree," refers to but one Bodhisattva, [as it is said, "The Bodhisattva Sarvārthasiddha, having left in order to go see Kṛṣṇagrāmaka, sat at the foot of a *jambu* tree, and entered into the First Dhyāna."]<sup>342</sup> The Bodhisattva is a *Prthagjana*, detached from Kāmadhātu: one can thus compare him with the non-Buddhist *Ṛṣis* detached from Kāmadhātu and say that a gift made to him is more meritorious than a gift made to *Ṛṣis*.

Without doubt, a gift made to this Bodhisattva is more meritorious than a gift made to an infinite number of *Ṛṣis*: and if the Sūtra says that it is more meritorious than a gift made to one hundred *Ṛṣis*, it is because the Sūtra explains the gradation of merit by multiples of one hundred: "to feed one hundred animals, to feed one immoral person, to feed one hundred immoral persons . . ." we observe that, to proceed with these

comparisons, the Sūtra does not further speak of a *jambuṣaṇḍagata*. It does not say, "A gift made to a candidate for the results of Srotaāpanna is incomparable greater than a gift made to a *jambuṣaṇḍagata*"—which it would say if *jambuṣaṇḍagata* were to signify "a possessor of the *nirvedhabhāgīyas*"—but rather, taking up again the Ṛṣis as the term of comparison, "A gift made to a candidate for the results of Srotaāpanna is incomparably greater than a gift made to one hundred non-Buddhist Ṛṣis.

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We have seen what the *pratītyasamutpāda* of beings is, and how beings last. We have seen also how death results from the exhaustion of life (*āyus*), etc. (ii.45a, trans. p. 269). It remains for us to say which consciousness is present at the moments of death and birth.

42a-c. Breaking, taking up again, detachment, loss of detachment, death and birth are regarded as proper to the mind consciousness.<sup>343</sup>

It is through a single mental consciousness that the breaking and the taking up again of the roots of good take place; the detachment either from a Dhātu, or from a *bhūmi* (First Dhyāna, etc.), and the loss of this detachment; and death and birth. What is true of birth is evidently true of the beginning of the intermediate existence: it is useless to speak of it.<sup>344</sup>

42d. Death and birth, with the sensation of indifference.

The term *cyuta* is the equivalent of *cyuti* or death; the term *udbhava* is the equivalent of *upapatti*, arising.

The mind consciousness, at death and at birth, is associated with the sensation of indifference, *upekṣā*, that is, with the sensation that is neither agreeable nor disagreeable. This sensation is not active; the other sensations are active and, as a consequence, an arising and a dying consciousness cannot be associated with them, for, in this hypothesis, it would itself be active.

43a. Neither the one nor the other in "absorption," nor for "one without thought."<sup>345</sup>

Death and birth take place in the mind consciousness (*manovijñāna*), [for and by the *manovijñāna*]. But death cannot take place in a person whose mind (*citta* = *manovijñāna*) is absorbed.<sup>346</sup> An absorbed mind is found in a sphere—First Dhyāna, etc.—dissimilar to Kāmadhātu where we suppose the one dying and the one being born is found. On the other hand, if we consider a being who dies or who is born in a sphere of absorption, then his mind is certainly not absorbed, for an absorbed mind is only absorbed through effort; it is *ābhisamskārika*: thus it is always active (*paṭu*). Finally, an absorbed mind is *anugrahaka*: that is to say, by its nature, it tends to last, to cause to last; hence it is not suitable to a cutting off of the series.

There is no longer any death or birth for "one without thought," [a person who has entered into *nirodhasamāpatti* and *asamjñīsamāpatti*, ii.41d]. One who is without thought cannot be killed: when his body (*āśraya* = the sense apparatus, iii.41) begins to decay—either by the action of the sword or of fire, or by the exhaustion of retribution of the absorptions—then, of necessity, the mind bound to the body [and existing as a seed in the body] becomes present and dies.<sup>347</sup>

The state of non-thought is also incompatible with birth, for it is lacking any cause for the cutting off of the mind, and because there cannot be a birth without defilement.<sup>348</sup>

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Existence at death (*maraṇabhava*) can be good, bad, or neutral. Concerning the death of the Arhat,

43b. He obtains Nirvāṇa in two neutral minds.<sup>349</sup>

Namely, in an *airyāpathika* mind or in a *vipākaja* mind. At least according to the masters who believe that, in Kāmadhātu, a *vipākaja* mind can be indifferent (*upekṣā*, iv.48); but, for the masters of an opposing opinion (iv.47), one cannot obtain Nirvāṇa in an *airyāpathika* mind.

Why is the last mind of the Arhat necessarily neutral?

Because this type of mind, being very weak, is suitable to the cutting off of the mind, that is, to the definitive cutting off of the mind.<sup>350</sup>



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In which part of the body does the consciousness perish at death?

When death or "falling" (*cyuti*) takes place at once, the *kāyendriya* (organ of the body or of touch) perishes at the same time as does the *manas*.

43c-44a. When death is gradual, the *manas* dies in the feet, at the navel, in the heart, accordingly as the being goes below, among humans, among the Suras, or is not reborn.<sup>351</sup>

*Adhoga*, "who goes below," is one who should be reborn in the painful

should be reborn in the human realms of rebirth; *suraga*, "who goes among the gods," is one who should be reborn in a heavenly realm of rebirth. The consciousness of these beings dies respectively, in the feet, the navel, or in the heart.

*Aja*, "who is not reborn," is the Arhat: his consciousness also dies in the heart; but according to another opinion, in the head.<sup>352</sup>

How does the consciousness die in a certain part of the body?

Because it is in such a part that the destruction of the organ of touch takes place.<sup>353</sup> [The activity of the consciousness which is nonmaterial and outside of space, is bound to this organ—which alone remains as its support or *āśraya*, iii.44]. The consciousness dies through the destruction of the organ of touch, which takes place in a certain place. Towards the end of life, the organ of touch perishes bit by bit; at the end it remains only in a certain part of the body where it finishes by disappearing; in the same way water placed on a hot rock diminishes gradually and finishes by disappearing in a certain place.

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It is thus that gradual death takes place; in general, the dying person is afflicted by some sensations which break the vital parts.

44b. The vital parts are split by water, etc.<sup>354</sup>

*Marmāṇi*,<sup>355</sup> or vital parts, are those parts of the body which cannot be damaged without death ensuing.

When one of the elements,—water, fire or wind,—is extremely troubled, the vital parts are as if they were split by terrible sensations which are like sharp knives. By saying that the vital parts are split, we do not mean to say that they are split like wood. Rather one should understand that they are henceforth incapable of activity quite as if they were split.

Why are the vital parts not split by trouble of the earth element?

Because there are only three *doṣas*, namely bile, phlegm, and wind, which are in order the elements of water, fire, and wind.

According to another opinion, since the world perishes by these three elements (iii.100a), death also takes place by these three elements.<sup>356</sup>

The vital parts of the gods are not split. But five premonitory signs appear to a god being approached by death: 1. some of his clothes and some of his ornaments give off unpleasant sounds; 2. the light of his body diminishes; 3. some drops of water remain attached to his body after his bath; 4. in spite of his natural mobility, his mind is fixed on an object; and 5. his eyes, naturally fixed, are troubled, opening and closing. And there are five signs of death: 1. his clothes become dirty; 2. his aura fades; 3. sweat appears in his armpits; 4. his body emits a bad odor; and 5. the god no longer enjoys his seat.<sup>357</sup>

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The Blessed One classified beings who arise, last, and die,<sup>358</sup> into three categories: those predestined to health, predestined to loss, and not predestined.

44c-d. An Āryan and one guilty of *ānantarya* transgressions are predestined, the first to health, the second to loss.<sup>359</sup>

What is "health," *samyaktva*?<sup>360</sup>

According to the Sūtra, the complete abandoning of affection, hatred, error, and all of the defilements, [that is, Nirvāṇa].

What is an Āryan?

One in whom the Path arises, that is, the Pure Path. He is an Āryan because he "has gone far" (*ārād yātaḥ*) from evil,<sup>361</sup> since he possesses disconnection (*viśamyoga*, ii.55d, p.) from the defilements.

How is the Āryan predestined to health?

Because he will certainly obtain Nirvāṇa.

But a person who acquires the *mokṣabhāgīyas* (vi.24c) will also certainly obtain Nirvāṇa. Why not consider him predestined to health?

Because he can commit transgressions which make him "predestined to loss;" or rather because, if he is in fact predestined for Nirvāṇa, the moment of his arrival at Nirvāṇa is not fixed, as is the case for the Āryans beginning with "he who, at a maximum, will be reborn seven times" (*saptakṛtvahparama*, vi.34a).

What is loss, *mithyātva*?

The hellish, animal, and Preta realms of rebirth. A person who commits *ānantarya* transgressions (iv.96) will certainly be reborn in hell; he is thus predestined to loss.

One who is not predestined (*anīyata*) is one who is not predestined to health or loss. Whether he becomes predestined to one or the other, or whether he continues to not be predestined, depends in fact on his future actions.

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We have described the world of human beings; let us pass to a description of the receptacle or physical world (*bhājanaloka*).<sup>362</sup>

45. Here is how it is thought that the receptable world is arranged: at the bottom there is a circle of wind, immeasurable, with a height of sixteen hundred thousand leagues.<sup>363</sup>

The great chiliocosm (iii.73) is arranged as we shall explain. At its bottom there arises, through the force of the predominant actions of beings (*adhipatiphala*, ii.58, iv.85), a circle of wind which rests on space.<sup>364</sup> It is sixteen thousand *yojanas* (iii.88) thick; it is immeasurable in circumference; and it is solid: a *mahānagna*<sup>365</sup> could strike at it with his *vajra* and his *vajra* would break without the circle of wind being scratched.

46a-b. The circle of water, eleven hundred twenty thousand high.

By the predominate actions of beings, there falls from massed

clouds, upon the circle of wind, a rain the drops of which are like the shafts of a carriage.<sup>366</sup> This water forms a circle of water, with a thickness of eleven hundred twenty thousand *yojanas*.

How do these waters not flow over the edge?<sup>367</sup>

Some say that the waters are sustained by the force of the actions of beings, as food and drink which do not fall in the intestines before being digested.

According to another opinion, the waters are sustained by the wind, like grain in a basket.

Then the water, agitated by a wind which the force of actions gives rise to, becomes gold in its upper part, as churned milk becomes cream:<sup>368</sup>

46c-d. Then, the circle of waters is no more than eight hundred thousand leagues in height; the rest becomes gold.<sup>369</sup>

Then there is above the circle of water now reduced to eight hundred thousand *yojanas*, a sphere of gold, three hundred twenty thousand *yojanas* thick.

47a-48a. The circle of water and gold have a diameter of twelve hundred three thousand four hundred and fifty leagues; triple for its perimeter.<sup>370</sup>

These two circles have the same dimensions.

On the circular sphere of gold which thus rests on the water,

48b-49c. There are Meru, Yugandhara, Īṣādhara, Khadiraka, Mount Sudarśana, Aśvakarṇa, Vinataka, and Mount Nimindhara; beyond are the continents; on the edge is Cakravāḍa.<sup>371</sup>

Nine great mountains rest on the sphere of gold. In the center there is Meru; concentrically, the other seven are arranged around Meru; Nimindhara forms the exterior rim that envelops Meru and the six inner wall-mountains<sup>372</sup>—whence its name. Beyond [Nimindhara] lie the four continents. Enveloping all is Cakravāḍa, thus named because it encircles the universe with its four continent and also because it has the form of a wheel.

49d-50a. Seven mountains are made of gold; the last is made of iron; and Meru is made of four jewels.

Yugandhara and the six mountains that surround it are made of gold; Cakravāḍa is made of iron; Meru has four faces which are respectively, from north to west, made of gold, silver, lapis and cristal. Each of these substances gives its own color to the part of space which faces it.<sup>373</sup> Since the face of Meru which is turned towards Jambudvīpa is made of lapis, our heaven is thus similar in color to lapis.

What is the origin of the different substances that make up Meru?

The waters which have fallen on the sphere of gold are rich in different potentialities;<sup>374</sup> under the action of the winds which possess different efficacies, they disappear and make room for different jewels. It is thus that the waters are transformed into jewels: the water is the cause, the jewels are a result different from the cause, and there is no simultaneity. This is quite different from the concept of transformation (*pariṇāma*)<sup>375</sup> that the Sāṅkhya imagine.

What do the Sāṅkhyas understand by *pariṇāma*?

They admit that *dharma*s arise and disappear within a permanent substance (a *dharmin* or *dravya*).

How is this incorrect?

One cannot admit the simultaneous existence of a permanent *dharmin*, and of *dharma*s arising and disappearing.<sup>376</sup>

But the Sāṅkhyas do not hold that there is a *dharmin* separate from the *dharma*s; they say that a *dharma*, when it is transformed (*pariṇam*), becomes the support of different characteristics: this *dharma* they call *dharmin*. In other words, transformation (*pariṇāma*) is only the modification (*anyathābhāvamātra*) of a substance (*dravya*).

This thesis is not correct.

Why is it not correct?

Because there is a contradiction in terms: you admit that that (the cause) is identical to this (the result), but that this is not like that.<sup>377</sup>

The gold, silver, jewels and the land thus formed are brought together and piled in heaps by the winds which are produced by the force of actions. They make up the mountains and the continents.

50b.-51b. Meru is immersed in the water to a depth of twenty-four thousand leagues and rises above the water some eighty thousand leagues. The immersion of the eight other mountains diminishes each by a half. The mountains have equal width and height.<sup>378</sup>

The mountains rest on the sphere of gold and are in the water to a depth of eighty thousand *yojanas*. Meru rises out of the water for the same number of *yojanas*, and is thus, both in and out of the water, one hundred sixty thousand *yojanas* in height. Yugandhara rises out of the water for forty thousand *yojanas*, Īṣādhara for twenty thousand *yojanas* and thus following until Cakravāḍa which rises out of the water for three hundred twelve *yojanas* and a half.<sup>379</sup> The mountains are as wide as they extend out of the water. [For example, if a mountain extends out of the water to a height of twenty thousand *yojanas*, it is then twenty thousand *yojanas* wide]. [The word *dhana*, in the Kārikā, has the sense of "wide".]

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51c-52c. The seven Sītās, of which the first is of eighty thousand leagues, form the interval between the mountains. This is the inner ocean, triple in circumference. The other Sītās diminish by a half. The rest is the great outer sea, of three hundred twenty-two thousand leagues.<sup>380</sup>

The Sītās<sup>381</sup> are located between the mountains, from Meru to Nimindhara: the Sītās are full of water endowed with the eight qualities: cold, clear, light, tasty, sweet, not fetid, and harming neither the throat nor the stomach.<sup>382</sup>

The first, between Meru and Yugandhara, is eighty thousand leagues in width. In exterior circumference, to the shore of Yugandhara, it is triple this, thus two hundred forty thousand *yojanas*.

The size of the other Sītās diminishes by a half: the second Sītā, between Yugandhara and Īṣādhara, is forty thousand *yojanas* in width, and so on to the seventh, between Vinataka and Nimindhara, which is twelve hundred fifty *yojanas* wide. The calculation of the circumferences presents no difficulty. The seven Sītās are the inner ocean. The rest, that is, the water between Nimindhara and Cakravāḍa, is the great outer sea; it is full of salt water, and is three hundred twenty-two thousand *yojanas* wide.<sup>383</sup>

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53b-55d. There is Jambudvīpa, three sides of two thousand, in the form of a carriage, and one side of three and a half; eastern Videha, like a half-moon, three sides like Jambu, and one side of three hundred fifty; Godānīya, of seven thousand five hundred, round, with a diameter of two thousand five hundred; and Kuru, of eight thousand, square, parallel.

In the outer sea, corresponding to the four sides of Meru, there are four continents (*dvīpas*):

1. Jambudvīpa has three sides of two thousand *yojanas* in length, one side of three *yojanas* and a half: it thus has the shape of a carriage.<sup>384</sup> In its center, resting on the sphere of gold, is the "diamond throne"<sup>385</sup> where the Bodhisattva sits to attain *vajropamasamādhi* (vi.44d) and so to become an Arhat and a Buddha: no other place, and no other person can support the *vajropamasamādhi* of the Bodhisattva.

2. Eastern Videha or Pūrvavideha has the shape of a half-moon; it has three sides of two thousand *yojanas*, thus of the same dimension as the long side of Jambu, and one side of three hundred fifty *yojanas*.

3. Godānīya, which faces the western side of Meru, is round like the moon; it is seven thousand five hundred *yojanas* [in circumference], and two thousand five hundred through the center.<sup>386</sup>

4. Facing the northern side of Meru is Kuru or Uttarakuru which has the shape of a seat; it is square: its sides, of two thousand *yojanas* each, form a circumference of eight thousand *yojanas*. To say that Kuru is "parallel" means that its four sides are of the same dimension.<sup>387</sup>

Such is the shape of the continents, and such is the shape of the faces of the persons who reside in them.<sup>388</sup>

56. There are eight intermediate continents: Dehas, Videhas, Kurus, Kauravas, Cāmaras, and Avaracāmaras, Śāṭhas and Uttaramantrins.<sup>389</sup>

These continents are designated by the name of their inhabitants. Dehas and Videhas are located on both sides of Pūrvavideha; Kurus and Kauravas on the sides of Uttarakuru; Cāmaras and Avaracāmaras on the sides of Jambudvīpa; and Śāṭhas and Uttaramantrins on the sides of Godānīya.

All of these continents are inhabited by human beings. Never-

theless, according to one opinion,<sup>390</sup> one of them [namely Cāmara] is reserved for Rakṣasas.

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57. Here, to the north of the nine ant-Mountains, lie the Himavat; beyond it, but on this side of the Mountain of Perfume, is a lake deep and wide by fifty leagues.<sup>391</sup>

By going toward the north in this Jambudvīpa, one encounters three ant-Mountains, [so called because they have the shape of an ant];<sup>392</sup> then three other ant-Mountains; then three other again; and finally the Himavat (= the Himālayas).

Beyond that, this side of the Gandhamādana ("the Mountain of Perfume"), lies Lake Anavatapta from whence there flows out four great rivers, the Gaṅgā, the Sindhu, the Vakṣu and the Sitā.<sup>393</sup> This lake, fifty *yojanas* wide and deep, is full of a water endowed with the eight qualities. Only persons who possess magical powers can go there.<sup>394</sup> The Jambu tree is located near this lake. Our continent receives its name of Jambudvīpa, either from the tree, or from the fruit of the tree which is also called Jambu.

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Where are the hells<sup>395</sup>, and what are their dimensions?

58. At the bottom, at twenty thousand leagues, is Avīci, of this same dimension; above, the seven hells; all eight have sixteen *utsadas*.

Beneath Jambudvīpa, at a distance of twenty thousand *yojanas*, lies the great hell Avīci. It is twenty thousand *yojanas* high and wide; its sun is thus found forty thousand *yojanas* below the sun of Jambudvīpa.<sup>396</sup>

Why is this hell named Avīci?<sup>397</sup>

Two explanations: 1. because there is not, in this hell, any interruption (*vīci*) of suffering. Suffering is interrupted in the other hells. In Saṃjīva, for example, bodies are first crushed and reduced to dust; then a cold wind revives them and gives them feeling: from



whence the name of Saṁjīva; 2. because there is no agreeable (*vīci*) state there.<sup>398</sup> In the other hells all agreeable sensation which arises from retribution is absent; but here there is some agreeable sensations which are "an outflowing" (*niṣyanda*, ii.56c).

Above Avīci are seven hells one above the other: Pratāpana, Tapanā, Mahāraurava, Raurava, Saṁghāta, Kālasūtra, and Saṁjīva. According to another opinion, these seven hells are placed at the same level as Avīci.

Each of the eight hells has sixteen *utsadas* (See p. 458, line 15). This results from a declaration of the Blessed One, "... There are eight hells there that I have revealed, difficult to get out of, full of cruel beings, each having sixteen *utsadas*; they have four walls and four gates; they are as high as they are wide; they are encircled by walls of fire; their ceiling is fire; their sun is burning, sparkling fire; and they are filled with flames hundreds of *yojanas* high."<sup>399</sup>

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What are the sixteen *utsadas*?

59a-c. Kukūla, Kuṇapa, Kṣuramārga, etc., and the River are located at the four cardinal points of these hells.<sup>400</sup>

At each gate of these hells there is found:

1. The Kukūla, a fire where one is pushed down to one's knees. When beings put their feet in there, they lose their skin, flesh and blood, which rearises when they take their feet out.<sup>401</sup>

2. The Kuṇapa, a mire of excrements, where there are water beasts called Sharp-mouthes, whose bodies are white and heads black, which can bite the damned through to their bones.<sup>402</sup>

3. The Kṣuramārga, or Kṣuradhārāmārga, the great road of razor blades; here beings lose their skin, flesh, and blood when they put their feet on it.<sup>403</sup>

Asipattravana, the forest whose leaves are swords; when these swords fall, they cut off major and minor parts of the body, which are then devoured by the Śyāmaśabala dogs.<sup>404</sup>

Ayaḥśalmalivana,<sup>405</sup> the forests of thorns, thorns sixteen digits in length. When beings climb these trees, the thorns turn downwards, but they turn upward when they descend the tree.

Birds, Iron-beaks, tear out and eat the eyes of the damned.

These three places of suffering constitute a single *utsada* because they have in common punishment through injury.

4. The fourth *utsada* is the river Vaitaraṇī,<sup>406</sup> of boiling water loaded with burning ashes. On both sides there are persons (*puruṣa*) armed with swords, lances and javelins, who push back the damned who would get out. Whether they plunge into the water or emerge, whether they go up or down the current, whether they travel in the two directions or are tossed about, the damned are boiled and cooked, as the grains of sesame or corn poured into a cauldron placed over the fire.

The river encircles the great hell like a moat.

The four *utsadas* are sixteen in number by reason of their difference of place, since they are located at the four gates to the great hell.

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What is the meaning of the word *utsada*?<sup>407</sup>

They are called *utsadas* because they are places of supplementary torment: in the hells the damned are tormented, but they are additionally so in the *utsadas*.

According to Manoratha (above, note 170), after having been shut up in the hells, the damned then fall into the *utsadas*.<sup>408</sup>

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One question leads to another. We have just spoken of the "persons" who stand on the banks of the Vaitaraṇī. Are the "guardians of hell" (*naraka-pāla*) beings?<sup>409</sup>

They are not beings.

Then how do they move?

Through the actions of beings, like the wind of creation.<sup>410</sup>

Then how do you explain what the Venerable Dharmasubhūti said, "Those who are angry, who take pleasure in cruel actions and transgressions, who rejoice in the sufferings of others, are reborn as *Yamarākṣasas*?"<sup>411</sup>

The demons who torment the beings in hell are not termed *Yamarākṣasas*, the "guardians of hell" as you think; but rather the servants of Yama who, on the order of Yama, throw the damned into

hell.

According to another opinion, the "guardians of hell" are beings.

Where does the retribution of the cruel acts take place that these guardians commit in the hells?

In the same hells. Since the retribution of *ānantarya* transgressions (iv.97) takes place in these hells, why would the retribution of the actions of the guardians not be possible here?

But why are not the guardians, who are found in the midst of fire, burned?

Because the force of action marks a boundary to the fire and prevents it from reaching the guardians, or rather because this same force causes the bodies of the guardians to be made up of primary elements of a special nature.<sup>412</sup>

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59c-d. There are eight other hells, the cold hells, Arbuda, etc.<sup>413</sup>

These hells are called Arbuda, Nirarbuda, Aṭaṭa, Hahava, Huhuva, Utpala, Padma, and Mahāpadma. Among these names, some (Arbuda, Nirarbuda, Utpala, Padma, and Mahāpadma) indicate the form that the beings in hell take: they take the form of an *arbuda*, a lotus . . . ; the others indicate the noise that the damned make under the bite of the cold: *aṭaṭa* . . .

These cold hells are located under Jambudvīpa, on a level with the great hells.

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How is there place, under a single Jambudvīpa, for the hells which are indeed wider than Jambudvīpa?<sup>414</sup>

The continents, like piles of grain, are wider at their bases. The great ocean does not sink into a deep, steep cavity around the continents. (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 866a21; *Cullavagga*, 9, 1.3).

The sixteen hells are created through the force of the actions of beings (ii.56b, iii.90c, 101c, iv.85a); there are hells,—the *prādeśika* hells,—created through the force of individual actions, the actions of one

being, of two beings, of many beings. Their variety is great; their place is not determined: river, mountain, desert, and elsewhere.<sup>415</sup>

The principal place of the hells is below. As for the animals, they have three places, the land, the water, and the air. Their principal place is the Great Ocean; the animals that are elsewhere are the surplus of the animals.<sup>416</sup>

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The king of the Pretas is called Yama; his residence, which is the principal dwelling of the Pretas, is located five hundred leagues under Jambudvīpa; it is five hundred leagues deep and wide. The Pretas that are found elsewhere are the surplus of the Pretas. The Pretas differ much one from another; certain of them possess supernatural powers and enjoy a glory similar to that of the gods; see the *Avadānas* of the Pretas.<sup>417</sup>

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Upon what do the sun and the moon rest?

Upon the wind. The collective force of the actions of beings produces the winds which create (*nirmā*) the moon, the sun and the stars in heaven.<sup>418</sup> All these astral bodies revolve around Meru as if transported by a whirlpool.

What is the distance from here to the moon and the sun?

60a. At mid-Meru lie the moon and the sun.

The moon and the sun move at a level with the summit of Yugandhara.

What are their dimensions? Respectively.

60b. Fifty and fifty and one leagues.<sup>419</sup>

The disk of the moon is of fifty *yojanas*; the disk of the sun is of fifty-one *yojanas*.

The smallest among the "houses" (*vimāna*) of the stars is of one *krośa* (iii.87c); [the largest is of sixteen *yojanas*].<sup>420</sup>

The force of the actions of beings forms, smaller than and external

to the house of the sun,<sup>421</sup> a disk of fire-stone,<sup>422</sup> hot and luminous; and, for the house of the moon, a disk of water-stone, cold and luminous. Their function, according to circumstances, is to cause to arise and last the eye, the body, fruits, flowers, crops, and herbs; and to destroy them.

In a universe with its four continents (iii.73) there is a single sun and a single moon. Yet the sun does not fulfill its function at the same time in the four continents.

61a-b. Midnight it sets, midday it rises at the same moment.

When it is midnight in Uttarakuru, the sun sets in Pūrvavideha, it is midday in Jambudvīpa, and it rises in Godāniya, and so on. (*Dīrgha*, TD 1, p. 147c6-14).

By reason of the variety of the progress of the sun, the days and nights grow longer and shorter.

61c-62b. The nights grow longer after the ninth day of the second quarter of the second month of the rains, and they grow shorter after the ninth day of the second quarter of the fourth month of winter. Reverse for the days. The days and the nights grow longer little by little accordingly as the sun goes towards the south or towards the north.

The nights grow longer from the ninth day of the clear quarter of Bhādrapada on, and grow shorter from the ninth day of the clear quarter of Phālguna on. Reverse for the days: when the nights become longer, the days become shorter, and vice versa. The days and the nights grow longer and shorter gradually, in proportion to the sun going towards the south or towards the north of Jambudvīpa.<sup>423</sup>

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Why does the disk of the moon not appear completely full at the beginning of the bright quarter?

62c-d. The moon is covered by its shadow by reason of its proximity to the sun, and one sees it incompletely.

This is the teaching of the *Prajñāpti*, "When the house of the moon moves in the vicinity of the house of the sun, then the light of the sun

falls on the house of the moon. Consequently, the shadow falls on the opposite side, and the disk appears incomplete.”<sup>424</sup>

But, according to the ancient masters, the Yogācārins, the manner of its moving is such that the moon appears sometimes complete, sometimes incomplete.<sup>425</sup>

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To what class of beings do the inhabitants of the houses of the sun, the moon and the stars belong?

These are the Cāturmahārājakāyikas,<sup>426</sup> and the only ones among these gods who inhabit houses; but there is a great number of Cāturmahārājakāyikas who inhabit the earth, in the *pariṣaṇḍās*—the stages or terraces—of Meru and elsewhere.

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63-64. There are four terraces, the distance between them being ten thousand leagues, extending out sixteen, eight, four and two thousand leagues. They are the Karoṭapāṇis, the Mālādharas, the Sadāmattas and the two Mahārājikas; and also on the seven mountains.<sup>427</sup>

The first terrace is ten thousand leagues above the water, the second ten thousand leagues above the first and so on. They thus reach up to the middle of Meru. The first terrace extends out from Meru sixteen thousand leagues; the others, in their order extend out eight, four, two thousand leagues.<sup>428</sup> On the first terrace reside the Yakṣas “Pitcher in their Hand”;<sup>429</sup> on the second, the “Wearers of Crowns;” on the third the “Always Intoxicated” (*sadāmatta*, which the Kārikā calls *sadāmada*):<sup>430</sup> all these gods belong to the Cāturmahārājakāyikas. At the fourth terrace are the Four Kings<sup>431</sup> in person with their attendants: these gods are called the Cāturmahārājakāyikas, the Four Great Kings.

As the Cāturmahārājakāyikas inhabit Meru, so too they have villages and towns on the seven mountains of gold, Yugandhara, etc. Also the gods of this class are the most numerous of the gods.

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65-68. The Thirty-three Gods are at the summit of Meru, the sides of which are eighty thousand (leagues). At the corners, four peaks which the Vajrapāṇis inhabit. In the middle, with sides of two thousand five hundred, with a height of one and a half, is a village called Sudarśana, of gold, with a variegated and smooth sun. There is Vaijayanta, with sides of two hundred fifty. On the outside, this village is adorned with Caitraratha, Pāruṣya, Miśra and Nandana (Parks); at a distance of twenty thousand leagues from these Parks, at the four sides, there are excellent fields. At the northeast Pārijāta, in the southwest Sudharmā.

1. The Trāyastriṃśas or Thirty-three Gods<sup>432</sup> inhabit the summit of Meru; the sides of this summit are of eighty thousand *yojanas*. According to other masters, the sides of each are twenty thousand, and the circumference is eighty thousand.<sup>433</sup>

2. At the corners, there are peaks (*kūṭa*), five hundred *yojanas* high and wide, where the Yakṣas called Vajrapāṇis reside.

3. In the middle of the plateau of Meru there is the royal city of Śakra, the chief of the gods, a city called "Beautiful to Look At" (Sudarśana).<sup>434</sup> Its sides are two thousand five hundred *yojanas*; its circumference is ten thousand; its height one *yojana* and a half;<sup>435</sup> it is of gold; it is adorned with one hundred and one types of colors; and the same for its sun. This sun is soft to the touch, like the leaf of the cotton tree; it rises and falls to facilitate its progress.

4. In the middle of this city there is the palace of Śakra, the chief of the gods, called Vaijayanta: it makes all the other residences blush by its richness and its gems. Its sides are two hundred fifty *yojanas*.

Such are the adornments of the city itself.

5. Ornaments outside of the city are the four Parks:<sup>436</sup> Caitraratha, Pāruṣyaka, Miśraka, and Nandana, fields of play for the gods.

6. At the four sides<sup>437</sup> of these Parks, from a distance of twenty *yojanas* on, there are four fields of play with a marvellous sun,<sup>438</sup> delightful and which appears to rival them.

7. The magnolia tree called Pārijātaka<sup>439</sup> is, for the Thirty-three Gods, the place *par excellence* for pleasure and for love; its roots go

down fifty *yojanas*;<sup>440</sup> it is one hundred *yojanas* high; with its branches, leaves and petals, it covers fifty *yojanas*.

The fragrance of its flowers spreads one hundred *yojanas* away with the wind, fifty against the wind.

So be it, it can spread to one hundred *yojanas* with the wind, but how can it go against the wind?

According to one opinion, one says that it spreads to fifty *yojanas* against the wind, because it does not go beyond the tree [which covers in fact fifty *yojanas*].

[But this explanation does not hold: for] the text says that it goes against the wind.

We say then that the fragrance does not go against the wind, that it perishes where it arises: but such is the quality of this fragrance that, even though it would be arrested by the lightest divine wind, it gives birth to a new "series" of identical fragrances. Nevertheless, the fragrances become weak, weaker, entirely weak and are completely arrested, incapable of going as far as it does when the wind is favorable.

Does the series of this fragrance have for its support only its own primary elements which constitute the fragrance? Or rather should one suppose that the wind becomes perfumed? [In the same way as, when the grains of sesame are perfumed by flowers, there arises a new odor which is no longer the fragrance of the flowers.]

The opinion of the masters is not fixed on this.

Yet the Blessed One said,<sup>441</sup> "The fragrance of flowers does not go against the wind, neither does the fragrance of good go against the wind; but the *satpuruṣa* goes in all directions." How do you reconcile this statement with the theory that fragrance "goes against the wind?"

This statement refers to odors of the world of humans, which, it is quite evident, does not go against the wind.

The Mahīśāsakas read,<sup>442</sup> "The fragrance [of the flowers of the Pārijātaka tree] go with the wind for a hundred *yojanas*; in the absence of wind, to fifty."

8. In the southeast lies Sudharmā,<sup>443</sup> the room where the gods come together (*devasabhā*) in order to examine the good and the evil deeds committed by human beings.

Such is the arrangement of the receptacle or physical world of the Thirty-three Gods.



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69a-b. Above, the gods reside in "houses."<sup>444</sup>

The gods higher than the Thirty-three Gods reside in *vimānas* or aerial abodes. These gods are the Yāmas, the Tuṣitas, the Nirmāṇaratis, and the Paranirmitavaśavartins, plus the gods of Rūpadhātu, namely sixteen categories of gods beginning with the Brahmakāyikas. In all, twenty-two types of gods live in the physical world and occupy set residences. [There are many other gods,<sup>445</sup> the Kṛiḍāpramoṣakas,<sup>446</sup> the Prahāsakas, etc., which a summary treatise like this does not take into account].

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69b-d. There are six gods who taste pleasure; they unite through coupling, an embrace, the touch of hands, a smile, and a look.

The Cāturmahārājakāyikas, Trāyastrimśas, Yāmas, Tuṣitas, Nirmāṇaratis and Paranirmitavaśavartins are the gods of Kāmadhātu. The higher gods are not in Kāmadhātu.

The Cāturmahārājakāyikas and the Trāyastrimśas live on the ground; thus they unite by coupling, like humans; but they appease the fire of their desire through the emission of wind, since they do not have any semen. The Yāmas appease the fire of their desire by embracing, the Tuṣitas by the touch of hands, the Nirmāṇaratis by smiling, and the Paranirmitavaśavartins by looking at each other. Such is the doctrine of the *Prajñāpti*.<sup>447</sup>

According to the Vaibhāṣikas (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 585b27), these expressions of the *Prajñāpti*, "embracing," "touching of the hands," etc., do not indicate the mode of union—for all the gods couple—but the duration of the act.<sup>448</sup> The more ardent the desire by reason of the more pleasurable object, so much shorter is the duration of the union.

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A small god or goddess appears on the knees, or from out of the knees of a god or goddess; this small god or goddess is their son or

daughter: all the gods are "apparitional" (iii.8c).

70a-c. Among these gods, their newborn are similar to infants of five to ten years.

From five to ten years according to the category of the gods. Young gods grow up quickly.

70c-d. The gods of Rūpadhātu are complete and clothed.<sup>449</sup>

The gods of Rūpadhātu, from their birth, are complete in their development; they are born fully clothed.

All the gods speak the Āryan language.<sup>450</sup>

In Kāmadhātu,

71a-b. There are three "arising" of the objects of desire: the gods of Kāmadhātu together with humans.<sup>451</sup>

1. There are beings whose objects of desire (*kāmaguṇa*) are placed (by outside factors) at their disposition; but they are able to dispose of these objects. These are humans and certain gods—namely the first four classes of gods.

2. There are beings whose objects of desire are created by themselves; and they dispose of these objects which they create. These are the Nirmāṇarātis.

3. There are beings whose objects of desire are created by others but who themselves dispose of these objects created by others. These are the Paranirmitavaśavartins.<sup>452</sup>

The first enjoy the objects of desire which are presented to them; the second enjoy objects of desire which they create at their will; and the third enjoy objects of desire that they create or have others create at their will. These are the three arising of the objects of desire (*kāmapapattis*).

In Rūpadhātu,

71c-d. There are three "arising of pleasure": the nine spheres of three Dhyānas.<sup>453</sup>

The nine spheres of the first three Dhyānas are the three "arising of pleasure." The gods of the first three Dhyānas, for long periods, pass their time pleasantly through pleasure born from separation from the defilements, through pleasure consisting of joy arisen from absorption

(*samādhija*: seeing the disappearance of *vicāra* and *vitarka*) and through pleasure free from joy (*niḥprītikasukha*, seeing the disappearance of satisfaction or *saumanasya*). By reason of their absence of suffering, and by reason of their duration, these arisings are indeed "arisings of pleasure" (*sukhopapatti*).

In *dhyānāntara* there is no pleasure consisting of joy. Is this an "arising of pleasure?"

This is to be discussed.<sup>454</sup>

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At what height are the twenty-two heavenly residences situated, starting from the Cāturmahārājikas to the highest gods of Rūpadhātu?

It is not easy to calculate this height in *yojanas*, but

72a-b. To the extent that there is descent from one residence, to this extent there is ascent towards a higher residence.<sup>455</sup>

In other words, to the extent that a residence is above Jambudvīpa, to that extent it is below its next higher residence. For example, the fourth house of the Cāturmahārājikas, the dwelling of the Cāturmahārājikas themselves is forty thousand *yojanas* above here; to the extent that this residence descends to here, to that extent this residence ascends to the residence of the Trāyastriṃśas, [on the summit of Meru, eighty thousand *yojanas* from here]. As many *yojanas* as there are from Trāyastriṃśas to here, that many are there from Trāyastriṃśas to the Yāmas. And thus following: the Akaniṣṭhas are above the Sudarśanas the same number of *yojanas* that the Sudarśanas are above Jambudvīpa.

Above the Akaniṣṭhas, there are no more residences (*sthāna*). This is because this residence is higher than the others, no residence is superior to it, and so it is called *a-kaniṣṭha*.<sup>456</sup> According to another opinion, this residence is called *agha-niṣṭha*, because *agha* signifies "assembled matter", and this residence is the limit (*niṣṭha*) of this matter.<sup>457</sup>

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Can a being born in an inferior residence go to a higher house and see its superior beings?

72c-d. The gods do not see their superiors without magic or the assistance of another.

When they possess magical powers, or when they are assisted by a being possessing magical powers or by a Yāma god, the Trāyastriṃśas can go to the Yāmas; and thus following.<sup>458</sup>

A being born in an lower residence can see a being born in a higher residence who makes a visit to an inferior residence, but not if this being belongs to a higher Dhātu, or to a higher *bhūmi*;<sup>459</sup> in the same way that one cannot feel a tangible things [higher in Dhātu or *bhūmi*], because it is not of the sphere [of a lower organ].<sup>460</sup> This is why beings higher through their Dhātu or *bhūmi* do not descend with their own bodies, but with a magic body of the sphere of the *bhūmi* to where they wish to descend (*Digha*, ii.210).

According to another school,<sup>461</sup> if a being of a higher *bhūmi* so desires, lower beings can see him in the same way as they see a being of their own *bhūmi*.

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What are the dimensions of the houses of the Yāmas and the other gods?

According to one opinion, the houses of the four types of higher gods of Yāma have the dimension of the summit of Meru.

According to others, the dimension of the First Dhyāna is the dimension of the universe with its four continents; that of the Second, the Third, and the Fourth Dhyāna is, respectively, the dimension of a small, medium and great chiliocosm.

According to another, the first three Dhyānas have, respectively, the dimension of a small, medium and great chiliocosm; the Fourth Dhyāna is without measure.<sup>462</sup>

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What is a small, a second, and a third chiliocosm?

73-74. One thousand four-continents, moons, suns, Merus, dwellings of the Kāma gods, and world of Brahmā, make up a

small chiliocosm; one thousand small chiliocosms make a dichiliocosm, the middle universe; and one thousand dichiliocosms make a trichiliocosm. The destruction and the creation of the universes lasts the same time.<sup>463</sup>

A *sāhasra cūḍika lokadhātu*, or small chiliocosm is made up of one thousand Jambudvīpas, Pūrvavidehas, Avaragodānīyas, Uttarakurus, moons, suns, Merus, dwellings of the Cāturmahārājakāyikas and the other gods of Kāmadhātu, and worlds of Brahmā. One thousand universes of this type make a dichiliocosm, a middle universe (*dvīsāhasro madhyamo lokadhātuḥ*). One thousand universes of this type make a trichiliomegachiliocosm (*trisāhasramahāsāhasro lokadhātuḥ*).

The periods of destruction and creation are equal in length.<sup>464</sup> The stanza uses the word *sambhava* in the sense of *vivarta*.

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In the same way that the dimensions of the physical worlds differ, in that same way the dimensions of the beings inhabiting them differ:

75-77. The inhabitants of Jambudvīpa have a height of four, or of three elbows and a half; those called Pūrva, Goda and Uttara, by doubling each time. The bodies of the gods of Kāmadhātu increase, by quarters of *krośa*, until a *krośa* and a half. The bodies of the gods of Rūpadhātu are at first a half *yojana*; then increase by a half; beyond the Paritābhas, the bodies double, and reduce three *yojanas* from the Anabhrakas on.

Humans of Jambudvīpa generally are three elbows and a half, sometimes four elbows in height; the Pūrvavidehakas, the Avaragodānīyakas, and the Auttarakauravas are respectively eight, sixteen, and thirty-two elbows in height.

The Cāturmahārājakāyikas are a quarter of a *krośa* (iii.88a) in height; the height of the other gods of Kāmadhātu increases successively by this same quarter: the Trāyastriṃśas, by half a *krośa*; the Yāmas, by three quarters of a *krośa*; the Tuṣitas, by one *krośa*; the Nirmāṇaratis, by a *krośa* and a quarter; and the Parinirmitavaśavartins, by a *krośa* and a

half.

The Brahmakāyikas, who are the first gods of Rūpadhātu, are a half-yojana in height; the Brahmapurohitas, one *yojana* in height; the Mahābrahmans, one *yojana* and a half in height; and the Parīttābhas, two *yojanas* in height.

Beyond the Parīttābhas, the dimensions double: Apramāṇābhas are four, Ābhāsvaras, eight, and the same until the Śubhakṛtsans, who are sixty-four *yojanas* in height. For the Anabhrakas, one doubles this number but subtracts three: they are then one hundred twenty-five *yojanas* in height. One continues doubling, from the Puṇyaprasavas on who are two hundred fifty *yojanas* in height, to the Akaniṣṭhas, who are sixteen thousand *yojanas* in height.

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The length of life of these beings also differs. With regard to humans:

78. Life, among Kurus, is one thousand years in length; in the two continents, it diminishes twice by half; here, it is indeterminate: nevertheless it is ten years at the end and incalculable at the beginning.<sup>465</sup>

The lifespan of beings in Godānāya is half the lifespan of beings in Uttarakuru, thus five hundred years in length; the life of beings in Pūrvavideha is two hundred and fifty years in length.

In Jambudvīpa, length of life is not determined, sometimes it is long, sometimes short.<sup>466</sup> At the end of the cosmic age or *kalpa* (iii.98c), at its minimum, it is ten years; whereas the lifespan of humans at the beginning of the cosmic age (*prāthamakalpika*, iii.91a) is incalculable: one cannot measure it by counting in thousands, etc.

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The lifespan of the gods of Kāmadhātu is an integral of the length of a day:

79a-80b. Fifty human years make a day-and-night for the lowest gods of Kāmadhātu, and these gods live a life of five hundred

years. For the higher gods, double the day and the life.<sup>467</sup>

Fifty human days make a day in the life of the Cāturmahārājakāyikas, whose lifespan is of five hundred years of twelve month of thirty days.<sup>468</sup> For the Trāyastriṃśas, one day equals one hundred human years, and their lifespan is one thousand years in length; for the Yāmas, one day equals two hundred human years and their lifespan is two thousand years in length; and so on.

But there is no sun or moon above Yugandhara; how is a day of the gods determined, and how are the gods illumined?

Day and night are marked by the flowers which open or close, like the *kumuda* and the *padma* in the world of humans; by the birds that sing or that are silent; and by sleep which ends or begins.<sup>469</sup> Furthermore the gods themselves are luminous.

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As for the gods of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu:

80b-81d. There is no day and night for the gods of Rūpadhātu; their lifespans are calculated in *kalpas* whose number is fixed by the dimensions of their bodies. In Ārūpyadhātu, a lifespan of a thousand *kalpas* which increases as much. These *kalpas* are, from the Parittābhas on, *mahākalpas*; below, halves.<sup>470</sup>

The gods of Rūpadhātu whose bodies are half a *yojana* in height—the Brahmakāyikas—live a half *kalpa*; and thus following to the Akaniṣṭhas, whose bodies are sixteen thousand *yojanas* in height, and whose lifespan is thus sixteen thousand *kalpas* in length.

In Ākāśānantyāyatana, a lifespan is twenty thousand *kalpas* in length; fifty thousand *kalpas* in length in Vijñānānantyāyatana, sixty thousand *kalpas* in length in Ākīrcanyāyatana, and eighty thousand in Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyātana or Bhavāgra.

But to which *kalpas* does this refer: to intermediate *kalpas* (*antarakalpas*), to *kalpas* of destruction (*saṃvarta*), to *kalpas* of creation (*vivarta*), or to great *kalpas* (*mahākalpas*, iii.89d)?

From the Parittābhas (lower gods of the Second Dhyāna) on, they refer to the great *kalpas*; below (Brahmapāriṣadyas, Brahmapurohitas,

Mahābrahmas) they refer to half great *kalpas*. In fact, there are twenty *antarakalpas* during which the world is created[: Mahābrahmā appears from the beginning]; then twenty *antarakalpas* during which the world lasts; and then twenty *antarakalpas* during which the world is destroyed[: Mahābrahmā disappears at the end]. Thus the life of Mahābrahma lasts sixty intermediate *antarakalpas*: these sixty make a *kalpa* and a half; half a great *kalpa* (or forty intermediate *kalpas*) is considered to be a *kalpa*.

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What is the length of a lifespan in the painful realms of rebirth?

Let us examine in order the first six hot hells, the last two hot hells, animals, Pretas, and the cold hells.

82. In six hells, Saṃjīva, etc., a day and night has the length of the life of the gods of Kāmadhātu; with such days, life as for the gods of Kāmadhātu.

A day in the six hells,—Saṃjīva, Kālasūtra, Saṃghāta, Raurava, Mahāraurava, and Tapana,—is equal in this order to the life of the gods of Kāmadhātu, the Cāturmahārājakāyikas, etc.

The damned in Saṃjīva have, like the Cāturmahārājakāyikas, a life of five hundred years of twelve months of thirty days; but each of these days has the length of the total lifespan of the Cāturmahārājakāyikas. Same relationship between the damned of Kālasūtra and the Trāyastriṃśas, and between the damned of Tapana and the Paranirmitavaśavartins.

83a-b. In Pratāpana, a lifespan of a half *antaḥkalpa*; in Avīci, a lifespan of one *antaḥkalpa*.

In Pratāpana, a lifespan lasts one half of an *antarakalpa*; in Avīci, one *antarakalpa*.<sup>471</sup>

83b-d. The life of animals is one *kalpa* in length at most; the life of the Pretas is five hundred years with its days the duration of a month.

The animals that live the longest time live one *antarakalpa*; these



are the great Nāga Kings, Nanda, Upananda, Aśvatara, etc. The Blessed One said, "There are, Oh Bhikṣus, eight great Nāga Kings who live a *kalpa* and who sustain the earth . . ." <sup>472</sup>

The days of the Pretas have a length of one human month; they live five hundred years made up of days of this length.

84. Life in the Arbudas is the time of the exhaustion of a *vāha*, by taking a grain of sesame every one hundred years; the others by multiplying each time by twenty. <sup>473</sup>

The Blessed One has indicated the length of a lifespan in the cold hells only through comparisons, "If, Oh Bhikṣus, a Magadhan *vāha* of sesame of eighty *khāris* <sup>474</sup> were full <sup>475</sup> of sesame seeds; if one were to take one grain each one hundred years, this *vāha* would be empty before a lifespan of beings born in the Arbuda hell would end: this is what I say. And, Oh Bhikṣus, twenty Arbudas make, Oh Bhikṣus, one Nirarbuda . . ." (See above, note 413).

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Do all beings, whose length of lifespan has just been indicated, live the full length of this lifespan?

85a. With the exception of Kuru, there is death before their time. <sup>476</sup>

The life of beings in Uttarakuru is fixed; they necessarily live one thousand years: their length of life is complete. <sup>477</sup> Everywhere else there is *antarāmṛtyu*, "death in the course of, in the middle of, a complete life," or premature death. Nevertheless certain persons are sheltered from premature death, namely the Bodhisattva who, in Tuṣita, is no longer bound to birth; a being in his last existence [who will not die before having obtained the state of Arhat]; <sup>478</sup> one who has been the object of a prediction by the Blessed One; one who is sent by the Blessed One; <sup>479</sup> a Śraddhānusārin and a Dharmānusārin (vi.29a-b) [who will not die before having become a Śraddhādhimuktika and a Dṛṣṭiprāpta]; a woman pregnant with the Bodhisattva or with a Cakravartin, etc. <sup>480</sup>

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We have explained the residences and the bodies by measuring them in terms of *yojanas*, and lifespans by measuring them in terms of years; but we have not explained *yojanas* and years.

These can be explained only through the means of words (*nāman*); one must then say that it is the limit (*paryanta*) of words, etc.

85b-c. An atom (*paramāṇu*), a syllable (*akṣara*), and an instant (*kṣaṇa*) is the limit of matter, of words, and of time.<sup>481</sup>

A *paramāṇu* is the limit of physical matter (*rūpa*); so too a syllable is the limit of words, for example, *go*; and an instant,<sup>482</sup> the limit of time (*advan*).

What is the dimension of an instant?

If the right conditions (*pratyaya*) are present, the time that it takes for a *dharma* to arise; or rather the time that it takes for a *dharma* in progress to go from one *paramāṇu* to another *paramāṇu*.<sup>483</sup>

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According to the Ābhidhārmikas, there are sixty-five instants in the time that it takes a healthy man to snap his fingers.<sup>484</sup>

85d-88a. *Paramāṇu*, *aṇu*, *loharajas*, *abrajās*, *śaśarajas*, *avirajas*, *gorajas*, *chidrarakas*, *likṣā*, that which comes out of the *likṣā*, *yava*, and *aṅguliparvan*, by multiplying each time by seven; twenty-four *aṅgulis* make one *hasta*; four *hastas* make one *dhanus*; five hundred *dhanus* make one *krośa*, the distance a hermitage should be located; and eight *krośas* make what is called one *yojana*.<sup>485</sup>

[Thus seven *paramāṇus* make one *aṇu*, and eight *aṇus* make a *loharajas*.

*Avirajas* signifies *edakarakas*, and *chidrarakas* signifies *vātāyana-chidrarakas*.

"That which come out of the *likṣā*" is the *yūka*.

The author does not say that three *aṅguliparvans* make one *aṅguli*, for that is well known.<sup>486</sup>]

A hermitage, *aranya*, should be located one *krośa* from a village.<sup>487</sup>

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88b-89c. One hundred and twenty *kṣaṇas* make one *tatkṣaṇa*; sixteen *tatkṣaṇas* make one *lava*; we obtain a *muhūrta* or hour, an *ahorāta* or one day and night, and a *māsa* or month, by multiplying the preceeding term by thirty; a *samvatsara* or year, is of twelve months by adding the *ūnarātras*.<sup>488</sup>

One *muhūrta* equals thirty *lavas*. Thirty *muhūrtas* make one day and night; a night is sometimes longer, sometimes shorter, and sometimes equal to a day.

There are four months of winter, of heat, and of rain;<sup>489</sup> twelve months which, with the days called *ūnarātras*, make a year. The *ūnarātras* are the six days which, in the course of the year, one should omit (for the calculation of the lunar months). There is a stanza about this: "When one month and a half of the cold, hot, rainy season has elapsed, the learned omit one *ūnarātra* in the half-month that remains."<sup>490</sup>

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We have explained the year; we must explain the *kalpa* or cosmic period.

89d. There are different types of *kalpa*:<sup>491</sup>

There is a distinction between a small *kalpa* (*antarakalpa*)<sup>492</sup>, a *kalpa* of disappearance (*sarivarta*),<sup>493</sup> a *kalpa* of creation (*vivarta*), and a great *kalpa*.

90a-b. A *kalpa* of disappearance lasts from the non-production of the damned to destruction of the receptacle world.

The period that extends from the moment when beings cease being reborn in hell until the moment when the world is destroyed is called a *sarivartakalpa*, a *kalpa* of destruction.

"Destruction" is of two types: destruction of the realms of rebirth, and destruction of the Dhātu.

It is again of two types: destruction of living beings, and destruction

of the physical world.

1. When no being is reborn in hell—even though beings in hell continue to die—the period of twenty small *kalpas* during which the world lasts is terminated; and the period of destruction begins.

When not a single being remains in the hells, the destruction of beings in hell is achieved, and the world has been destroyed to that extent: if a being of this universe has committed any actions which should be retributed in hell, the force of these actions causes him to be reborn in the hell of another universe not in the process of destruction.<sup>494</sup>

2. So too is the destruction of animals and Pretas. The animals that reside in the great ocean disappear first; those that live with humans will disappear at the same time as do humans.<sup>495</sup>

3. Among humans of Jambudvīpa, a person enters by himself, without a teacher, by reason of *dharmatā*,<sup>496</sup> into the First Dhyāna. Coming out of this Dhyāna, he exclaims, "Happy is the pleasure and the joy that arise from detachment! Calm is the pleasure and joy that arise from detachment!" Understanding these words, other persons also enter into absorption and, after their death, pass into the world of Brahmā. When, by this continual process, there does not remain a single person in Jambudvīpa, the destruction of the persons of Jambudvīpa is finished.

The same for the inhabitants of Pūrvavideha and Avaragodāniya. The inhabitants of Uttarakuru are incapable of detaching themselves from Kāmadhātu and, as a consequence, of entering into *dhyāna*: they are also reborn, not in the world of Brahmā, but among the gods of Kāmadhātu.

When a single human being no longer remains, the destruction of humans is finished, and the world has been destroyed to this extent.

4. The same then holds for the gods of Kāmadhātu, from the Cāturmahārājakāyikas to the Paranirmitavaśavartins, who enter into *dhyāna* and are reborn in the world of Brahmā, and who successively disappear. When a single god no longer remains in Kāmadhātu, the destruction of Kāmadhātu is finished.

5. It then happens, by reason of *dharmatā*, that a god of the world of Brahmā enters into the Second Dhyāna. Coming out of this Dhyāna, he exclaims, "Happy is the pleasure and joy that arise from absorption!

Calm is the pleasure and joy that arise from absorption!" Understanding these words, other gods of the world of Brahmā enter into the Second Dhyāna and after their death, are reborn in the heaven of the Ābhāsvaras. When a single being no longer remains in the world of Brahmā, the destruction of beings (*sattvasaṃvartanī*) is finished and the world has been destroyed to that extent.

6. Then, by reason of the exhaustion of the collective action which has created the physical world, and by reason of the emptiness of the world, seven suns successively appear,<sup>497</sup> and the world is entirely consumed from this sphere with its continents to Meru. From this world thus inflamed, the flame, conducted by the wind, burns the houses of the world of Brahmā.<sup>498</sup> Even though it is well understood that the flame that burns these houses is a flame of Rūpadhātu, the destruction of Kāmadhātu has not yet taken hold of Rūpadhātu. But it is said that the flame goes from this world and burns the world of Brahmā, because a new flame arises in relation to the first one.

So too, *mutatis mutandis*, is the destruction through water and through wind, which are similar to destruction through fire but which extend higher.<sup>499</sup>

The period that extends from the moment when beings cease to be born in the hells until the moment when the physical world has been destroyed is what is called a *saṃvartakalpa*, a *kalpa* of disappearance.

90c-d. The *kalpa* of creation lasts from the primordial wind until the production of hellish beings.

From the primordial wind (*prāgvāyu*) until the moment when beings arise in hells.

The world, which has been destroyed as we have seen, stays destroyed for a long time—during twenty small *kalpas*. There is only space where the world once was.

1. When, by reason of the collective action of beings, there appears the first signs of a future physical world; when some very light winds arise in space, then this period of twenty small *kalpas* during which the world remained destroyed is finished; and the period, also of twenty small *kalpas*, during which the world is created, begins.<sup>500</sup>

The winds come gradually and, finally, constitute a circle of wind; then there arises all of the receptacles as we have just described: a circle

of water, a sphere of gold, Meru, etc. The mansion of Brahmā appears first and then all the mansions until those of the Yāmas. But this is only after the circle of wind arises.<sup>501</sup>

The physical world is thus created, and the world is now created to this extent.

2. Then a being, dying in Ābhāsvara, is born in the mansion of Brahmā which is empty; other beings, dying one after the other in Ābhāsvara, are born in the heaven of the Brahmapurohitas, the Brahmakāyikas, the Paranirmitavaśavartins and the other gods of Kāmadhātu; in Uttarakuru, Godāniya, Videha, and Jambudvīpa; among the Pretas and animals; and in the hells. The rule is that the beings who disappear last reappear first.

When a being is born in the hells, the period of creation, of twenty small *kalpas*, is finished, and the period of duration begins.

[The first small *kalpa* of the period of creation is used for the creation of the physical world, the mansion of Brahmā, etc.] During the nineteen small *kalpas* that complete this period, until the appearance of the beings in hell, the lifespan of humans is infinite in length.

91a-b. A small *kalpa*, in the course of which a lifespan, from infinite, becomes a lifespan ten years in length.

Humans, at the end of the period of creation, have an infinitely long lifespan; their lifespan diminishes when creation is achieved, until it is not more than ten years in length (iii.98c-d). The period in which this diminution takes place constitutes the first small *kalpa* of the period of destruction.

91c-d. The eighteen *kalpas* which are of augmentation and of diminution.

A lifespan, which is now ten years in length, increases until it is eighty thousand years in length; then it decreases and is reduced to a length of ten years. The period in the course of which this increase and this decrease takes place is the second small *kalpa*.

This *kalpa* is followed by seventeen similar ones.

92a. One, of augmentation.

The twentieth small *kalpa* is only of increase, not of decrease. The lifespan of humans increases from ten years to eighty thousand years in

length.

How high, by increase, do these increases go?

92b. They go to a lifespan of eighty thousand.<sup>502</sup>

But not beyond. The time required for the increase and the decrease of the eighteen *kalpas* is equal to the time that the decrease of the first *kalpa* and the increase of the last take.<sup>503</sup>

92c-d. In this way then the world stays created for twenty *kalpas*.

The world remains created for twenty small *kalpas* thus calculated. As long as this period of duration lasts,

93a-b. During the same length of time, the world is in the process of creation, in the process of disappearance, and in a state of disappearance.

The creation, the disappearance, and the period when the world disappears lasts a total of twenty small *kalpas*. There are not, during these three periods, any phases of increase and decrease of lifespan, but these periods are equal in length to the period during which the world remains created.

The physical world is created in one small *kalpa*; it is filled during nineteen; it is emptied during nineteen; and it perishes in one small *kalpa*.

Four times twenty small *kalpas* make eighty:

93c. These eighty make a great *kalpa*.

This is the extent of a great *kalpa*.

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Of what does a *kalpa* consist?

The *kalpa* is by nature the five *skandhas*.<sup>504</sup>

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It is said that the quality of Buddhahood is acquired through cultivation that last three *asamkhyeya kalpas*. To which among the four types of *kalpas* does this refer?

93d-94a. The quality of Buddhahood results from three of these

[*kalpas*].<sup>505</sup>

Of these great *kalpas* that we have just defined.

But the word *asamkhyā* (= *asamkhyaya*) signifies "incalculable;" how can one speak of three "incalculables?"

One should not understand it in this manner, for, in an isolated (*muktaka*) Sūtra,<sup>506</sup> it is said that numeration is to the sixteenth place.

What are these sixteen places?<sup>507</sup>

One, not two, is the first place; ten times one is the second place; ten times ten (or one hundred) is the third; ten times one hundred (or one thousand) is the fourth . . . and so on, each term being worth ten times the preceeding: *prabheda* (10,000), *lakṣa* (1000,000), *atīlakṣa*, *koṭi*, *madhya*, *ayuta*, *mahāyuta*, *nayuta*, *mahānayuta*, *prayuta*, *mahāprayuta*, *kaṁkara*, *mahākaṁkara*, *bimbāra*, *mahābimbāra*, *akṣobhya*, *mahākṣobhya*, *vivāha*, *mahāvivāha*, *utsaṅga*, *mahotsaṅga*, *vāhana*, *mahāvāhana*, *tiṣṭha*, *mahātiṣṭha*, *hetu*, *mahāhetu*, *karabha*, *mahākarabha*, *indra*, *mahendra*, *samāpta* (or *samāptam*), *mahāsamāpta* (or *mahāsamāptam*), *gati*, *mahāgati*, *nimbarajas*, *mahānimbarajas*, *mudrā*, *mahāmudrā*, *bala*, *mahābala*, *saṁjñā*, *mahāsaṁjñā*, *vibhūta*, *mahāvibhūta*, *balakṣa*, *mahābalakṣa*, and *asamkhyā*.

In this list eight numbers have been lost.<sup>508</sup>

A great *kalpa* successively numbered (=multiplied) to the sixteenth place is called an *asamkhyeya*;<sup>509</sup> if one begins again, one has a second, and a third *asamkhyeya*. An *asamkhyeya* [*kalpa*] does not receive its name from the fact that it is incalculable.

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But why do the Bodhisattvas, once they have undertaken the resolution to obtain supreme Bodhi, take such a long time to obtain it?

Because supreme Bodhi is very difficult to obtain: one needs a great accumulation of knowledge and merit, and of innumerable heroic works in the course of three *asamkhyeya kalpas*.

One would understand that the Bodhisattva searches out this Bodhi so difficult to obtain, if this Bodhi were the sole means of arriving at deliverance; but such is not the case. Why then do they undertake this infinite labor?



For the good of others, because they want to become capable of pulling others out of the great flood of suffering.

But what personal good do they find in the good of others?

The good of others is their own good, because they desire it.

Who believes this?

In truth, persons devoid of pity and who think only of themselves believe with difficulty in the altruism of the Bodhisattvas; but compassionate persons believe in it easily. Don't we see that certain persons, confirmed in the absence of pity, find pleasure in the suffering of others even when it is not to their benefit? In the same way one must admit that the Bodhisattvas, confirmed in pity, find pleasure in doing good to others without any egoistic concerns. Don't we see that certain persons, ignorant of the true nature of the conditioned *dharmas* (i.e., the *saṃskāras*) that constitute their pretended "self," are attached to these *dharmas* through the force of habit, as completely devoid of personality as these *dharmas* are, and suffer a thousand pains by reason of this attachment? In the same way one must admit that the Bodhisattvas, through the force of habit, detach themselves from the *dharmas* that constitute the pretended "self," no longer consider these *dharmas* as "me" and "mine," increase compassionate solicitude for others, and are ready to suffer a thousand pains because of this solicitude.

In a few words, there is a certain category of persons, who, indifferent to what concerns them personally, are happy through the well-being of others, and are unhappy through the suffering of others.<sup>510</sup> For them, to be useful to others is to be useful to themselves. A stanza says, "An inferior person searches out, by all means, his personal well-being; a mediocre person searches out the destruction of suffering, not well-being, because well-being is the cause of suffering; an excellent person, through his personal suffering, searches out the well-being and the definitive destruction of the suffering of others, for he suffers from the suffering of others."<sup>511</sup>

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During what periods do the Buddhas appear, during a period of increase or during a period of decrease?

94a-b. They appear during the decrease to one hundred.<sup>512</sup>

The Buddhas appear during the period of the decrease of lifespan, when the length of life decreases from eighty thousand years to one hundred years in length.

Why do they not appear when life decreases from one hundred to ten years?

Because the five corruptions (*āyuhkaṣāya*, *kalpakaṣāya*, *kleśakaṣāya*, *dṛṣṭikaṣāya*, and *sattvakaṣāya*)<sup>513</sup> then become very strong.<sup>514</sup>

In the final period of the decrease of lifespan, the length of life (or *āyus*) becomes bad, base; being corrupted, it is called a *kaṣāya* or "corruption;" the same for the other corruptions.

The first two corruptions deteriorate the vitality and the means of subsistence.<sup>515</sup> The next two corruptions deteriorate the good; the corruption of defilements deteriorate beings through laxity (*kāmasukhaḥallikā*); the corruption of views through the practice of painful asceticism; or rather the corruption of defilement and the corruption of views deteriorate respectively the spiritual good of householders and of wanderers.<sup>516</sup> The corruption of beings deteriorates beings from the physical and the mental point of view; it deteriorates their height, beauty, health, force, intelligence, memory, energy, and firmness.

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During what periods do the Pratyekabuddhas appear?

94c. The Pratyekabuddhas appear in the course of two periods.<sup>517</sup>

They appear during the period of increase and during the period of decrease of lifespan. One distinguishes in fact two types of Pratyekabuddhas: those that live in a group (*vargacārin*), [and who also appear during the period of increase], and those who live like a rhinoceros.<sup>518</sup>

a. The first are the ancient Śrāvakas [who will obtain the first or second result of the Śrāvakas under the reign of a Buddha].

According to another opinion, there are also Pṛthagjanas who have realized, in the vehicle of the Śrāvakas,<sup>519</sup> the *nirvedhabhāgīyas* (vi.20); in the course of a subsequent existence, by themselves, they will realize the Way. The masters who follow this opinion find an argument in the

*Pūrvakathā*<sup>520</sup> where they read, "Five hundred ascetics cultivated painful austerities on a mountain. A monkey who had lived in the company of Pratyekabuddhas imitated the attitudes of the Pratyekabuddhas in front of them. These ascetics then imitated the monkey and, they say, obtained the Bodhi of the Pratyekabuddhas." It is clear, say these masters, that these ascetics were not Āryans, Śrāvakas; for, if they had previously obtained the result of the Śrāvakas, namely liberation from rules and rituals (*śīlavrataparamarśa*, v. French trans. p. 18), they would not have given themselves up later to painful austerities.

b. The Pratyekabuddhas who are "like a rhinoceros" live alone.

94d. The Rhinoceros by reason of one hundred *kalpas*.<sup>521</sup>

The Rhinoceros has cultivated for one hundred great *kalpas* in his preparation for Bodhi, [that is, he has cultivated morality, absorption, and *prajñā*]. He obtains Bodhi (vi.67) without the help of the teaching or *āgama*, but alone. He is a Pratyekabuddha because he himself brings about his salvation without converting others.

Why does he not apply himself to the conversion of others? He is certainly capable of teaching the Law: he possesses the comprehensions (*pratisamvīds*, vii.37b): [and even if he does not possess them,] he can [through his *pranidhijñāna*, vii.37a] remember the teachings of the ancient Buddhas. He is no longer deprived of pity, for he manifests his supernormal power with a view to being of service to beings.<sup>522</sup> He can no longer say that beings are "unconvertible" in the period in which he lives, for, in this period—the period of decrease of life—beings can detach themselves from Kāmadhātu by the worldly path.<sup>523</sup> Why then does he not teach the Law?

By reason of his previous habit [of solitude], he finds pleasure in, and aspires to absence of turmoil; he does not have the courage to apply himself to making others understand the profound Dharma: he would have to make disciples; he would have to conduct the multitude who follow the current against the current, and this is a difficult thing. Now he fears being distracted from his absorption and of entering into contact (*samsarga*, vi.6a) with humans.<sup>524</sup>

95-96. The Cakravartin Kings do not appear when lifespan is under eighty thousand years in length; they have a wheel of gold, a wheel of silver, a wheel of copper, and a wheel of iron; in inverse order, he reigns over one, two, three, or four continents; but never two at once, like the Buddhas; they triumph through spontaneous default, personal influence, fighting, or the sword, but always without doing evil.<sup>525</sup>

1. The Cakravartin Kings appear from the period when the lifespan of humans is infinite to the period when their lifespan is eighty thousand years in length; not when life is shorter, for then the world is no longer a suitable receptacle for their glorious prosperity.

They are called Cakravartins, because their nature is to reign (*rājyam cakreṇa vartayitum*).<sup>526</sup>

2. There are four types of Cakravartin Kings,<sup>527</sup> Suvarṇcakravartin, Rūpyacakravartin, Tāmracakraṭartin, and Ayaścakraṭartin, accordingly as their wheel (*cakra*) is of gold, silver, copper, or iron: the first is the best, the second is almost best, the third is mediocre, and the fourth is inferior. The Cakravartin whose wheel is iron reigns over one continent, the Cakravartin whose wheel is copper reigns over two continents, and so on.

This is the doctrine of the *Prajñāpti*.<sup>528</sup> A Sūtra, in fact, speaks only of a Cakravartin King having a wheel of gold, by reason of his greater importance, "When, to a king of royal and consecrated race—who, even in the days of his youth, on the fifteenth day, having washed his head, having undertaken the obligations of youth, ascends accompanied by this ministers to the terrace of his palace—there appears in the east the jewel of a wheel having a thousand rays, a wheel having a rim, having a hub, complete in all ways, beautiful, not made by the hand of an artisan, all in gold<sup>529</sup>—this king is a Cakravartin King."<sup>530</sup>

3. Two Cakravartins, the same as two Buddhas, do not appear at the same time. The Sūtra says, "It is impossible in the present, or in the future, for two Tathāgatas, Arhats, perfect Buddhas to appear in the world without one preceding and the other following. It is impossible. It is the rule that there is only one. And this holds for the Cakravartins as for the Tathāgatas."<sup>531</sup>

Here a question is raised. What is the meaning of the expression "in

the world?" Does this mean "in a great Trisāhasra universe" (iii.74), or "in all the universes?"<sup>532</sup>

According to one opinion, the Buddhas do not appear elsewhere [that is: in two great universes at once]<sup>533</sup> because the coexistence of two Buddhas would create an obstacle to the power of the Blessed Ones. A single Blessed One applies himself wheresoever: where a Blessed One does not apply himself to the converting of beings, other Blessed Ones do not apply themselves either. Further, we read in the Sūtra, "'Śāriputra, if someone comes and asks you if there now exists someone, a Bhikṣu or a Brāhmin, who is equal<sup>534</sup> to the ascetic Gautama with regard to Samyaksambodhi, what would you answer him?'

"'If someone were to interrogate me thus, Oh Venerable One, I would answer him that there does not exist now anyone, Bhikṣu or Brāhmin, who is the equal of the Blessed One. And why would I respond in this manner? Because I have heard and understood of the Blessed One, that it is impossible, both in the present and in the future, for two Blessed Ones, Arhats, perfect Buddhas to appear in the world without one preceding and the other following.'"<sup>535</sup>

Objection: How then are we to understand what the Blessed One said in the *Brahmasūtra*,<sup>536</sup> "I exercise my power even over a great Trisāhasra universe?"

This text should not be taken literally: it means that without making an effort (without making a special act of attention), the Buddha sees as far as this limit. When he desires it, his seeing goes wherever he wills it without limit.<sup>537</sup>

According to other schools, the Buddhas appear at the same time, but in many universes. Here are their arguments. One sees that many persons apply themselves at the same time to the preparations [for Bodhi]. Certainly, it is not proper that many Buddhas should appear at the same time in the same spot (=in the same universe); but, on the other hand, nothing prevents many Buddhas from appearing at the same time: thus they appear in different universes.<sup>538</sup> The universes are infinite in number, so even if the Blessed One lives an entire *kalpa*, he cannot go about in the infinity of the universe as he does here; all the more so if he only lives a human lifetime.

What is this activity of the Blessed One?

He wills that a person's faculty (faith, etc.)—by reason of such a

person, of such a place and of such conditions of time, due to the disappearance of such a defect and to the realization of such a cause, and in such a manner—if not arisen should arise, and if not perfected should be perfected.

Objection: But we have quoted the Sūtra, "It is impossible for two Tathāgatas to appear in the world without one preceding and the other following."

Answer: There is reason to examine if this text refers to one universe—a universe with its four continents, a great Trisāhasra universe—or to all universes. Let us observe that the rule which concerns the appearance of the Cakravartin Kings is formulated in the same terms as those that concern the appearance of the Tathāgatas. Would you deny that Cakravartin Kings could appear at the same time? If you do not deny this, why not also admit that the Buddhas, which are the foundation of merit, appear at the same time in different universes?<sup>539</sup> What is wrong with numerous Buddhas appearing in numerous universes? Innumerable beings would thus obtain both temporal well-being and supreme happiness.

Objection: But in this same spirit, you should also admit that two Tathāgatas can appear at the same time in one universe.

Answer: No. In fact, 1. their simultaneous appearance in a universe would be without utility; 2. the vow of the Bodhisattva is to "become a Buddha, a protector of the unprotected, in a world blind and without a protector;" 3. respect with regard to a single Buddha is greater; 4. greater also is the haste to conform to his Law: persons know that a Buddha is rare, and that they will be without a protector once the Buddha is in Nirvāṇa or when he goes elsewhere.<sup>540</sup>

4. It is by their wheel of gold, silver, etc., that Cakravartin Kings conquer the earth. Their conquest differs according to the nature of their wheel.<sup>541</sup>

A Cakravartin King with a golden wheel triumphs through *pratyudyāna*. Lesser kings<sup>542</sup> come towards him, saying, "Rich districts, flourishing, abundant in living things, full of men and sage men<sup>543</sup>—may Your Majesty deign to govern them! We ourselves are at your orders."

A Cakravartin King with a silver wheel goes towards them himself, and then they submit to him.

A Cakravartin King with a copper wheel goes to them; they make

preparations for resistance, but they submit to him.

A Cakravartin King with an iron wheel goes to them; they brandish their arms, but then they submit to him.

In no case does a Cakravartin King kill.

5. Cakravartin Kings cause beings to enter the path of the ten good actions (*karmapatha*, iv.66b).<sup>544</sup> Also, after their death, they are reborn among the gods.

6. The Sūtra says, "When Cakravartin Kings appear in the world, the seven jewels also appear: a wheel, an elephant, a horse, a treasure, women, a treasurer, and a military advisor."<sup>545</sup> Do these jewels which are living beings,—the jewel of elephants, etc.,—arise through the actions of others?

No. A being accumulates actions which should be retributed by a birth related to a Cakravartin King, by a birth as a jewel of an elephant, etc.: when a Cakravartin King appears, his own actions make this being arise.

7. There are many difference between the Cakravartin Kings and other men, notably that these Kings possess, like the Buddha, the thirty-two marks of the Mahāpuruṣa.<sup>546</sup>

97a. But the marks of the Muni are better placed, more brilliant, and complete.

But the marks of the Buddha outweigh those of the Kings in that they are better placed,<sup>547</sup> more brilliant, and complete.

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Did humans have kings at the beginning of the *kalpa*?

No.

98. In the beginning, beings were similar to the gods of Rūpadhātu; then, little by little, through attachment to taste, and through laziness, they made provisions and attributed parts to themselves; a protector of the fields was, by them, retributed.<sup>548</sup>

Humans at the beginning of the cosmic age<sup>549</sup> were similar to the beings of Rūpadhātu. The Sūtra says, "There are visible beings, born of the mind, having all their members, with complete and intact organs, of fine figure, of beautiful color, shining by themselves, travelling through the air, having joy for their food, and living a long time."<sup>550</sup>

Yet there appeared the "juice of the earth," the taste of which had the sweetness of honey. One being, of greedy temperament, having perceived the smell of this juice, took pleasure in it and ate it; the other beings then did the same. This was the beginning of eating by mouthfuls (*kavadīkāra*, iii.39). This eating made their bodies become coarse and heavy and their luminosity come to an end: and then darkness appeared. And then there appeared the sun and the moon.

Because of the attachment of beings to taste, the juice of the earth gradually disappeared. Then *prthivīparpaṭaka*<sup>551</sup> appeared, and beings attached themselves to it. *Prthivīparpaṭaka* disappeared and a forest creeper appeared and beings then became attached to it. This creeper disappeared and then rice grew, unworked and unseeded: this rice, a coarse food, gave forth waste: beings then developed organs of excretion and sexual organs; they then took different forms. Beings with sexual differences, by reason of their previous habits, were seized by this crocodile which is wrong judgment; they conceived an active desire for pleasure and so had sexual intercourse. It is from this moment on that the beings of Kāmadhātu were possessed by the demon which is craving.

One cut rice in the morning for the morning meal, and in the evening for the evening meal. One being, of lazy temperament, made provisions. The others imitated him. With provisions arose the idea of "mine," the idea of property: then the rice, cut and recut, stopped growing.

Then they distributed the fields. One was the owner of one field; one seized the goods of another. This was the beginning of robbery.

In order to prevent robbery, they came together and gave a sixth part to an excellent man in order that he protect the fields: this man was given the name *kṣetrāpa* or guardian of the fields, and, as he was a *kṣetrāpa*, he received the name of *kṣatriya*. Because he was very esteemed (*saṁmāta*) by the multitude (*mahājana*), and because he charmed (*rañj*) his subjects, he became the Rāja Mahāsaṁmāta.<sup>552</sup> This was the beginning of dynasties.<sup>553</sup>

Those who abandoned the householder's life received the name of Brahmins.

Then, under a certain king, there were many bandits and thieves. The king punished them by the sword. Others said, "We have not committed such actions," and this was the beginning of lying.



98c-d. Then, through the development of the courses of action, life shortened to a length of ten years.<sup>554</sup>

From this moment on, the bad courses of action, murder, etc., increased and the lifespan of humans became shorter and shorter. It was reduced, finally, to a length of ten years.

There are thus two *dharmas*: attachment to taste and laziness which are the beginning of this long degeneration.

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A small *kalpa* terminates when a lifespan is ten years in length. What happens then?

99. The *kalpa* terminates through iron, sickness, hunger, which last respectively seven days, seven months, and seven years.<sup>555</sup>

The end of the *kalpa* is marked by three calamities.<sup>556</sup>

1. In the period when the *kalpa* draws to its end, their lifespans being reduced to ten years in length, persons, full of forbidden craving and slaves of unjust greed, profess false doctrines. The spirit of wickedness arises in them: they conceive thoughts of hatred; as soon as they see one another, as a hunter who sees game, everything that falls into their hand,—a piece of wood, aconite plants,—becomes a sharp weapon, and they massacre one another.

2. In the period when the *kalpa* draws to its end, their lifespans being reduced to ten years, persons, full of forbidden craving and slaves to unjust greed, profess false doctrines. Non-human beings (*Piśācas*, etc.) emit deadly vapors, from whence incurable sicknesses arise by which humans die.

3. In the period when the *kalpa* draws to its end... the heavens cease to rain, from whence three famines arise, the famine of the boxes (*cañicu*), the famine of the white bones, and the famine when one lives by tokens.<sup>557</sup>

The famine of the boxes is called this for two reasons. What is today a *samudgaka*, was in this period called *cañica*; and *cañicu* is the same as *cañica*.<sup>558</sup> Persons, overwhelmed with hunger and weakness, die all in a group; and, with a view to being useful to persons of the future, they place seeds in a *cañicu*. This is why this famine is called *cañicu*.

The famine of the white bones is called this for two reasons. Bodies become dry and hard, and when they die, their bones soon become white. Persons gather up these white bones, boil them and drink them.<sup>559</sup>

The famine of tokens is called this for two reasons. Beings, in houses, eat according to the indication of tokens, "Today it is the turn of the master of the house to eat; tomorrow it is the turn of the mistress of the house . . ." And, with the tokens, persons search out grains in the empty earth; they are boiled in much water, and drunk.<sup>560</sup>

Scripture teaches that person who have, for a single day and night, undertaken abstention from murder, or have given one myrobalan fruit or a mouthful of food to the Saṅgha, will not be reborn here in this world during the period of knives, sickness, or famine.

4. How long a time do these periods last?

Killing lasts seven days, sickness lasts seven months and seven days, and famine last seven years, seven months and seven days. The conjunction *ca* ("and") in the stanza shows that one must add the different lengths of time.

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The continents of Videha and Godāniya do not know the three calamities: yet wickedness, bad color and weakness, and hunger and thirst reign therein when Jambudvīpa is overwhelmed by knives, sickness, and famine.

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We have described destruction by fire, and have said that the other destructions are accomplished in a similar manner.

100a-b. There are three destructions: through fire, water, and wind.<sup>561</sup>

When all beings have disappeared from the lower physical worlds, having come together in a *dhyāna* heaven, the destructions take place: through fire, by reason of the seven suns; through water, by reason of the rain; and through wind, by reason of the disorder of the wind

element. The effect of these destructions is that not one atom of the destroyed physical world remains.

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[Here arises the problem of a whole and its part (*avayavin, avayava*), of a substance and its qualities (*guṇin, guṇa*), iii.49d].

Certain non-Buddhist masters—[Kaṇabhuj, etc.]—say that the atoms are eternal, and that, as a consequence, they remain when the universe is dissolved. In fact, say these masters, if it were otherwise, coarse bodies would arise without cause (*ahetuka*).

[The Buddhists:] But we have explained (iii.50a) that the seed of a new universe is wind, a wind endowed with special powers which have their beginning in the actions of creatures. And the instrumental cause (*nimitta*) of this wind is the wind of Rūpadhātu<sup>562</sup> which is not destroyed. Further, a Sūtra of the Mahīśāsakas says that the wind brings the seeds<sup>563</sup> in from another universe.

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] But even if the seeds were so brought in, we do not admit that gross bodies,—shoots, stalk, etc.,—arise from a seed, from a stalk, etc.[: for seeds, shoots, etc., are merely *nimittakāraṇa*, instrumental causes, not *samavāyikāraṇa*, material cause];<sup>564</sup> we say rather, that the shoot, etc., arises from its parts, and that these parts arise in turn from their parts, and so on to the most minute parts which arise from the atoms.

[The Buddhists:] What then is the efficacy (*sāmarthya*: use, purpose) of a seed with regard to its shoot?

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] The seed has no efficacy with regard to the generation (*janana*) of the shoot, except that it provokes the aggregation of the atoms of the shoot. It is impossible in fact for a certain thing to arise from a thing having another nature: if such generation were possible, there would be no rule in generation. [One could then make mats out of cotton threads].

[The Buddhists:] No. Different does come from different, but according to certain rules, as sound arises, or the products of cooking, etc. [Sound arises from striking, which is different in nature from sound, but not different from everything that is different from sound.] The potentiality (*śakti*) of all things is determined.

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] Your examples are not valid. We admit that *guṇadharmas* or attributes (sound, etc.) arise either from that which is similar or from that which is different (*saṁyoga*, etc.); but this does not hold in the same way for *dravyadharmas* (or substances) which arise from the similar things.<sup>565</sup> It is thus that *vīraṇa* threads,—and not other threads—give rise to a mat, and that only cotton threads give rise to cotton cloth.

[The Buddhists:] Your example does not prove this, for it is not, itself, proven. You say that a thing arises from a similar thing, since a mat arises from *vīraṇa* threads: but, a mat is the *vīraṇa* threads themselves disposed in a certain manner and which take the name of mat; cloth is threads disposed in a certain manner. In the same way a row of ants is only ants.

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] How do you prove that cloth is not a thing distinct from threads?

[The Buddhists:] When an organ (of sight or touch) is in relation with a thread, the cloth is not perceived. Now, if the cloth exists [created by each thread,] why would it not be perceived? You say that the cloth does not exist, integrally, in each thread: this is to acknowledge that the cloth is only the collection of its parts which are each constituted by a thread: for how would you prove that the parts of a cloth are a thing other than the threads? You say that the cloth exists integrally in each thread, but that one does not perceive it in each thread because the perception of the cloth supposes a union of the organ and the cloth in such a way that the numerous creative elements of the cloth are perceived: in this hypothesis, it would suffice to see the fringe in order to see the cloth. You say that, if one does not see the cloth when one sees the fringe, it is because the central parts, etc., are not in relation with the organ: this is to admit then that one would never see the cloth, for the central parts and the extremes which are supposed to create the cloth are not perceived together. You say that they are perceived successively: this is to acknowledge that the whole (the entity cloth, *avayavin*) is not perceived; and this is to acknowledge too that the idea of cloth or of mat has for its sole object the parts of the cloth or the mat. How do we have, from all evidence, the idea of a circle from the circle formed from the circular trajectory of a brand? Further, cloth cannot be a thing other than thread, for, in the hypothesis where it would be otherwise, when the

threads are different in color, different in nature, and different in disposition, one could not attribute either color, or nature, or disposition to the cloth. You say that the cloth is different in color: this is to acknowledge that different creates different; further, to suppose that one of the sides is not variegated, in looking at it one would not see the cloth, but rather would see it "variegated." But do you dare say that the cloth, made of threads of different dispositions, is of different dispositions? It would be truly too diverse to be an entity! Consider again the entity which is the light of fire: its heating and illuminating power varies from beginning to end; one cannot recognize in it either color or tangible qualities.

[The Vaiśeṣikas: But if the "all," cloth, is not distinct from its "parts," and if the atoms, not perceptible to the organs, do not create a coarse body perceptible to the organs—a body distinct from the atoms—then the world is invisible: but one can see a cow.]

[The Buddhists:] For us, the atoms, although suprasensible, become sensible when they come together: the Vaiśeṣikas also attribute the power to create coarse bodies to the united atoms; the factors of visual consciousness should be united in order to produce a consciousness; and persons who suffer from ophthalmia see masses of hair, not hairs one by one.

[The author having refuted the doctrine of a whole, *avayavin*, distinct from its parts, *avayava*, now refutes the doctrine of substances, *guṇin*, distinct from their attributes, *guṇa*].

[The Buddhists:] What one understands by atom (*paramāṇu*) is physical matter (*rūpa*), etc.; it is thus certain that atoms perish at the destruction of the universe.

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] An atom is a thing in and of itself (*dravya*); a thing in and of itself is distinct from physical matter, etc.;<sup>566</sup> and physical matter can perish without an atom perishing.

[The Buddhists:] The distinction between a thing and its attributes is inadmissible: for no one distinguishes, "This is earth, water, fire: these are the attributes of earth, namely, its color, its taste, etc." And yet you affirm that a thing, earth, etc., is perceptible to the eye, etc. [Thus you cannot say that one does not perceive it because it is suprasensible]. Further, when wool, cotton, opium juice, or incense is burned, one no longer has the idea of wool, cotton, etc., with regard to its ashes: thus the

idea has for its object, not a thing in and of itself whose color would be an attribute, but its color, its taste, etc.<sup>567</sup> You say that, when an unfired clay jug has been submitted to the action of fire, we say that it has always been the same jug; and that, as a consequence, the jug is a thing other than its color, that it stays the same even though its color changes. But, in fact, if we were to recognize the unfired jug in the fired jug, it is because its figure remains similar: as one recognizes a row of ants. In fact, who would recognize the jug if one does not see in it certain characteristics observed initially?

Let us here stop this discussion of these infantile theories.

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What is the upper limit of the destructions?

100c-101d. Three Dhyānas, beginning with the second, are, in order, the top of the destructions; by reason of the community of the nature of destructions and the vices of the first three Dhyānas. As for the Fourth Dhyāna, no destruction, by reason of its non-agitation: this is not that it is eternal, for its mansions are produced and perish along with the beings who live therein.

1. The Second Dhyāna is the limit of the destruction by fire: everything below it is burned; the Third Dhyāna is the limit of the destruction by water: everything below it is dissolved; the Fourth Dhyāna is the limit of the destruction by wind: everything below it is dispersed. "The top of the destruction" is the name of that which remains when the destruction is finished.

The heaven of the First Dhyāna then perishes by fire: in fact, the vice or imperfection of the First Dhyāna is *vitarka-vicāra*; these burn the mind and are thus similar to fire. The Second Dhyāna perishes by water: in fact, it has joy for its vice. This, being associated with physical well-being, rends the body soft and flabby: it is similar to water. This is why the Sūtra teaches that the sensation of suffering is destroyed by the suppression of all solidity of the body.<sup>568</sup> The Third Dhyāna perishes by wind: in fact, it has inbreathing and outbreathing, which are wind, for its vice.

The external vices of a Dhyāna (that is, the calamities which destroy a Dhyāna heaven) are of the same order as the internal vices which affect the person who has entered into this Dhyāna. (See viii. French trans. p. 126).<sup>569</sup>

2. Why is there no destruction by the earth element as by the fire element, etc.?

What one calls the physical world is earth, and as a consequence can be opposed by fire, water, and wind, but not by earth itself.

3. The Fourth Dhyāna is not subject to destruction, because it is free from agitation. The Buddha said in fact that this Dhyāna, being free from internal vices, is non-movable (*ānejjya*).<sup>570</sup> The external vices have thus no hold on it and, as a consequence, it is not subject to destruction.

According to another opinion, the non-destruction of the Fourth Dhyāna is explained by the force of the Śuddhāvāsakāyika gods whose abode it is. These gods are incapable of entering into Ārūpyadhātu, and are also incapable of going elsewhere [to a lower sphere].<sup>571</sup>

The receptacle world of the Fourth Dhyāna is not eternal, but by this fact, it does not constitute a "sphere;" like the stars, it is divided into diverse residences; these different mansions, the abodes of beings, arise and perish with these beings. (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 692b19).

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What is the order of succession of these three destructions?

102. Seven by fire, one by water; and when seven destructions by water have thus taken place, seven by fire followed by the destruction by wind.<sup>572</sup>

After seven series of seven successive destructions by fire, destruction is then done seven times by water; the eighth series of seven destructions by fire is followed by one destruction by wind. The physical worlds, in fact, last by reason of the duration of the gods who are reborn therein by the force of their absorptions. There are fifty-six destructions by fire, seven by water, and one by wind: this is what justifies the declaration of the *Prajñāpti*<sup>573</sup> that the Śubhakarṣṇa gods live sixty-four *kalpas*. (iii.80d).

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1. According to Buddhaghosa (*Atthasālinī*, 62), Kāmadhātu is made up of four bad realms of rebirth (hellish beings, animals, Pretas and Asuras, see iii. 4a), humans and the six classes of gods: in all eleven divisions (*padesa*).

The six gods of Kāmadhātu (Burnouf, *Introduction*, 603, 608; Hastings, article, "Cosmogony and Cosmology"; names explained in the *Vyākhyā*) are an old list, sometimes reduced to five names (*Trāyastriṃśas* . . . Paranimittavaśavartins subject to Māra, *Saṃyutta*, i.133). [Each category has chiefs or a king, *Āṅguttara*, iv.242.] Above there are, in *Dīgha*, i.215, the Brahmakāyikas and Mahābrahmā; in *Āṅguttara*, i.210, the Brahmakāyikas and the higher gods; in *Mahānidāsa*, 44, the Brahmakāyikas. (See below, note 4).

The *Vyākhyā* explains the words *naraka*, etc. First opinion: from the root *nṛ* (*naye*, *Dhāupāṭha*, i.847), "Beings are led there by transgression"; second opinion: from the root *ṛ* (*gatiprāpanayoḥ* or *gativiśeṣanayoḥ* [the reading of the *Vyākhyā*], i.983, vi.111) preceded by a negation; third opinion: from *ram*, *rañj*, "beings do not rejoice therein"; fourth opinion, that of Saṃgrahabhadra, "Beings do not obtain (*r* = *prāp*) protection there."

2. *Vyākhyā*: All of the Dhyānas belong to the three realms, corresponding to weak, medium, and strong absorptions: thus the Fourth Dhyāna contains the stage of Anābhakras, Puṇyaprasavas, Vṛhatphalas. But a strong absorption of the Fourth Dhyāna can be mixed with an *anāśrava* absorption (as explained in vi.43); from whence there are five new places: Avṛhas, etc. The Fourth Dhyāna is thus made up of eight stages.

3. We are reminded of the four *bhavūppattis* of *Majjhima*, iii.147: the Parittābhas gods, the Appamāṇābhas gods, the Saṃkiliṭṭhābhas gods, and the Parisuddhābhas gods.

4. This is the opinion of the Bahirdeśakas (*Vyākhyā*) or the Pāścātyas (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 509a22), "the Westerners." This refers to the masters in Gandhāra. In this country, there are some Sautrāntikas, but when the *Vibhāṣā* speaks of Pāścātyas, it means the extra-Kashmirian Sarvāstivādins, or those of Gandhāra.

The *Mahāvūyūppatti* has four names for the First Dhyāna: Brahmakāyikas, Brahmāpāriśadyās, Brahmāpurohitās, and Mahābrahmāṇas. From whence, according to Georgy, and Hodgson, there are four distinct heavens; Remusat and Burnouf (*Introduction*, 608) have discussed their various sources. In the *Kośa* the Pāriśadyas are omitted, and Brahmakāyikas are the inferior class. Elsewhere (iii.5a, etc.) Brahmakāyikas is the generic name for all the gods of the First Dhyāna, of all of gods of the world of Brahmā.

*Vyākhyā*: He is called Brahmā, because he is produced by broad, large (*bṛhat*) roots of good. Who is he? He is called Mahābrahmā. He is great, *mahān*, because he has attained the intermediate *dhyāna* (viii.23); because he is born and dies before and after all others (iii.6a, Para. 2); and because he is distinguished by his stature, etc. They are called the Brahmakāyikas, because the *kāya*, that is to say, the *nivāsa*, or dwelling, of Mahābrahmā is theirs (*tasya kāyo nivāsa eṣām vidyate*). Some are called Brahmāpurohitās, because Brahmā is placed (*dhiyate*) at their head (*pura eṣām*). And some are called Mahābrahmāṇas, because *āyurvarṇādibhir viśeṣair mahān brahmā eṣām*.

The *Vyākhyā* explains the names of the gods in very clear language (*Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 119). Saṃgrahabhadra is in agreement. For details on all the gods, see iii. 64.

5. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 509a22.

a. Pāli sources. Rūpadhātu (or world of Brahmā, see above, note 1) contains sixteen places: 1.-9. three places for each one of the first three Dhyānas; 10.-11. the Vehapphalas and Asaffīasattas for the Fourth Dhyāna; 12.-16. five Suddhāvāsas, reserved for the Anāgāmins. Variants: *Majjhima*, i.329; iii.147, etc.

b. The "correct opinion of the Sarvāstivādins" admits sixteen places, by assigning only two places to the First Dhyāna.

c. The masters of the West (the Vaibhāṣikas of Gandhāra, Pāścātyas, and Bahirdeśakas) admit seventeen places, by assigning three places to the First Dhyāna (a special place for the Mahābrahmāṇas).

d. Some other Bahirdeśakas (*Kośa*, ii.41d) admit seventeen places, by assigning two places to the First Dhyāna, and a special place to the Asaṃjñisattvas in the Fourth Dhyāna.

e. Eighteen places, by assigning three places to the First Dhyāna (a special place for the Mahābrahmāṇas) and a special place to the Asaṃjñisattvas.

This is the opinion of Śrīlabdha (*Śrī-lo-to*, Watters, i355, the author of a Sautrāntika *Vibhāṣāśāstra*), according to P'u-kuang and Fa-pao who quote Saṃghabhadra according to whom: "the Sthavira admits eighteen places". This is the opinion of the Mahāyāna Sthiramati or Sāramati (*TD*, 31, number 1606, Grand Vehicle).

f. The Yogācāras also admit the number of eighteen, but they place the Asaṃjñisattvas in the heaven of the Vṛhatphalas, and obtain the number of eighteen by recognizing the Maheśvaradevas (compare *Mahāvīryupatti*, 162.7, Mahāmaheśvarāyatana).

Yuan-hui and other commentators say that the School (*nikāya*) of the Sthaviras admit eighteen places, wrongly interpreting the expression "the Sthavira" of Saṃghabhadra, (a) because, among the twenty schools, there is a School of the Sthaviras (but Ts'e-yuan, P'u-kuang and Fa-pao say that "the Sthavira" of Saṃghabhadra is Śrīlabdha); (b) because they do not know that eighteen is the number of the Sautrāntika Śrīlabdha, whereas seventeen is the established number in the Sautrāntika system. The *Vibhāṣā* attributes the opinion of seventeen places to the Western Masters, the Gandhārans. Among these masters, there are some Sautrāntikas, but many are Sarvāstivādins. The *Vibhāṣā* designates a divergent opinion of the Sarvāstivādin school by the expression "Western Masters", and not the Sautrāntikas; this is why Saṃghabhadra says only, "There are others who say (that the places are seventeen in number) . . ." and does not say "another School" . . .

Saeki gives, in resume, "Sixteen places: the correct opinion of the Sarvāstivādins. Seventeen places: a. Westerners (separate Mahābrahmas) and b. some other masters (separate Asaṃjñins). Eighteen places (by distinguishing the place of Mahābrahmā from that of the Asaṃjñins): and the Sthavira (a) Śrīlabdha, a Sthavira not included among the twenty schools, who is also termed a Mūlasautrāntika; and (b) the Sthavira, who is included among the twenty schools, and who is termed the Mūlasthavira. Further, Sthiramati (Sāramati) (and the Yogācārins)."

6. This "dwelling" is *dhyānāntarikā*, *Kośa*, ii.41d.

7. I believe that I correctly understand Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha (*i-sheng so chü* 一生所居 which should be corrected to read *i-chu*—主); but the *Kośa*, in many places, speaks of some "Great Brahmās", Mahābrahmāṇas: these are the Mahābrahmadevas of the Pāli texts, the followers or the court of the one, sole king (see *Kośa*, vi.38b); the *Vyākhyā* explains their name: "They are Mahābrahmāṇas because Brahmā is the greatest among them by his duration of life, his color, etc."

8. Beal, *Catena*, 94, "Following the *Kośa* Shaster, it is said that Brahmā has no distinct abode, only in the midst of the Brahmāpurohita Heaven there is a high-storied tower, and this is (the abode of Brahmā)."

9. The problem as to whether there is *rūpa* in this *dhātu* or not, is discussed viii.3c.

10. As we will see iii.41, the mind and mental states, in the first two Dhātus, are an *āśrita* (a thing supported) which have for their *āśraya* (support) a body endowed with organs. The mind "falls", or dies, when the organs are destroyed. On *nikāya* = *nikāyasabbhāga*, ii.41, see below iii.7c, *nikāyasabbhāga* = *upapattiyāyatana*.

11. Hsüan-tsang corrects: The mental series of material beings is not supported on these two, because they lack any force: they are strong among non-material beings because they proceed from an absorption from whence the notion of matter has been eliminated. But why not admit that the mental series of non-material beings is directly supported on this absorption? Why is there an intermediate support? Furthermore, the "genus" and vital organ of non-material beings is supported by matter . . .

12. See ii.14, viii.3c.

13. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 387b26-27: As we have *prthivīdhātu*, etc.

14. This explanation holds for the expression *ārūpyadhātu*: but when one speaks of the non-material absorptions (viii.2), *ārūpya* should be understood as equivalent to *rūpa*, or rather as signifying "favorable to *Ārūpya*[dhātu]" (*Vyākhyā*).

15. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 199a6. The first stanza is quoted in *Anguttara*, iii.411, where it is attributed to a deity (*devatā*). In Sanskrit as in Pāli it begins with *na te kāmāyāni cīrāṇi loke / samkalparāgaḥ puruṣasya kāmāḥ*. The two other stanzas, to my knowledge, are absent in the Pāli. The *Vyākhyā* gives the last two lines.

The argument of the Ājivika does not hold. He thinks that a Bhikṣu ceases to be a Bhikṣu if he is a *kāmapabbogin*; and, if *kāma* = desire, then the Bhikṣu would be *kāmapabbogin*, and would lose the quality of Bhikṣu, even when he does not enjoy these objects. But the Bhikṣu, through desire, corrupts his morality and his precepts, without losing the quality of Bhikṣu: by this he transgresses by his body or speech the boundary of the rules of the Tathāgata.

In *Kābhavattbu*, viii.3-4, the Theravādins establish against the Pubbaseliyas that *kāma*, in the expression *Kāmadhātu*, does not signify "object of desire", as *rūpāyatana* or "visible matter", etc., but rather "desire." They quote the stanza of the *Anguttara*, iii.411 and *Samyutta*, i.22, as does Vasubandhu.

Compare *Vibhanga*, 256 quoted in *Atthasālinī*, 164-5; the distinction between the *vatthukāmas* and the *kilesakāmas*, *Mahānidāsa* to *Suttanipāta*, 766; *Compendium*, p. 81, n. 2.

16. Some *dharma*s are produced (*samudācaranti*) in *Kāmadhātu* which are of the sphere of *Rūpadhātu* and *Ārūpyadhātu*, for example the different absorptions (viii.19c); a person can experience "desire" (*rāga*) with respect to these absorptions: but as this desire has a *dharma* of a higher sphere for its object, it does not lodge in him: like a foot on a burning paving-stone (v.2, 39). So too among the beings of *Kāmadhātu* some *anāsravas*, or "pure" *dharma*s are produced, namely the mental states which constitute the Path: these *dharma*s are not the object of "desire" (*rāga*) in any *Dhātu* (v. 16, viii.20c): they are thus *adbhūtopavāta* or *adbhūtvāpi*, foreign to the *Dhātus*.

From whence the principle that it is "thirst" which determines the spheres (*Kāmadhātu* = one sphere, *Rūpadhātu* = four spheres); viii.20c.

All *dharma* with respect to which the "thirst" of a being in *Kāmadhātu* develops is also of the sphere of *Kāmadhātu*.

17. See vii.49-51.

18. There are four *anantas*: *ākāso ananto*, *cakkavālāni anantāni*, *sattakāyo ananto*, *buddhañānam anantam* (*Atthasālinī*, 160).

19. P'u-kuang (quoted by Saeki, viii.5b) says, "If one follows the opinion of the Mahīśāsakas, there is an arising of new beings (*yu shih ch'i yu ch'ing* 有始起有情 = *asty ādyutpannaḥ sattvaḥ*) which do not arise from action-defilement (*karmakleśa*)."

20. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 966b11-27, mentions two opinions, a horizontal disposition, and a horizontal and vertical disposition of the universe, and the difficulties that they present. Compare *Dīgha*, i.33.

21. This Sūtra is *Samyukta*, 34.7; it is used in the *Lokaprajñāpti*, beginning (trans. in *Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 196).

22. The *Īśādhāra*, "the cloud the drops of which have the dimension of a pole," is one of the four clouds at the beginning of the cosmic age, *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 247, *Kośa*, iii.90c (A "rain" Nāga of Waddell, *JRAS*, 1894, 98.)

23. The opinion of the Dharmaguptakas according to P'u-kuang. The opinion of Sthiramati, *Tsa-chi* (TD 31, number 1606), etc.

24. For example, *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 120b26, *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 493b8.

25. On the disposition of the universe, see the references in Hastings, article "Cosmology", 137b (*Mahāvastu*, i.122; *Lotus Sūtra*, Chap. xi; *Avatamsaka*). See below iii.45, 73.

26. Are there five or six *gatis*?

*Kathāvatthu*, viii.1. Regardless of *Majjhima*, i.73 (*pañca kho pan'imā sārīputta gāyo* ...), the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas maintain that the Asuras constitute a separate *gati*. But the Kālakāṣṭhikas are placed among the Pretas, and the Vepacitti (*Samyutta*, i.221, *Dialogues*, ii.280, *Brethren*, 749) among the Devas. (According to the version and the note of Aung-Rhys Davids.)

Furthermore *Majjhima*, i.73; *Dīgha*, iii.234, *Ānguttara*, iv.459, *Samyutta*, vi.474.

Yet there are four *apāyas* or painful realms of rebirth: the damned, animals, Pretas and Asuras (References: Rhys Davids-Stede). These are the *akṣapagatis* of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 147, the *akṣhanas* of the *Dīgha*, iii.264, and the *duggatis* of the *Petavatthu*, which are lacking in the paradise of Amitābha (*Sukhāāvati*, 11).

In the *Lotus Sūtra*, we sometimes have six *gatis* (Burnouf, 309), sometimes five (Burnouf, 377).

Nāgārjuna's *Letter to a Friend* gives five *gatis*; the same for the inscription of Bodhi-Gayā (Fujishima, *JAs.* 1888, ii.423; Chavannes, *RHR.* 1896, ii).

But six *gatis* in the *Dharmasamgraha*, 57, and other sources named *ibidem*.

Notes of Kyokuga Saeki. i. The Asuras 1. are included among the Pretas (*Vibhāṣā* and *Samvibhinnabhūdaya*, TD 28, number 1552); 2. are not included among the *gatis* (Buddhabhūmi, etc.); 3. are a sixth *gati* (*Mahāsāṃghikas*, etc.); 4. are included among the Pretas and the animals (*Saddharmasamtyupasthānasūtra*); and 5. are included among the Pretas, the animals and the gods (*Sagāthasūtra*). ii. The Sūtra says that there are five *gatis*. How can one maintain that there are six? Some five centuries after the Buddha's demise, there were many schools; the schools were not in agreement; some held to five *gatis*, others to six. The first make the Sūtra say that there are five *gatis*, the others that there are six. iii. In the Mahāyāna, the *Avatamsaka* says that there are six *gatis*.

27. See below note 37.

28. Definition of *gati* in *Kāraṇaprajñāpti*, translated in *Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 345. We see there that *nārakaniḥkāyasabhāgātā*, *nārakāyatanaśamanvāgama*, and *anivṛtāvyaḥkṛtānārakaruṣādīni* as well as *nārakeṣu pratisaṃdhiḥ* are *narakagati*.

29. This Sūtra, discussed in *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 309b15, is the *Saptabhavasūtra*. The schools which deny intermediate existence contest its authenticity, see Saṃghabhadra, translated in *Nirvāṇa*, 1925, p. 23, note.

30. Vasubandhu means: Only the Kāśmīrians read this Sūtra; this Sūtra is *muktaka*, that is, it does not form part of the *Āgamas*.

According to *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 865a18.

31. If the *gatis* are undefiled-neutral *dharma*s, the *Prakaraṇa* should say how these *dharma*s are abandoned through meditation, "The *anuśayas* abandoned through meditation and the universal *anuśayas* are active and develop with respect to the *gatis*" (see i.40c and Chapter V); it should not say, "all the *anuśayas*", for among them there are those that are not active in undefiled-neutral *dharma*s.

32. This is the explanation of the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, 371b16.

*Samādhicitta* = *pratisaṃdhicitta* = *upapattibhava* of the *Kośa*, iii.13c, 38. We have *pratisaṃdhi* = *viññāṇa*, the element of "reincarnation", *Paṭisaṃbhidaṃmagga*, i, p. 52; *pratisaṃdhicitta* and *viññāṇa*, *Visuddhimagga*, 548, 659.

33. According to iii.38, ii.14.

34. Paramārtha (TD 29, p. 199c7) differs: "You say that *karmabhava* is mentioned here because it is the cause of the realms of rebirth: it would be fitting also to mention the *skandhas* which are also the cause of the realms of rebirth."

35. One could say that intermediary existence is a realm of rebirth, even though it is mentioned separately in order to indicate that it is the access to other realms of rebirth.

36. *ārūpya na gatiḥ syuḥ cyuṭideśa evotpādāt / ārūpyagā hi yatra cyavante vibhāre vā vrkṣamāle vā yāvac caturthyaṁ dhyānabhūman tatraivotpadyante*: "In whichever place beings die, beings 'who should go to the *ārūpyas*', (*ārūpyaga*), either in a monastery, at the foot of a tree, or in the sphere of the Fourth Dhyāna, are reborn in this place from an *ākāśānantya* existence, etc." (See above iii.3b).

37. The undefiled-neutral *dharmas* can be either *vipākaja* or *auṣpacyika* (i.37, ii.57). Saṁghabhadra adopts the opinion of the second masters.

We see ii.10 that the *jīvitendriya* is exclusively retribution, but that the five material organs,—the mental organ, and the four sensations—are sometimes retribution, sometimes not retribution.

38. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 707a23-25.

The Sūtra (*Mahāvinyutapatti*, 119.1-7) has: 1. *rūpiṇaḥ santi sattvā nānāvakāya nānāvasaṁjñīmas tadyathā manuṣyā ekatyāś ca devāḥ*, 2. . . . *nānāvakāya ekatvasaṁjñīmas tadyathā devā brahmacāyikāḥ prathamābhiniṣṛvṛttāḥ*, 3. . . . *ekatvakāyā nānāvasaṁjñīmas tadyathā devā ābhāsvarāḥ*, 4. . . . *ekatvakāyā ekatvasaṁjñīmas tadyathā devā subhaktisnāḥ*, 5. *ākāśānantyāyatanam* (better: *āyatanopagāḥ*), 6. *viññānānantyāyatanam*, 7. *ākāśānantyāyatanam*.

*Dīgha*, ii.68 (iii.253, 282, *Ānguttara*, iv.39, v.53), "There are seven *viññāṇatthūsis* and two *āyatanas* (which are joined to the *viññānasthūsis* in order to make nine *sattvāvāsas*, *Kośa*, iii. 6c): 1. *santi Ananda sattā nānattakāyā nānattasaññīmo seyyathāpi manussā ekacce ca devā ekacce ca vinipātikā* . . . 2. *sattā nānattakāyā ekattasaññīmo* . . . and as above to *subhaktisnāḥ*; 5. *santi Ananda sattā sabbaso rūpasaññānam samatikkamā paṭighasaññānam atthagamā nānattasaññānam amana-sikārā ananto ākāso ti ākāśānatticāyatanopagā*; 6. . . . *viññāṇānatticāyatanopagā*; 7. . . . *ākāśānatticāyatanopagā*.

39. The gods of the First Dhyāna are, according to the system of the Foreign Masters (*bahirdeśakanaya*): 1. the Brahmacāyikas, 2. the Brahmāpurohitas, 3. the Mahābrahmans (*mahābrahmāṇas ca*). For the Masters of Kāśmīr, the Mahābrahmans do not form a "place" (*sthāna*) distinct from the Brahmāpurohitas (as we have seen, p. 366).

The *vinipātikas* of the Pāli text are missing.

40. The *Vibhāṣā* (707a) omits the "gods of the First Dhyāna," because these gods are not necessarily different in ideas (note of Kyokuga Saeki).

Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha translate *prathamābhiniṣṛvṛtta* as those who arise at the beginning of the *kalpa*; the Lotsava has, literally, *danī por byun ba*.

41. We follow the version of Paramārtha. Vasubandhu (as the Lotsava and Hsüan-tsang) explains the expression *nānāvakāya* as "difference of ideas because their ideas are different; endowed with this difference, they have different ideas." On *nānāvasaṁjñā*, the references of Rhys Davids-Stede and of Franke, *Dīgha*, p. 34, n.8.

42. The Brahmacāyikas are all the gods of the First Dhyāna; by naming the first ones, one names the others.

43. Compare *Dīgha*, i.18, iii.29. Brahmā thinks, "*mayā ime sattā nimmitā* . . ."; the other gods think, "*imīnā mayam bbotā brahmaṇā nimmitā*."

The Tibetan can be translated, "The aspect of the idea not being different, they are of the same idea." Paramārtha is very clear: "Because they have the similar idea that Brahmā is their sole cause." Saṁghabhadra refutes an objection: "Their ideas are different, since the Brahmacāyikas think that they are created, whereas Mahābrahmā thinks that he creates." In fact, he says, both have the idea of a single cause, the idea of creation (*nirmāṇa*).

44. Height = *āroha* (*uttarata*); greatness, breadth = *pariṇāba* (*stbantaḥpramāṇa*); body = *ākṛtīvigrāha*, that is to say *vigrāha* consisting of *ākṛti*, or "figure", and as a consequence equivalent to *śarīra*. [There is, furthermore, *vedanāvigrāha*, "mass of sensation", etc.]; speech = *vāgbbhāṣā* (*vāguccāraṇa*): Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha translate: voice, sound (= *vāg bhāṣaḥ*).

45. The *Dīgha* differs. We have the formula for Brahmā's desire, "... *aho vata aññe pi sattā itthatam āgaccheyyuntī*," and the thought of the gods, "*imam hi mayam addasāma idha paṭhamam upapannam / mayam pan'ambā pacchā upapannā*." "for we have seen him arise here before us, and as for us, we have arisen after him."

46. P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 153a20) says that there are three answers to this question; Saṅghabhadra (TD 29, p. 462c20) mentions six responses; and the *Vibhāṣā* (TD 27, p. 508c3) gives five answers of which Vasubandhu reproduces the first three.

47. Intermediate existence can be prolonged only when the intermediate being should be reincarnated into Kāmadhātu, iii.14d.

48. According to the *Vyākhyā*.

Paramārtha understands: "The gods remember the past in the world of Brahmā; they formerly saw [=in a preceding existence in the world of Brahmā] Brahmā of long life and lasting for a long time; later, they see him anew; and as a consequence they say ..."

Hsüan-tsang: "The gods remember the past of this being in this world itself; they have seen him previously ..."

49. Destruction of the universe by fire, iii.90a-b, 100c-d.

50. See viii.4.

51. The *Vyākhyā*: *paribhūdyate'neneti paribhedah*.

52. Vasubandhu reproduces the seventh of the eight explanations of the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 708a13.

53. Addition of Hsüan-tsang who follows Saṅghabhadra (whom the *Vyākhyā* quotes *ad* iii.7a), "The Āryans who are in the first three heavens of the Fourth Dhyāna, desire to enter among the Śuddhāvāsas (last five heavens of the Fourth Dhyāna) or into Ārūpya; and the Śuddhāvāsas desire Nirvāṇa."

54. *Vyākhyā*: *cittacaittānām mandapracāratvād abalavad vijñānām na tiṣṭhati*.

55. Fa-pao says that the Sūtra does not teach the nine *sattvāvāsas*, but the *Vibhāṣā* (TD 27, p. 706b13) is plain: "Why have we created this Śāstra? In order to explain the meaning of the Sūtra. The Sūtra teaches seven *vijñānasthitis*, four *vijñānasthitis*, and nine *sattvāvāsas*, but it does not explain their distinctions and it does not say how they are included or are not included in one another ..."

The Sūtra of the Nine Dwellings of Beings: *nava sattvāvāsāḥ / katame nava / rūpiṇaḥ santi sattvā nānāvakāyā nānāvāsasamjñīnas tadyathā manusyā ekatyās ca devā / ayam prathamāḥ sattvāvāsāḥ* ... The fifth dwelling is that of the Unconscious Ones: *rūpiṇaḥ santi sattvā asamjñīno'pratisamjñīnaḥ / tadyathā devā asamjñīsattvāḥ / ayam pañcamāḥ sattvāvāsas* ... The ninth dwelling: *arūpiṇaḥ santi sattvā ye sarvaśa ākīrṇanyāyatanāṃ samatīkramya naivāsasamjñānāsamjñāyatanaṃ upasamjñāyā viharanti / tadyathā devā naivāsasamjñānāsamjñāyatanaṃ pagāḥ / ayam navamāḥ sattvāvāsāḥ*. This is very close to the edition of the *Dīgha*, iii.263, 288, *Āṅguttara*, iv.401.

The *Mahāvūyutpatti*, 119, adds the *naivāsasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* (9th *sattvāvāsa*) and the *asamjñīsattvas* to the *vijñānasthitis*; the same for the *Dīgha*, ii.68, which places the *asamjñīsattvas* before *naivāsamjñā*.

56. Hsüan-tsang adds: "With the exception of the place of the *Asamjñīsattvas*, the Fourth Dhyāna is not a dwelling, as explained above."

The *Vyākhyā* observes that Vasubandhu enumerates the painful realms of rebirth through signs (*mukhamātra*); this refers also to the gods of the Fourth Dhyāna which is not a "dwelling," for no one desires to remain there. Saṅghabhadra is of this opinion. Some other commentators think that Vasubandhu, excluding only the painful realms of rebirth, holds the Fourth Dhyāna to be a dwelling: they have to defend this opinion.

57. See viii.3c.

*Dīgha*, 9.7, *Samyukta*, 3.6. *Dīgha*, iii.228, enumerates the four *viññānasthūti*s according to the *Samyutta*, iii.54: *rūpūpāyāṃ va āvuso viññāṇaṃ tiṭṭhamāṇaṃ tiṭṭhati rūpārammaṇaṃ rūpapaṭiṭṭhaṃ nandūpasevanāṃ vuddhiṃ virūlhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjati / vedanūpāyāṃ . . .* The Sanskrit edition should be the nearest: the notable variant being the preference accorded to the expression *rūpopagā*. The meaning is clear: "It is by going to the visible, to sensation, to ideas, to the *saṃskāras*, that the mind takes its support; it is with visible matter as its object and for its place that, associated with pleasure, the mind develops . . ."

But the Abhidharma (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 706b16) attributes to the Sūtra the expressions *rūpopagā viññānasthūti*, *vedanopagā viññānasthūti* . . . the grammatical explanation of which is not easy.

a. The Vaibhāṣikas understand: *Viññānasthūti*, or "dwelling of the *viññāna*", is that upon which the mind resides (*tiṭṭhati*). This dwelling, this object of the mind, is *upaga*, that is to say "near" (*saṃpācārīṇi*) the mind. It is, by its nature, "visible." Being visible and near, it is termed *rūpopagā*.

b. Bhagavadviśeṣa says that the Sautrāntikas have two explanations: 1. *Viññānasthūti* means the duration of the mind, the non-interruption of the series of the mind (*viññānasamītatyanupaccheda*). Visible matter is "approached" (*upagamya*), and it is "made one's own" (*tadātmikriyate*) by this *sthūti*. The *sthūti* is thus *rūpopagā*: "duration of the mind which approaches the visible." 2. *Sthūti* means "thirst" (*ṭṣṇā*), for thirst causes the mind to last. We thus have *viññānasthūti* = "duration of the mind, consisting of thirst". This thirst "approaches" visible matter, and attaches itself to it. We thus have: *rūpopagā viññānasthūti* = "thirst attaching itself to visible matter and causing the *viññāna* to last." But, in these two explanations, *viññānasthūti* is distinct from visible matter; now it is visible matter which is *viññānasthūti*. We must then hold to explanation a. (But this explanation is absurd from the grammatical point of view. Also) some others explain *rūpopagā viññānasthūti* as *rūpasvabhāva viññānasthūti*: "The object wherein one fixes the mind and consisting of visible matter." In fact the root *gam* is understood in the sense of *svabhāva*, as we have *khakkaṭṭhakharagata*, etc. (But, we would say, *gata* is not *upaga*).

58. The *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 706b20 and foll., examines whether these *skandhas* are *sattvākhyā* or *asattvākhyā*. Two opinions.

59. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 103a3; *Samyutta*, ii.101 (*Nettipakaraṇa*, 57): *viññāṇe ca bhikkhave āhāre atthi nandī atthi rāgo atthi tanhā patīṭṭhiṃ tatha viññāṇaṃ virūlhaṃ*.

The word *abhyārūḍha* (a term employed in order to designate a sailor riding on a ship) should correspond to *virūlha* of the Pāli.

60. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 9a7. Compare *Samyutta*, iii.54.

The four *skandhas* of the past and the future are the *sthūti*s of past and future *viññāna*.

61. "Matrix, or "womb" is a useful equivalent. Better: "Four modes of birth, arising".

The theory of the four *yonis* in their relationship with the five *gatis* is presented in the *Kāraṇaprajñāpti*, Chap. xv (*Cosmologie bouddhique*, 345). Vasubandhu borrows his information from this work (the story of Kapotamālīnī, of the Bhikṣuṇī "born in the hermitage", etc.). The same subject studied in *Visuddhimagga*, 552.

*Dīgha*, iii.230: *catasso yoniyo, aṇḍajayoni, jalābujayoni, saṃsedajayoni, opapātikayoni; Majjhima*, i.73: *aṇḍajā yoni . . .* (with definitions); *Visuddhimagga*, 552, 557; *Mahāvīryupatti*, 117: *jarāyujāb, aṇḍajāb, saṃsvedajāb, upapādakāb*.

62. *Yoni* = *skye gnas*; in Hsüan-tsang, *sheng* 生 = to be born, to arise; in Paramārtha, *tsa* 雜 = to mix. *śukraśoṇitasamṇipāto yoniḥ*, in *Prastapāda* (Viz. S. S. p. 27) which defines the *yonijas* and *ayonijas*.

63. "Born from a womb": *jarāyur yena mātuḥ kuṣṭau garbho veṣṭitas tiṭṭhati / tasmā jātā jarāyujāb. Majjhima*: *ye sattā vatthikoṣaṃ abhinibbhijja jāyanti ayaṃ vuccatī jalābujā yoni*. On the numerous modes of impregnation, *Mūlinda* 123, *Samantapāsādikā*, i.213; Windisch, *Geburt*, 24.

64. "Arise from perspiration": *bhūtanām prthivyādāmām samsvedād dravatvalakṣaṇāj jātāb* ... *Majjhima: ye sattā pūṭṭimacche vā ... jāyanti*.

65. *Upapāduka sattva, sems can skye ba pa*, Hsüan-tsang: *hua-sheng yu ch'ing* 化生有情  
Paramārtha: *tse jan sheng ch'ung sheng*.

*Upapāduka* in *Mahāvīryapatti*, *Koṣṭhyābhya*, and *Mahāvastu*; *aupapāduka* in *Dīvyā, Avadānasataka*; *aupapādika* in *Caraka* (quoted in Windisch, *Geburt*, 187), which corresponds to the Jaina *uvavāya*, and the Pāli *aupapātika*.

*Upapātika*, *upapattika*, *opapātika* (defined in *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*: *cavitvā uppajjanakasattā*: "one who, (immediately upon) death, is reborn").

A very long bibliography from the *Lotus Sūtra*, 394: "came into the world by a miracle", Senart, *JAs*. 1876, ii.477, Windisch, *Geburt*, 184, to S. Levi, *JAs*. 1912, ii.502 (who quotes Weber, Childers, Leumann, etc.).

*Upapāta* simply signifies "birth, arising" (*cyutyupapātajñāna*, vii.29, etc.) and not necessarily "casual and unusual birth" (Rhys Davids-Stede).

66. Organs not lacking is *avikalendriyāb*; organs not deficient is *abhinendriyāb*: the organ of the eye is *bhīṇa* when one is one-eyed or when one squints. The members, *aṅga*, are the hands, the feet; the "sub-members" are the fingers, etc.

67. *Majjhima: katamā ca opapātikā yoni / devā nerayikā ekacce ca manussā ekacce ca vimipātikā*.

68. Two merchants whose ship had burned found (*śamadbhigata*) a crane on the sea shore. From this union there were born the Sthavira Śāila and Upaśāila (*Vyākhyā*). According to another source, "Śāila = mountain, Upaśāila = small mountain; a crane produced two eggs there, from whence there was born two men, and hence their names."

69. The thirty-two eggs of Viśākhā, Ralston-Schiefner, p. 125. The eggs of Padmāvatī, Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, i.81 ("Lait de la mere").

70. Five hundred eggs were born to the queen of the King of Pañcāla: they were placed in a box (*mañjūṣā*) that was abandoned in the Ganges. The King of the Licchavis found the box and in it, five hundred young men (*Vyākhyā*).

71. Māṇdhātara was born from a swelling (*pīṣaka*) which formed on the head of Upośadha; Cāru and Upacāru were born from a swelling which formed on the knee of Māṇdhātara (Cakravartin Kings, see *Kośa*, iii.97d). *Dīvyā*, 210, Ralston-Schiefner, p. xxxvii, *Buddhacarita*, i.29), and the references of Cowell (*Viṣṇupurāṇa*, iv.2, *Mahābhārata*, iii.10450), Hopkins, *Great Epic*, 1915, 169.

72. Kapotamālinī was born from a swelling on the breast of King Brahmadatta.

73. Āmrāpālī was born from the stem of a banana-tree.

See the story of Āmrāpālī and Jivaka in Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, iii.325, (translated between A.D. 148 and 170); Ralston-Schiefner, p. lii. A birth considered as "apparitional," in "Sisters," p. 120.

74. Compare *Majjhima*, i.73, *Vibhanga*, 416.

75. This paragraph according to *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 626c17 and also according to the *Kāraṇaprajñāpti*, xv (*Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 345-6) where Vasubandhu deviates on a point: "The Pretas are solely apparitional. However certain masters say that they are also born from a womb. One Preti in fact said to Maudgalyāyana ... " The *Vyākhyā* observes that the discourse of the Preti appears to indicate that her sons are apparitional; if they were born from a womb, the mother would be satisfied. But this fecundity is explained by the speed with which the sons of the Preta are constituted, and the violence of the mother's hunger explains how they do not satisfy as food.

We have the *Petavatthu*, i.6: *kālena pañca puttāni sāyam pañca punāpare / vijayivāna khādāmi te pi na honti me alam* // The *Vyākhyā* furnishes fragments of the Sanskrit stanza: [*abam*] *rātau pañca sūtān divā pañca tathāparān / janayivā [pi khādāmi] nāsti rtyāsi tathāpi me* //



In Ceylon the *nijjhāmatanbhikāpetas*, which are exclusively apparitional, are distinguished from the other Pretas which are of the four types. See Rhys Davids-Stede, s. voc. *petā*.

76. The fifth of the Bodhisattvavaśitās of the *Mahāvīryūtpatti*, 27; defined in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 347.

77. In the *Mahāvastu*, i.145, "the Buddhas are produced through their own virtues and their birth is miraculous (*upapāduka*)"; i.154, "Rahūla descended directly from Tūṣita into the bowels of his mother; his birth is marvellous without being, for that, like that of the Cakravartins, and like that of those of *upapāduka* birth." On these texts and other Lokottaravādin declarations of the *Mahāvastu*, see Barth, *J. des Savants*, Aug. 1899. Compare *Lalitā*, Lefmann, 88.

78. These Tīrthikas are Maskarin, etc.

We read in the *Nirgranthasāstra*: *ṛddhiṃ bhadanta ko darśayati / māyāvi gautamaḥ*, and elsewhere, referring to the Bhagavat, the passage quoted by Vasubandhu: *kalpaśatasāyāyād evaṃvidho loka māyāvi prādurbhūya lokam bhakṣayati (Vyākhyā)*. ("to devour the world" is to "live at the expense of the world," *upajiv*). Compare *Majjhima*, i.375: *samaṇo hi bhante gotamo māyāvi . . . Saṃyutta*, iv.341; *Commentary of the Theragāthā*, 1209.

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 38b11. "The Tīrthikas slander the Buddha saying that he is a great magician who troubles the mind of the world." And p. 139a23: The Pāṭali-tīrthika says, "Gautama, do you know magic? If you do not know it, you are not omniscient; if you do know it, you are a magician."

79. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 627c15 and foll.

80. According to the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*, relics are as illusory as the Buddhas (*JRAS*. 1906, 970).

81. There is *kāyanidhana*, that is to say *kāyanāśa*: the body disappears (*antarabhīyate*) at death . . . This is the teaching of the *Kāraṇaprajñāpti*.

82. On the preservation of relics and *ṛddhi*, vii.52.

The *Vyākhyā* explains: "The thing that the magician consecrates (*adbhiṣṭhati*) saying, 'may this thing be thus' is termed *adbhiṣṭhāna*. This thing is the object (*prayojana*) of this *ṛddhi*, or this *ṛddhi* is produced in this thing: thus this *ṛddhi* is called *adbhiṣṭhānikā*."

83. On the four types of Garuḍas and Nāgas (W. de Visser, *The Dragon in China and Japan*, 1913), and in which order the first eat the second, *Dirgha*, TD 1, p. 127b29, *Saṃyutta*, iii 240, 246.

There are sixteen Nāgas safe from the attacks of the Garuḍas (Sāgara, Nanda, etc.), note of W. de Visser. See iii.83b, Beal, 48.

84. Saṅghabhadra (TD 29, p. 467b29) mentions a second opinion, that the womb of perspiration is the most extended.

85. See p. 390.

A bibliographic summary of *antarābhava*.

*Kośa*, iii.10-15, 40c; iv.53a-b, vi.34a, 39.

*Kathavatthu*, viii.2. The Theravādins deny *antarābhava* against the Sammitiyas and the Pubbaseliyas. These latter stress the existence of an Anāgāmin called Antarāparinirvāyin (see below p. 386 and iii.40c); they do not attribute *antarābhava* to creatures who are going to hell, to the Asaṅkhasattas, or to Ārūpyadhātu.

*Saṃmāyikanikāyaśāstra*, TD 32, number 1646, Third Chapter.

*Kāraṇaprajñāptiśāstra*, xi.5 (*Cosmologie bouddhique*, 341).

Sects that deny *antarābhava* are the Mahāsāṃghikas, Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaravādins, Kukkuṭikas, Mahiśāsakas (Vasumitra), Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahiśāsakas, and Vibhajjavādins (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 356c14). The *Vyākhyā* mentions many opinions: no *antarābhava*; *antarābhava* preceding birth in the Three Dhātus; *antarābhava* preceding birth in Kāmadhātu; finally,—the sole correct opinion,—*antarābhava* preceding birth in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu.

*Vibhāṣā* TD 27, p. 352b18-366a1: "Even though there is a difference in time and place between death and birth, because in the interval, there is no destruction following upon birth, these Schools

do not admit *antarābhava*." In *Visuddhimagga*, 604, as in *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 544, birth immediately follows upon death: *tesaṃ antarikā natthi*.

Brahmanical sources, notably *Ślokaṁvārttika*, *Ātmavāda*, 62: "Vindhyavāsin has refuted *antarābhavadeha*"; Goldstucker s. voc. *antarābhava* and *ativāhika*, *āvivāhika*; *Sāṃkhyaśāstra*, v.103. (A. B. Keith, *Karmamīmāṃsā*, p. 59, *Bulletin School Oriental Studies*, 1924, p. 554, thinks that this Vindhyavāsin is the Sāṃkhya master, about which see Takakusu, "Life of Vasubandhu," *JRAS*, January, 1905.)

On the manner in which "the disembodied *jīva*, before it secures a new *āyatana* (body) wanders about like a great cloud." see Hopkins, *Great Epic*, 39, *JAOS*, 22, 372; the demon body which undergoes death in order to go to hell, *Sāṃkhyaprapaścābhāṣya*, iii.7.

Diverse references, *JRAS*, 1897, 466; *JAS*, 1902, ii.295; *Nirvana* (1925), 28; Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, 207; *Sūtrālamkāra*, p. 152, *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 286, 544. On the Bar-do, see Jaschke and Sarad Candra Das (and a very rich literature).

86. This causes a difficulty. We have seen that the *gati* is undefiled-neutral. Now arising is always defiled (iii. 38) and death can be good or defiled. How can one say that intermediate existence, which is to be found between death and arising, is found between two *gatis*, *gatyor antarāle*? Answer. At the moment of death as at the moment of arising there exists the *nikāyasabhaga*, the *jīvitendriya*, the *jāti*, etc., and the *kāyendriya* (ii.35), which are undefiled-neutral and are as a consequence, with no difficulty, *gati* by their very nature.

87. The first term refers to the action which projects the existence (divine, human, etc.), the second to actions which complete the existence (caste, stature, etc.), according to iv.95.

Or rather: the place where the retribution projected by the action is manifested, namely the *nāmarūpa*, and where the *saḍāyatana* is completed.

88. Four schools, the Mahāśārnghikas etc., do not admit *antarābhava*, see the *Commentary* to the *Samayabhedha* of Vasumitra in the *Materiaux* of J. Przyluski; the same for the Mahīśāsakas (Saeki).

89. The *Vyākhyā* says: *atrācārya Guṇamatīḥ saba śiṣyēnācārya Vasumitrena svanikāyānurāgabhāvitamatir vyākhyānāvāpāram apāya pratyavasthānapāna eva vartate / vāyam iha śāstrārthavivaraṇam praty ādriyāmahe na taddūṣaṇam niṣāravād bahuvaktavyabhayāc ca*.

Yāsomitra, in the introductory stanzas to the *Vyākhyā*, notes that he follows "the commentators, Guṇamati, Vasumitra, etc.", in the places where they are correct; in the commentary to i.1, p. 7 (Petrograd edition), he condemns the explanation that Guṇamati and his student Vasumitra give to *tasmai namaskṛtya*. From the gloss that we have here, it results that Guṇamati and Vasumitra belong to another sect or school (*nikāya*). Details are lacking.

90. Compare Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, ii.200.

91. See above, note 29.

92. *Majjhima*, ii.156: *jānanti pana bhonto yathā gabbhassa avakkanti hoti / jānāma mayam bho yathā gabbhassa avakkanti hoti / idha mātāpitaro ca sannipatiṭṭhā honti mātā ca utumhi hoti gandhabbo ca paccupattihito hoti / evaṃ tinnaṃ sannipatā gabbhassa avakkanti hoti*. The same formula, *Majjhima*, i.265. (A propos these formulas, Rhys Davids-Stede say that the Gandharva "is said to preside over child-conception") (For other modes of conception, *asucipānena*, etc., see *Samantapāsādikā*, i.214, *Milinda*, 123, which repeats the formula of the *Majjhima*.)

(We can compare the *avakranti* of *nāmarūpa* which takes place when the *vijñāna* is *pratiṣṭhita*, *Samyutta*, ii.66; elsewhere we find *avakranti* of the *vijñāna*, *ibid* ii.91).

A different redaction, *Divya*, 1.440: *trayāṇāṃ sthānānāṃ saṃmukhibhāvāt putrā jāyante duhitaraś ca / katameṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ / mātāpitarau raktau bhavataḥ sannipatiṭṭhau / mātā kalyā bhavati tṛumatī / gandharvaḥ pratyupasthito bhavati / eṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ . . .* (The reading *gandharva* *pratyupasthita* that Windisch retains, *Geburt*, p. 27, is certainly faulty: four Mss. have *pratyupasthito*).

Our text has *garbhāvakrantiḥ*, descent of the embryo (and not: *putrā jāyante* . . .); it places the

qualities of the woman before the union of the parents; for the rest it follows the *Dīvyā*.

Discussed in *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 363b2; *kalya* signifies "not sick"; details on *ṛtumatī*.

On the Gandharva, see the sources mentioned in note 85. Also the remarks in *Hist. de l'Inde* (Cavaignac, *Hist. du Monde*, vol. iii), i.287. Oldenberg, *Religion du Veda*, 209, has indeed shown that the Buddhist Gandharva is "the animated seed which, passing from an old existence to a new existence, waits and instantly grasps on to the act of generation in order to become an embryo, or *garbha*." (Against Hillebrandt, who makes the Gandharva a genie of fertility; same conception in Rhys Davids-Stede: the Gandharva "is said to preside over child conception." Also against Pischel who makes the Gandharva an embryo). Gandharva is the "Veda-ized" or "Brahmanized" name of the disembodied spirit as "primitives" conceived it.

93. According to the Lotsava. Hsüan-tsang: "... a Gandharva is made ready. If he is not the intermediate being, what will the Gandharva be? How could a dissolution of the former *skandhas* be made ready? If they do not read this text, how do they explain the *Āśvalāyanaśūtra*? ..." We are led to believe that the meaning is: "The school that we are combating pretends that the word *gandharva* signifies *marāṇabhava* or *skandhabheda* ..."

*Vyākhyā*: *skandhabhedaś ca pratyupasthita iti marāṇabhavaḥ*.

94. The *Assalāyanaśūtra*, *Majjhima*, ii.157, gives a more archaic recension of our text.

95. *Samyukta*, 37.20, *Dīrgha*, TD 1, p. 51c12, *Dīrgha*, iii.237; *Kośa*, vi.37.

Whatever we may think of the Antarāparinirvāyin of the *Kathāvatthu*, viii.2 and the *Puggalapaññāti* (quoted below note 97), the definition that the *Āṅguttara*, ii.134, gives of this saint, presupposes a belief in intermediate existence (See below iii.40c - 41a).

96. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 427a11, *Āṅguttara*, iv.70, *Kośa*, vi.40. I have compared the Sanskrit version, reproduced in full in the *Vyākhyā*, with the Pāli version, *JRAS*, 1906, 446.

97. One should compare this explanation of the Vibhajyavādins with that of the *Puggalapaññāti*, 16. The Antarāparinibbāyin realizes the path *upapannam vā samanantarā apattam vā vemajjham āyupamānam*: the Upahaccaparinibbāyin realizes the path *atikkamivā vemajjham āyupamānam upahacca ... upabacca vā kalakriyam* (According to the commentary, *upabacca* = *upagantvā*, thus "holds firm to the place of death"). Buddhaghosa, *ad Kathāvatthu*, iv.2 (If one can become an Arhat by birth) reproaches the Uttarāpathakas for substituting *upapajjaparinibbāyīm* for *upabacca*.

98. There is premature death (*antarāmaraṇa*) in Ārūpyadhātu; thus a being of Ārūpyadhātu can enter into Nirvāṇa before having completed his thousands of *kalpas* of existences in Ārūpyadhātu.

99. For an explanation of this *śloka*, see *Cosmologie bouddhique*, 141, 235, *Āṅguttara*, iv.422.

100. Hsüan-tsang: After a long time (gloss: after 900 years) the sovereign master of the Law has entered into Nirvāṇa; the great generals of the Law (Gloss: *Sāradvatīputra*, etc.) have also entered into Nirvāṇa ...

101. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 620c11; *Majjhima*, i.332, where we have Kakusandha and Vidhura (Vidura=mkhas mgu); *Theragāthā*, 1187 (with the variants Vidhūra and Vidūra). Mrs Rhys Davids, "Dussi is a name for Mara in a previous life"; the *Vyākhyā*: *dāsi nāma māraḥ*.

We may recall that a heretic of the *Kathāvatthu*, viii.2, thinks that existence in hell is not preceded by an intermediate existence.

102. Hsüan-tsang: Or rather, who does not admit that *antarābhava* is "arising"? The word "infernal, hellish being" also designates *antarābhava*; when *antarābhava* is produced immediately following a death of existence, one can also speak of arising (*upapatti*), because it is the means of the arising. The Sūtra says that the criminal is immediately born as a "hellish being"; it does not say that at this moment there is an arising of existence.

103. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 403c6, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 356c21.

Version of Hsüan-tsang: "Desiring to go on the road to the east, you do not have any provisions;

desiring to stop, there is no stopping place in the interval."

Recension of *Dhammapada* 237: *upanātavayo va dāmi si / sampayāto si Yamassa santike / vāso pi ca te n'atthi antarā / pābeyyam pi ca te na vijjati*.

104. On the action which projects the intermediate existence, etc., iv.53a. Same doctrine attributed to the heretics in the *Kathāvatthu*, viii.2 (p. 106): "There is no particular action which produces intermediate existence . . ."

105. Suppose, says Hsüan-tsang that there are five embryos which give rise to five *antarābhavas*, each one calling for a different realm of rebirth; thus one says that these five *antarābhavas*, although formed in a single womb, do not touch one another nor burn one another.

106. The *Vyākhyā*: "By reason of the transparence (*acchatvāt*) of the body (*ātmabhāva*) of intermediate beings, there is no reciprocal adherence (*anyonyam*): thus no burning . . . It is for this reason that the womb is not burned."

107. This constitutes a Trisāhasramahāsāhasra (iii.74), that is to say, a *buddhakṣetra*.

108. After the beginning of the "one hundred kalpas," iv.108.

109. The *Vyākhyā* quotes, in full, a recension of the dreams of Kṛkin which may be compared with the recension of the Mahiśāsakas, TD 22, number 1421, in Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, ii.343.

On the dreams of Kṛkin, Burnouf, *Introduction*, 565; Feer, *Cat. des papiers de Burnouf*, 65; Tokiwa, *Studien zum Sumāgadhāvadāna* (Darmstadt, 1898); Minayev, *Recherches*, 89; Oldenbourg, *Zapiski*, 1888, JRAS, 1893, 509; notes in *Cosmologie bouddhique*, 237. Many points of contact with the dreams of Bimbisāra, for example I-tsing, Takakusu, 13; Chavannes, ii.137.

Dreams of the mother of an Arhat and of a Cakravartin (elephant, etc.) SBE xxii, 231, 246.

110. The same master is quoted iii.59a-c, where we have grouped some references.

111. Hsüan-tsang: "There is no reason to explain this text because it is not in the Three Piṭakas, and because the authors of these stanzas go beyond the Truth (?)."

Paramārtha: "This is not in the Sūtra . . . this is merely an arrangement of words. Wise men desire to arrange the meaning in Śāstras . . ."

Vasumitra says: The Mahāśāṅghikas think that the Bodhisattvas do not take up the nature of *kalala*, *arbuda*, etc.; that they enter into the womb having become great elephants; that they are born by cutting open the womb. In the same way, Bhavya, for the Ekavyavahārikas (Wassilief, 236, Rockhill, 188).

112. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 362b14.

113. The Bhikṣuṇī *dear mo*, or *hsien-pai* 鮮白, according to Hsüan-tsang; *shu-ko-lo* 叔柯羅 in Paramārtha. *Avadānasātaka*, ii.15 (73).

Translated according to Paramārtha who expands the original. Hsüan-tsang: "From world to world, she has autogenous clothing which never leaves her body and which transforms itself according to the seasons, until finally, at Nirvāṇa, the clothed body will be burned." (Compare the story of Śaṇavāsa, Hsüan-tsang, Julien, i.39, quoted in Przyluski, *Funerailes*, 111; and that of Nāgasena, Demieville, *Milinda*, 80).

The Pāli sources (*Therīgāthā*, 54, *Samyutta*, i.512) have nothing similar.

114. These four *bhavas* are enumerated in *Mahāvūyutpatti*, 245, 1271, with *marāṇabhava* placed first.

115. *Vyākhyā*: *suviśuddham ity ekādaśadvīpakaśurapakṣālarjitam*. These eleven *apakṣālas* are, according to the Sūtra, *vīcīkṣā*, *amanasikāra*, *kāyadaustulya*, *styānamiddha*, *auddhatya*, *atyārābhya-vīrya*, *audālya*, *chambhātva*, *nānāvasamjñā*, *abbhijalpa*, *atidhyāyivārṇa jñeyesa*.

116. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 364b8. Do intermediate beings see one another? Yes. Who sees whom? There are different opinions. According to certain masters, hellish intermediate beings see only

hellish intermediate beings... heavenly intermediate beings see only heavenly intermediate beings. According to other masters, animal intermediate beings see hellish and animal intermediate beings... According to other masters, the five classes see the five classes.

117. According to the heretics of the *Kathāvatthu*: *satto dībbacakkhuko viya adībbacakkhuko iddhimā viya aniddhimā*...

118. His body is *accha*, viii.3c.

119. The *Vibhāṣā* discusses this point, TD 27, p. 360a9. According to the Dārṣṭāntikas, it is false that an intermediate being cannot change his Dhātu, his realm of rebirth, or the place of his new existence. All of the actions which comprise the five *ānantaryas* can be "changed."... An intermediate being who goes to be reborn into the Fourth Dhyāna can generate a false view; he is then destroyed and is immediately replaced by a hellish intermediate being...

120. The Lotsava and Paramārtha omit the grammatical explanation which is partially translated by Hsüan-tsang. *Dhātupāṭha*, i.615, *arva hīmsāyām. śakandhu*, vi. 1.94.

121. *Alpeśākhyā*, that is to say, *anudāra bhīnavīrya*. We have *īṣṭa īṣṭaḥ / alpa īṣṭaḥ / alpeśa ākhyā yasya so'lpēśākhyāḥ*. Trenckner, *Milinda*, 422 (= *appaparivāra*). Hsüan-tsang: "of little merit," Paramārtha: "of little merit-virtue."

122. This is the fourth opinion expressed in the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 361b14; the others are below under b, c, d. Vasubandhu prefers this fourth opinion according to the Chinese commentators.

123. We understand that an intermediate being can last a very long time since it is projected by the cause which projects the duration, frequently long, of the existence properly so-called. See above, note 104.

124. According to the principle *sāmagrīm prāpya kālām ca phalanti khalu dehinām*, *Divyāvadāna*, 54, *passim*.

125. Third opinion of the *Vibhāṣā*.

126. Second opinion of the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 361b8, that of Śamadatta (?).

The heretics of the *Kathāvatthu*: *sattābham vā atirekasattābham vā tiṭṭhati*.

For the theories found in Tibet, Jäschke and Candra Das, *sub voc. bar do*:... of a shorter or longer duration, ordinarily under 49 days... yet no more than 49 days.

127. First opinion of the *Vibhāṣā* [From this passage can we conclude that, according to Vasubandhu, the *Vaiśāṣikas* admit the opinions indicated in first place in the *Vibhāṣā*? See note 153].

128. If an intermediate being must be reborn as a horse, then his actions will cause horses to mate out of season.

129. *Ghoṣaka* (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 361a6): If the desired father is encountered, and if the desired mother is not encountered, then the father will mate with another woman.

130. Yet *Saṃghabhadra* justifies the thesis that condemns *Vasubandhu*. The example of *Kalmāṣapāda*, etc., shows that some actions, whose retribution in a certain realm of rebirth (*gati*) is determined, can give forth a diversity of births (*upapatti*).

*Vyākhyā*: *na nikāyabhedād ekākṣepakatvam bhīyate tatkarmanāḥ ekajātīyatvād gavyākṣṛ-tisamsthānāntarāparitṛyāgāc ca / gatīniyatānām hi karmanām upapattivaicitṛyam dṛṣṭam kalmāṣapādādivād iti nāsty eṣa doṣa ity ācāryasaṃghabhadraḥ*.

According to the Tibetan version of the *Vyākhyā*: *upapattipratyayavācītriyam*.

131. This theory, which cannot but remind one of the ancient *Gandharvas* who were nymphomaniac Genies, passed into Tantric literature, see *Caṇḍamahāroṣaṇatantra*, Chap. xvi, in *Theorie des Douze Causes*, 125.

132. Males to the right, females to the left, *Avadānasāṭaka*, i.14; positions changed in the Chinese redactions of Chavannes, *Cinq cent contes*, i.380.

133. We must compare the (Buddhist) medical theories of Vāgbhaṭa and Caraka, Windisch, *Buddhas Geburt*, 48, and the *Prastapadā* (V. S. S., 1895), 33-34.

134. *Vyākhyā*: *ekasminn eva kṣaṇe bījān nirudhyate anikuraś cotpadyate tulādāṇḍanāmonmāvat*.

135. Sanskrit redaction: *valmīka īti bhikṣo asya kāyasyaitad adbhivacanānī rūpiṇa audārikasya cātummahābhūtiśikṣasya odanakulmāśopacitasya mātāpitrāśucikalalasambhūtasya ...* Pāli redaction, *Majjhima*, i.144: *vammīko ti keho bhikkhu imass'etam cātummahābhūtikassa kāyasya adbhivacanānī mātāpettikasambhāvassa odanakulmāśupacayassa aniccucchādanaparimaddanabhedanaviddham-samadhammassa*.

136. The first part of this formula *Samyutta*, ii. 178, *Cullavagga*, xii.13, *Aṅguttara*, ii.54, *Theragāthā*, 456, 575, *Udāna*, vi.8, *Nettipakaraṇa*, 174.

137. *Purvācārya yogācārā āryasaṅgprabhṛtayaḥ* (*Vyākhyā*). According to P'u-kuang, quoted by Saeki, some Sautrāntikas or Sarvāstivādins.

138. I think that this is the meaning; but I do not wish to superimpose the versions of the Lotsava, Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang onto the notes of the *Vyākhyā*.

139. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 341b9; *Jātaka*, v.266: *ete patanti niraye uddhapādā avamāsirā / isīmanī ativattāro samyatanānī tapassinām*. For *ūrdhvapādā*, *avākśīras*, Rhys Davids-Stede *sub. voc. avamāsirā*, *Suttantapāṭa*, 248, *Samyutta*, i.48, etc. This is not most commonly "a position characteristic of beings in Purgatory" (as *Mahāvastu*, iii.455.3), but the position of a being who falls into hell; the same for *Manu*, iii.249, viii.94.

According to the glosses of Saeki, the Rṣis are the Buddhas, the ascetics (*samyata*) are the Pratyekabuddhas, and the penitents are the Bodhisattvas. The explanations of the *Lokaprajñāpti* (*Cosmologie*, p. 239) differ.

*ativaktar* = *adbhikṣeptar* = *apavāditar*.

140. According to the Sūtra quoted in note 142, we should read *garbhasanīkṛānti*; but *gabbāvakkanti*, *gabbe okkanti* (*Dīgha*, iii.103, 231, *Cūlaniddesa*, 304) and *kārikā* 17 give *garbhāvākrānti*. The Lotsava has *jug-pa* throughout.

141. *Dīgha*, iii.103, 231, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p.863a11.

*Vibhāṣā*, p. 863a11: There are four types of *garbhāvākrānti* ( *ju t'ai* 入胎, Paramārtha TD 29, p. 204a1: *t'uo t'ai* 託胎, entry into the womb): to enter into the womb without full consciousness, and to remain there, and to leave it in the same condition; to enter in full consciousness, to remain there and to leave it without full consciousness; to enter and remain there in full consciousness, but to leave without full consciousness; and to enter, to remain there, and to leave in full consciousness. Why create this Śāstra? In order to explain (*vibhaktum*) the meaning of the Sūtra. The Sūtra teaches four *garbhāvākrāntis* ... but it does not explain them. The Sūtra is the support, the root of this Śāstra. Desiring to say what the Sūtra does not say, we make this Śāstra. What is to enter, to remain, and to leave without full consciousness? Two ways. 1. He whose merit is small, at the moment of entry, produces error of ideas and resolution (*saṃjñā*, *adhimokṣa*); he thinks, "The heavens rain down ...". 2. He whose merit is great believes that he is entering into a palace ...

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 863b8 and foll.: There are five opinions on the four *garbhāvākrāntis* examined in descending order: the fourth, full consciousness upon entry, remaining, and leaving; the third, full consciousness upon entry and remaining; the second, full consciousness at entry; and the first, complete absence of full consciousness. According to the extract which Saeki gives: 1. the fourth: Bodhisattvas, third: Pratyekabuddhas, second: Pāramitā-Śrāvakas, first: all others. 2. second: Srotaāpannas, Sakṛdāgamins. 3. Beings having pure knowledge and action, impure knowledge and action, no knowledge but pure action, neither pure knowledge nor pure action. The four *garbhāvākrāntis* correspond to this classification. When the first ones enter the womb, they are

pure and free from all troubling tangibles; when they remain therein . . . ; when they leave it, the gate of their birth is open, easy, without pressure or obstacle: from whence it results that these beings do not lose their "mindfulness" for any moment (*smṛtiśoṣa*). (For beings of the following categories, the conditions of leaving, remaining and entering become successively bad; from whence "loss of mindfulness") In the order of Bodhisattvas, etc. 4. The three good *garbhāvakṛāntis* are those which the Bodhisattvas take up in the course of the three *asaṃkhyeyakalpas* of their careers.

Buddhaghosa *ad Dīgha*, iii.103 (*Dialogues*, iii. p. 98): fourth, omniscient Bodhisattvas; third, the two great Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas; second, the twenty-four great Theras; first, persons in general.

142. According to Hsüan-tsang.

According to Saṃghabhadra: *aṇḍāj jāto janīyate jāyate cety aṇḍajāb*, by virtue of *Pāṇini*, 3.2.75

143. In the case of full consciousness, how can one say that reincarnation or rebirth (*pratisaṃdhibandha*) takes place by reason of a defiled mind (*kliṣṭacitta*) (iii.38)? Because the mind is defiled through affection for the mother, etc. (*mātsrnehādī*).

144. See *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 149, *Muséon*, 1910, 336.

145. Namely, the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika.

146. *Kārikās* 18 and 19 are quoted in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, ix.15, 73.

147. (*Samyutta*, i.206 (*Jātaka Commentary*, iv.496, *Kathāvatthu*, xiv.2): *Mahāniddesa*, 120, *Mahāvūyūtpatti*, 190. Windisch, *Buddhas Geburt*, 87, compare the *Nirukta*, the *Garbha-upanishad*, the Sāṃkhya and medical sources.

Note that *Mūlinda*, 40, and *Visuddhimagga*, 236, treat of premature death, but omits the *pasākhā*: "The embryo dies at the time of *kalala* . . . of *ghana*, at one month, at two months . . ." In the *Mahāniddesa*: " . . . it dies at the time of *pasākhā*: it dies when scarcely born.

The Sanskrit version (see *Samyukta* TD 2, p. 357c29) replaces the fourth line with: (*rūpindriyāni jāyante*) *vyāñjanāny anupūrvāśab*. The "material organs" are the subtle parts of the eye, ear, nose, and tongue [=the eye properly so-called, that which sees . . .]; the *vyāñjanas* are the visible supports (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the eye thus defined, etc., for it is by reason of its support that the organ properly so-called is manifested (*abhiṃvyajyate*). (The organ of touch exists from the very beginning).

*On kalala*, etc., p. 395–396, and n. 154. TD 14, no 523.

According to the commentator of the *Kathāvatthu*, xiv.2, the organs of the eye, etc., appear after seventy-seven days.

According to a Mahāyāna commentary, there are eight embryonic states: 1.-5. *kalalāvasthā* . . . *prāsākhāvasthā*, 6. *keśalomāvasthā*, 7. *indriyāvasthā*, 8. *vyāñjanāvasthā* (the period when the supports of the *indriyas* are clearly manifested). In agreement with the Hīnayāna commentaries, P'u-kuang and Fa-pao say that *keśa*, *roman*, *nakha*, etc., up to the moment when the *indriyas-vyāñjanas* are complete, all constitute the fifth state. But according to the Sāṃhītiyas, hair, etc., are a sixth state.

148. We have tried, in *Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 30, to translate the Tibetan here word for word.

149. The description of *Majjhima*, i.266 is more moderate: " . . . When he is born, his mother nourishes him with her blood, for, according to the *Vimaya*, 'Oh Bhikṣus, maternal milk is of blood . . .'"

150. Compare *Majjhima*, i.266: . . . *vuddhim anvāya paripākam anvāya*.

151. Note of Saeki: The author refutes the Mahīśāsakas who admit that there is a beginning, one eternal cause, of effects without causes; see above note 19.

152. In *kārikās* 20 to 24 Vasubandhu defines *āvasthika* or "static" *pratītyasamutpāda* (see 25a), the series considered in twelve successive states (*āvasthā, daśā*).

On the three parts or "sections" (*kāṇḍa*) and the three "paths" (*vartman*), a theory common to the two scholars, see *Deux notes sur le Pratītyasamutpāda* (Congres d'Alger, 1905); Shwe Zan Aung, *Compendium*, 259; *Théorie des douze causes*, Gand, 1913, p. 34-38; the Sanskrit source is the *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra*.

Samghabhadra (*Nyāyānusāra*) establishes that the causal series is both internal and external,—the *kalala*, etc., on the one hand; the seed, etc., on the other: this is what is termed *Pratītyasamutpāda* (Comp. *Śālistambasūtra*, *Théorie des douze causes*, p. 73). *Pratītyasamutpāda* is thus not only the twelve *aṅgas*. How do we know this? By the Śāstra (*Prakaraṇa*, below, p. 405 line 2) which says, "What is *pratītyasamutpāda*? All the conditioned *dharmas*." Indications vary elsewhere in the same Sūtra. Sometimes twelve *bhavāṅgas* are enumerated, for example in the *Paramārthasūnyatāsūtra*, etc.; sometimes eleven, for example in the *Chih-shih ching* 智事經 (*Jñānavastu-sūtra* = *Sañiyutta*, ii.56), etc.; sometimes ten, as in the *Nagaropamādisūtra* (*Dīrgha*, 340); sometimes nine, as in the *Mahānidānaparyāyasūtra*; sometimes eight, as in the Sūtra which says, "The Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas who do not truly know the nature of the *dharmas* . . ." Such are the differences. (Other variations, Senart, *Mélanges Harlez*, 281, Przyluski, *JAs*, 1920, ii.326). Why does the doctrine of the Sūtras differ from that of the Treatises? The Treatises teach according to the nature of the *dharmas*; the Sūtras take into consideration the person to be converted . . . Or rather the Sūtras are of non-explicit sense (*anūāha*), the Treatises are of explicit meaning. The Sūtras only consider living beings (*sattvābhyā*); the Treatises consider living beings (*sattva*) and non-living beings . . . (Below, p. 405).

153. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 120a29: Some say, "This Sūtra refers only to Kāmadhātu and the three types of arising with the exception of apparitional birth; and, as a result, it is without fault." We should say that this Sūtra refers to the Three Dhātus and the four types of birth. Although apparitional beings possess all the organs at the moment they are born, these organs are not sharp (*īkṣṇa*); then, little by little, with time, the organs become sharp. When they are not sharp, at the first moment, this is the *aṅga* of *viññāna*; at the second moment and as long as they are not sharp, this is the *aṅga* of *nāmarūpa*; when they are sharp, this is the *aṅga* of *śaḍāyatana*. In this way, the Sūtra does not present the fault of being incomplete. (This refers also to the apparitional beings who possess all their organs from the beginning, *Kośa*, ii.14, *Kathāvatthu*, xiv.2).

P'u-kuang says, "The Śāstra of Vasubandhu does not take the judgement of the *Vibhāṣā* (p'o-sha p'ing-chia 婆沙評家) as authority; it follows the sense of the first masters of the *Vibhāṣā*."

We must, it appears to me—without my having the *Vibhāṣā* in my hands—understand the *p'ing-chia* to be the group of scholars who drew up the *Vibhāṣā* and who formulated a critical judgement on the opinions of the different masters. Saeki notes that, on such and such a point, the *Vibhāṣā* confines itself to enumerating opinions: "There is no *p'ing chia*," it says. According to others, four *p'ing-chia*. See note 127.

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 122c12: Twelve *aṅgas* exist in Kāmadhātu; eleven *aṅgas* in Rūpadhātu with the exception of *nāmarūpa*; ten *aṅgas* in Ārūpyadhātu with the exception of *nāmarūpa* and *śaḍāyatana*. (But we see the difficulty of the propositions which result from this thesis, for: "The *śaḍāyatana* exist by reason of the *viññāna*," "*sparsa* by reason of the *viññāna*"). Thus the *Vibhāṣā* (literally: the *p'ing-chia* say): "We must say that the twelve *aṅgas* exist in the Three Dhātus . . ."

154. For these definitions, *Théorie des douze causes*, 41; the *San-tsang fa-tsu*, trans. by Klaproth, *Foe-koue-ki*, 286, which very closely follows the doctrine presented by Vasubandhu, but requiring glosses; for example, *sparsa* is described: "From the leaving of the uterus until the age of three or four years, even though the six roots (= *indriyas*) corresponding through touch to the six dusts (*viṣaya*, *ālamāna*), one cannot yet reflect, nor comprehend the joys and the sufferings of life."

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 119a2: What is *avidyā*? We cannot say that it is all the past *kleśas*, for this would destroy the characteristics proper to *avidyā*; we must say that it is *pūrvakleśadaśā* (or *avasthā*), the period of the past *kleśa*. What are the *saṃskāras*? The period of the past action. What is the *viññāna*? It is *pratisamdhicitta*, "the mind at conception" with that which accompanies it. What is *nāmarūpa*? After *pratisamdhicitta* and before the four material organs are produced. (*Kāyendriya*, the organ of touch, is acquired all at once). In this interval, before the *śaḍāyatanas* are



complete, there are five periods (*avasthā*): *kalala*, *arbuda*, *peśm*, *ghana*, and *praśābhā*, which together make up the period of *nāmarūpa*. What is the *śaḍāyatana*? When the four material organs are produced, the six *āyatanas* are complete. In the period of *praśābhā*, the organs of the eye, etc., are not capable of giving any support to *sparsa*.

155. Commentary of *Kathāvatthu*, xiv.2; *Kośa*, ii.14.

156. *Vyākhyā*: *caksurādyāyatanotpattikāle kāyamañāyatanayor vyavasthāpanāt*. Hsüan-tsang: "But this refers to the moment when the six *āyatanas* are complete."

157. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 117c3: *Pratītyasamutpāda* is of four types: *kaṣaṇika*, *sāmbandhika*, *āvasthika*, and *prākarsika*.

The *Vyākhyā* explains, in a different order: a. *kaṣaṇikāḥ kṣaṇe bhavaḥ kṣaṇo'syāstūti kaṣaṇikāḥ*. b. *prākarsena dīryati carati vā prākarsikāḥ / prabandhavyukta ity arthah*. And further on: *sa evāvasthikāḥ prākarsayogāt prākarsikāḥ / anekakaṣaṇikatvāt anekajanmikāt vā ca.c. sāmbandhikāḥ / hetuphalasāmbandhavyukta ity arthah*. d. *āvasthikāḥ / dvādaśa pañcaskandhikā avasthā ity arthah*.

158. Hsüan-tsang corrects: "the three *skandhas*."

159. One can say that the organs are placed beside the *nāman* which is their support (*āśraya*); one can say that their existence or activity (*vr̥tti*) depends on *nāmarūpa*.

160. The *abhinipāta* of the eye is its activity (*pravṛtti*) with respect to visible things.

161. The *paryavasthānas* are the absence of shame, *abhrī*, etc., v.47.

162. Here Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha omit this quotation from the *Prakarana*. (According to the *Vyākhyā*, "the *Prakarana*"). See below, p. 405, 410.

163. Saṃghabhadra: The masters of the Abhidharma say that it is with respect to the "states" (*avasthās*) that the Buddha taught *pratītyasamutpāda*. The Sautrāntika (=Vasubandhu) does not believe this, and this is why he puts in his stanza the word *kila* (which we have translated as "according to the School").

164. Saeki mentions *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 578b16. *Pratītyasamutpāda* of the Sūtra is *ābhīprāyika*; in the Abhidharma, *lākṣaṇika*. See above, note 152.

165. *Samyutta*, ii.26; *Majjhima*, i.8, 111; *Visuddhimagga*, 599; *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 84b26; *Sālistamba*, p. 88 (*Théorie des douze causes*), quoted in *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 593. Variants, among which we shall take up those of the third paragraph.

*Vyākhyā*: *kiṃ svid idam ity āmadravayam anveśate / katham svid idam iti kena prakāreṇa kayā yuktyeti / ke santa iti ke vāyam idānīm vidyamānaḥ / ke bhaviṣyāma ity evaṃ nāvadhārayati*.

The *Sālistamba* in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*: *kiṃ nv idam / katham nv idam / ke santaḥ / ke bhaviṣyāmaḥ / ayaṃ sattvaḥ kuta āgataḥ / sa itaś cyutaḥ kutra gamiṣyati*.

*Majjhima*, i.8 and *Visuddhimagga*, 599 (Warren, 243): *abam nu kho'smi / no nu kho'smi / kiṃ nu kho'smi / katham nu kho'smi / ayaṃ nu kho sutto kuto āgato / so kubbimāmi bhavissati* (The *Visuddhimagga* reads: *abam nu kho'smim* . . . )

This text appears to bear some relationship to the Sūtra of the *tr̥ṣṇavicāritas*, *Kośa*, vii.13a.

166. Opinion rejected by Saṃghabhadra.

167. These are the three *vartman* or *vaṭṭa*. *Visuddhimagga*, 581: *tivaṭṭam (idam bhavacakkam) anavaṭṭhitam bhamati*.

In all the other sources, the third *vartman* is solely defined as retribution (*vipāka*) (or fruit, *phala*); see *Théorie des douze causes*, 34.

168. Hsüan-tsang: "The *naya* of the *bhavāṅgas* is solely that." Saṃghabhadra comments on the word "solely", which, he says, indicates that the number of the *bhavāṅgas* is limited to twelve.

169. *Madhyama*, 34.3, *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 92c22.

The commentators say: the word *kevala* indicates the absence of *ātman* (self) and of *ātmīya* (things pertaining to the self); the word "grand" indicates the absence of beginning and end; . . . "mass of suffering", because it is accumulated by the impure *saṃskāras*; *samudaya* because it is produced by a conjunction of conditions . . .

170. According to the *Vyākhyā*: "The Sthavira Vasubandhu, teacher of the master Manoratha"; according to P'u-kuang: "Vasubandhu the elder, a dissident Sarvāstivādin" (*yu pu i shih* 有部異師 ).

On Manoratha, the teacher of Vasubandhu the elder, see Watters, i.211.

171. According to the *Vyākhyā*, the *Sabhetusapratyayasamīdānāsūtra*.

*avidyā bhikṣavaḥ sabhetukā sapratyayā samīdānā / kaś ca bhikṣavo 'vidyāyā hetuḥ kaś pratyayaḥ kim nidānam / avidyāyā bhikṣavo 'yomisomanasikāro hetuḥ . . .*

Same quotation in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 452, excerpt from the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*.

*Samyukta*, 13.20 (note of Saeki).

*Théorie des douze causes*, p. 8; *Anguttara*, v.113 (on the nourishment of *avidyā*). *Nettipakarana*, 79 (*avijjā avijjāya hetu, ayonisomanasikāro paccayo*).

172. See below, note 176.

173. "Here", that is to say in the *Sūtra* that we are concerned with now, the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* (*Vyākhyā*), the *Dvādaśāṅgasūtra* (Saeki).

For example, *Samyutta*, ii.25.

174. The *Sautrāntika* Śrīlābha.

175. See above, note 171.

176. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 74b-c. *caḥṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi corpadyata āvilo manasikāro mohajaḥ. mohaja = avidyāya*.

*Madhyamakavṛtti*, 452, according to the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*: *āvilo mohaja manasikāro bhikṣavo 'vidyāyā hetuḥ*.

177. *Samyukta*, 2.14. *Samyutta*, iii.96: *avijjāsamphassajena . . . vedayitena phupphasya assutavato putthujjanassa uppannā taṇhā*.

178. *Samyutta*, ii.25: *pañcicasamuppadam vo bhikkhave desissāmi pañcicasamuppanne ca dhamme*.

179. *Prakarana*, TD 26, p. 715c4 *traiyadvikāḥ sarve saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ / ta eva ca pratītyasamutpannāḥ*.

Above p. 405.

180. By qualifying *cetanā* with the word *ābhisaṃskārikā*, the author indicates the unique or self-characteristic of all the *cetanā*s (i.15a); for the *cetanā*, creating retribution (*vipākābhisaṃskaraṇā*) is its *ābhisaṃskārikā*. The future *dharmas* are "willed" (*cetiṭā*), that is to say are "the object of a vow or an intention" (*pranibhīta*), by this *cetanā*. "I will be a god, I will be a man." It is in this way that the future *dharmas* are *saṃskṛta*; they are not so called through "anticipatory designation" (*bhāvinyā samijñayā*).

181. It is the object of a *kuśaladharmacchanda*, v.16, viii.20c.

182. *Kośa*, i 13.

183. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 118b25: The Bhadanta Vasumitra says: The *dharma* which is cause (*hetu*) is *pratītyasamutpāda dharma*; the *dharma* which is caused (*sabhetuka*) is *pratītyasamutpanna dharma*; the *dharma* which is arising is *pratītyasamutpāda dharma* . . . ; the *dharma* which is production (*utpāda*) . . . ; the *dharma* which is active (*karaka*?) . . . The Bhadanta says: The *pravartaka* (see *Kośa*, iv.10) is *pratītyasamutpāda dharma*; the *anuvartaka* is *pratītyasamutpanna dharma*.

184. According to the Tibetan, the Sthavira Bsam rdzogs (which Schiefner, *Tāranātha*, 4, n.6, gives

as Saṁbhūti); Hsüan-tsang: *wang-man* 望滿 "hope-fulfillment"; transcribed by Paramārtha.

This paragraph appears to be excerpted word for word from the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 118b15, which Saeki quotes fol. 16a.

185. According to the *Vyākhyā*.

186. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 85a16. *pūrvānte'jñānam aparānte'jñānam madhyānte'jñānam buddhe'jñānam dharmē'jñānam saṃghe'jñānam* . . . (See p. 421).

187. See Chapter ix, French trans. p.247.

188. The Lotsava translates: "It happens that, in the Teaching not everything is only of clear meaning. The Bhagavat also gives definitions which bear on the essentials of the thing to be defined." Hsüan-tsang: "All the Sūtras are not spoken in a clear meaning; it happens that they are also spoken according to their essentials." Paramārtha: "All the Sūtras are not of clear meaning by the fact that they define . . ."

189. *Sikṣasamuccaya*, 245; *Majjhima*, i.185 (*katamā ajjhattikā paṭhavādhātu / yaṃ ajjhattam . . . kakkhalam . . . seyyathāpi kesā . . .*), iii.240.

190. The Lotsava indicates the first words of this other Sūtra: *santy asmiṃ kāye*, see *Sikṣasamuccaya*, 228, *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 57, *Majjhima*, iii.90, *Dīgha*, iii.101.

191. The *viññāna* that this refers to is the *pratisaṃdhibhiviññāna*, the *viññāna* of "reincarnation": we should understand *upaga* = *tām tām upapattiṃ gacchati*.

192. According to the *Vyākhyā*, the *Āryamahīśāsakas*; according to the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 116c57, the *Vibhajyavādin*s; according to the *Samayabhedha*, the *Mahāsārngghikas*; according to the *Yü-chia lun chi* 瑜伽論記, the *Mahāsārngghikas* and the *Mahīśāsakas*. *Kathāvatthu*, vi.2 (xi.7, xxi.7); *Nirvāṇa*, 1925, p. 185.

*Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 84b16. *Utpādād vā tatbhāgatānām anutpādād vā tatbhāgatānām sthitasveyam (dharmaṇām) dharmatā; Samyukta*, ii.25; *Visuddhimagga*, 518.

On this formula (which the *Vyākhyā* quotes according to the *Śālistambasūtra*, Cordier, 111, 361), see the note in *Théorie des douze causes*, 111-113.

193. *Utpādās ca nāmābhūtvābhāvalakṣaṇaḥ* (definition of the Sautrāntikas, ii. p. 242), Paramārtha translates this text. The Lotsava has: *utpādās ca nāmotpattiḥ* (and the *Vyākhyā* glosses: the *utpatti* of a *dharma* is necessarily "of the moment", [*śadanmāna*]). *Vyākhyā*, in *Cosmologie*, p. 166, line 5, reads: *ko'śyotpādasya avidyādibhir abhisambandho yathaudanena pākasyābhisambandhaḥ kartṛkriyālakṣaṇaḥ*.

194. Etymology of the word *pratītyasamutpāda*, Burnouf, *Lotus*, 530, *Introduction*, 623; *Visuddhimagga*, 518, 521 (Warren, 168); Aung and Rhys Davids, *Compendium*, 259; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 5; *Théorie des douze causes*, 48.

195. According to *Pāṇini*, 3.4.21: *saṃānakartṛkayoh pūrvakāle*.

196. The Sautrāntikas do not admit the pre-existence of this *dharma*.

197. *Śābdika* = *śābdavid* = *vaśyākarana*.

198. Two opinions: the refutation which follows is Sautrāntika or Sarvāstivādin (P'u-kuang, TD 41, p. 170a29).

199. *Anāgata* = *alabdāhāmaka*.

200. Two simultaneous actions: *pratītyakriyā* and *samutpādakriyā*.

201. According to the version of Paramārtha, more explicit than Hsüan-tsang: "One should quote this Sūtra as an explanation of *pratītyasamutpāda*."

202. *Vyākhyā*: *asam abhāvo labdhāhāmaka utpadyate yathā pratītye api tathā / asan // atha*

*labdhātma utpadyate . . . utpanno'pi punar utpadyata ity anavasthānād anistā prāpnoti.* Yet the Sāṃkhya affirms *sata evotpādo nāsataḥ*. And we Buddhists admit the existence of the future against the Vaibhāṣikas; and against the Sautrāntikas, we admit the existence of "generating seeds" (*janakadharmabīja*): we say then *san purāpi vā*: "or rather, it is pre-existent."

But one can see in the fourth *pāda*: *asan purāpi vā* = "In order to avoid infinite regression, you say that it arises non-existent: this is to return to the thesis refuted in the first line: *asann utpadyate yadvat*."

203. *Vyākhyā*: *na hy asau pūrvam mukhaṃ vyādadaṭṭi vidārayati paścāc chete / kiṃ tarhi mukhaṃ vyādadaṭṭi chete sa mukhaṃ vyādāya śeta ity ucyate / . . .*

204. This is the explanation of Bhadanta Śrīlābha (*Vyākhyā*).

*pratir vīpsārtha itī nānavacimām adbhikarānānām sarveṣāṃ kriyāguṇābhyām icchā vīpsā / tāṃ ayaṃ pratir dyotayati // itau gatau sādhaḥ ityāḥ / tatra sādhuḥ itī yatpratrayaḥ / itau vīpsātau sādhaḥ vānavasthāyina ity arthaḥ // samupasargaḥ samavāyārthaṃ dyotayati // utpūrvah padīḥ prādurbhāvārtho dbāuvartbhapaṣṇāmāt // tāṃ tāṃ sāmagrīm prati ityānām vīnasvarāṇāṃ samavāyenotpādaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ.* One dharma never arises alone, *Kośa*, ii.22, etc.

See the explanation of *pratītya*, vii. note 100.

205. *Samyutta*, ii.72, iv. 33; *Milinda*, 56, etc.

206. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 85a14, *Majjhima*, iii.63, *Mahāvastu*, ii.285, *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 9, *Théorie des douze causes*, p. 49.

i. First explanation, approved by Vasubandhu. The arguments two to four are (according to P'u-kuang who follows Saṃghabhadra), those of the Sthaviraśīṣya Bhadanta Rāma (*śīṣya*=ti-tzu 弟子).

ii. Second explanation, that of the Sthavira Vasuvarman (*Vyākhyā*); according to Fa-pao, a divergent explanation of the Sautrāntikas (*ching-pu i shih* 經部異釋) (as is also the fifth explanation); according to P'u-kuang, the "dissident Sautrāntika master" (*ching-pu i shih* 經部異師), the Bhadanta Shih-ts'ao 世曹 (Vasuvarman); according to Saṃghabhadra, the "Sthavira-t'u-t'ang 徒黨", (which gives Sthavirapākṣika, a follower of the Sthavira).

iii. Heterodox explanation.

iv. Explanation of the ancient masters (Sautrāntika).

v. Explanation of Śrīlābha (*Vyākhyā*) (whom Saṃghabhadra terms, generally, "the Sthavira"); Fa-pao: a divergent explanation of the Sautrāntikas; P'u-kuang, "Sthavira-t'ung-hsiueh 同學"; Saṃghabhadra, "Sthavira-t'ung-chiem 同見."

207. The *Vyākhyā* comments on this paragraph with the words: *etat sarvam ācāryamatam*.

208. According to the *Vyākhyā*, an explanation of the Sthavira Vasuvarman, which should be the Shih-ts'ao of P'u-kuang. A Vasuvarman is the author of TD 32, no 1647, *Treatise on the Four Truths*.

209. Namely, the ancient masters: *ācārya itī pūrvācāryāḥ*.

210. *aprahāṇajñāpanārtham, utpattijñāpanārtham*.

211. According to the *Vyākhyā*, the opinion of Śrīlābha.

212. According to the *Vyākhyā*: *sa eṣa Bhadanta Śrīlābhaḥ*. Note of Saeki: the Sthavira.

213. The Sūtra says: *jātipratītyā jaramaraṇasokaḥ paridevadupkhaḥ daurmanasyopāyāsāḥ sambhavantī* (with variants).

The terms *śoka . . . upāyās* are included (*saṃgrhāta*) in *jaramaraṇa* and are not separate items (*nāṅgāntaram*). They come from diverse transformations (*pariṇāma*) of objects (*viśaya*), living beings and non-living beings, and from the person (*ātmabhāva*).

They are defined: *śoka* = *daurmanasyasamprayuktavītarka*; *parideva* = *śokasamutthitapralāpa*; *dupkha*, as ii.7a; *daurmanasya*, as ii.8b; *upāyāsa* = *vicchinnavega daurmanasya*, or, according to others, *śokaparidevapūrvaka śrama* (*Vyākhyā*).

See the definitions of the *Śālistambasūtra* (*Théorie des douze causes*, 80); *Abhidhammaśāṅgikā*, 36; *sokādivacanam pan'ettha nissandaphalanidassanam*; *Visuddhimagga*, 503 (grief is the cause of all *vyāsana*); for other references, see *Théorie des douze causes*, 31-32.

*Soka*, etc., are represented on the wheel of existence in *Ajaṇṭa*, J. Przyluski, *JAs.* 1920, ii.313, an article that should be read.

214. The *Vyākhyā* explains *aprajānaṃ* with the words *āvenikim avidyāṃ darśayati*: "the author indicates here *avidyā* pure and simple." See p. 402, 419.

215. See iii.101b.

216. For us, the item *viññāna* is the whole of the series of *viññānas* from the existence at death (*maranabhava*) until the existence at birth (*upapattibhava*): in other words, the mental series of the intermediate being since his initial mind (*pratisamūhicitā*) to its end (the existence at birth, the beginning of the realm of rebirth). This series includes mental consciousness (*manoviññāna*), plus the five consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc. We are thus in agreement with the definition of the item *viññāna* (*viññānāṅganirdeśe*): *viññānam katamat / sad viññānakāyā*.

This definition of the *viññāna* is from the *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 578b16, *Majjhima*, i.53. According to Paramārtha, confirmed by the *Vyākhyā* below (see note 217), we should read: "according to the *Viññānavibhaṅga* of the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*."

If the item *viññāna* is the initial mind of the realm of rebirth, existence at arising (*pratisamūhicitā*, *upapattibhava*), the *Sūtra* would say: *viññānaṃ katamat / manoviññānam*. For "it is to the *manoviññāna* alone that the cutting off of the roots belongs . . ." (iii.42a).

217. *Vyākhyā*: *pratītyasamutpādasūtre nāmarūpavibhaṅga evaṃ nirdeśāt / nāma katamat . . .*

On the definition of *nāmarūpa* and its variants, *Théorie des douze causes*.

218. Here Vasubandhu gives the Sautrāntika explanation of *upādāna*: the *Vaibhāṣika* thesis, v.38. On the four *upādānas*, *Kathāvatthu*, xv.2, *Vibhaṅga*, 145, *Nettipakaraṇa*, 41, *Sāmyutta*, ii.3, *Digha*, ii.58, *Majjhima*, i.66.

219. On *kukkuravṛata*, etc., *Majjhima*, i.387, *Digha*, iii.6.

The *Pāṇḍarabhikṣus* call to mind the *Pāṇḍaraṅgaparibbājakas* who divided, along with the *Brāhmins* and the *brāhmaṇajātīyapāsāṇḍas*, the favors of Bindusāra, *Samantapāsādikā*, 44; Mrs Rhys Davids reconciles this with the *Pāṇḍara*[sa]gotta of the *Theragāthā*, 949.

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 590a26: There are two *Tīrthakas*, *Acela Śreṇika* (*Acela Seniya* *Kukkuravatikā* of the *Majjhima*, i.387, compare *Nettipakaraṇa*, 99) and *Pūraṇa Koḍika* (*Puṇṇa Koliyaputta Govatika*). These two *Tīrthikas*, at the same time, went to ask questions of the people seated together, saying, "We two practice all the difficult practices of this world, we study them, and we accomplish them to perfection. Who can in truth prophesize the retribution that these practices will produce? . . ."

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 284a13: *Śūlavratopādāna* is twofold, internal and external. The inner persons (or Buddhists) are those who abuse themselves thinking that bathing makes for purity, that the practice of the twelve *Dhutas* suffices for purity.

220. *Ātmabhāva*, *ātmavāda* are the five *upādānaskandhas*, as results from the text: *ye ke cīc chramaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā āmeti samanupāsyantaḥ samanupāsyanti sarve ta imāṃ eva pañcōpādānaskandhāṃ*. (*Sāmyutta*, iii.46).

221. The "divergent" masters (*i-sibh* 異師) of the Sautrāntika school (Saeki).

222. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 498b10. *Bālo bhikṣavo'srutavāṇ prthagjanāḥ prajñāptim anupatītaḥ cakkuṣā rūpaṇi dṛṣṭva . . .* (*Madhyamakavṛtti*, 137 and note).

The *bāla*, who lacks "innate" (*upapattilābhikā*) *prajñā* which comes from the influence of a previous religious practice (*pūrvābhyaśavāsānānirjātā*); *a'srutavāṇ*, who is lacking the *prajñā* which arises from Scripture (*āgamajā*); the *prthagjana*, who is lacking the *prajñā* arisen from *adbhigama*, that is to say from *satyābhisamaya* (vi.27).

*Prajñāptim anupatītas* = *yathā saññā yathā ca vyavahāras tathānugataḥ*. The expression

appears to be lacking in Pāli.

223. "In the *Sarva*", I understand to be the *Sarvavarga*, but we do not find anything parallel in the *Sabbavagga* of the *Samyutta*, iv.15. The Lotsava translates as *thams cad las*; Hsüan-tsang: *chuching* 諸經 "in all the various Scriptures"; Paramārtha: *i-ch'ieh ch'u* 一切處 "in all places".

224. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 58a4; *Samyutta*, iii.100: "Is *upādāna* the same thing as the *upādānaskandhas*? It is neither the same thing as the *upādānaskandhas*, nor different from the *upādānaskandhas*: *chandarāga* with respect to them is *upādāna* with respect to them (*api ca yo tattha chandarāgo tam tattha upādānam*)"; iii.167: *rūpa* is an *upādāniya dhamma* (that is the object of *upādāna*, giving rise to *upādāna*); *chandarāga* with respect to it is *upādāna* with respect to *rūpa* (the same for the other *skandhas*); iv.89, same text by replacing the *skandhas* with the six *indriyas*.

*Vyākhyā*: *apraṇṇepesu viṣayeṣu prārthanā chandab; praṇṇepesu rāgabh.*

225. *Vyākhyā*: *idam atra bhavasya svalakṣaṇam svabhāva ity arthab.*

Compare the Sūtra quoted vi.3 (trans. note 27): *yad kiṃ cid veditaṃ idam atra duḥkhasya.*

*Visuddhimagga*, 575, less precise; *Vibhaṅga*, 137, *Cullavaddesa*, 471.

226. Hsüan-tsang: *viññānasamānāyogena. avakrānti* = *liu* 流 "to flow". *avakrānti* of *viññāna*, *Samyutta*, ii.91.

227. Compare *Majjhima*, i.49, *Dīgha*, ii.305, *Vibhaṅga*, 99, *Dhammasaṅgani*, 644.

The word *khālīya*, cavity, corresponds to *khaṇḍicca* which is explained as "the state of being broken (of teeth)" (Rhys Davids-Stede) according to the *Ānguttara*, i.138 (*khaṇḍadantia*), *Visuddhimagga*, 449.

228. In the word *avidyā*, the prefix *nañ(ā-)* has the sense of *virodha*; it creates words which designate the *vipakṣa* (the *pratidvandva*); it does not indicate simple exclusion (*pariyudāsamātra*); and it does not indicate simple absence (*abhāva*).

229. Other examples: *ayuki*, *avyavahāra*, *amanuṣya*. (On *amanuṣya*, iv.58c-d, 97b, and iv. note 348.)

230. See v.34.

231. On *darśana*, vii.1.

232. We have seen above (p. 417) that fools "do not understand (*aprajāna*) the conditioned character of the *dhammas*": we can draw a definition of *avidyā* from this passage. This *avidyā* is anterior to *dr̥ṣṭi* (*āmadr̥ṣṭi* = *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*). Definition of *avidyā*, p. 411, 421.

On the other hand *avidyā* = *moha*, ii.26a, iv.9c, v.20a.

Speaking truthfully, if *avidyā* is not simply "ignorance," the simple absence of correct *vidyā* or *prajñā*, one is at a loss to see how it is not a defiled *prajñā*; if *avidyā* is anything other than ignorance of the conditioned character of the *dhammas*, ignorance of the true nature of former existence, etc., how is it not confused with this defiled *prajñā* which is the bad *dr̥ṣṭi*, "view of self," "view of the former existence of self," etc.? All the more then one may admit a reasoned "view of the self," such as non-Buddhist scholars can formulate, a natural, innate (*sahaja*) "view of the self." Note that the three *dr̥ṣṭis* are defined as *moha* (*mūḍhā*), the root of evil (v.20a).

233. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 190b15.

On the deliverance of the defiled mind, vi.77a.

The Abhidhamma (for example the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, i.21) recognizes the *visuddhi* of *sīla*, *citta*, and *dīp̐hi*.

234. *Vyākhyā*: *kalpanāmātram etad āgamanīrapekṣam iti kathayati*. Fa-pao and P'u-kuang do not agree whether Vasubandhu here takes the part of the *Vaibhāṣikas* against the *Sautrāntikas*. In other words, whether Vasubandhu says, as his personal opinion, "Who can stop a master in his imaginations?", or if he gives these words to the *Vaibhāṣikas*. The *Vyākhyā* accepts the first hypothesis. But Saṃghabhadra says, "The *Sautrāntikas* say that good *prajñā* can be mixed . . .", and we know that he always mentions and quotes Vasubandhu as "the *Sautrāntika*." The Chinese

commentators think that Vasubandhu rejects the theory of the mixing of good *prajñā* with defiled *prajñā*; nevertheless, he does not admit that *avidyā* is a separate *dharmā*.

235. Hsüan-tsang: "There is a separate thing, *avidyā*, which differs from *prajñā*, as *rāga* differs from the mind. This master is correct."

236. Bhadanta Śrīlābha says, "*Avidyā* is the general designation of all of the *kleśas*; there is no *avidyā* separate from craving and the other *kleśas* (*avidyeti sarvakleśānām iyaṁ sāmānyasamīhā / na rāgādīkleśavyatirikatāvidyā nāmāsti*). According to the Sūtra, "Oh Mahākauṣṭhila, he does not rightly discern (*na prajānāti*), and as a consequence we say *avidyā*" (*Samīyutta*, iii.172: Mahākotṭhito (or Mahākotṭhiko) ... *avoca / avijjā avijjāti āvuso Sāriputta vuccati* ...). In fact all the *kleśas* are by their nature non-knowledge (*ajñānasvarūpa*), for they grasp things as they are not (*viparītāgrahaṇatā*).

This is the thesis of Harivarman in TD 32, no 1646. According to Saeki, here Vasubandhu refers to Harivarman.

237. Above iii. p., *Samīyukta*, TD 2, p. 85a16, p. 126c5: *pūrvānte 'jñānam aparānte ... madhyānte ... (buddhadharmasamgharatanesv ... duḥkhasamudayanirodhamārgesv ... kuśalākuśalāvvyākerteṣv ... ādhyātmika ... bāhye 'jñānam / yat kinīcid tatra tatrajñānam tama āvaranam ...)* See Kōsa, ii.26a-c, where we have *avidyā*, *ajñāna* and "non-clarity."

*Vibhāṣā*, 85: *yam aññānam adassanam anabbisamayo ... (asamīpakehāna is missing from the long list of synonyms).*

One will find in Rhys Davids-Stede (*avijjā*) and in *Théorie des douze causes*, 6-9, a good number of references.

238. The *Vyākhyā* has *mayanā*, *mayanānām*, and in the *Dhātupāṭha*, *mī gatau*: thus *sattvamayanā*. Paramārtha has simply *lei* 類 (= *maya*).

Hsüan-tsang: *yu ch'ing shih* (to depend upon, to support) *wo lei hsing* 有情恃我類性 = *sattva-ātmāsūtra-maya-tā*: *lei* gives *maya* and *hsing* = -tā, 類性.

P'u-kuang explains: *lei-hsing (mayatā) = abarimāna*.

Saṅghabhadra explains *maya* in the sense of "to go (to the realms of rebirth)"; that which is the nature of *maya* is *mayatā*. (We would have *sattva mayatā* = "the quality of going of beings ...").

239. *Samīyukta*, TD 2, p. 245c21.

240. *Abhiṅgāramamakāraṇānūsaya*, *Samīyutta*, iii.80, etc.; *asmīmāna*, *asmīti māna*, iii.155.

241. *Nīschāya* corresponds to *nicchāta* of the Pāli sources. On this word, Rhys Davids and Stede. Often accompanying *nibbata*, *sūbbhūta*, etc.: however see *Ānguttara*, v.65.

242. Here it would be more fitting to explain the *saṁskāras* and *viññāna*; see iii.36a.

243. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 73a18, *Théorie des douze causes*, p. 16-18. See ii.47.

244. It is by reason of a name that the non-material *skandhas* are active (*pravartante*) with respect to objects not immediately perceived (*apratyakṣesv artheṣu*): "Such is the object (or the meaning), *artha*, of this noun." By reason of the organs, the non-material *skandhas* arise (*utpadyante*) with respect to the objects perceived. By reason of the object, the non-material *skandhas* are active with respect to names: "Such is the name of this object."

Compare *Atthasālinī*, 392, *Expositor*, 500-501. Buddhaghosa, on the origin of names; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 73a18.

245. On this subject the *Vyākhyā* quotes a Sūtra which presents together, with the *Mahānāmasutta* of the *Samīyutta*, v.369, some interesting variants: *mṛtasya khalu kālagatasya jñātaya imāṁ pūṭikakāyaṁ agnīṇā vā dīhanti udake vā plāvayanti bhūmasu vā nikhananti vātātapābhyām vā pariśaṣam pariśaṣayam paryādānam gacchati / yat punar idam ucyate cūṭam iti vā mana iti vā viññānam iti vā śraddāparibhāvūtam śūlatyāgaśrutaprajñāparibhāvūtam tad ūrdhvaḡami bhavati viśeṣagāmy āyatyaṁ svargopagam*.

In *Samyutta*, mention only of the body cut to pieces and eaten by animals and birds, etc.; as *Dīgha*, ii.295. See Nariman, *RHR*, 1912, i.85.

246. On *sparsa*, see *Kośa*, ii.24, iii. note 160. *Théorie des douze causes*, 22, Mrs Rhys Davids, intro. to the trans. of the *Dhammasaṅgani*, 63, *Compendium*, 12, 14 (awareness of the objective presentation).

Majjhima, i.190; *Atthasālinī*, 109, 141-2; *Visuddhimagga*, 463, 595; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 554 (important); *Vijñānakāya* (analyzed in *Études Asiatiques*, 1925, i.370).

Here the *kārikā* defines the position of the Sarvāstivādins: whereas, according to the Sautrāntikas, *sparsa* is the "coming together of the three", according to the Sarvāstivādins (and according to Buddhaghosa, *Atthasālinī*, 109), *sparsa* is not the "coming together of the three", but the effect of this coming together, a mental (*caitasika*) *dharma*, *Kośa*, ii.24.

The "three" are the eye, the object and the *vijñāna*. The *vijñāna* is produced by the eye and the object (plus an intellectual element, the *samanvāhāra*), *Majjhima*, i.190, *Madhyamakavṛtti*, i.554. The Sarvāstivādin thesis is that the *vijñāna* (= *citta*), "the mind," knows "the thing only" (*arthamātra*), whereas the "mental states" (*caitta*, *caitasika*) (namely *sparsa*, *vedanā*, etc.) know the "particulars of the thing" (*arthavaiśeṣa*). Th. Stcherbatski (*Central Conception*, 15, 17, 55) defines *vijñāna* as "the mind viewed as a receptive faculty, pure consciousness (which renders well the idea of *manodhātu*), pure sensation without any content," and *sparsa* as "sensation," "real sensation". To not depart from the definitions furnished by our texts (*Kośa*, ii.34, note 178), *vijñāna* grasps the *upalabhyatārūpa*: this is the most rudimentary of the "gnosis" (as psychologists say), the idea that one perceives something; but, on the other hand, *cakṣurvijñānaṁ nīlaṁ vijānāti*, "the visual consciousness knows the blue" (One should explain that without doubt one should understand by *cakṣurvijñāna* the *vijñāna* with the *caitta*, *sparsa*, etc., which necessarily accompany it).

Maung Tin recounts the definition of *sparsa* of the *Atthasālinī*: *tikasamnipātasamkṛtāssa pana attano kāraṇassa vasena paveditattā samnipātapaccupatthāno (phasso)* = Contact has coinciding as its manifestation, because it is revealed through its own cause, known as the coinciding of the three (i.e., the basis [that is to say, the organ], the object and consciousness). The meaning of this appears to be: Contact appears, arises (*paccupatthāni*) by reason of the conjunction (literally: has for its immediate cause this conjunction: *yasya samnipātāḥ pratyupasthānaṁ sa samnipātapratyupasthāna itī*), because it is sensed ("experienced") by reason of (and in conformity with) its cause, which is what is called the conjunction of the three." From another point of view *phassa* is *vedanāpaccupatthāna* (= *yo vedanāyāḥ pratyupasthānaṁ sa vedanāpratyupasthāna itī*) because it causes the *vedanā* or agreeable impression to arise (*paccapattāpeti* = *uppādeti*).

247. *Samyutta*, TD 2, p. 18a16: in the Pāli sources, we need not read *tinnaṁ saṁgatiphasso*, as does the *Samyutta* Index, but like *Samyutta*, iv.68, and *Majjhima*, i.111: *yā . . . imesaṁ tinnaṁ dhammānaṁ saṁgatī samnipāto samavayo ayaṁ vuccati cakkhusamphasso*. *Nettipakkaraṇa*, 28: *cakkhurūpaviññānaṁ samnipātālakkaḥaṇo phasso*. *Théorie des douze causes*, p. 20.

248. *Atthasālinī*, 109: *na saṁgatimattam eva phasso*.

249. *Ṣaṭṣaṭka dharmaparyāya*, *Majjhima*, iii.180 (*Chachakkasutta*) *Dīgha*, iii.243.

250. See iv.4a-b.

251. They read *ya eṣāṁ dharmānaṁ saṁgateḥ samnipātāt samavayūt sa sparsaḥ*. And not: . . . *saṁgatīḥ samnipātāḥ samavayāḥ* . . .

252. Classic example: *yathā buddhānaṁ sukha utpādāḥ* (*Dhammapada*, 194), *Visuddhimagga*, in Warren, 194, *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 70.

253. This discussion is *atibahuvistaraṇaprakāraṇisāriṇī*.

254. *Sparsa* = *saṁsparsa* (*Vyākhyā*).

255. *Pratighasamsparsa*, so called because its *āśraya* (the organ) is *sapratigha* (first opinion of the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 760c13, which follows TD 28, no 1552 and Vasubandhu), because its *āśraya* and



its object (*ālambana*) are *sapratigha* (second opinion of the *Vibhāṣā*, which follows TD 28, number 1550 and Saṃghabhadra).

256. *Abhivacanasaṃphassa*, *Digha*, ii.62 (Warren, 206, *Dialogues*, ii.59, and an attempt at translation in *Théorie des douze causes*, p. 19, n. 2), *Vibhaṅga*, 6. *Abhivacana* in *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, 1306.

257. *Vyākhyā*: *adhyucyate' nenety abhivacanam / vān nāmnī pravartate nāmārthan dyotayaty abhivacanam nāma*.

258. *caḥsurvijñānena nīlam vijñāti no tu nīlam iti / manovijñānena nīlam nīlam iti ca vijñāti* (variant: *caḥsurvijñānasamaṅgī... manovijñānasamaṅgī...*). On this text, which is without doubt excepted from the *Abhidharma* (*Nyāyabīndupūrvapakṣasamākṣepa*, Mdo 111, fol. 108b), see *Kośa*, i.14c, *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 74, note.

259. This is the opinion of Fa-sheng in the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* (6.18), TD 28, number 1550. Fa-sheng 法勝 has been reconstructed as Dharmakīrti, Dharmajina (Nanjio), or Dharmottara (Takakusu); Péri, "Date de Vasubandhu," 25, mentions the transcription *dha-ma-sli-ti* (=?).

260. Hsüan-tsang translates: with the *vacana* for its *adhipati* [*pratyaya*].

261. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 760b25. Two *sparsas*: *sāsrava* and *anāsrava*; three *sparsas*: *kuśala*, *akuśala*, and *avyākṛta*; four *sparsas*: *traiśbhūta* and *adhbhūtoparyāpanna*; etc. From the point of view of *nīvaraṇa* and of its *pratiṣkhepa* (the hindrance and its opposition): *sparsas* of *avidyā* and *vidyā*; from the point of view of the same nature of the *sparsa*: *sparsa* of neither-*vidyā*-nor-*avidyā*; from the point of view of what is pleasing and what is displeasing: *sparsas* of sympathy and antipathy; from the point of view of association (*samprayoga*): agreeable *sparsa*, etc.; from the point of view of its support: *sparsas* of the eye, of the ear, etc.

262. *Abhikṣepasamudācārin* = *nityasamudācārin* (*Vyākhyā*).

263. How *sparsa* is *vedanīya*, iv.49.

*Sukhavedya* is explained: *sukhasya vedaḥ sukhavedaḥ / sukhavede sādhuḥ sukhavedyaḥ / sukham vā vedyam asminn iti sukhavedyaḥ*.

264. *Vedanā* has been explained i.14, ii.24; here the author does not explain the characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of *vedanā*, but its type (*prakāra*).

On *adukkhāsukhā*, *Majjhima*, i.397.

265. The Sautrāntika does not reply, because the problem of shade has already been discussed ii.50c.

266. *Prakaraṇa*, TD 26, p. 698c10.

267. *Saṃyukta*, 8.4. Saeki quotes TD 24, number 1451 (the *Vimayaksudrakavastu*, see S. Lévi, *Seize Arhats*, p. 37) where the Bhagavat explains to Ānanda the four principles of *Āṅguttara*, ii.167.

268. The *Vaiśvāṣika* theory of the *mahābhūmikas* is presented ii.23c and following; one should replace *adhimukti* with *adhimokṣa*, p. 189, 190.

269. The *asamskṛtas* are unconnected with cause, since they refer to the *caittas*.

270. Paramārtha translates: "in the first three *bhūmis*"; Hsüan-tsang: "in the first *bhūmi*"; the *Vyākhyā* glosses: in the *savītarka-savicāra bhūmi*.

271. This is the thesis presented ii. trans. p. 192–3, 204.

Here the *Vyākhyā* quotes several definitions of the *Pañcaskandhaka* (of Vasubandhu) (Mdo, 58) which we have reproduced ii. trans. p. 189–190. (There is a *Pañcaskandhaka* by Candrakīrti, Mdo, 24).

272. The *Prakaranapāda* in effect arranges the "mental states" into four categories: *mahābhūmikas*, *kuśalamahābhūmikas*, *kleśamahābhūmikas*, *parīttakleśabhūmikas* (see ii. trans. p. 195–6 and note 109).

273. The Sūtra opposes *akusāla* to *kuśāla*.

274. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 72c9, p. 87c26.

We have *Samyutta* ii.72, iv.33 and passim: *cakkhū ca paticca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvinnānam / vinnānam saṁgati paṭasso / phassaṇapaccayā vedanā / vedanāpaccayā tanhā / ayaṁ kho dukkhassa samudayo*.

Our Sūtra, most probably, has: *cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāni cotpadyate cakṣurvinnānam / trayāṇāṁsaṁnipātāḥ sparśaḥ / sabajāta vedanā saṁjñā cetanā*.

*Vijñānakāya* in *Études Asiatiques* (BEFEO, 1925), i.370.

275. The meaning of *sabajāta* is not specified; we can understand it as *parasparasabajāta*, "arisen one from the other."

276. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 197c18: *maṁsāsabagatāṁ smṛtisambodhyaṅgāṁ bhāvayati*.

277. *Madhyama*, TD, p. 791b1. *yā vedanā yā ca saṁjñā [yā ca cetanā yac ca vijñānam] saṁsṛṣṭā [ime dharmā na visamsṛṣṭāḥ]*. Saeki quotes this Sūtra which has for its protagonist Great-ko-thi-la (the same person to whom the Bhagavat teaches that *āyus* and *uṣmaka* are "mixed," below note 281): the Pāli edition, *Majjhima*, i.293 (*Mahāvédallasutta*, where the protagonists are Mahākottita and Sāriputta), omits the words *yā ca cetanā*.

It is the doctrine of the *Dhammasaṅgani*, 1193, that the *skandhas* of *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṁkhāra* (= *cetanā*) are *cittasaṁsattā* [that is, united to the mind from their origins to their end, *Atthasālinī*, 49].

On *saṁsṛṣṭa*, vii.11d.

278. This means, according to the *Vyākhyā*, in the same Sūtra where we read: "*vedanā, saṁjñā, cetanā* . . ."

279. *Majjhima*, i.293 omits *yaṁ ceteti* . . .

Compare *Samyutta*, iv.68: *phutṭho vedeti phutṭho ceteti phutṭho saṁjānāti*.

280. According to the *Vyākhyā*, this is a reply of Vasubandhu: *ācārya āha*.

281. The Sūtra is quoted viii.3c, note 26. The formula is lacking in *Majjhima*, i.295. On *āyus* and *uṣman* (*uṣmaka*), ii. trans. p. 233.

282. The Pāli sources know of six *soṇanassūpavicāras*, *domanassūpavicāras*, and *upekkhūpavicāras* (*Diṅha*, iii.244, *Majjhima*, iii.218, *Vibhaṅga*, 381, etc.): *cakkhūna rūpāni disvā soṇanassattahāniyaṁ rūpāni upavicarati . . . manasā dhammāni vinnāyā soṇanassattahāniyaṁ dhammāni upavicarati*; but they ignore the word *mana-upavicāra*, as does the *Mahāvīyapatti*.

The Sanskrit text: *cakṣuṣā rūpāni dṛṣṭvā saumanasyasthāniyāni rūpāny upavicarati . . . manasā dharmāni vijñāyā saumanasyasthāniyān dharmāni upavicarati*.

This grammatical explanation disappears in all the translations, but the *Vyākhyā* partially reproduces it. (We have *manasa upavicārah* = *mana-upavicāra* = *manopavicāra*).

283. This thing (*dravya*) which is the mental *vedanā*, of one single type by its being associated with the mental consciousness, is threefold by the triple variety of its nature, satisfaction, etc.; and each one of these three is sixfold by the variety of its object, visibles, etc. Thus we have  $1 \times 3 \times 6 = 18$ .

284. The *Bhāṣyam* says simply: *trayo dharmopavicārā ubhayatā*, but we have translated the *Vyākhyā* here. The source is the *Vibhaṅga*, TD 27, p. 716c3. When the *dharmamanopavicāra* has for its object seven types of *dharmas*—the six internal *āyatana*s (eye . . . *manāyatana*) and the external *dharmāyatana*—either together, or not together, its object is not mixed; when it has for its object these seven *dharmas* (either together, or not together) plus one, two, . . . five of the external objects (visible things, etc.), its object is mixed. Same doctrine on the subject of the *smṛtyupasthāna*s: *kāyasmṛtyupasthāna* is of an unmixed object, bearing only on the body; *dharmasmṛtyupasthāna* can be of unmixed object, or mixed (*sambhīma*, *mīṣa*), or universal (*saṁasta*) object, vi.15c.

285. The word *kīla* indicates that Vasubandhu does not accept this etymology.

286. The prefix *upa* has the sense of repetition (*punaḥ punaḥ*).

287. Problem discussed in *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 716b6. The *upavicāra* are proper to mental sensation: there is thus *saumanasya-upavicāra*, not *sukha-upavicāra*.

288. Problem discussed in *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 715a3.

289. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 690c4. *caḥṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā saumanasyasthānīyāni rūpāṇy upavicarati*.

290. According to the Lotsava: "The word *ga* signifies 'taking for an object', as in the expression: How does he go? He goes thus." This gloss is omitted by Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang.

291. Hsüan-tsang adds: "The same in the prefatory absorptions of the Second, Third, and Fourth Ārūpya."

292. According to the *Vyākhyā*, Vasubandhu; according to P'u-kuang, the Sautrāntikas (TD 41, p. 179c12).

293. *Satataṃbava*=*satata*, *vibhāra*=*yogaviśeṣa*.

*Dīgha*, iii.250 (variants: *satata*, *sattha*, *sassata*), 281, *Anguttara*, ii.198, iii.279. *Saṃgūṭṭiparyāya*, 15.6; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 189a18 (so called because the Arhats always cultivate it).

294. *Upekṣako viharati, Atthasālinī*, 172.

295. When the Arhat thinks of the *dharmas* which constitute the Buddha, *buddhasaṃtānika dharmas*, he experiences a good satisfaction. Such a satisfaction is not forbidden, nor is it to be fought.

296. Anantavarman does not accept this theory: This is not correct, for, in the Sūtra, the Bhagavat does not say that the satisfactions, etc., are *upavicāra* solely when they are defiled (*sāṃkleśika*). He says in fact, "Oh Bhikṣus, take support on the six *upavicāras* of satisfaction, abandon the *upavicāras* of dissatisfaction; take support on the six *upavicāras* of equanimity, abandon the *upavicāras* of satisfaction. There are, Oh Bhikṣus, two equanimities, the equanimity resting on unity (*ekatasamānīśrīta*), and equanimity resting on variety (*nānāśrītasamānīśrīta*): take support on the first, but abandon the second" (*ya ime ṣaṭ saumanasyopavicārās tān āśrītya tān adbhīṣṭhāya ya ime ṣaṭ daurmanasyopavicārās tān prajāhūta . . .*). *Majjhima*, i. 364, in another context: *yā 'yam upekkhā nānattā nāttasitā tān abhinivajjētvā yā 'yam upekkhā ekattā ekattasitā . . . tān evupekkhāṃ bhāveti*.

But, says Yaśomitra, this Sūtra does not prove that the satisfactions, etc., can be *upavicāra* without being *sāṃkleśika*. One supports oneself on light (*laghu*) defilement in order to abandon heavy (*guru*) defilement; as he said, "*Māna* or pride, is to be abandoned by supporting oneself on *māna*." The text referred to in *Nettipakaraṇa*, 87: "*The māna, supported on which one abandons māna, is good (kusala)*." According to this same work, thirst (=desire) can also be good, see below note 297. (We know the Tantric thesis of *rāga* expelled by *rāga*, *Cūṭavaiśuddhiprakaraṇa*, JASB., 1898, p. 175.

To be sure, *māna* is never purification (*vyāvadānika*). Nanda (who expelled desire for women by desire for goddesses) is an example. The Bhagavat also teaches that one abandons the *upavicāras* of equanimity by the *upavicāras* of equanimity.

297. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 715b1: five explanations of the expression *śāstrpāda*; Vasubandhu adopts the first. (In taking into consideration the three time periods, 108 *upavicāras*. The *chattimisa sattpādā* of *Majjhima*, iii.217.

According to the *Vyākhyā*: *ta evaṣṭadaśopavicārāḥ . . .* "These eighteen *upavicāras*, through the distinction of those which have for their principle craving and *naiṣkramya*, make up the thirty-six points of the Master." Understood in this way, the argument goes to prove that some of the *upavicāras* are good, others bad.

Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang understand: "On the other hand, the satisfactions, etc. (*tāny eva saumanasyādini*) . . ."

*Naiṣkramya* is explained as "leaving" (*naiṣkrama*) the *sāṃkleśas* or getting out of the suffering

of *saṃsāra*.

On *gredhāśrūta*, *naīṣkeramyāśrūta*, *Kośa*, ii. trans. p. 155, iv.77b-c; *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, 245.1145, *Samyutta*, iv.232, *Vibhaṅga*, 381, *Milinda*, *gehanissīta* and *nekkhammanissīta* (thirty-six *vedanās*); *Nettipakaraṇa*, 87, how good desire gets one out of dissatisfaction, *nekkhammasīta*. Rhys Davids-Stede, *nekkhamma*, *geha*, *gedha* (confused with the words *kāma* and *grha*).

*Somanassa*, *domanassa*, *upekkhā* are *sevūtabba*, *asevūtabba*, *Dīgha*, ii.278.

298. Same comparison, grain and husk, *Vyāsa ad Yogasūtra*, ii.13.

299. This thesis is demonstrated in Chapter IX (page 297 of the French translation).

300. The term *klesā* is to be understood as both the *klesas* and the *upaklesas*, v.46.

301. *Cittacāntasamudācārādyaapaṭutvā*. As we shall see, iii.42d, *upekṣāyām cyutodbhavaṃ*.

302. See Chapter IX, French trans. p. 296-7.

303. It appears indeed that this is not exactly correct: the first moment of *antarābhava* is necessarily defiled.

304. See above p. 383 and note 85.

305. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 123a24, *Ekottara*, TD 2, p. 772b14. *Dīgha*, iii.211 (*Samgūṣittanta*): *sabbe sattā ābharaṭṭhūtikā sabbe sattā saṃkharāṭṭhūtikā / ayaṃ kho āvuso tena bhagavatā jānatā passatā arahatā sammāsambuddhena eko dhammo sammadakkhāto*. The word *saṃkharāṭṭhūtikā* is omitted in *Angūtara*, v.50, 55. *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, i.122.

*Madhyamakavṛtti*, 40, quotes another Sūtra: *eko dharmah sattvasthūṭaye yad uta catvāra ābhārā*. *Mahāvastu*, iii.65.

The first section (*Ekadharma*) of the *Samgūṣitpariyāya* begins: "All beings last through food."

306. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 102a13, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 674b28, *Lokaprajñāpti* (analyzed in *Cosmologie bouddhique*); *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, 118; Beal, *Catena*, (interesting).

*Dīgha*, iii.228 (*kabalīkaro āhāro olāriko vā sukhūmo vā . . .*) *Majjhima*, i.48, 261, *Samyutta*, ii.98; *Dhammasaṅgani*, 71, 646, *Atthasālinī*, 153, *Visuddhimagga*, 341, *Nettipakaraṇa*, 114.

See the *Udayisūtra*, *Kośa*, ii.44d, viii.3c.

307. *Mātrapurīṣa* absent from among the Four Kings.

308. On the constituent elements of the molecule, ii.22; the smallest part of the visible termed *chāyā* includes odor, taste, tangible.

Paramārtha is not very clear: "How are the (odors) *chāyā-ātapa-jvālā-prabhā*, etc. food?"; Hsüan-tsang: "How are *chāyā-ātapa*-flame-cold food?"

Hsüan-tsang translates the phrase *yāny api tu nābhyavabṛīyante* "which however are not swallowed," by a simple *yu* 又 (=punah).

309. According to the *Vyākhyā*, Vasubandhu now presents his own opinion (*svābhīprāya*).

310. *Vibhaṅga*, TD 27, p. 675a13. *Vibhaṅga*, 13, *atthi rūpaṃ kabalīkaro āhāro / atthi rūpaṃ na kabalīkaro āhāro*: this refers to *rūpaskandha*; Vasubandhu speaks of *rūpāyatana*.

311. *Vijñā*, as one says *prajñā*; the meaning is *vijñāna*.

Food by the mouthfuls, being, by its nature, the three *āyatana*s of odor, taste, and tangible, is evidently *sāsrava*, impure; but *sparsā*, *manasamcetanā* and the *vijñāna* are sometimes impure, sometimes pure. It is only when they are impure that they are food.

312. The Lotsava does not explain the term *vijñāna*. Paramārtha explains it through *manovijñāna*, Hsüan-tsang through *vijñānaskandha*.

313. *Vyākhyā*: *catvāra ābhārā bhūtanām sattvanām sthūṭaye sambhavaśiṣṇām cānugrahāya / katame catvāraḥ / kavaḍḍikārābhāra audārikāḥ sūkṣmāś cābhārāḥ prathamāḥ / sparśo dvītyāḥ / mana-*

*ḥṣamcetanā tṛṣṭyaḥ* / *viññānam āhāraḥ caturthaḥ*. (Comp. viii.3c).

Ekottara, TD 2, p. 719a15: *bhūtānām sthūṭaye yāpanāyāi sambhavaṣiṇām cānugrahāya; Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 676b15; *Samyutta*, ii.11, *Majjhima*, i.261: *cattāro'me bhikkhave āhāra bhūtānām tṛṣṭyā sambhavesimān vā anuggahāya . . . kabalāṁkāro āhāro olāriko vā sukhumo vā . . .*

On the expression *kāyassa tṛṣṭyā yāpanāya*, *Visuddhimagga*, 32 and other sources in Rhys Davids-Stede (*yāpanā*).

*Stṛṭyā*=*avasthāpanāya*, *anugrahāya*=*punarbhavāya sambhavāya* (*Vyākhyā*).

314. See p. 442 line 27.

315. *Manomaya*, see *Kōsa*, ii.44d, viii.3c.

316. Above p. 393.

317. Hsüan-tsang: *Abhimirvṛtti* (*ch'i* 起, *utpāda*), because, turned towards future birth, it is produced in a short period of time.

318. . . . a painful body . . . The Lotsava translates *lus* = *kāya*, *ātmabhāva*; the Chinese translators have *svabhāva*. The *Vyākhyā* gives the words *savyābādham* (*sadupkhatvāt*) *abhimirvartya*.

319. This is a Sūtra of four points (*cāruṣkoṭika*): *asti pudgalo yasyābhimirvṛttisamyojanam prabhinam nopapattisamyojanam / asti yasyopapattiḥprayojanam prabhinam nābhimirvṛttisamyojanam / asti yasyābhimirvṛttiprayojanam prabhinam upapattisamyojanam ca / asti yasya nābhimirvṛttiprayojanam prabhinam nopapattisamyojanam*.

The distinction between *abhimirvṛtti* and *upapatti* is elucidated in *Kōsa*, vi.3.

Rhys Davids and Stede have grouped many references under the words *abhimibbatta*, *abhimibbatti*, *abhimibbatteti*. One of the most interesting is *Samyutta*, iii.152 (which slightly calls to mind the "embroiderer" of the Upanishad).

Let us add that, in *Anguttara*, ii.134, we have (in addition to *orambhāgiya samyojana* which brings about rebirth in Kāmadhātu): *upapattiḥpatilābhika samyojana* (correct *upapatti*) and *bhavaḥpatilābhika samyojana*: this second category is the *abhimirvṛttisamyojana* of the Abhidharma bhava=*antarabhava* the *Antarāparinibbāyin* has broken the bond which produces *upapatti*, but not the bond which produces *bhava*.

320. The words "when he is an *Anāgāmin*" are necessary, for one can detach oneself from the two lower Dhātus through a worldly path, thus in a manner which is not definitive.

321. *Anugraha*. Here, by *sambhavaṣiṇ*, one should understand, conforming to the second explanation (above line 28), not the intermediate beings, but all beings not liberated from thirst (*satṛṣṇa*).

322. Four opinions in *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 674c25; Vasubandhu follows the orthodox opinion (*p'ing-chia* says: . . .)

323. We see in fact that three of the four foods—*manahsaṁcetanā*, which is action; the *viññāna* considered as *viññānabhāja*, "the seed which is the *viññāna*," action which develops or perfumes (*karmaparibhāṇita*); and *sparsa*, which is associated with action—have for their result *anugraha* or re-existence (*anugrahāya bhavati*). But how can food by the mouthfuls have this result?

324. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 103a5: *rogasya gaṇḍasya śalyasya catvāra āhāra mūlān jarāmaraṇa-pratyayaḥ* (?). According to the *Vyākhyā*, the word *jarāmaraṇa-pratyayaḥ* belongs to another redaction of this same Sūtra (*Ekottara*, TD 2, p. 656c10). *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 677a17. *Samyutta*, iii.189: *rūpaṁ rogo ti gaṇḍo ti sallatī ti . . .*

325. The question also concerns *sparsa* and *viññāna*, which are associated with *manahsaṁcetanā*.

326. This brings to mind the "popular maxim" (Jacob, ii.11) of the *āśāmodakas*, "cakes of hope," or *manomodakas*, "cakes made by the *manas*" of the *Nyāyakandali*, 130 and *Nyāyavārttika*, 43 (quotations trans. from the *Sarvadarśana*, Muséon, 1902, ad 16, 22).

In the *Shidō-in-zu* 四度印圖, (*Musée Guimet, Bibl. Études*, viii.1899), 126, the *mudrā* of drinking and of eating, the four foods, and the sensation of acidity which produces the thought of a result.

327. The Abhidharma treatise by this name. TD 26, number 1536, chap. 8, fol. 8 (Saeki); *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 676b16.

328. A remark of the Sautrāntikas according to certain commentators.

329. The *Vibhāṣā* explains four opinions:

1. *vijñāna*, *sparsa*, and *kavaḍḍikāra* nourish present existence; *cetanā* nourishes future existence.
2. *sparsa* and *kavaḍḍikāra* nourish present existence; *vijñāna* and *cetanā* nourish future existence.
3. *kavaḍḍikāra* nourishes present existence; *sparsa*, *vijñāna*, and *cetanā* nourish future existence.
4. P'ing-chia: all four foods have the two functions.

330. *Vyākhyā*: *sukhavedanīyenānugrahāt / yāḥ kaścid vedanāskandhaḥ saṁvijñāskandhaḥ sarvaḥ sa sparśam pratyūyetivacanā*.

331. Paramārtha: The *bhava* thus projected arises from the *vijñāna*-seed informed-perfumed by action.

Hsüan-tsang: *Punarbhava* or new existence means future "birth" (*sheng* 生). This future birth is projected by the *manasamcetanā*. Being projected by the food which is the *manasamcetanā*, *punarbhava* is produced by the force of the *vijñāna*-seed perfumed by action.

According to P'u-kuang, this explanation is that of the Sautrāntika school; the Sarvāstivādins do not use the expression "*vijñānabīja*."

332. *Samigūḍiparyāya*, TD 26, p. 368a28. *yāḥ kaś cit kavaḍḍikāraḥ sarvaḥ sa āhāraḥ / syāt kavaḍḍikāro nāhāraḥ / syād āhāro na kavaḍḍikāraḥ / syād ubhayaṁ / syān nobhayaṁ iti cātuskoṭikam*.

333. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 674a3).

On *asvapaṇika* "matter" arising from *saṁādhi*, i. trans. p. 103.

334. According to Hsüan-tsang. *Vyākhyā*: *yāḥ ceba paribhuktaḥ kavaḍḍikāro bhoktur bādhām ādadhāti sa kim āhāraḥ / so'py āhāraḥ / āpāte bhojanavelāyām anugrahāt*.

335. See for example the *Pañcasikṣāsūtra*, Feer, *Fragments du Kandjour*, 241.

336. *Vyākhyā*: That which has for its effect augmentation is food *par excellence* (*mukhya*).

337. In the *Dakkhiṇāvibhaṅgasutta* (*Majjhima*, iii.255): *tiracchānagatē dānaṁ datvā satagunā dakkhiṇā paṭikaṅkhitabbā / putthujane dussile . . . sabassagunā . . . / putthujana silavante . . . sataṣaṭṭhagunā . . . / bāhirake kāmesu vitarāge . . . koṭṭisāṭṭhagunā . . . / sotāpatti-phalasacchikriyāya paṭiṣṭhāne dānaṁ datvā asāṁkheyyā appameyyā dakkhiṇā paṭikaṅkhitabbā*.

On the value of the gift according to the field, *Kośa*, iv.117.

338. The Bhagavat said: *yāḥ kās cī jambuṣaṇḍāt sravanyāḥ sarvās tāḥ samudranimnāḥ samudrapravāṇāḥ samudraprāgbhārāḥ*.

(Compare *Āṅguttara*, v.22, *Samyutta*, v.39).

339. *Jambuṣaṇḍagata*=*jambudvīpanivāsin*.

We recall that *Jambudvīpapurusa* = Buddha (*Kośa*, vii.30a-c).

*Kuṣṭimantāḥ*, "possessing a womb" = who possesses the capacity to eat; since the beginning of embryonic life.

340. *Vyākhyā*: *kim atrāścaryam . . .*

341. Spiritual states which immediately precede the abandoning of the quality of Pṛthagjana = entry into the Path = the acquisition of the quality of candidate for the first fruit, vi.17.

342. We have, in viii.27c, *Vyākhyā*, another redaction: *bodhisattvo hi karmāntapratyavekṣaṇāya* [*karmānta*=labored field] *niṣkerānto jambumūle prathamam dhyānam upādātavān*. *Divya*, 391: *asmin pradeśe jambūccāyāyām niṣadya . . . Majjhima*, i.246: . . . *piṇu sakkassa kamante sūāya jambuccāyāya nisimmo vivicca eva kāmehi . . . prathamam jhānam upasampajja . . .*; *Laṭṭa*, Lefman, 128 (Chapter xi): *avalokya ca kṣṣikarmāntam . . . Mahāvastu* ii.45, 26.

343. The cutting off of the roots of good results from "false view" (*mūhyādṛṣṭi*), which, being of reflection (*saṁtīrikā*), is mental (*mānasī*); the recovery of these roots results from "correct, right view" and from doubt (*samyagdṛṣṭi*, *vicikīṣā*), which are mental (iv.79-80).

It is only in the *manovijñāna* that detachment takes place: for detachment can be obtained only by an absorbed (*saṁbhūta*) mind; the losing of this detachment is caused by incorrect judgment (*ayoniso manasikāra*), which is *vikalpa*, and thus purely mental.

Death is produced in a *viññāna* propitious to the cutting off of the series: thus among a person wherein the activity of the five organs of sense consciousness is "reopened" (*cyutiḥ saṁkṣīp-tapaścendriyaṣṭracārya pravācchedānukūle viññāne bhavati*). Arising (*upapatti*) happens only to the *manovijñāna* since it takes place with "a troubled mind" (*viparyastamati*, iii.15).

344. That is to say *pratisaṁdhisāmyād anukto'py uktakalpa iti nocyate*.

345. *Kathāvatthu*, xv.9; *Kośa*, viii.16.

346. The Bhagavat leaves the Fourth Dhyāna in order to die, *Dīgha*, ii.156; below note 350.

347. We can understand: "the mind, being made present, falls (=dies)"; or rather "the mind of this [*pudgala*] being made present [=having entered into activity=*samudācarya*], this *pudgala* falls"; or again *saṁmukhībhūtya* = *saṁmukhībhbhūtya* [with the falling of *ni*, as we say: "There is a wind which causes leaves to be shoved up, there is a wind which causes leaves to dry up" = *asti pāṇarūho vāto'sti pāṇasūṣo'parah*; variant from the commentary of *Uṇādi*, 2.22], with the meaning: "... having made the mind present, the *pudgala* dies."

How a mind, interrupted by absorption, is reborn, ii. trans. p. 230.

348. Hsüan-tsang reads, *hetvabhāvāt* = "because the cause of arising is lacking," and not *cittaccheda hetvabhāvāt* (which causes difficulties).

We have seen, iii.38, that arising takes place through all of the *klesas* or defilements, proper to the sphere where they take place (*sarvaklesair hi tadbhūmikair upapattiḥ pratisaṁdhibandho bhavati*).

349. The mind at death can be good, bad, or neutral. There are four types of neutral mind: *vipākaja*, *airyāpatthika*, *śailpasthānika*, and *nairmānika* (ii.71d, trans. p. 315). There is good reason to specify to which category the mind of a dying Arhat belongs, [the mind by which he enters into Nirvāṇa, *nirvāṇi*].

In *Visuddhimagga*, 292, some Arhats die sitting down, some while lying down, and some while walking. [Thus with *airyāpatthika* minds?]

350. There are two "cuttings off of the mind" (*cittaccheda*): *aprasaṁdhabhika* cutting off, or definitive cutting off, in which the mind at death is not followed by the mind of an intermediate existence; and *saprasaṁdhabhika* cutting off, so that the mind at death continues into the mind of the intermediate being [a cutting off of the series of minds which lasts one life, the cutting off of the *bhavaṅga* in the Pāli sources]. In this last case, the mind can be also good or bad.

On the nature of the mind of a dying Arhat and, in general, of all dying persons, *Kathāvatthu*, xxii.3. [Death takes place in *pakatiṭṭa*, a mind of Kāmadhātu for a being of Kāmadhātu]. On the death of the two types of Arhat, see *Compendium*, Introduction, p. 75.

351. On the two types of death, death all at once, and gradual death, see ii.15, trans. p. 176, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 952c11.

When death is gradual, the organs of sight, hearing, smell and taste, the sexual organ, and the "organs" of agreeable and disagreeable sensation disappear first; the organ of touch (*kāyendriya*),

the vital organ (*jīvīhendriya*), the *mānas* and the sensation of indifference (*upekṣendriya*) remain: these four *indriyas* perish together.

352. Beal, *Catena*, 41, according to a *gāthā* which should be Mahāyāna, gives different indications.

For the Saint, the head; for a future god, the eyes; for a future human, the heart; for a future Preta, the groin . . . We can divine the future destiny of a dead person by examining which part remains warm the longest.

Vaṅgīsa, before her conversion, listened to a skull with a stethoscope with success, and knew if the dead person would be reborn as a man, god, or in hell. But listening to the skull of an Arhat, he remained nonplused (*Theragāthā, Commentary, Brethern*, 395).

We see, *Avadānaśataka*, i.5, that the rays re-enter into a certain part of the body of the Buddha according to the realm of rebirth that he has predicted. [Into the feet, when it refers to beings in hell . . .].

353. The *viññāna*, being non-material (*arūpīvāt*), does not reside in a place (*adesastha*); but it has for its support a body endowed with organs.

354. On the vital parts, the four hundred and four illnesses, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 953a7, and following, *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna*, TD 17, p. 41b20. *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ii.41 (*marmacchedādivedanā*).

355. Pāli gloss quoted in the *Expositor* (PTS), 132: *maranti anenāti yasmim tālīte na jīvati tam phānaṃ mammaṃ nāma*.

356. I-tsing (*Takakusu*, 131) quotes a Sūtra which enumerates four *doṣas*: "The *chū-lu*, i.e. making the body slothful and heavy, owing to an increase of the element earth," plus *sleṣman* (*kapha*) *pitta* and *vāta*. Takakusu translates *chū-lu* as *gulma*: "the phonetic probability is rather in favour of *guru* or its derivation (*gaurava*)." [But the fourth classical *doṣa* is the blood, Jolly, *Grundriss*, 41]. On the three *doṣas*, Rhys Davids-Stede mention *Milinda*, 43, 172 and *Sumanāgalavilāsini*, i.133; Takakusu, *Commentary on the Cullavagga*, v.14.1, *Mahāvagga*, vi.14.1.

357. On the signs of death among the gods, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 365a21, and *Ekottara*, TD 2, p. 693c11.

Beal, *Catena*, 97, quotes a source which combines the two lists with some omissions, for a total of five. Chavannes, i.425 (TD 4, number 206), has a list of seven signs: 1. the brightness of the nape of the neck becomes extinguished; 2. flowers wilt; 3. color becomes altered; 4. dust accumulates on clothing; 5. a sour smell from the armpits; 6. the body becomes thin; 7. "he has left his throne."

Elsewhere we find only the second list: *Divya*, 193: *cyavanadharmino devaputrasya pañca pūrvanimitāni prādurbhavanti* [which corresponds word for word to the text which the Lotsava translates as the preamble to our first list] *akliṣṭāni vāsāmsi kliṣṭāni / amlānāni mālyāni mlāyanti / dasargandhiyam kāyena (?) niṣkrāmati / ubhābhyāni kaksābhyāni svedah prādurbhavati / cyavanadharma devaputraḥ sva āsane dhṛtiṃ na labhate* [which is our second list]. Same list in the Friendly Letter of Nāgārjuna, *JPTS*, 1886, 100 (where we have as the third sign the colour of the body becoming ugly: compare *livuttaka*, Para. 83).

We know that five signs distinguish the gods from mortals: no bad smell, no dust, no winking of the eyes, no shadow, and no touching of the ground (see the references of Bloomfield, *Pārvaṇātha*, Baltimore, 1919, p. 51).

In *Divya*, 222, Māndhātara differs from Śakra only by the winking of his eyes.

358. Hsüan-tsang adds: "which are in intermediate existence."

359. *Kośa*, iv.80d.

*Ekottara*, TD 2, p. 614b23, *Dīrgha*, 13.20, *Mahāvīyutpatti*, 95.11.

*Dīrgha*, iii.217, *tayo rāsi, micchattaniyato rāsi, sammattaniyato rāsi, aniyato rāsi*; *Puggala-paññatti*, 13, recognizes only *puggala niyata* (*pañca puggalā ānantarikā ye ca micchādīṭhikā niyatā*, see *Kośa*, v.7, iv.96) and the *aniyata*; but *Dhammasaṅgani*, 1028, recognizes the three categories [The explanation as we see by the note of the translator and *Atthasālinī*, 45, differs from the explanation of the Abhidharma]. On the *aniyatas*, see *Nettipakarana*, 96, 99 and commentary.



360. *Samyaktva* defined vi.26a (note 162).

361. A traditional etymology.

362. The oldest sources are the Sūtras of the *Dirgha* and *Madhyamāgama*, notably *Dirgha*, 30; among the most recent Sūtras, TD 1, number 25 (the Hi-shai of Beal); among the *Sāstras*, TD 32, number 1644, the *Lokaprajñāpti* and the *Kāraṇaprajñāpti* (analyzed in *Cosmologie bouddhique*), the *Vibhāṣā*. It appears that Vasubandhu here reviews all this literature. The *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna* (Lévi, *Pour l'histoire du Rāmāyana*, JAs. 1918, i.), *Dīvyā*, xvii. (the conquests of Māndhātara, xxxii. = TD 14, number 551 and foll.), belong also to the Hīnayāna. For the Pāli sources, *Lotus*, 842, Sp. Hardy, *Legends and theories*, 1886. Chinese sources (of the two Vehicles), Beal, *Catena*, 1871, and *Four Lectures*. The schema of the universe in Georgy, *Alphabetum Tibetanum*, 1772, Gogerly, *Ceylon Buddhism*, 1908; vol ii, Sp. Hardy, *Legends*, 104. Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, art. *Cosmogony and Cosmology (Buddhist)*, iv. 129-138, B. C. Law, *Heaven and Hell in Buddhist Perspective*, 1925; I have not seen the *Buddhist Cosmology* of MacGovern (London, 1923?).

363. *Uṣanti* = *icchanti*. This can refer to either "The Vaibhāṣikas" (P'u-kuang), or to "All the schools" (Fa-pao).

According to one opinion (notably Mahāyāna) the sphere of gold is placed immediately on the circle of wind; above is the circle of water.

*Samniveśa* is interpreted by Hsüan-tsang in the sense of disposition: "Such is the disposition of the receptacle world: below ..."; and this interpretation is preferable since the circle of wind forms part of the receptacle world. Paramārtha understands, I believe, "foundation"; the Lotsava has *gnas*, "place".

364. Burnouf has translated, *Introduction*, 448, the Sūtra which the *Vyākhyā* quotes ad i.5: *prthivī bho gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitā prthivī brāhmaṇa abmaṇḍale pratiṣṭhitā / abmaṇḍalam bho gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitam / vāyau pratiṣṭhitam / vāyur bho gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitāḥ / ākāśe pratiṣṭhitāḥ / ākāśam bho gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitam / atisarasī mahābrāhmaṇa atisarasī mahābrāhmaṇa / ākāśam brāhmaṇa apratiṣṭhitam anālambanam iti vistarāḥ*.

Compare *Digha*, ii.107 (on the earthquakes); Windisch, *Māra et Bouddha*, 61. *ayam ānanda mahapaṭhavī udake patiṣṭhitā / udakam vāte patiṣṭhitam / vāto ākāśaṭṭho hoti*. Thesis which Nāgasena (with the reading *vāto ākāśe patiṣṭhitō*) explains in *Milinda*, 68.

On the origin of the circle of wind, iii.90c; 100a-b (Hsüan-tsang fol. 16a to the end). We will see iii.93c, note 504, that, when the universe is destroyed, it stays in the *rūpa* there where it was. This *rūpa* should be the *ākāśadhātū*, i.28.

365. Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha transcribe; the Lotsava has *tshan po che chen po*, the meaning of which, according to Śarad Chandra, 1024, is also not clear; see *Mahāvīryupatti*, 253; *Kośa*, vii.31, note 178; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 155a11.

366. We have, according to the Lotsava, *īśādhārāmātrā varṣyadhārā* [See *Cosmologie*, p. 317, note, different Tibetan editions, *Lokaprajñāpti*, etc.] *īśā* signifies "pole"; Paramārtha translates "great post", but Hsüan-tsang: "the axel of a carriage." We know elsewhere that *īśā* is a measure (*Sulbasūtra*, in Monier-Williams).

On the primordial rain, below iii.90c, *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 243a15, 23, quoted above p. 370 (the rain of the cloud *īśādhārā*); *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 247: clouds forming thirty-two couches (*paṭala*) covering the world. The *deva* *īśādhārā* rains during five small *kalpas*, like the *devas* *Gajaprameha*, *Acchinnaadhara* and *Sthūlabinduka*. [According to the *Pitāputrasamāgama* = *Ratnakūṭa*, xvi, Lévi, JAs. 1925, i.37]. [Bendall mentions the Nāgarāja with the name of *īśādhārā*, *Mahāvīryupatti*, 168.24].

367. According to Hsüan-tsang. We have seen, iii.47, that the circle of water has a diameter of 1,203,450 *yojanas*. It thus forms a drum almost as high as it is large: how is it held up? According to the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 691b23, the source of this presentation, some other masters think that the circle of water is incalculable in width, like the circle of wind.

368. *Pakvaksīrasarībhaṇayogena*. Grammatical explanation in the *Vyākhyā*. See the comparison of the *Digba*, iii.85: *seyyathāpi nāma payaso tattasya nibbāyamanāsya upari santānakaṃ hoti* . . .

369. *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 148, quotes the *Āgama* of the Sarvāstivādins: On the circle of gold there rests Jambudvīpa, some 84,000 *yojanas* of earth. [The circle of gold is named *kāñcanavajramandala*, *Bodhicarya*, vi.1]. The *Kośa* prefers 80,000, see iii.50b.

370. The circumference is triple that of the diameter: *sarvasya parimaṇḍalasya iyaṃ sthitiṃ yad asya tripaḥśamānam* (*triguṇam eva*) *śamantaparikṣiptasya pramāṇam* (*Vyākhyā*).

371. The "ancient" metrical sources of the *Atthasālinī* (p. 207 and foll.) have the same number for the diameter of the "circles", and contain details on the mountains and the continents which are near to those Vasubandhu furnishes. However comparisons with other documents multiply the numerous variants.

Burnouf, *Lotus*, 844, Hopkins, *Mythological Aspects of Trees and Mountains in the Great Epic*, JAOS, xxx.366 (Babylonian origin, Carpenter in *Mélanges C. H. Toy*, 72).

*Nemijātaka*, v.145 and foll. (*Jātaka*, vi.125); *Atthasālinī*, 297; Spence Hardy, *Legends*, 81.

Remusat, *J. des Savants*, 1831, p.600, Beal, *Catena*, 45; *Dīrvyavadān*, 217, same order of the mountains as in the *Kośa*.

*Mahāvīyutpatti*, 194, *Dharmasamgraha*, 125, *Mahāvastu*, ii.300, *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 246, *Atthasālinī*, 298 and *Jātaka*, vi.125 differ.

372. These are the seven *paribhaṇḍaparvata* of the *Jātaka*. *Ra-ba* signifies wall.

373. Lévi, *Rāmāyaṇa*, 45.

374. *Nānāvīdhabhājagarbha*, that is to say, according to the *Vyākhyā*, *nānāprakārasāmarthyayukta*.

375. ii.36c-d, iii.100a, iv.4, v.26, vii.13a.

376. That is to say, *na hy avasthitasya rūparasādyātmakasya kṣīraṇivṛttau dadbhijanna*: We can only admit that—color, taste, etc., remaining the same—there would be, at the destruction of milk, the appearance of small milk.

377. You admit that the successive moments (milk . . . small milk) are "other" (*anyathā*), you admit that there is a modification (*anyathābhāva*): thus there is no transformation (*pariṇāma*); there is no passage, from one state to another state, of one and the same thing; for that which is otherwise (*anyathātva*) is other (*anyatva*) such as Yajñadatta and Devadatta.

378. In the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna* (Lévi, *Rāmāyaṇa*, 46) as in *Atthasālinī* (208), Meru emerges to a height of 84,000.

379. Vasubandhu does not speak of the *Mahācakra* *vāḍa*, *Mahāvīyutpatti*, 194.12, *Lotus*, 842, *Dharmasamgraha*, 124 and notes p. 65, *Dict. of St Petersburg*. The *Cakra* *vāḍa* of Beal, 45, is of a height of 300 *yojanas*; in *Atthasālinī* (299), the *Cakra* *vāḍa* is immersed 82,000, and emerges some 82,000.

380. Hsüan-tsang corrects this redaction which is sufficiently embarrassing: "Between the mountains [that is to say, between Meru, Yugandhara . . . Cakra *vāḍa*] there are eight oceans. The first seven are the inner [ocean]. The first is 80,000 long; and is triple to its external limit. The six others, diminishing by a half. The eighth is the outer [ocean], of 321,000 *yojanas*."

381. We read *Śūā* in the *kārikā*. We do not find the translation "cold" anywhere. The *Lotsava* has *rol mthso*, *rol pa'i mthso bdun*: "the seven lakes of which the waters move in gentle waves as if they were dancing to the music of the wind" (Śarad Chandra Das).

The heroes of *Jātaka* 541 see the seven mountains that encircle Meru, *satta paribhaṇḍapabbate*, which is found *Sidāntare*, that is to say *Sidāmahāsamuddassa antare*, in the middle of the great sea *Sidā*. This sea is so called because its water is so subtle (*sukhuma*) that it cannot even bear a peacock feather: it sinks (*sīdati*) (*Jātaka*, vi.125). Compare iii.57.

382. The *Vyākhyā* quotes this *sloka*.

*Divya*, 127.19. The eight qualities of the waters of the lakes of Sukhāvati, in Beal, *Catena*, 379; of Karaṇḍahrada (Beal, *Hsüan-tsang*, ii.165; see *ibid.* i.10).

383. The masters are not in agreement. We have seen that the diameter of the circle of water and of the circle of the sphere of gold is 1,203,450 *yojanas*. On the other hand the Cakravāḍa is so called because it encircles the universe with its four continents. Now if one adds up the numbers given above (half of Meru 40,000; first Sītā 80,000; Yugandhara 40,000; second Sītā 20,000 . . .), we see that Cakravāḍa is not placed at the edge of the sphere of gold. Thus, certain masters think that the outer ocean, between Nimindhara and Cakravāḍa, should be 323,287.50 *yojanas*. Beal, p. 46, gives 322,312 *yojanas*. But the difference can be resolved in two ways: either by admitting that Cakravāḍa is not located at the edge—that it encircles, not the circle of water but the upper part of the sphere of gold; or by admitting that the descriptions of the mountains, "same height and width" (iii. 51b), should not be taken literally: the edges of the mountains are not strictly perpendicular (*atyantacchinmatāḥ*).

384. The form of a carriage, see *Dīgha*, ii.235.

385. *Vajrasana*, iv.112b, trans. note 506. Saeki quotes the *Si-yu-ki* (= *Hsi-yü-chi*), Watters, ii.114; Sarad Candra Das, 751, Foucher, *Iconographie*, ii.15-21, Beal, *Catena*, 21.

386. We are assured that, in this continent, the eye hears sounds, the ear sees colors, etc.

387. On Uttarakurus, "Hyperboreans", iii.78, 85, 90, 99c, iv.43, 82, 97, Beal, *Catena*, 37, Hastings, ii.687.

388. The *Vyākhyā* has an interesting remark: *bhūmivaśāt sattvānām vaicitryam himavadvindhyavāsīnām kirāṭasābarāṇām gaurāśyāmate*: Beings differ by reason of their habitation; the inhabitants of the Himavat, namely the Kirāṭas, are yellow; the inhabitants of the Vindhyas, namely the Śābaras, are black. On the face of the men on the 3,000 islands, Saeki mentions the *Śāraṅgamasūtra*, 2BII; see also *Saddharmasmṛti* in Lévi, *Rāmāyaṇa*, 47.

389. *Mahāvīryupatti*, 154.

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 868a6. There are five small islands around the intermediate continents, inhabited by men, or by *amanuṣyas*, or deserted . . . In the beginning men spoke ārya; later, after they had eaten and drunk, men differed and, through the increase of treachery (*śāḍhya*), there were many languages; there are also men who do not know how to speak . . .

Beal, *Catena*, 35, gives numerous details on the four great and the eight small continents, according to the *Dīrgha*, Saṅghabhadra (*Nyāyānusāra*), etc. According to Saṅghabhadra, Deha, Videha, Kuru and Kaurava will be deserted.

390. *Vibhāṣā*, second opinion ("New *Vibhāṣā Śāstra*", Beal, *Catena*, 35).

391. For the Gandhamādana mountains, etc., see Hopkins, *Epic Mythology*, 9.

392. The *Lotsava*, Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang translate *kṣātri* = 鐵山 "black mountain." Paramārtha adds a gloss: "They are called 'ant-mountains' because they are low" (T 29, p.215b10); the *Vyākhyā* glosses *kṣāḍrīnavakāt* by *kṣāḍrīnām parvatānām navakāt*.

393. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 22a2. The *Jñānaprasthāna* says that there are five great rivers in Jambudvīpa: Gaṅgā, Yamunā, Sarayū (Sarabhū), Aciravati, Mahī [this is the list of the Pāli Canon]. When the Bhadranta Kātyāyanīputra established this Śāstra, he was in the East; this is why he quotes, as an example, the rivers that Easterners know and see. But, in fact, there are in Jambudvīpa four great rivers which each gives forth four secondary rivers. [The rest of this text, on the four great and the sixteen small rivers, is translated and commented on by S. Lévi, *Pour l'histoire du Rāmāyaṇa*, p. 150-152].

On the rivers of the Pāli Canon and of *Milinda*, Rhys Davids, *Milinda*, i. p. xlv, and above all Demiéville, *Milinda*, 230 (BEFEO, 1924).

On the Vakṣu or Vahkṣu, and Cakṣus and Sucakṣus of the Buddhist and Brāhmanical sources, see Lévi, loc. cit., *Mahāvastu*, 167.80, Eitel, 194, Hopkins, *Sacred Rivers of India*, 214, Watters, i.293; *JAs.* 1914, ii.409; V. Smith, 262. We owe the identification of Vakṣu = Oxus to Rémusat.

On the Sitā, Lévi, *ibid.* p. 139 (=Tarim); Minayev, *Grammaire palie*, p. ix, quotes Ctesias in *Pliny*, xxxi.2 on the Side: "... *stagnum in India in quo nihil innatet omnia mergantur*. (The river of Yarkand or the Sirikol).

"To the north of the Sitā, Scripture is written in the language of the land of Campaka, in the languages of the land of the monkeys, in the language of the land called Gold." (*Mel. As.* ii.177).

394. Paramārtha here adds two lines. According to Paramārtha: "On the south bank of this lake, a mountain 25 *yojanas* in height; on the north bank, a mountain 15 *yojanas* in height; both are of various minerals. To the north of Gandhamādāna mountain, at its summit, there is a cave called Nanda, decorated with the seven jewels, 50 *yojanas* in length and width, the abode of the king of the elephants. Beyond, there are six kingdoms, seven forests, and seven rivers. Beyond the seventh river, there are two forests in the shape of a half-moon. To the north of these forests, there is the Jambu tree to a height of 100 *yojanas* ..."

395. Let us mention the Bibliography of Kern, *Manual*, 58; L. Feer, "Enfer Indien," *JAs.* 1892 and 1893; B. C. Law, *Heaven and Hell in Buddhist Perspective*, Calcutta, 1925 (Pāli sources); Gogerly, *Ceylon Buddhism*, 1908, vol. 2; *Kāraṇḍavyūha*, edited by S. B. Samasrami, Calcutta, 1873; the Friendly Letter, Wenzel, *JPTS*, 1886; *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna*, fragments in the *ŚŚikṣāsamuccaya* and S. Lévi, *Rāmāyaṇa*. We owe a very interesting essay to J. Przyluski, and the first, on the story of Buddhist hell, in *Légende d'Açoka*, 1924.

396. See note 369: there are 84,000 *yojanas* between the sphere of gold and the surface of Jambudvīpa.

*Avīci* and *avīci*, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, vi.120, viii.107, *Rāstrapālapariprcchā*, 30.

Geography of *Avīci*, *Saddharmasmṛti*, in *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 70.

397. The expression *avīci maññe* in the description of an overcrowded country, *Āṅguttara*, i.159, *Dīgha*, iii.75. Terrible *Avīci* with its four doors, *Itivuttaka*, 86 and *Cullavagga*, vii.4.8. As the lower limit of Kāmadhātu, *Dhammasaṅgani*, 1281. *Avīci* is not named in *Suttanipāṭa* p. 121, *Samyutta*, i.154 (Notes of Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, iii. p. 73).

*Avīcisamantatisabhitam*, in an uninterrupted series (explanation of *sadā*), *Mahāniddesa*, 18, 347. *Avīci* a synonym of *jarā* in *Visuddhimagga* 449 (Rhys Davids-Stede).

398. This second explanation has passed to Maheśvara in the *Amarakośa*: *na vidyate vicīḥ sukhaṃ yatra*. We have two Tibetan equivalents *mthsams-med* = "without interval" [Eitel understands that the damned die there and are reborn there incessantly] and *mṇar-med* = "without tortures", as a euphemism, says Wenzel, *JPTS*, 1886, 23; but *mṇar-med* = "without pleasure."

399. *ity eke aṣṭau nirayā ākhyātā duratīkramāḥ /*  
*ākīrṇā raudrakarmabhiḥ pratyekeṇ śoḍaśotsadāḥ //*  
*catuḥskandhāḥ<sup>a</sup> caturdvārā vibhaktā bhāgaśo mitāḥ<sup>b1</sup> /*  
*ayaḥprākāraparyantā<sup>c</sup> ayasā pratikubjūtāḥ<sup>d1</sup> //*  
*teṣāṃ ayomayī bhūmīr jvalitā tejasā yutā /*  
*[anekayojanasatāir jvalābhis tīṣṭhatī] sphuṭāḥ<sup>e</sup> //*

*Dīrgha*, TD 1, p. 127a4, *Ekottara*, TD 2, p. 747c12, *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 341a25. I have quoted *in extenso* in *Cosmologie bouddhique* the parallel passages: 1. *Āṅguttara*, i.141, *Majjhima*, iii.182, *Peṭavatthu*, 21.65, *Kāṭhāvatthu*, xx.3; 2. *Jātaka*, v.266; 3. *Mahāvastu*, i.9 and iii.454; 4. *Lokaprajñāpti* (Mdo, 89b and 104b, *Sūtra* and glosses).

a. Reading given in the *Vyākhyā*: *catuḥskandhāṇi catuḥprākāra ity arthaḥ / catuḥsamniveśā ity āpare*.

Elsewhere *catuḥkarnāḥ* (*Mahāvastu*), *catuḥkarnā* (*Jātaka*).

Elsewhere *catuḥbhāgāḥ* according to the version *cha bzhi* (*Lokaprajñāpti*), with the commentary: four parts, east, south, etc. This is the version of Senart: "They are in four parts; they have four doors ..."; this is the interpretation of the Chinese translators: "four faces and four

doors”.

Version of the *Bhāṣya* *tsig pa* = wall, masonry.

b. Reading of all the sources. Senart: “They are isolated and limited, each having a definite place.” I translate the commentary of the *Lokaprajñāpti*.

c. *Ayaḥprākāraparikṣiptā ity arthaḥ* (*Vyākhyā*).

d. *Ayasopariṣṭāc chāditaḥ / ayasā pūṭhitadvārā ity apare* (*Vyākhyā*). Senart: “having a canopy of fire.”

e. *Sphuṭā iti vyāptāḥ* (*Vyākhyā*).

*Dpag tbsad bgya phrag du mar yañ / me lce rnamṣ ni mched par gnas* (*Lokaprajñāpti*); *dpag tbsad bgya phrag du mar ni / me lce dag gis khyab par gnas* (Version of the *Bhāṣya*).

According to the commentary on the *Lokaprajñāpti*, this refers to Avici, which gives the reading: ... *tiṣṭhati sphuṭaḥ*.

In the Pāli editions, this refers to the ground: *samantā yojanasataṃ phuṭā* (var. *pbarivā*) *tiṣṭhati sabbadā*.

J. Przyluski discovered in *Diṇya*, p. 375, a fragment of the *Bālāpanditasūtra*, where there is described “the ground formed of burning fire, having a hot smell, forming only a single flame” (Burnouf, *Introduction*, 366) which is the floor of our hells.

400. On the development of hellish cosmology, see Przyluski, *Légende d'Aśoka*, 130; see also Feer, *Fragments du Kandjour*, 518, Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, iv.113 (Bibliography).

In the *Devadūtasūtra* (*Ānguttara*, i.138, *Majjhima*, iii.178) the great hell (*mahāniraya*) has four gates which lead into four secondary hells, *Gūṭhaniraya*, *Kukkulaniraya*, *Simbalivana*, *Asipat-travana*; all this is surrounded by the river *Khārodakā* which is, at least once, identified with the *Vaitaraṇī* (*Jātaka*, vi.250, quoted in Przyluski, *Aśoka*, 132).

In the thirtieth *Sūtra* of the *Dīrgha*, there are sixteen *utsadas*, which are placed between the two *Cakravādas*; the same in the *Kuṇḍasūtra* (Przyluski, *Aśoka*, 135, 136).

According to Vasubandhu, there are sixteen *utsadas*, counting the River (*Vaitaraṇī*) as an *utsada*, and by making one *utsada* out of the forests, etc.

In *Jātaka*, i.174: *attha pana mahāniraye sodasa ussadaniraye*; *ibid.* ii.3, there is a village *pākāraparikṣipta catudvāra nagara* which is an *ussadaniraya*, a place where many of the damned suffer.

401. The *kukkūla* is the *kukkūla* of the *Mahāvastu*, i.44 = iii.455; Paramārtha: “Burning ashes.” Compare *Śiṣāsamuccaya*: *pādāḥ pravilīyāte / utkṣiptaḥ punaḥ sambhavadati*. TD 32, number 1644 describes a journey to *Kukkūla*.

402. *Kuṇapa* (*Mahāvastu*, *ibid.*) corresponds to the *gūṭhaniraya* of the *Devadūtasūtra* which is related to the *gūṭhakūpa* of *Samyutta*, ii.259, *Petavatthu*, 64. The animals with sharp mouths (*nyaṭkulā nama prāṇī*, *Mahāvastu* patti, 215.20 or *nyanikuṭā*, “torso”) are the *sūcīmukha pāna*; compare *Samyutta*, ii.258; *Saddharmasmṛti* in *Śiṣāsamuccaya*, 69-76.

403. The *ksuramārga* is absent in the *Mahāvastu*; it is described in *Kāraṇḍavyūha*, 38.

404. In *Devadūta*, the *asipattravana* follows *simbalivana*. Compare *Mahāvastu* patti, 215.

405. The *simbalivana* of the *Devadūta*; its thorns have eight fingers in the *Dvāvimśatyavadāna* (ed. R. Turner).

406. On the *Vaitaraṇī* (= *khārodakā nadī*), Lévi, *Rāmāyaṇa*, 152, Hopkins, *Sacred Rivers*, 222. The *rab-med* “Without a ford” of the friendly letter, *JPTS.*, 1886, 21.

407. Paramārtha, *yüan* 園 = garden; Hsüan-tsang, *ts'eng* 增 = additions, excrescences.

Senart, *Mahāvastu*, i.372; Sp. Hardy, *Manual*, 27 (*osupat*);

*Śiṣāsamuccaya*, 56.6, 248.5.

*Vyākhyā*: *adbhikayānāstbānavād utsadāḥ / narakeṣu . . . / narakāvarodhād ūrdhvam eṣu kukūlādīṣe śīdanīy atas ta utsadā ity aparāḥ*.

*Ut* signifies *adbhika* or *ūrdhva*.

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 866b4 explains why the annexes to hell are called *utsada*; three reasons according to P'u-kuang (p. 187a3), two according to Fa-pao (p. 616a15): because its suffering is very

strong, quite varied, supplementary. Sojourn in the *utsadas* lasts 10,000 years; it is indefinite or infinite in the hells properly so-called (*Majjhima*, i.335).

In *Petavatthu*, p. 46, there is a *sattussada niraya* (mentioned by Rhys Davids-Stede) which is explained, in *Digha*, i.87, as "full of beings."

408. Beal, *Catena*, 65, says that the damned pass from *Avīci* to the cold hells, and from there to the dark hells, etc.

409. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 866b12. This is the controversy of *Kathavatthi*, xx.3. The *Andhakas* deny the existence of beings called *nirayapāla* basing themselves on a text (not identified): "This is not Vessabhū, nor the king of the Petas . . . it is their own actions which torment the damned." Vasubandhu, in the *Vijñaptimātravivṛtīśaka*, stanza 4 (translated in *Muséon*, 1912, 53-90; the Tibetan, edited and translated by S. Lévi, 1926), demonstrates the non-existence of the guardians of the hells, of the dogs, of the crows, of the walls of steel, etc. Saeki quotes a commentary of the *Vivṛtīśaka*: "Or rather it is believed that the guardians of the hells are real beings: an opinion of the Mahāsāṃghikas and of the Sāṃmitīyas; or rather it is believed that they are not real beings, but certain kinds of *bhūta* and *bhautika* created through action: opinion of the Sarvāstivādins etc.; or rather it is believed that, even though they are not beings, yet, being produced by the *vāsanā* (the trace of actions and thoughts), they are not simple modifications of the mind: opinion of the Sautrāntikas."

Compare the women created by action, *Śiṣāsamuccaya*, 69-76.

410. *Vivartanivāyavyūvat*. In this same way, at creation, the winds move (*ceṣṭante*) in order to create the receptacle world. The self-styled "guardians of the hells" are only *bhūta* and *bhautika*, *asatvākebya*, "non-living beings," i.10b.

411. *Dhārmasubhūti* has been quoted above, iii.13a. We have here a *śloka* which ends: [*jāyante*] *yamarāṣeśaḥ*. Perhaps an excerpt from the *Daśākūśalākarmapathanirdeśa* (Lévi, *JAs.*, 1925, i.37).

Hsüan-tsang translates: *fa-shan-hsien* 法善現. Paramārtha transcribes *bhu* by *pu* 部 or *hou* 吼. On this master, and the masters with analogous names (*Subhūti* *hoṣa*), F. W. Thomas, *Album Kern*, 407, and S. Lévi, *Notes Indiennes*, *JAs.*, 1925, i.36 (*Dharmika Subhūti*, one of the names of *Aśvaghōṣa* according to Tāranātha).

412. . . . *ṛtāvadbhūvat / bhūtaviseṣanirvṛtter vā*. Paramārtha adds: "They do not differ from the other beings who arise in hell; how can they be guardians?"

*Nāgasena*, p. 67, explains why the damned in general are not destroyed by the fire.

413. J. Przyluski, *Aṅoka*, 135, observes that there are ten cold hells in the 30th Sūtra of the *Dīrgha* (placed between the *Cakravāḍas*), in *Samyutta*, i.152 (Feer, *JAs*, 1892, ii.213), *Anguttara*, v.172, *Suttanipāta* (*Kokāliyasutta*): *abbuda nirabbuda*, *ababa*, *aṭaṭa*, *abaha* (or *abaha*, *aṭaṭa*), *kumuda*, *sogandhika*, *uppala* (or *uppalaka*), *punḍarika*, *paduma*. With the eight great hot hells, eighteen hells, as in the *Kuṇḍasūtra* (Przyluski, 136). [Feer, *JAs.*, 1892, ii.220: "The names of the cold hells designate simply the number of years of punishment": see below p. 473]. Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, ii.341: There are hundreds and thousands of *Arbudas*; the *Nirayas* are thirty-six in number. *Mahāvīryapatti*, 215.1-8; *Divya*, 67, trans. Burnouf, *Introduction*, 201 [Burnouf mentions the identity of *Mahāpadma* with the *Pen-to-li* = *Punḍarika* of the note to the *Foe-kone-ki* (= *Fu-kuei-chi*), p. 298-99).

Or rather we distinguish the eight cold hells and the ten hot hells which are placed between the *Cakravāḍas* or Universes; these, with the numerous small hells, are the *lokāntarika* hells, Eitel, p. 106-107; Saeki, about this, mentions the *Li-shih lun* 立世論, TD 32, the *Saddharmasmṛtyu-paśṭhāna*, TD 17, p. 103b19 and the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 866b3.

On the *lokāntarika aghā andhakārā* . . . Burnouf, *Lotus*, 631, 832, *Dīrgha*, ii.12, *Divya*, 204, Sp. Hardy, *Legends*, 110, Deussen-Geden, *Upanishads*, 322.

414. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 866a15. Here a difficult person objects: "It is said that *Jambudvīpa* is narrower at the top, and larger at the bottom; and that the other continents present the opposite

appearance: is this reasonable?"

415. *Vibhāṣā*, ibidem. Below Jambudvīpa, the great hells; at the surface of Jambudvīpa, the "border" (*pien* 邊) hells (Compare Beal, *Catena*, 65) and the *prāḍefika* (*ku* 孤) hells: in valleys, mountains, etc. In the other *dvīpas* the great hells are lacking because there the great crimes are not committed. ... According to some, all the hells are lacking in Uttarakuru. The damned are of human form; they first speak in Āryan languages; then, crushed by their sufferings, they no longer pronounce one single intelligible word.

*Prāḍefika* hells. Hsüan-tsang translates *ku* 孤, isolated; Paramārtha, *pieh ch'u* 別處 a separate place (p.216b5); the Tibetan *ñi-thse* which also signifies "ephemeral" (as *prāḍefika* thought, momentary thought, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, trans. p. 42; *prāḍefikayāna*, *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 183.10, *Mahāvīyutpatti*, 59.5). Three hells "of a day's duration", *Saddharmasmṛti*, Lévi, *Rāmāyaṇa*, 53. See Rhys Davids-Stede, *padesa*.

Another name for this is *pratyekeanaraka*, *paccekaniraya* (Comm. on the *Suttanipāṭa* and *Petavatthu*); such as the hells which Saṃgharakṣita visits, *Divya*, 335, 336, *Introduction*, 320 ("some hells which are renewed each day" says Burnouf according to the Tibetan *ñi-thse*, and according to the description itself). Burnouf quotes Des Hautesrayes: "hells dispersed over the surface of the earth, on the rivers and in isolated places" (which corresponds to the *Vibhāṣā* trans. by Beal, 57, on the "solitary hells").

We recall that one of the names of the *mahāniraya* of *Majjhima*, i.337, is *paccattavedaniya*.

The *pratyekeanaraka* of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 136, is an imitation of a monastery; the damned-pretas of *Saṃyutta*, ii.254 are the "individual" damned; the same for the heros of the *Maitrakanyakāvadāna*.

The Bodhisattva who should go to Avici goes into a *pratyekeanaraka* (*Mahāvastu*, i.103): "a urinal hell" says Barth, *J. des Savants*, quoted in part, p. 23; but, ii.350, there is fire in this type of hell).

416. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 690c15, mentions the opinion that the animals which live among humans are not beings, *sattvas*: they resemble animals, give milk, etc. We see that the "disappearance of the animals" at the end of the world is accomplished in two steps, the animals which live with humans disappearing after the others and at the same time as humans (iii.90a).

417. The city of Yama is 86,000 *yojanas*, Hopkins, *JAOS*, xxxiii.149.

The *peta mahiddhika*, *Petavatthu*, i.10; *Kathāvatthu*, xx.3; *Avadānaśataka*, 46. *Kośa*, iii, note 26.

Fourth decade of the *Avadānaśataka*; *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna*, Chap IV (TD 17, number 721); sources of Beal, *Catena*, 67. Description of the Pretas who frequent men, *manuṣyacaraṇṇu*, *Lotus*, iii. Stede, *Gespentergeschichten des Petavatthu*, Leipzig, 1914.

Details on the Pretas, *Kośa*, iii.9d, 83c.

418. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang differ. The sun is set into motion by five winds, Beal, *Catena*, p. 68.

419. In *Visuddhimagga*, 417-418 (Warren, 324; Spence Hardy, *Legends*, 233), the moon is 49 and the sun 50 *yojanas* in width.

420. Absent in the Tibetan version.

421. It appears difficult to otherwise understand the Lotsava: *ñi mepi gzhal med khañ 'og gi pbyi rol ni me sel kyī dkyil 'khor . . . mñon par 'grub bo*. Paramārtha: sun disk lower face outer limit 日輪下面外邊. . . The houses, *vimāna*, are distinct from the disk; on the dimensions of the houses, mansions, Beal, *Catena*, 68.

422. *Taijasa cakra* is explained *sūryakāntāmaka*, "made of the *sūryakānta* gem."

423. Hsüan-tsang adds: "By how much is the augmentation? By a *lava*." The *lava* is the thirtieth of a *muhūrta* which is a thirtieth part of the day, or four minutes, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 701c9. The *Māsaparikṣā* Chapter of the *Śārdūlakarṇa* is omitted in the Cowell-Neil edition (see *Divya*

Appendix).

The *Lokaprajñāpti* indicates the maximum of a day and a night; in agreement with the *Sārdūlakarṇa*, *Divya*, 642: *hemantānām dvītiye māse rohiṇyām aṣṭamyaṁ dvādaśamubūrto divaso* . . . ; common figures, as we see in Thibaut, p. 26, Barnett, *Antiquities of India*, 196: the duration of the day is a maximum of 15 hours, a minimum of 9 hours.

This contradicts the dates of the equinox in 61c-62.

424. *Vyākhyā*: *aparapārśve chāyāpatanī vikalamāṇḍalān darśayati / tadyathā stambhe pradīpachāyāpatanī yathā yathā stambha āsanno bhavati tathā tathā stambhaḥ svacchāyayā chādyate / dāre hi vartamāne pradīpe paripūrnastambho dṛśyate / kiṁ cid āsanne kiṁ cit kṣīyate / yāvad atyāsanne stambho naṣṭarūpo vartate / tadvad etat*.

Paramārtha: Consequently, the shade of the sun covers the other parts of the moon.

Hsüan-tsang: The other sides (west and east) produce a shade which covers the disk of the moon (east and west).

425. *Vyākhyā*: *punas tiryagavanāmonnāmayogena adhobbhāgā candramāṇḍalasya kṣīyate / ūrdhvaṁ vardhate ceti yogācārāḥ*.

Paramārtha: Such is the manner of the progress of the sun and of the moon that sometimes one sees them complete, sometimes by half. Hsüan-tsang: The progress of the sun and the moon are not similar; one sees them as complete or partial.

The phases of the moon are explained in TD 1, number 24, Beal, 69: 1. on account of its revolution, by which the hind parts are exhibited; 2. the blue-clad *devas*, perpetually intervening between the earth and the moon, cause the disc of the latter to be obscured; 3. because the bright rays of the sun (sixty bright rays) obscure the disc of the moon . . . the moon is so near the sun that its brightness is obscured . . .

Beal also quotes TD 32, number 1644: "The subject of the 19th Chapter is the motion of the sun and moon" (Nanjio 1297).

426. *Cāturmahārājakāyika* is explained: *cāturmahārājānām kāyaḥ / tatra bhavāś cāturmahārājakāyikāḥ* = which forms part of the company of the Four Great Kings.

427. According to the *Lokaprajñāpti* (*Cosmologie*, Appendix, p. 301), there, between the city of the Asuras and that of the Suras (or Thirty-three), there are "five gardens of the Thirty-three, the Udakaniśrita Nāgas, the Karotapānis, etc." *Divya*, 218, *Jātaka*, i.204.

*Paṇiṣaṇḍā*, Tib. *ban-rim*, Paramārtha: stage (*ts'eng* 層), Hsüan-tsang: stage-series (*ts'eng-chi* 層級). *Divya*, 212.8 (the *Sumeruparikhaṇḍa*, incorrect reading); 217.17, 344.12 (*Sumerupariṣaṇḍā*, which differs from the dwellings of the Karotapānis, etc., and is not one of our *paṇiṣaṇḍā*). *Mahāvīryūpatti*, 194.21, *sumerupariṣaṇḍa*, 245.358, *paṇiṣaṇḍa*.

428. We do not see how the *paṇiṣaṇḍā* "depart" (*nirgata*, 'phags, *ch'u* 出), from out of the side of Meru.

If we admit that the *paṇiṣaṇḍā* are recessed terraces, placed all around the circumference of Meru, one can then understand the theory that attributes to the summit of the mountain sides of 20,000 *yojanas* in height, not of 80,000 *yojanas*. [Above the first terrace the side is 80,000 less 32,000: diminishing then 16, 8, 4, there then remains a prism of 20,000 *yojanas* on a side.]

Great variety in the designs which represent Meru, *Alphabetum tibetanum*, 473; Beal, *Catena*, 75; Eitel, *Handbook*, 164, etc.

429. See Burnouf, 600, *Divya*, 218, *Mahāvastu*, i.30 and 394; Morris, *JPTS*, 1893, 21 (*karoti*).

430. *Sadāmatta* is the name of one of the "particular paradises" of Maitrakanyaka.

431. Dhṛtarāṣṭra in the East, Virūḍhaka in the South, Virūpākṣa in the West, and Vaiśrāvaṇa in the North.

432. The gods which are the company of the Thirty-three Gods, Śakra, etc. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 691c20, which Vasubandhu follows faithfully. *Divya*, 219; *Mahāvastu*, i.31; *Lokaprajñāpti*, fol.



28a-48b, *Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 301-306; *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna* in Lévi, *Rāmāyaṇa*, 44-47 (the Chinese names of the parks do not agree with our versions of the *Kośa*).

433. In the *Vibhāṣā*, the first opinion is that the sides are 20,000 *yojanas* in height; the second, that they are 24,000. *Vyākhyā*: How does one reconcile the theory of sides of 20,000 with the thesis that the mountains are as high as they are wide? These masters think that this thesis refers to the central section of the mountain (*madhyabhāgam evābhisamākṣya evam uktam*). See above note 428.

434. On *Sudarśana*, *Divya*, 220; *Commentary on the Dhammapada*, 30 (p. 319 of Burlingame's *Buddhist Legends*.)

435. Hsüan-tsang: Its walls of gold are one *yojana* and a half in height.

436. On the four parks, see *Mahāvīryapatti*, 196.1-4; *Divya*, 194-195 (regrets of a dying god), *Mahāvastu*, i.32. The four parks of the Jainas, *SBE*, 45, p. 288.

437. *Caturdśam* is explained: *catasro diśo'syeti caturdśam kriyāviśeṣaṇam*. According to Bhāguri, we have the two forms *diś* and *diśa* (*Vyākhyā*).

438. The *subhūmīni* of the stanza is explained: *sobhanā bhūmaya eṣām ūi subhūmūni kṛdāstbānāni*.

439. *Pārījātaka* (*Divya*, 219, etc.) is the *Pāricchattaka* of the *Jātaka*, i.202, *Atthasālinī*, 298, *Visuddhimagga*, 206 (opinion of the *Porāṇas*).

440. *Paramārtha* and Hsüan-tsang, five *yojanas*.

441. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 205b1, *Ekottara*, TD 2, p. 613c4, *Udānavarga*, vi.14, *Dhammapada*, 54, *Anguttara*, i.226, *Jātaka*, iii.291: *na puṣpagandhaḥ prativātam eti*.

442. Hsüan-tsang: "The Sūtra of the Mahiśāsakas says . . ."

443. On the *Sudharmā*, see *Divya*, 220, *Anguttara*, i.226; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 692a20: The gods come together on the eighth, the fourteenth and the fifteenth day of each fortnight; they examine the gods and men, govern the Asuras, etc. . . The same, TD 1, number 24. Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, i.26. J. Przyluski, *JAs*. ii.157, on *Dīgha*, ii.207, *Mahāvastu*, iii.198.

444. The *vimānas* are either immense plate-shaped, or individual, mansions, p. iii.101c.

445. The *bhaumas* and *āntarikṣavāsins* (?) of *Mahāvīryapatti*, 156, etc.

Vasubandhu is not speaking here of the Asuras (see iii.4) which the *Lokaprajñāpti* discusses (trans. in *Cosmologie bouddhique*); he also ignores Māra (on which Beal, *Catena*, 93; Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, i.125 = the King of the *Paranirmitavaśavartins*; Huber, *Sūtrālamkāra*, 110) and *Maheśvara* (Beal, 94).

446. Pāli: *khiddāpadosika*.

447. *Lokaprajñāpti*, Chap. VI (*Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 300): "As, in Jambu, there is *abrahmacārya*, *mañbhunadharma*, *dvandvasamāpatti*, so too in the other continents and among the gods up to the Thirty-three Gods; among the Yāmas, appeasement of desire (*paridāha*, *gḍuñ ba*) for embracing . . ."

*Lokaprajñāpti*, ibid.: "As, in Jambu, the women have their month, are pregnant, give birth, so too in the other continents. Among the *Cāturmahārājakāyikas*, the infant appears on the bosom or the shoulder of the god or the goddess . . ."

448. *Vyākhyā*: "As long as there lasts mating, embracing, contact of the hands, smiling, looking, so long will there last mating for the gods inhabiting this earth" (Four Kings and the Thirty-three), the Yāmas, etc.

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 585b12. . . Some say that as the higher gods approach detachment from desire (*vairāgya*), the fire of desire becomes weaker; but, in any union (*mañbhuna*), one must mate (*dvandvasamāpatti*) in order to appease the fire of desire.

449. See above p. 391.

450. That is to say, adds Hsüan-tsang, they speak as they do in Central India, "middle *in-tu* 中印度." Beal, *Catena*, 91.

451. *Samgūṣṭiparyāya*, TD 26, p. 386a27; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 870a28; *Dīgha*, iii.218; *Itivuttaka*, 94.

452. Rhys Davids-Stede translate: "having power under the control of another".

In *Dīgha*, i.216, there is a god Saṁtusita, King of the Tusitas, a Sunimitta, King of the Nimmānaratīs, and a Vasavatti, King of the Paranimmitavasavattīs; above, Mahābrahmā, King of the Brahmakāyikas.

*Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, i.121, Māṇḍhātār possesses the human *kāmaguṇas*, the Parinirmitas possess divine *kāmaguṇas*.

453. See ii.45, p. 237.

On the *sukha* of the *dhyānas*, viii.9.

*Dīgha*, iii.218, differs, at any rate, in the redaction.

454. *Sukha* is absent there, for the sensation of *dhyānāntara* is the sensation of indifference, equanimity, viii.23; thus this is not "an arising of pleasure." This *dhyāna* is the retribution of a good action, it resembles *sukha* (*sukhakaḥ*), thus it is "an arising of pleasure." But then the Fourth Dhyāna will also be "an arising of pleasure"? No, because *sukha* is absent there. Consequently this point is to be examined (*vicāryam*, *saṁpradhāryam*).

455. Other methods of calculation in Beal, *Catena* 82. [Excerpt from the *Vibhāṣā*, with numbers very different from those that we have here: ten thousand *yojanas* between the residences; same doctrine in the *In-pen Sūtra*; in the *Abhidharma*; "one year for the falling of a rock of one hundred cubits thrown from the world of Brahmā; 65,535 years for the falling of a mountain thrown from Akaniṣṭha"; in the *Jñānaprasthāna*: "18,383 years for the falling of a rock of ten cubits thrown from the first stage of Rūpadhātu."]

The same, *Milinda*, 82, a rock takes four months to fall from Brahmāloka falling at a rate of 84,000 *yojanas* a day.

*Sūtrālamkāra*, Huber, 127, the heaven of Trāyastriṃśas is 3,000,336 *lī*s.

456. *Vyākhyā*: *taduteṣṭatarabbhūmyantarābhāvān naite kaniṣṭhā ity akaniṣṭhāb*.

457. The *Mahāvūyapatti*, 161.5-6., mentions two forms, the Akaniṣṭhas gods and Aghaniṣṭhas gods. It appears that Aghaniṣṭha is the reading of the MSS of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, see Wogihara. On *agha*, *Kośa*, i.28a, trans. p. 89; and the references of Rhys Davids and Stede.

Rhys Davids and Stede, s. voc. *kaniṣṭha*, mention "*akaniṣṭha* in *akaniṣṭhabhavana*, *Jātaka*, iii.487, *Commentary on the Dhammapada*, *passim*, *akaniṣṭhagāminī*, *Samyutta*, v.237, etc." We could quote *Vibhāṅga*, 425 (*akaniṣṭha deva*); *Dhammasaṅgani*, 1283 (limit of Rūpadhātu), *Dīgha*, ii.52, iii.237, etc.

458. But the Cāturmahārājakāyikas are of the same *bhūmi* as the Trāyastriṃśas; they can thus, without difficulty, go to them.

459. The Four Kings and the Thirty-three Gods are of the same *bhūmi* (for both inhabit Meru); the four other classes of higher gods of Kāmadhātu, Yāmas, etc., occupy distinct *bhūmis*; Rūpadhātu embraces Four Dhyānas which are also *bhūmis*.

A god arisen in the First Dhyāna does not see a god arisen in the Second Dhyāna.

460. This is simply an example; we can also read: "As sound is not understood . . ."

461. The Mahāsārngīkikas whom Saṁghabhadra refutes.

462. See iii.101c.

463. *Anguttara*, i.227, *Cullavagga*, 235.2b (*sabassī cūlanikā lokadhātu*); *Dīgha*, TD 1, p. 114b20, c7, quoted by Beal, *Catena*, 102, who quotes many Sūtras. The term "chilocosm" was invented by

Rémusat.

*Mahāvīyutpatti*, 153 and 15.15. In the *Mahāvīyutpatti*, it appears that *sāhasracūḍika* forms only one word; by this fact, a *lokadhātu*, a universe, is called *sāhasra* because it is composed of one thousand four-continent universes, (*cāturdvīpaka lokadhātu*), and *cūḍika* because it is the *cūḍa* (*cūḍābhūtatavā*) of a great universe. [Without doubt we have here *kṣulla*, *kṣudra* = *culla*, *cūla*].

464. This point will be elucidated iii.93a-b (*Vyākhyā*). Rather: "Creation and destruction [of the universes of one group] take place at the same time."

*Vivarta* is explained as *vividhāvartana* or rather *vividhā vartante'sminn iti*. *Samivarta* = *samivartana*, or rather *samivartante'sminn iti*: this is the period when beings "come together" (*samivartante* = *saṃgacchanti*) in the higher *dhyānas*; see below, note 493.

465. There is an *Āyuspariyantāsūtra*, Csoma-Feer, p. 278, *Mdo*, 26, 217.

466. *Vibhaṅga*, 422: *manussānaṃ kittakam āyuppanāṇaṃ / vassasatam appam vā bhīyyo vā*. According to the canonical formula: *yo cīram jīvati so vassasatam* . . .

467. This is based on a Sūtra very close to *Ānguttara*, iv.256-7 (eulogy of the *Upasatha*), *Vibhaṅga*, 422. *Lokaprajñāpti* in *Cosmologie*, 301.

468. The year of 360 days and the year of the "middle Period" (=the middle period) of Thibaut, *Astronomie*, 1899, p. 28. Below iii.90.

469. Very close to the source of Vasubandhu, *Divya*, 279: *katham rātrir jñāyate divaso vā / devapūṣpāṇāṃ saṃkocavikāśān maṇināṃ jvalanājvalanāc chakunināṃ ca kṣāṇakūjanāt*.

470. Doctrine of the *Kośa* in Beal, *Catena*, 83.

*Ānguttara*, i.267: life of 20,000, 40,000, 60,000 *kappas* for the gods of the first three *Ārūpyas*; the Fourth *Ārūpya* is ignored.

*Vibhaṅga*, 424; *Brahmapārisajjas*, life of 1/3 of a *kappa* (or 1/4); *Brahmapurohitas*, 1/2; *Mahābrahmas*, 1; *Parittābhas*, 2; *Appamāṇābhas*, 4 . . . We have 64 *kappas* for the *Subhakiṇhas*, higher gods of the Third *Dhyāna*. For the Fourth *Dhyāna*, six divisions, namely the *Asaṇṇasattas* with the *Vehappalas*, 500 *kappas*, and the five types of *Suddhāvāsikas*, 1,000, 2,000, 4,000, 8,000 and 16,000 *kappas* (*Akaṇiṭṭhas*). The *Ārūpyas*, as in the *Kośa*.

Buddhaghosa interprets the formula: "The duration of the life of the *Brahmakāyikas* is a *kappa*," in the sense of "part of a *kappa*", *Kathāvatthu*, commentary to xi.5.

471. The Pāli sources (*Itivuttaka*, p. 11, *Ānguttara*, etc.) are quoted iv.99c, note 449.

472. The *Vyākhyā* quotes the Sūtra.

This list is quoted in the *Lokaprajñāpti* (with *Tejasvin* in place of *Manasvin*) iii.1, *Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 298. M. W. De Visser has assured us that it does not figure in the *Dirgha* (16 *Nagas* who escape from *Garuḍa*), in *Saddharmapundarika* (eight: *Nanda*, *Upananda*, *Sāgarā* . . . *Manasvin* . . .).

The Sūtra quoted by Beal, *Catena*, 419; *Mahāvīyutpatti*, 167.14, 51, 66, 58, 44. *Mucilinda*, *Mahāvagga*, i.3. There is no Pāli reference to the *Nāgas* who, like *Seṣa*, hold up the earth. Above, p. 382.

473. *Suttanipāta*, p. 126, *Samyutta*, i.152, *Ānguttara*, v.173: *seyyathāpi bhikkhu vīsatikhāriko kosalako tilavāho / tato puriso vassasatassa vassasatassa accayena* . . . *Suttanipāta*, 677, says that the "learned" have calculated the *vāhas* of sesame for *Paduma* hell, and that they have a figure of 512,000,000,000 (Fausböll).

474. According to the *Lotsava*; in *Paramārtha* and *Hsüan-tsang*, as in the Pāli sources, *vimsatikhārika*.

Tibetan, *rdzan* = *vāha*; *khāl* = *khāri*; on the dimensions of *vāha*, Burnett, *Antiquities*, 208, *Gaṇitasārasaṃgraha* (Madras, 1912), 5. On the other hand, *tilavāha* = *tilasakapa*, thus "cart-load" (Rhys Davids and Stede).

475. Full all the way to the top = *cūḍikābaddha* (*āvabaddha*, *Mahāvvyutpatti*, 244.92).

476. *Āntarāṃtṛtyu* = *antarena kālakriya* = *akālaamarāṇa*. See ii.45, trans. p. 235, and Vasumitra on the sects.

477. Persons in Uttarakuru are free from premature death because they do not say, "This is mine" (*Lokaṣṭrajñāpti*).

478. *Divya*, 174.1: *asthānam anavakāśo yac caramabbavikāḥ sattvo'samprāpte viśeṣādhiḡame so'ntarā kālām kuryāt*.

479. *Jimoddiṣṭa*, *jinadūta*, see ii. trans. p. 236 and notes.

480. Beings who have entered into the absorptions of *nīrodha*, of unconsciousness, of *maītrī*, etc., do not die before they have left these absorptions.

481. The *paramāṇu* as distinct from the *aṇu*, "atom", see ii.22. On name, *nāman*, ii.47. On time, *kāla*, *adbhvan*, iv.27a.

482. *Bhojarāja ad Yogasūtra*, iii.52: *kṣaṇa* is the smallest division of time, which cannot be further reduced in quantity. *Ṣaḍdarśana*, p. 28.

483. These two definitions belong to the Sautrāntikas. We have seen ii.46a, trans. p. 245, a Vaiḥāṣika definition: *kāryaparisaṃmāptilakṣaṇa eṣa naḥ kṣaṇaḥ*. We should note the remark of the *Atthasālinī*, p. 60 at the bottom, that sixteen thoughts arise and perish during the time that a *rūpa*

The second definition recalls that which the Jains [*Tattvārthādhigama*, iv.15 (see S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇ, *JAs*, 1910, i.161) trans. of Jacobi, *Journal of the Germany Oriental Society*, vol 40, 1906] give of *samaya* (which is their *kṣaṇa*): *paramasūksmakriyasya sarvajaghaṇyagatiparinātasya paramāṇoḥ svāvagāhanakṣetravyatikramakālah samaya itī*. According to Jacobi, "die Zeit, die ein Atom in langsamster Bewegung gebraucht, um sich um seine eigene Körperlänge weiterzubewegen." One needs an "incalculable" (*asamkhyeya*) number of *samayas* in order to make one *āvalikā*; a "calculable" (*samkhyeya*) number of these in order to make one *prāṇa* (7 *prāṇas* = 1 *stoka*, 7 *stokas* = 1 *lava*; 38½ *lavas* = *nālikā* [= *ghaṭī*], 2 *nālikās* = 1 *muhūrta*).

Compare *Gaṇitasārasaṃgraha*, i.32 (a mathematical treatise of Mahāvīracārya, published and translated by M. Rāṅgācārya, Madras, 1912).

*aṇur aṇvantaram kāle vyatīkramānti yāvati /*

*sa kālāḥ samayo'samkhyaiḥ samayair āvalī bhavet //*

The time in which an atom (moving) goes beyond another atom (immediately next to it) is a *samaya*; innumerable *samayas* make an *āvalī*.

484. Quoted in *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 547: *balavatpuruṣacchaṭāmātreṇa pañcaśaṣṭiḥ kṣaṇā atīkramantīti pāṭhāt*. *Mahāvvyutpatti*, 253.10, *acchaṭāsaṃghātāmāra*; *Divya*, 142; *Pāli*, *accharā*.

The *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 701b2, has five opinions on the *kṣaṇa*. (The first four assign it a duration more and more reduced: Vasubandhu quotes here the second (Note of Saeki). The fifth is the best (but Saeki does not reproduce it): the first four solely indicate the duration of the *kṣaṇa* in a general manner; the Bhagavat did not tell the true duration of a *kṣaṇa* . . . because no one is capable of understanding it.) The *Samyuktabrāhṃa* (?), TD 28, p. 886c11, is interesting.

485. This is the series in *Mahāvvyutpatti*, 251 (with *vāṭāyanacchīdrarajas* and *yūka* = *likṣodbbava*).

*Dhanus* = *daṇḍa*; *basta* = the *puruṣabasta* of the Abhidharma according to which the stature of the inhabitants of the *Dvīpas* is calculated.

The series of *Sārdūlakarṇa* (*Divya*, 645, where the text is altered) differs in certain details.

In *Lalita*, 149 (*rgya cher rol pa*, 142), *truti* is placed between *aṇu* and *vāṭāyanarajas*; *yūka* is replaced by *sarsapa*. Other Buddhist sources, *Lokaṣṭrajñāpti*, fol. 12a (*Cosmologie*, p. 262); Waters, i.141 (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 701b2); *Saddharmasūtra*, Lévi, *Rāmāyaṇa*, 153; *Kalpadrūma* (Calcutta, 1908), 9. *Gaṇitasārasaṃgraha*, 3; *Varāhamihira* (in Alberuni, i.162); Fleet, *JRAS*, 1912, 229, 1913, 153; Hopkins, *JAOS*, 33.150; Barnett, *Antiquities*, 208.

*Likkā* in the Pāli commentaries = 36 *rattareṇus*, 1/7 *ūkā*.

486. Same omission in the *Hsi-yü-chi*, ii.

487. Eitel (p. 98) observes that a cemetery ascetic should not approach a village closer than the limit of a *krośa*.

488. According to *Lokaṣṭrāṇṭī*, fol. 55b, *Cosmologie*, 309; figures reproduced in the *Hsi-yü-chi*, ii. (Watters, i.143, Julien, i.61, Beal, i.71; *vaṣṣaṇa*, error for *tatṣaṇa*, in numerical Dictionary quoted by Chavannes, *Religions Eminentes*, 152). Source of the *Mahāvīryapatti*, 253, differs.

In *Divya*, 643-644, the order *ṣaṇa* and *tatṣaṇa* is reversed.

On *ṣaṇa* above p. 474.

*Tatṣaṇa* defined in *Divya*: *tadyathā strīyā nātīdīrghanātībravakartimyaḥ sūtrodyāma eva-ndīrghas tatṣaṇaḥ*; Saeki quotes the *Prajñāpti*: "When a women of medium age is about to spin, the stroke, the movement of a thread neither long nor short, its duration is the *tatṣaṇa*." That is to say: the normal time that it takes the thread to touch the finger is the *tatṣaṇa*. [According to a note of P. Louis van Hée].

489. In Scripture (*pravacana*), there are three seasons (*ṛtu*) and not six as in the world. *Śiśira* is cold and is thus *hemanta*; *vasanta* is hot and is thus *grīṣma*, *śarad* is rainy and is thus *varṣās* (*Vyākhyā*). [Three seasons in the *Kāthyāvar*, Alberuni, i. 557]. For all the Buddhas, *hemanta* is the first season (*Vyākhyā*). (Burnouf, *Introduction*, 569). On the Buddhist seasons, I-tsing, Takakusu, 101, 219, 220, *Hsi-yü-chi*, chap. ii, Watters, i.144. Thibaut, *Astronomie* . . . , p. 11.

490. The "learned" are the Buddhists who, in the fourteenth and fifteenth fortnight of each of the three seasons omit a day which is called *ānarātra* or *ṣayāba* (Thibaut, *Astronomie*, 1899, 26, Barnett, *Antiquities*, 195) and, in this way, hold *poṣadha* after fourteen days and not after fifteen: *cāturdāśiko 'ra bhikṣubhiḥ poṣadhaḥ kriyate*.

"Worldly" (*laukika*) computation has months of 30 days. The lunar month has 29 days, 12 hours, and 44 minutes. The ceremony of *poṣadha* is regulated according to the moon. One must thus omit a day (*ānarātra*) from the worldly computation every two months. Thus each ecclesiastical season of eight half-months will be 15 days + 15 + 15 + 14 + 15 + 15 + 15 + 14.

In order to pass from the ecclesiastical (*cāndra*) year to the worldly year, one adds six days; in order to catch up to the solar year (of 366 days) one adds an intercalary month (*adhimāsa*) after two years and seven months (Alberuni, ii.21).

We should study the *Māraṅgasūtra*, TD 21, number 1300, analyzed in *Divya* 657, part of the *Sāṅdālakarṇa* (*māsa-parikṣā*) omitted by Cowell-Neil.

491. A good study by Fleet, *JRAS*. 1911, 479, on the *kalpas* and the *yugas*. Fleet recalls the formulas of *Aśoka*: *āva kapam, āva samivatakapā*. According to Buddhaghosa, Makkhali admits 62 *antarakappas* instead of 64, *Sumaṅgala*, i.162 (*Digha*, i.54). The *kalpas* of the Jains, for example, SBE. 22.

The four periods, disappearance, etc., described in 90-93, are "the four *asankheyya* of the [*maha*]kappa", *Anguttara*, ii.142.

492. We customarily translate *antarakalpa*, *antahkalpa*, as "intermediate Kalpa", and others, by "der Kalpa der Zwischenzeit" or "Zwischen-Kalpa." (Schmidt, *Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen*, 304). But Rémusat has correctly seen that "these expressions do not make sense" (*Mélanges posthumes*, 103, note). The *antarakalpas* or *antahkalpas* are, rather, *kalpas* which are within, inside of greater periods. The translation of Rémusat "petit kalpa" ("small kalpa") is, if not literal, at least useful.

493. We translate *samivarta*, *samivartanī* as "disappearance." Such is indeed the meaning of the word when one speaks of *bhājanasamivartanī*, "disappearance of the receptacles," *yadā bhājanāni samivartante vinasānyantīyarthah* = "when the receptacles disappear, that is to say, perish." But in the expressions *gatisamivartanī*, etc., *samivart* signifies "to go together, to be found together with." There is *samivartanī* of the realms of rebirth (*gati*) when hellish beings, animals, etc., are found to be together (*samivartante, ekasthibhavantī*) in one part of the heavenly realm of rebirth; *samivartanī* of beings (*sattva*), when beings are found together in a single Dhyāna heaven (*Rūpadhātu*).

494. *Ekottara*, TD, p. 736c17; Beal, *Catena*, 113. Sp. Hardy, *Manual*, 472, says that, at the end of the *kalpa*, beings guilty of the five *ānantaryas* (iv.96) get out of hell, but that "the doubter, the skeptic" (the man in *Digha*, i.55, *Samyutta*, iii.207) is transported to the hell of another universe (see iv.99c).

495. A being whose actions should be punished by an animal rebirth will be reborn into another universe. Hsüan-tsang: "The animals who live with humans and with the gods disappear at the same time as do these."

On the animals in heaven, *Kathāvatthu*, xx.4.

*Manuṣyasabacariṣṭava itī manuṣyasabacariṣṭasīla gomabhiṣādayaḥ*.

496. He obtains the first *dhyāna dharmatāpratilambika*. By *dharmatā* one should understand "the particular transformation which the good *dharmas* then undergo" (*kuśalānām dharmānām tadānīm pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ*). This point is elucidated viii.38.

497. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 429a19; *Ekottara*, TD 2, p. 736c20; *Mahāparinirvāṇa*, TD 12, p. 753c14: Seven suns come out at the same time from behind the mountain *Yugandhara*; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 690a15: Four opinions, 1. that the suns are hidden behind *Yugandhara* (?); 2. that one sun divides into seven; 3. that one sun takes on a seven times greater force; 4. that seven suns, at first hidden, then manifest themselves by reason of the actions of beings.

*Saptasūryavyākaraṇa*, above p. 376, quoted in *Lokaprajñāpti*, Mdo 62, fol. 66 (*Cosmologie*, 314); *Pūṭaputrasamāgama* (= *Ratnakūṭa*, xvi) in *Śiṣyāsamuccaya*, 247. Pāli sources, bibliographie of Minaiev, *Zapiski*, ix.323; *Sattasūriyuggamaṇa* in *Anguttara*, iv.3000, *Visuddhi*, 416 (Warren, 321).

Alberuni, i.326; Hastings, *Ages of the World*; Hopkins, *Epic Mythology*, 1915, 84, 99, *Great Epic*, 475; *Dictionary of St. Petersburg*, s. voc. *saṁvarta*.

Mesopotamian origin of this theory (?), Carpenter, *Studies in the History of Religion*, 79.

498. See above p. 376.

499. Below 100c. When the receptacle world is empty, water (*abdhātu*) is produced which dissolves, like salt, the receptacle world. This water, which is of *Kāmadhātu*, "binds" (*sambadhnāti*) a water of the First *Dhyāna* and the Second *Dhyāna*. This water, which is thus of three spheres (*Kāmadhātu* and two *Dhyānas*) disappears with the receptacle to which it corresponds.

Disappearance through wind: the wind disperses (*vikīraṭi*, *vidhvamsayati*) the receptacles of the first three *Dhyānas* like a pile of dust (*pāṁśurāṣī*).

On that which remains, note 504.

500. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 691b8, quoted by Saeki *ad* iii.45.

501. According to the rule enunciated below: *yat paścāt saṁvartate tat pūrvam vivartate*.

502. According to other sources, 84,000.

503. According to the *Mahāyāna*, the 20 *kalpas* are of augmentation and diminution.

504. It has been explained, i.7, that the *skandhas* are time.

What does a *kalpa* consist of? *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 700b23: Some say that it is by its nature *rūpāyatana*, etc.; the days-and-nights, etc., are totally the arising and the destruction of the *skandhas*; as a *kalpa* is made up of days-and-nights, etc., it is of the same nature. But a *kalpa* is the time of the Three *Dhātus*: thus it is five or four *skandhas*. Hui-hui: "kalpa, with respect to *Kāmadhātu* (and *Rūpadhātu*), is five *skandhas*; with respect to *Ārūpyadhātu*, it is four *skandhas*. The 'empty' *kalpa* ('the period when the world stays destroyed') is two *skandhas* [namely, says the gloss, *saṁskāraskandha* and *rūpaskandha* (for *ākāśa* is *rūpa*)], since the days-and-nights, etc., do not exist separate from the *skandhas*." A commentary on the *Kosa* observes that, according to the *Mahāyāna*, time (*kāla*) is a *viprayukta saṁskāra*. [The 90th *saṁskāra* of the list of the 100 *dharmas*, *Vijñaptimātra*, *Muséon*, 1906, 178-194, R. Kimura, *Original and developed doctrines*, 1920, p. 55].

505. i. *Asamkhyeya kalpas*, "numberless kalpas" are the time an *asamkhyeya* number (10 to the 59th power) of *mahākalpas* last.

[*asamkhyā* = *asamkhyeya*, incalculable. *samkhyānenāsamkhyeyā asamkhyā itī*.]

Hsüan-tsang: Among the four types of *kalpas* which have been named, which should one multiply in order to make "three numberless kalpas"? One should multiply the great *kalpas*, 10, 100, 1,000, and thus following until this multiplication gives "three numberless kalpas." That which is termed "without number, numberless" (*wu-shu* 無數) does not signify "incalculable" (*pu k'o shu* 不可數). A *chieh-tuo* 解脫 Sūtra says that the word "numberless" (*asamkhyeya*) is a number among the sixteen numbers. What are these sixteen? As this Sūtra says, "One and not two . . ."

ii. The first *asamkhyeya* of the career of Śākyamuni begins under the former Śākyamuni (*Mahāvastu*, i.1) and terminates under Ratnaśikhin. During this *asamkhyeya* there appeared 75,000 Buddhas (*Kośa*, iv.110; Rémusat, *Mélanges posthumes*, 116; numerical Dict., in Chavannes, *Religieux éminents*, reads 5,000 in place of 75,000).

The second *asamkhyeya* ends with Dipamkara. Buddhas: 76,000.

The third *asamkhyeya* ends with Vipasyin. Buddhas: 77,000.

There then follow 91 *mahākalpas* (in place of 100, as the *Kośa* explains, iv.112a).

Vipasyin is the first of the seven "historic" Buddhas (celebrated in the *Saptabuddhastotra*); then there are Śikhin, Viśvabhūj, Krakutsanda, Konākamuni, Kāśyapa, Śākyamuni. (References, Kern, Manual, 64).

iii. In the Pāli sources (*Cariyāpitaka*, i.1.1, etc.), the career of the Bodhisattva is four *asamkheyyas* in length plus a hundred thousand *kappas*. Some later works, like the *Sārasaṃgraha*, have Bodhisattvas of four, eight, and sixteen *asamkheyyas*, plus each time one hundred thousand *kappas*.

506. A *muktaka* Sūtra, that is to say a Sūtra which does not form part of the *Āgamas*: *na caturāgamaṃtargatam ity arthaḥ*. Elsewhere a *muktaka* Sūtra is a non-authentic Sūtra.

Paramārtha translates: *yu* 餘 = remaining, other; Hsüan-tsang: *chieh-tuo* 解脫 = [vi] *muktaka*.

507. Our list is that of the *Mahāvvyutpatti*, 249 (which, according to Wogihara, is excerpted from the *Kośa*). The numbers 14 and 15, in the MSS of the *Mahāvvyutpatti*, are *prasūta*, *mahāprasūta*, but the Chinese versions give *prayuta*, *mahāprayuta*: the Tibetan (*rab bkran*) gives *prakṛṣṇa* or *prasṛta*. For 36, 37, Wogihara corrects *saṃāptah*, *mahāsaṃāptah* to *saṃāptam*, *mahāsaṃāptam*.

Our list, as Vasubandhu remarks below p. 480, has 52 terms: "Eight members, in the middle, have been forgotten": *aṣṭakam madhyād vismṛtam* . . . see below, note 508.

On the great numbers, Georgy, *Alphabetum Tibetanum*, 640; Schiefner, *Mélanges Asiatiques*, 629; Rémusat, *Mélanges posthumes*, 67; Beal, *Catena*, 122; other sources and calculations in Hastings, art. *Ages of the world*, 188b.

The *Mahāvvyutpatti* presents four types of calculation 246-249, excerpted from the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* and the *Prajñāpāramitāśāstra*, *Skandhavyūha*, *Lalitā*, Abhidharma; then "worldly" calculation (from 1 to 100).

The *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, quoted by Rémusat, teaches that "in the higher system, the numbers are multiplied by themselves": there are ten numbers thus calculated beginning with *asamkhyā*: *asamkhyā*, *asamkhyā*<sup>2</sup>, *asamkhyā*<sup>3</sup> . . . [I think that the Tibetan version (*Kandjour*, 36, fol. 36) invites us to apply this progression from *koṣi* (=10,000,000): *koṣi*, *koṣi*<sup>2</sup>, *koṣi*<sup>3</sup> and thus following up to *anabhilāpya-anabhilāpya-parivartanirdeśa* which should be the 122nd term of this series]. "Nothing is certainly more unreasonable that all this numerical apparel . . . and yet one is obliged to admit that the Buddhists have sometimes made use of it, either in order to sustain their imagination in the contemplation of the infinity of time and space, or in order to make this idea nearer to those rude spirits incapable of conceiving of this". (Rémusat).

The Brahmanical numbers are also very large. The lives of Brahmā, Nārāyaṇa, Rudra, Īśvara, Sadāśiva, Śakti keep increasing. Śakti lives 10,782,449,978,758,523,781,120 plus 27 zeros of *kalpas*. This life is only one *truṣi* or second of a day in the life of Śiva, which is represented in *kalpas* by 37,264,147,126,589,458,187,550,720 plus 30 zeros. Concerning this, Alberuni (i.363) says: "If those dreamers had more assiduously studied arithmetic, they would not have invented such outrageous numbers. God takes care that their trees do not grow into heaven."

508. *Vyākhyā: aṣṭau sīhānāni kvāpi pradese pramuṣitatvān na paṭhitāni / tenātra dvāpācāsat sīhānāni bhavanti / ṣaṣṭyā ca samēkyāsthānāir bhavitavyam / tāny aṣṭakāni svayam kāmī cīn nāmāni kṛtvā paṭhitavyāni yena ṣaṣṭiḥ samēkyāsthānāni paripūrṇāni bhavēyuh.* Same doctrine in *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 891b10.

For Yaśomitra the number *asamēkya* is the sixteenth of the series 1, 10, 100, 1000... We should place in this list, in an undetermined place, the eight numbers which are lacking, by giving them some name.

The editor of *Mahāvīyutpatti*, 249, does not understand it thus; he adds, 53-60, *apramāṇam, aprameyam . . . anabhilāpyam*.

Sarad Chandra Das gives our list as coming from the *Kośa*, 1-52: "Up to this number there are sanscrit equivalents; from 53 to 60, there are no sanscrit equivalents, the Tibetan having introduced new names to replace the lost originals." These new names (which one can translate as *maitra*, *mahāmaitra*, *karuṇa*, *mahākaruṇa* . . .) do not have, in fact, any resemblance to 53-60 of the *Mahāvīyutpatti*.

509. According to Paramārtha. The *Lotsava*, certainly less clear: *de ltar na gnas gzhan drug cur phyin pa de dag tu phyin pa'i bskal pa ni bskal pa granis med pa ces bya'o*.

510. Opinion expressed in *Ekottara*, TD 2, p. 562b2, b25, *Parinirvāṇa*, TD 12, p. 624b21, TD 31, p. 518a18 (Saeki). Altruism of the Bodhisattva, *Kośa*, iv.11la. That persons of little virtue cannot believe in the Bodhisattva, vii.34. How the Bodhisattva considers others as his "self," *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, viii.

511. We can thus understand: the excellent desire, for others, of temporal happiness (*ābhyaśrayika*) and bliss (*naishāśrayika*) (= *nirvāṇa*, cessation of suffering), and, for himself the cessation of suffering, that is to say, the quality of Buddha, because he is useful to others.

According to Saeki, the *Prajñāpāramitāśāstra*, 29.18, quotes some stanzas of the *Samyukta* presenting the same doctrine.

Compare the four categories of *Dīgha*, iii.233, *Anguttara*, ii.95.

512. Different theory in the Pāli sources, for example *Sārasaṃgraha*.

Sources are not in agreement on the date of the appearance of the last Buddhas; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 700c29, *Dirghāgama*, etc. (Rémusat, *Mélanges posthumes*, 116; *Notes of the Foe kowé ki*, 189).

The *Dirgha* places, in the course of the ninth *antarakalpa* of our great *kalpa*, four Buddhas: Krakucchanda (period when life is 40,000 years long), Kanakamuni (life of 30,000 years), Kāśyapa (life of 20,000 years), Śākyamuni (life of 100 years) [same figures in *Dīgha*, ii.3, *Aśokāvadāna*, *Avadānaśataka*, etc.]; elsewhere we have 60,000, 40,000, 20,000 and 100.

Others say: No Buddhas during the first five *antarakalpas*; Krakucchanda in the sixth, Kanakamuni in the seventh, Kāśyapa in the eighth, Śākyamuni in the ninth, Maitreya in the tenth. The other Buddhas of the present Bhadrakalpa in the other *antarakalpas*.

According to the Mahāyāna, we are in the first *antarakalpa* of our great *kalpa*: four Buddhas in the period of diminution; one Buddha (Maitreya) in the period of augmentation. In fact, in the comment of TD 14, number 452 ("The Birth Above of Maitreya"): "Why does Śākyamuni appear in a period of diminution, Maitreya in a period of augmentation? By reason of their vows. . ."

*Prajñāpāramitāśāstra*, TD 25, p. 89c12, p. 93a13. It is said that the Buddhas appear when human life is of 84,000, 70,000, 60,000, 50,000, 40,000, 30,000, 20,000, 100 years . . . But the compassion of the Buddhas is constant. Their Dharma, like a good remedy, is *ākālika*. The gods live more than 1000 x 1000 years and enjoy great pleasures [Yet they can be converted]. So much the more mankind. Thus the Buddhas should appear when life is more than 80,000 years.

513. The order of the *kaṣāyas* (*sīṅg ma*) differ according to the sources, *Mahāvīyutpatti*, 124 and the numerical Dict. (Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, i.17, interesting): *āyus drṣṭi kleśa sattva kalpa* (*dus kyī sīṅgs*); *Dharmasaṃgraha*, 91, *kleśa drṣṭi sattva āyus kalpa*; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, i.47, *āyus sattva kleśa drṣṭi kalpa*; *Karuṇāpundarika*, iii, *āyus, kalpa, sattva drṣṭi kleśa*; *Lotus of the Good Law*, 43, *kalpa sattva kleśa drṣṭi āyus*. [The Buddhas who appear then preach the Three Vehicles].



Three *kaṣāyas*, *Kośa*, iv.59.  
On *kalpakāṣāya*, iii.99, note 555.

514. When life is of one hundred years, the five *kaṣāyas* are *utsāda*, but not *abhyutsāda* as when life was formerly reduced.

515. The *upakaraṇas* are the *dhānyapuṣpaphalausadbhādini*, the fruits of the sphere. Their deterioration or *vipattī*, is that their *rasa*, *vīrya*, *vipāka* and *prabhāva* become small; or rather again the fruits of the sphere are completely absent. See *Kośa*, iv.85a.

516. *Vyākhyā: kāmasukhallikā = kāmasukham eva kāmasukhalīmatā vā / kāmāṣṇā vā yayā kāmasukhe sajjate. Ātmaklamatha = ātmopatāpa, ātmapiḍā. anuyoga = anuṣeṣaṇa* (*Dīgha*, iii 113).  
Compare iv.86a-c.

517. The Pratyekabuddhas take this name because, before obtaining the result, they did not receive instruction, and because, having obtained the result, they do not give instruction.

518. Wassiliev, 276: "To the types of Āryans recognized by the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas add two types of Pratyekas."

*Vargacārīn*, in *Mahāvīryupatti*, 45; in the *Commentary of Nāmasaṃgī*, vi.10. (The text only speaks of *khaḍga pratyekasāyaka*.)

*Khaḍgaviṣṇakalpa: Suttanipāṭa*, third Sutta; *Visuddhimagga*, 234 (*mahesī*), etc.; *Mahāvastu*, i.357 (his Nirvāṇa), *Śiṣāsāramuccaya*, 194 (*khaḍgasama*), *Dīvyā*, 294, 582.

*Śrāvakaṣūrin* as *pretapūrin*, etc., *Avadānaśataka*, i.259.

The Vargacārīns have obtained the fruits of Srotaāpanna or of Sakṛdāgāmin in a period when the Good Law exists; later, in a period when the Good Law has disappeared, they realize by themselves the quality of Arhat. Since they experienced the terror (*saṃvega*) of existence under a former Buddha, they do not have to be terrorized (*saṃvejanīya*) again: thus the Vargacārīns appear even in a period when life continues to be augmented.

519. We shall see vi.23c at which moment the ascetic can pass from one Vehicle to another.

520. Pūrvakathā, a conjectural translation of *ñon gyi gtam*; Hsüan-tsang has *pen-shih* 本事; Paramārtha, *pen-hsing ching* 本行經 p. 222a (*pūrvacaryāsūtra*).

Saeki refers to the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 241b2, to *Bālapaṇḍita* ("Weisse und Thor"), Chap. xiii, and to *Aśokarājasūtra*. This story is recounted in fact in *Dīvyā*, 349, an excerpt from the Sūtra of Aśoka as we have seen in Przyluski, *Légende d'Aśoka*, 310 (*JAs*. 1914, 2, 520).

521. *Anvaya = bodhibetu*; thus "the Rhinoceros has one hundred *kalpas* as the cause of Bodhi."

*Vyākhyā: yathā khaḍgaviṣṇā advitīyā bhavanti evaṃ te gr̥hasthapravrajitair anyaiś ca pratyekabuddhaiḥ asaṃstṣṭavibhāṇi iti khaḍgaviṣṇakalpā ūy ucyante.*

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 156b26, not two Pratyekas at the same time.

522. *Rddher āviṣkaraṇāt*, for example, *Mahāvastu*, iii.27.

523. Why would some *lokottaravūṭarāgas* be impossible? See *Introduction*, Chapter v.

524. Saṅghabhadra, TD 29, p. 524b8, indicates at first some other reasons which are, in his opinion, the good ones, notably: "The Rhinoceros does not possess *vaśīśārdya*. To persons attached to personalism (*ātmavāda*), he desires to teach non-personality (*nairātmya*); but his mind is timid."

525. See below note 539.

526. Hsüan-tsang: These kings, by means of the movement of the wheel, govern all, thus they are called Cakravartins. Etymology in *Sumaṅgala*, i.249.

527. *Fo-koue-ki* (= *Fo kuo chi*), 134. The *Dīrgha* only speaks of the king of the wheel of fire; the *Chū-she lun* (= *Kośa*) distinguishes: 1. wheel of fire, Jambudvīpa, life being 20,000 years; 2. wheel of copper, Jambu and Videha, 40,000 years; 3. wheel of silver, Jambu, Videha, Godāniya, 60,000 years; 4. wheel of gold, four Dvīpas, 80,000 years.

On the period when the Cakravartins appear, *Dirgha*, TD 1, p. 21c22, p. 119b27, *Saṃyukta*, TD 2, p. 194a6; TD 3, number 155.

*Suvarṇacakravartin*, see *Vie de Hsüan-tsang* (=Life of Hsüan-tsang), 70; *caturbhāgacakravartin*, *Dīvyā*, 369 at the bottom (the Chinese versions understand: king of a continent, Przyluski, *Aṣoka*); *caturdvīpeśvara*, *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 175. Pāli, late, *cakkavāḷacakkavattin*, *cāturanta*, *diṭṭa*, *padesa* *cakkavattin* (Rhys Davids and Stede).

Notes on the Cakravartins, *Kośa* ii. p., iv.77b-c, vii. 53c; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, fol. 125b-126a (*cāturdvīpaka*, *jambudvīpeśvara*); *Maitreyasamīti*, 86, 237, 246, where Leumann supposes a Dvīdvīpa (king of two continents) = Didīpa or Dudīpa, which would give Brahmanical Dilīpa, and Dujīpa, *Jātaka*, 543.129.

528. It is the teaching (*nirdeśa*) of the *Prajñāpti* that there are four types of Cakravartins. See *Kāraṇaprajñāpti*, Chap. ii (analyzed in *Cosmologie bouddhique*, 329) [Takakusu, *Abhidharma Literature*, 117].

529. Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha: "as if made by some good craftsman." Nothing which corresponds to *lha rdzas*. (But *Foe-koue-ki*, 133: a work of heavenly artisans) [Leumann, *Maitreyasamīti*, 86].

530. *Dirgha*, TD 1, p. 119b27; *Saṃyukta*, TD 2, p. 194a6; *Ekottara*, TD 2, p. 731b15; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 310c8. This is the text of which we have the Pāli recension, *Dīgha*, ii.172: *yassa raññokkhattiyyassa* ... Quoted in *Kāraṇaprajñāpti*, Chap. ii, analyzed in *Cosmologie*, 328.

531. *Anguttara*, i.27, *Dīgha*, iii.114, *Majjhima*, iii.65, *Milinda*, 236.

*Vyākhyā: asthānam: vartamānakālāpekṣayā. Anavakāśab: anāgatakalāpekṣayā.*

The Pāli recension has: *ekissā lokadhātuyā dve arabanto ... apubbam acarimam uppajjeyum ...*

532. Hsüan-tsang differs: What is the meaning of the expression, "Is there only one?" Does it refer to a great Trisāhasra universe ...

533. Note of Saeki. The Sarvāstivādins say that only one Buddha appears in a universe of the ten cardinal directions. The Sautrāntikas and the Mahāyāna say that, in the universe of the ten directions, many Buddhas appear. See *Kathāvatthu*, xxi.6, the treatises of Vasumitra, etc. (Mahāsaṃghikas, Lokottaravādins).

Saṃghabhadra, TD 29, p. 524c6. The Sūtra does not make any distinctions. No Sūtra says, "Only in this world," or "Solely in a *lokadhātu*." How do we establish that the Sūtra solely refers to a great Trisāhasra and not to all the universes? Further the Sūtra (*Brahmarājasūtra*) says, "Is there a Bhikṣu equal to Gautama ...?"

534. Equal to the Buddhas who are equal for all beings.

535. *Dirgha*, TD 1, p. 78c19, *Dīgha*, iii.113.

536. *Thsaṅs-pa'i mdo* = *Brahmasūtra*; Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang, *Fan-wang ching* 梵王經 = *Brahmarājasūtra* (= *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 547a). This formula can easily find a place in the *Brahmanimantanika*, *Majjhima*, i.329.

537. See *Kośa*, vii.55a. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 767b2. In the same way the memory of the Bhagavat bears "naturally" on 91 *kalpas* (iv.109). The explanations of the *Visuddhimagga*, 414, on the triple *khetta* of the Bhagavat: *jāṇikkhetta*, 10,000 *cakkavālas* which tremble at his birth; *āṇikkhetta*, a *koṭi* and 100,000 *cakkavālas* where his *parittas*, magic formulas of protection, reign; *visayakkhetta*, the field which is the object of his knowledge, infinite.

538. Paramārtha here stops the exposition of the "pluralist" thesis.

539. Saṃghabhadra refutes this argument. The comparison with the Cakravartins proves nothing: their power is limited to the four continents; the power of conversion of the Buddhas is infinite, since their "knowledge" (*jñāna*) attains to all the universes.

540. All this argument in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, fol. 39.

*Tatra prabhūtair eva kalpāir ekatyo 'pi buddhasya prādurbhāvo na bhavati / ekasminn eva ca kalpe prabhūtanām buddhānām prādurbhāvo bhavati / teṣu ca teṣu . . . dikṣv aprameyāsamākhyeṣu lokadhātusv aprameyānām eva buddhānām utpādo vedīṭvayā / tat kasya betoh / santi daśasu dikṣv aprameyāsamākhyayā bodhisattvā ye tulyakālākṛta prāṇidhānās tulyasambhārasamudāgatās ca / yasminn eva divase pakṣe māse samvasāra ekena bodhisattvena bodhicīṭam prāṇibhūtam tasminn eva divase . . . sarvaṣ / yathā caika utsabho ghaṭṭo vyāyaccbhūtaś ca tathā sarve / tathā hi dbhriyante 'sminn eva lokadhātāv anekāni bodhisattvaśatāni yāni tulyakālākṛtaprāṇidhānāni tulyadānāni tulyaśilāni tulyakṣāntīni tulyavīryāni tulyasamādhiṃ tulyaprajñāni prāg eva daśasu dikṣv anantāparyanteṣu lokadhātusv / buddhakṣetreṇāpi trisāhasramahāsāhasrāny aprameyāsamākhyeyāni daśasu dikṣv samvidyante / na ca tulyasambhārasamudāgatayor dvayor tāvad bodhisattvayor ekasminn lokadhātāv buddhakṣetre yugapad utpattiyavakāśo 'sti prāg evāprameyāsamākhyayānām / na ca punas tulyasambhāranām kramenānupariṇipāṭikayā utpādo yujyate / tasmād daśasu dikṣv aprameyāsamākhyeṣu yathāpariśodhīṣu tathāgatāśānyeṣu te tulyasambhārā bodhisattvā anyonyeṣu buddhakṣetreṣūtpadyanta īti vedīṭvayam // tad anena paryāyeṇa bahulokadhātusv buddhabābhūyam eva yujyate na caikasmin buddhakṣetre dvayor tathāgatayor yugapad utpādo bhavati / tat kasya betoh / dīrgharātram khalu bodhisattvaṣ evam prāṇidhānam anubhūtam bhavati yathāham eko'pariṇāyake loka pariṇāyakaḥ syām sattvānām vinetā sarvaduḥkhebbho vimocayitā . . . // punas ca śakta ekas tathāgatas trisāhasramahāsāhasra ekasmin buddhakṣetre sarvabuddhakāryam kartum / ato dvitīyasya tathāgatasya vyārtha eva utpādah . . . // [ekasya ca tathāgatasya] loka utpādāt sattvānām svārthakaraṇaprasiddhiḥ pracuratarā bhavati pradakṣīnatārā tat kasya betoh / teṣā evam bhavati ayam eva kṛtsne jagaty ekas tathāgato na dvitīyah / asminn janapadacārikām vā viprakerānte parinirvṛte vā nāsti sa kaści . . . yasyāsmābhir antike brahmacāryam caritavyam syād dharmo vā śrotavya īti viditvābhūvarante ghanatarēṇa cchandavyāyāmena brahmacāryavāśāya saddharmaśravaṇāya ca / buddhababūṭvaṃ tu te upalabhyā nābhūvareraṃ evam eṣāṃ ekasya buddhayotpādāt svakārthakāryaprasiddhiḥ pracuratarā bhavati pradakṣīnatārā ca.*

541. *Mahāvīyutpatti*, 181, *svayamyānam, pratyudyānam, kalahajitā, sastrajitā* (read *pratyudyāna, svayamyāna, kalahajit . . .*) [var. *astrajitā*].

542. *Koṭṭarājan*, see *Mahāvīyutpatti*, 186.8. *Samyutta*, v.44: *ye keci kuṭṭarājāno sabbe te rañño cakkavattisā anuyantā (?) bhavanti*.

543. *Rddha sphūta subhikṣa ākṛṣṇabāhujanamanuṣya* (*Mahāvīyutpatti*, 245.10, 11, 13, 14). *Vyākhyā: janāḥ prākṛtamanuṣyāḥ / manuṣyās tu matimantah; JAs*. 1913, i.602.

544. *Dīgha*, ii.173, *Sikṣāsāmuccaya*, 175.

545. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 493a10, *Ekottara*, TD 2, p. 731b16, *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 194a7. *Majjhima*, iii.172, *Samyutta*, v.99; compare *Dīgha*, iii.59.

*Lālita*, 14-18, *Mahāvastu*, i.108. *Dīgha*, ii.172, *Majjhima*, iii. 172, *Mahābodhivamsa*, 66 (according to Leumann, *Maṭṭreyasamīti*, 86).

*Vyākhyā: grhapatiratnam kośādhyaṣajātīyah / pariṇāyakaratanam balādhyaṣajātīyah. Grhapati* possess the divine eye, vii.53c-d.

546. The marks (iv.108, 110a) are enumerated in *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 888a6-889a9; Pārśva examines why there are thirty-two, no more no less.

Good Pāli bibliography in Rhys Davids-Stede.

547. *Defasthatarā* is translated by Paramārtha as "most correct" (*ch'eng 正*), and comments: "not inclined" (*pu p'ien 不偏*). The *Vyākhyā* is illegible: *defasthatarāṇīti / atrasthānāni (?)*, translated as *gnas ma 'grus pa*.

548. Tibetan: Because some [persons] were endowed with grasping, after having made provision through attachment to taste and through laziness, a protector of the fields was rewarded.

Paramārtha: Little by little, beings through attachment to taste, and through idleness, made provision, and by means of riches looked to (var. hired) a protector of the fields. Hsüan-tsang: By reason of the appearance of stocking up provisions and of robbery, in order to put an end (to robbery), they hired (*ku* 雇) a guardian of the fields.

549. Summary bibliography of the "Buddhist Genesis."

a. *Aggaññasutta*, *Dīgha*, iii.84 and i.17 (*Dialogues* i.105, iii. 9 and 25, meaning of the word *aggañña* according to *Buddhaghosa*; O. Franke, 273). *Visuddhimagga*, 417 (Warren, 324, Sp. Hardy, *Manual*, 63).

b. Kandjour, *Vimaya*, iii.421-430, v.115-166, trans. by Schiefner, 6 June 1851, *Mélanges Asiatiques*, i.395 (mentioned by Georgi, *Alphabetum Tibetanum*, 188; Pallas, *Sammlungen über die Mongolische Völkerschaft*, ii.28; Kovalewski, *Buddhistischen Kosmologie*, *Mem. de l'univ. de Kasan*, 1837, i.122 and the *Sranang Ssetsen* of Schmid and by Rockhill, *Life*, 1).

*Lokaprajñāpti*, xi (analyzed in *Cosmologie*, 318) which quotes the *Vāsiṣṭhabhāradvāja vyākaraṇa* (comp. *Dīgha*, iii.80).

*Abhiṣṭkramanāsūtra*, Kandjour, Mdo 28.161, translated by Csoma, *JASB*, 1833, 385, reprinted by Ross, *ibid.* 1911.

c. *Mahāvastu*, i.338 and notes 615.

d. Beal, *Catena*, 109, *Four Lectures*, 151 (according to *Dīgha*, *Madhyama*, etc.)

550. *Dīgha*, TD 1, p. 147c28 (Compare *Dīgha*, i.17, 34).

*Vyākhyā*: *dr̥ṣṭyarūpatvād rūpiṇaḥ / upapādūkatvān manomayāḥ / hastapadatadaṅ-gulādyūpetaṭvāḥ sarvāṅgapratyaṅgopetāḥ / samagrendriyatvād avikalāḥ / kāṇavibhrāntādyabh-āvād abimendriyāḥ / darśanīyasamīkṣhānatvād chubbhāḥ / ramanīyavarṇatvād varṇasthāyinaḥ / ādityādiṣṭhānapekṣatvād svayamprabhāḥ / karmarddhisamyogena kāśacaratvād vibhā-yasamgamāḥ / kavaḍḍikārahānapekṣatvād prūṣbhakṣāḥ prītyābhārā itī paryāyau / tathā dīrghāyūṣo dīrgham adbhūtanam tiṣṭhantī.*

*Karmarddhi* is defined vii.53c, where it is called *karmajā ṛddhi*.

551. *Prthivīparpāṭaka*, *Mahāvastu*, 223.212; Hsüan-tsang: "earth-skin-cake" 地皮餅, Paramārtha: "earth-skin-dried" 地皮乾. Notes of Senart, *Mahāvastu*, i.616 (MSS. *paryanīṭaka*, *par-pantaka*); Lex. *paryāṭaka*.

552. *Atthasālinī*, 392.

553. Lists of Kāvartins descended from Mahāsammata. The *Lokaprajñāpti* contains a list based on the Abhidharma, another on the *Vimaya* (*Cosmologie*, 320, 322): *Mahāvastu*, 180; Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, i.324, 330; *Mahāvastu*, i.348; *Jātaka* iii.454; *Sumaṅgala*, i.258; *JRAS*. 1914, 414; Geiger, concerning the translation of the *Mahāvastu*.

554. Hui-hui says: "This Śāstra does not totally explain how many years life diminishes or augments by a year. The traditional opinion is that, every century, life diminishes or augments by one year (This is the system presented by Rémusat, *Mélanges posthumes*, 103, with a computation which appears to me to be erroneous: read 16,798,000 in place of 16,800,000). The Mahāyāna admits this theory for diminution, but it thinks that, during the period of augmentation, the life of the child is double that of the life of his father." In the *Cakravattīśānada* (*Dīgha*, iii.68), persons of 80,000 years have children of 40,000; these, children of 20,000; then 10,000, 5,000, 2,500 or 2,000, 1,000, 500, 250 or 200, 100 years. *Cosmologie*, 314.

555. Vasubandhu follows *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 693a7.

According to the explanations that Chavannes concludes from the numerical Dictionary and his commentary (*Cinq cents contes*, i.16) famine appears when life is thirty years long; sickness, when it is twenty years; killing, when it is ten. This is *kalpakasāya*.

*Vyākhyā*. There are three ends (*niryāṇa*) of the *kalpa*: fire, illness, and hunger. Should we think that these three scourges are produced successively at the end of each and every *kalpa* when life is ten years long (*dasavarṣayūṣkalpa*)? Or rather that these three scourges are produced in turn at the

end of three successive *kalpas*? Scholars are divided; but we are followers of the second opinion (which is that of TD 32, number 1644, quoted by Saeki).

556. *Āṅguttara*, i.159. "I have heard the ancient Brāhmins say . . . that the world was once over-populated, such as Avici (?). How did it come to be that now mankind was destroyed, diminished, and that the villages became non-villages . . . ? Now, Oh Brāhmin, men are *adhammarāgaratta*, *viśamalobbhābhībhūta*, *micchādhammapareta*. They take up sharp arms and kill one another . . . It no longer rains, there is hunger . . . (*micchādhammaparetānam* [*manussānam*] *yakkhā vā amanusse oṣajanti* . . . *vā* is unlikely; we have a variant *vāle*)." This passes into the eschatological plan of *Dīgha*, iii.70, the *Cakkavattisihanāda*. (Famine and illness are absent, there is only *sattbantarakappa*).

557. Pāli sources. *Āṅguttara*, i.160, *dubbhikkhaṃ hoti dussassam setaṭṭhikam salākavuttam tena bahū manussā kālam karonī*. *Saṃyutta*, iv.323: The Bhagavat passes through the country with a great following of Bhikkhus when famine was reigning, *dubbhikkhe dvīhīke setaṭṭhike salākāvutte*. In the *Suttavibhaṅga* (*Vimaya*, ed. Oldenberg, iii.6.15, 87): in such a country *dubbhikkhā hoti dvīhīkā setaṭṭhikā salākāvuttā na sukarā uñchena paggabena jāpetum*; commentary in *Samantapāsādikā*, i.175 (where Buddhaghosa gives many explanations; some are in agreement with those of Vasubandhu). Buddhaghosa gives the variant *setaṭṭhikā*, a sickness of rice, that we find in *Āṅguttara*, iv.269: women will have a similar sickness, as *mañjēṭṭhikā* (from *mañjēṭṭhā*, madder-root) is the sickness of sugar-cane, as *setaṭṭhikā* a type of wheat blight, is the sickness of rice. Rhys Davids-Stede discuss the expression *dvīhīkadubhīkā* (*Saṃyutta*, iv.195).

558. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang translate *samudga(ka)* by *chū-chi* 聚集, to accumulate, bring together; 'du-ba has the same meaning. The version of Hsüan-tsang is very free; Paramārtha appears more literal: Now *chū-chi*, at that period was called *chan-che* 廩遮. (p. 223c). Further *lien-che* (perfume box, etc., Couvreur, 1904, p. 197) is called *chan-che*.

[In *Mahāvīyutpatti*, 233 (list of utensils) we have: 6. *samudga* (=za ma tog), 25. *cañca* (=gab-tse, ga-ba-tse). For *gab-tse* (ga-ba-tse, tse), the word lists give: "table for magical operations", Śarad Chandra, Desgodins, etc.]

b. *Divyāvadāna*, 131 (the story of Menḍhaka, excerpted from the *Dulva*, vol. iii, Chap. on Medicines, S. Lévi, *Elements de formation du Divya*, T'oung-Pao, 1907, 11, note): *dvādasavarṣikā anāvṛtīr vyākṛtā / trividham durbhikṣam bhaviṣyati cañcu śvetāsthi salākāvṛtti ca / tatra cañcu ucyaṭe samudgake / tasmīn manusya bijāni prakṣīpya anāgatasattvapekṣayā sthāpayanti mṛtānām anena te bijakā[r]jyam kariṣyanti / idam samudgagam baddhvā cañcu ucyaṭe . . .*

559. This second explanation is slightly closer to that of the *Divya*.

560. *Divya*: *vilebhyo dhānyagudakāni salākayākṛṣya bahūdakasthālyāni kvāthayitvā pibanti*.

561. *Dīrgha*, TD 1, p. 137b12; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 690a14, examines whence come the suns (created at the origin of the world? created at the end of the *kalpa* by the actions of beings?), the water, the wind; examine that which becomes things; is there *pariṇāma* (iii.40d)? is there transformation in fire, in water? Above, note 497.

562. [In the same way that, at the end of the world, the flame of Kāmadhātu provokes the arising of the flame of Rūpadhātu, above p. 477].

563. Saeki mentions here *Dīrgha*, TD 1, p. 147c2, on the five types of seeds; the same the *Vyākhyā*: *pañca bijajātāni mūlabijām phalubijām bijabijām agrabijām skandhabijām*.

*Dīgha*, i.5, iii.44, 47; *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, i.81, etc. (Rhys Davids and Stede, s. *voc.* *bija*): *mūla*, *khandha*, *phala*, *agga*, *bijabija*; *Fragments Stein*, JRAS. 1913, 574, Rockhill in *Revue Historie Religions*, ix.168.

564. For *nimuttakāraṇa*, *samavāyikāraṇa*, see Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, 136, 139, 141, 146.

565. *Guṇa* [dharma] and *dravya* [dharma] are defined *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, i.1.15-16, see Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 122.

566. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, ii.1.1: "The earth has smell, taste, smell, touch".

567. The Pailukas maintain that things (*avayavidravya*), wool, etc. are not consumed, or burned up; the old attributes disappear; new attributes, arisen from the cooking, arise; but the things, which are the support (*āśraya*) of the attributes, remain as they are (*tadavastha*) (*Vyākhyā*).

We have in *Nyāyabindu*, Calcutta, 1889, p. 86, a Pailuka, a disciple of Kaṇāda; in the *Nyāyavārttikatātpārya*, 355 (ad 3.1.4) a Pailukaṇṭha.

568. According to *Madhyama*, 58.

569. We shall see in viii.11 that there are eight *apakṣālas* and that the first three Dhyānas are *sa-iñjita*. (See also iv.46).

*Aṅguttara*, v.135: the thorn (*kaṇṭaka*) of the First Dhyāna is *sadda*; of the Second, *vitakkavicāras*; of the Third, *pūi*; and of the Fourth, *assāsapassāsa*. *Kaṇṭaka* is that which destroys the Dhyāna, that which is incompatible with the Dhyāna (*Kaṭhāvatthu*, ii.5), as the mind of women is the *kaṇṭaka* of the chaste life; *apakṣāla*, on the contrary, is a certain vice, an imperfection or lack, essential to a Dhyāna.

Tibetan: *skyon*; Chinese versions: *tsai* 災 = calamity; *vipatti*, *tsai-wo* 災禍 calamity-obstacle, and also *kuo* 過 fault, defect, in *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, 245, 664 (see the notes to Sasaki's edition: *apakṣāla*, *apakṣala*, *apakṣaṇa*, *apācara*), *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 145 and *Bodhisattvabhūmi* in Wogihara.

570. See iv. p. 107, vi.24a, viii.101b.

571. Paramārtha adds: They obtain Nirvāṇa in this sphere.

572. Same doctrine and phraseology in *Visuddhimagga*, 421: *evam vinassanto'pi ca [loko] nīrantaram eva satta vāre aggina vinassati . . . vāto paripunnacatusaṭṭhikappāyuke Subhakiṇhe viddhamisento lokam vināseti*.

573. Hsüan-tsang: the text (*wen* 文) of the *Prajñāptipada*. Paramārtha: *fen-pieh li-shih lun* 分別立世論 (p. 225a).

## *Karma*

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**O**ri. Homage to the Buddha

Who created the variety of the world of living beings and the receptacle-world which we have described in the preceding chapter?

It was not a god (ii.64d) who intelligently created it.

la. The variety of the world arises from action.

The variety of the world arises from the actions of living beings.

But, in this hypothesis, how does it happen that actions produce at one and the same time, pleasing things,—saffron, sandalwood, etc.—on the one hand, and bodies of quite opposite qualities on the other?

The actions of beings whose conduct is a mixture of good and bad actions (*vyāmiśrakārm*, iv. 60) produce bodies resembling abscesses whose impurities flow out through the nine gates, and, in order to serve as a remedy to these bodies, they also produce objects of pleasing enjoyment, colors and shapes, odors, tastes and tangibles.

But the gods have accomplished only good actions: their bodies and their objects of enjoyment are equally pleasing.

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What is action?

lb. It is volition and that which is produced through volition.

The sūtra says that there are two types of action, volition (*cetanā*) and the action after having been willed.<sup>1</sup> Action after having been

willed (*cetayitvā*) is what the *kārikā* designates by the words "that which is produced through volition."

These two actions form three actions: bodily action, vocal action, and mental action.

How do you establish this division, according to the support of its action, according to its nature, or according to its original cause?

To what does this question tend? If one were to regard its support, there is nothing but an action, for all actions are supported on a physical support, a body. If one were to regard its nature, there is only vocal action, for, of these three,—body, speech and *manas*,—only the voice is ultimately action by its nature.<sup>2</sup> If one were to regard its original cause, we have only mental action, for all actions have their origin in the mind. The *Vaibhāṣikas* say that the three types of action are established by reason of all of these three causes, support, nature and original cause, in this order.

1c-d. Volition is mental action: it gives rise to two actions, bodily and vocal action.

Volition is called mental action; that which arises from volition,<sup>3</sup> namely action which has been willed,<sup>4</sup> is made up of the two other actions, bodily and vocal action.

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2a. These two actions are informative and non-informative.

Bodily action and vocal action are informative (*viññapti*) and non-informative (*aviññapti*, i. 11, iv.4); we then have bodily informative action, vocal informative action,<sup>5</sup> bodily non-informative action, and vocal non-informative action.

What action is "bodily informative action?"

2b-3b. Bodily *viññapti* is shape. It is not movement because all conditioned things are momentary, since they perish: on the other hand, nothing does not perish without a cause and the creative cause would be at the same time destructive.

Bodily *viññapti* is such and such a shape (*saṁsthāna*, i.10a) of the



body by reason of a volition

According to others, (the Vatsīputrīyas,)<sup>6</sup> bodily *vijñapti* is displacement,<sup>7</sup> for it takes place when there is movement, and not when there is no movement.<sup>8</sup>

The author answers: This is not so, because all conditioned things are momentary.

What is understood by "momentary" (*kṣaṇika*)?

*Kṣaṇa* means to perish immediately after having acquired its being; *kṣaṇika* is a *dharma* that has *kṣaṇa*, as a *daṇḍika* is one who has a staff (*daṇḍa*).<sup>9</sup>

A conditioned thing does not exist beyond the acquisition of its being: it perishes on the spot where it arises; it cannot go from this spot to another. Consequently bodily *vijñapti* is not movement.

The Vatsīputrīyas: If conditioned things are momentary, we would admit that they are not susceptible of displacement.

It is proven that they are momentary, "since they necessarily perish;"<sup>10</sup> for the destruction of conditioned things is spontaneous; it does not come from anything; it does not depend on a cause.

1. That which depends on a cause is an effect, something "done," "created." Destruction is a negation: how can a negation "be done" or "created?" Therefore destruction does not depend on a cause.

2. Destruction does not depend on a cause: hence a conditioned thing perishes as soon as it arises; if it did not perish immediately, it would not perish later, since it would then remain the same. Since you admit that it perishes, you must admit that it immediately perishes.<sup>11</sup>

3. Would you say that a conditioned thing changes and that, consequently, it is later subject to destruction? It is absurd to say that a certain thing changes, becoming another thing, staying the same thing that you say shows its modified characteristics (ii.46a, p. 245).

4. Would you say that there is no means of correct knowledge more decisive than direct perception; would you say that everyone holds that kindling perishes through its relationship with fire; and that, consequently, it is false that all things perish without a cause? There are many remarks to make with respect to this.

In fact, people do not directly perceive the destruction of kindling by reason of fire. If you think that kindling perishes through its relationship to fire because we no longer see the kindling when this

relationship has taken place, then your thesis rests on an inference, and not on direct perception, and your reasoning is not conclusive.

The fact that we no longer see kindling after its relationship with fire is open to two interpretations: either the kindling perishes by reason of this relationship, or it unceasingly perishes in and of itself, and under normal conditions is unceasingly reborn in and of itself, but stops renewing itself by virtue of its relationship with the fire.

You admit that the destruction of the flame is spontaneous. When, after a relationship with wind, the flame is no longer visible, you admit that this relationship is not the cause of the destruction of the flame; but you admit that the flame, by virtue of this relationship, stops renewing itself. The same for the sound of the bell: a hand, laid on the bell, prevents a renewing of its sound; but it does not destroy the sound that you admit is momentary.

Therefore it is inference that should determine this question.

5. The Vatsīputrīyas: What reasons do you bring to bear in favor of the thesis of spontaneous destruction?

We have already said that destruction, being a negative state, cannot be caused. We would further say that if destruction is the effect of a cause, nothing would not perish without a cause.

If, like arising, destruction proceeds from a cause, it would never take place without a cause. Now we hold that intelligence, a flame, or a sound, which are momentary, perish without their destruction depending on a cause. Hence the destruction of the kindling, etc., is spontaneous.

The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that an earlier thought perishes by reason of a later thought, that earlier sound perishes by reason of later sound.

But the two thoughts in question are not simultaneous. Some contradictory thoughts,—doubt and certainty, pleasure and suffering, love and hate,—do not displace one another; and the same holds for non-contradictory thoughts. And if you suppose that they do contradict one another, then how can weak *dharma*s destroy strong *dharma*s of the same type—as when weak thoughts or sounds immediately follow strong thoughts or sounds?

6. Some [the Sthavira Vasubandhu]<sup>12</sup> think that a flame perishes through the absence of a cause of duration. But an absence cannot be a

cause.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, a flame perishes by reason of *dharma* and *adharma*, merit and demerit.

This explanation is inadmissible. *Dharma* and *adharma* would both be causes of arising and of destruction: *dharma* would cause the flame to arise and cause it to perish, accordingly as the flame is favorable or unfavorable; *adharma*, accordingly as it is unfavorable or favorable. Now we cannot admit that *dharma* and *adharma* enter into activity and cease being active from moment to moment.<sup>13</sup>

Furthermore since this manner of explaining destruction would hold for all conditioned things, it is useless to pursue the discussion. You do not have the right to say that kindling perishes through its relationship with the flame.<sup>14</sup>

7. If one holds that the destruction of the kindling, etc., has for its cause the relationship of this kindling with fire, one would then be forced to acknowledge that a cause that engenders is at the same time a cause that destroys.

Cooking (*paka*), or a relationship with fire, produces different products (*pakaja*), of deeper and deeper color. The same cause that produces the first color destroys this first color, or, at least—if you object that it refers to a new relationship with fire, since the fire is momentary—the cause that destroys the first color is similar to the cause that produces it. Now it is impossible that a certain cause would produce a certain effect and that later this same cause, or a parallel cause, would destroy this same effect. (Compare *Tarka-saṃgraha*, xxiii).

Would you say that, if the successive flames are different,—long, short, large and small,—our conclusion does not become indispensable? Let us use another example. By the prolonged action of ashes, snow, caustics, sun, water, or earth, there arises and disappears in turn different “products of cooking.” But you do not attribute the characteristic of momentariness to these diverse factors of cooking.

8. Some<sup>15</sup> ask why water diminishes when it is heated if a relationship with fire is not destruction of the water?

By reason of its relationship with fire, through the force of the fire, the heat element—which is present in water (ii.22, p. 186)—increases and, increasing, causes the mass of water to be reborn in quantities more and more reduced, until being totally reduced, the water ceases renewing itself. This is what a relationship with fire does to water.<sup>16</sup>

itself. This is what a relationship with fire does to water.<sup>16</sup>

9. Let us conclude. The destruction of things is spontaneous. Things perish in and of themselves, because it is their nature to perish. As they perish in and of themselves, they perish upon arising. As they perish upon arising, they are momentary. Thus there is no movement, no displacement; there is only arising in another place of the second moment of the series: this is the case, even in the opinion of our opponent, for the fire which consumes firewood. The idea of movement is a false conception.

Hence bodily *vijñapti* is not displacement, movement; rather bodily *vijñapti* is shape.

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The Sautrāntikas say that shape is not a distinct thing, a thing in and of itself. [For the Vaibhāṣikas, *rūpāyatana*, visible physical matter is both *varṇarūpa* or color: blue, etc., and *saṁsthānarūpa* or shape: long, etc. (i.10a). For the Sautrāntikas, shape does not exist as a substance, but only as a designation.]

When there arises, in one direction, a large mass of color, this mass is called "long." When, by comparison, a mass of color is small, it is called "short." When a color arises in a great quantity in the four directions, it is called "square." When it arises equally in all directions, it is called "circular." The other figures,—high, low, etc.,—are explained in the same manner; when a color arises in a great quantity in the direction of the zenith, it is called "high," etc. Shape is thus not a thing in and of itself, a *rūpa*.

1. First argument. If shape were a thing in and of itself,

3c. It would be perceived by two organs.

In fact, seeing through the organ of sight, one has the idea of length, etc.; touching through the tactile organ, one has the idea of length. Thus if length, or any other shape, were a thing in and of itself, it would be perceived by two organs. Now, according to the scriptural definition, *rūpāyatana*, the visible physical matter, is perceived by only the eye.

The Vaibhāṣikas answer that touch does not perceive length relative to softness or hardness, arranged in a certain manner, without length

forming part of the tangible.

This is quite right: but exactly the same holds for the visible. Length is not visible: one calls a visible (color) or a tangible (softness, etc.) arranged in a certain manner "long."

The *Vaibhāṣikas*: When we have the idea of length after having touched something, we are not perceiving shape through touch; we remember the shape, because it is associated with a tangible. It is the same when we see the color (visible) of fire, for we then remember heat (tangible); and when we smell the odor of flower, we then remember its color.

In the two cases that you allege, one imagines that a color recalls a tangible, or that an odor recalls a color, because the *dharmas* as cause are closely associated: all fire is hot, and certain odors belong to certain flowers. But a tangible (softness, etc.) is not invariably associated with a certain shape: how then does the perception of a tangible provoke the remembrance of a certain shape? If a similar remembrance is produced without there having been an invariable association between a tangible and its shape, one would in this same manner remember color after having touched something. But such is not the case. Hence, one must not say that the perception of a tangible provokes the remembrance of its shape.

2. Second argument. One sees many shapes in a multicolored piece of cloth. Thus, there would be, according to you, many *rūpas*, in the category of shape in one and the same piece: this is impossible, as it was for color. If shape were a real thing, that which, in the cloth, forms part of a long line cannot at the same time form a part of a short line.

3. Third argument. All "real" *rūpa*, susceptible of being struck (*sapratigha*, i.29b),—blue, etc.,—is made up of real atoms of a certain nature: color *rūpa* (blue, etc.) necessarily exists in the octuple atom, etc. (ii. 22, trans. p. 185). Now

3c. Shape does not exist in an atom.

There is no atom of length. In fact, when a long mass diminishes, we arrive at the moment when we no longer have the idea of long with regard to it, but rather the idea of short: hence this idea does not proceed from a *rūpa* "shape" existing in the thing. Therefore what we designate as long is a number of real things,—atoms of color,—arranged in a

certain manner.

If you maintain that the expressions, "long," etc. refer to some atoms of shape arranged in a certain manner, and that some atoms that would not be "shape" by nature could not be designated as "long," etc.—this is merely repeating your affirmation without the support of any argument. In fact, if the existence of special atoms of shape were proved, you would be able to maintain that united, arranged in a certain fashion, they constitute length: but since the existence of these atoms has not been proved, as the existence of the atoms of color has been proved, how could they be united and arranged? <sup>17</sup>

[4. Objection of the Sarvāstivādins:] If a shape is not distinct in color, if a shape is nothing other than a certain color, then shapes would not differ when their color is the same: now some jugs of the same color have different shapes.

Have we not said that one designates a number of real things arranged in a certain manner as "long?" Some ants, all similar, arrange themselves in a straight line or in a circle, and so present different shapes. In the same way the shapes of jugs differ without their color differing.

[5. Objection of the Sarvāstivādins:] But, in darkness or at a distance, one sees the shape of an object,—a column, a person, etc.,—without seeing its color. Hence shape exists separate from color.

In fact, one first sees color in an indistinct manner; one then forms—through the mental consciousness—the idea of shape, in the same way that one forms the idea of a line, or the idea of an army accordingly as one has seen, indistinctly, some birds, some ants, some elephants, etc.: "This army is arranged in a circle."<sup>18</sup> Or rather it happens that one does not clearly distinguish either color or shape; one only knows—through the mental consciousness—a mass.

[6. The Sarvāstivādins criticize the Sautrāntikas.] You Sautrāntikas negate both movement and shape. Then what is designated by the term "bodily *vijñapti*?"

We say that bodily *vijñapti* is shape [thus separating ourselves from the Vatsīputrīyas-Sārhmitīyas] but we do not say that shape is a thing in and of itself [thus separating ourselves from the Sarvāstivādins.]

[The Sarvāstivādins:] If you maintain that bodily *vijñapti* is not a real thing, but solely a shape that exists as designation, what then is the

real *dharma* that constitutes bodily action?

Bodily action is the action which has for its object the body: that is to say, the volition that puts a body into motion in diverse ways: it proceeds by being supported on this gate which is the body, and is thus called bodily action. Other actions should be defined according to their natures: [i.e., vocal action is the action which has the voice for its object; mental action is the action of the *manas* or action associated with the *manas* (see iv.78c-d).]

[The Sarvāstivādins:] A scripture says that "action is volition and willed action." If bodily action and vocal action are volition, what difference is there between the two types of action defined in this scripture?

There are two types of volition. First,<sup>19</sup> the initial or preparatory stage, wherein one produces a volition which is pure volition, "I must do such and such an action": this is what the Scripture calls *cetanākarma*, action which is volition. Then, after this stage of pure volition, one produces a volition of action, the volition of doing an action in conformity with what has been previously willed, to move the body or to emit a voice: this is what the Scripture calls *cetayitvā karma*, action after having been willed, or willed action.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] If this is the case, then informative (*viññapti*) action does not exist: bodily-vocal action, according to you, is only volition; there is no place for the *viññapti* which is matter (*rūpa*) by its nature. And if *viññapti* does not exist, then *avijñapti*, "non-information" of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, does not exist.<sup>20</sup> From whence there would be a great number of difficulties which will be enumerated later (i.e., *saṃvarāsaṃvarābhāva*, etc., see below 4a-b).

These difficulties can be refuted. *Avijñapti* is explained very well in our system. We admit two types of volition bearing on bodily actions and vocal sounds which are the bodily and vocal *viññaptis*. These two types of volitions—which bear the names of bodily action and vocal action—are capable of producing a volition *sui generis* which is the *avijñapti*. Where is the difficulty in this?

[The Sarvāstivādins:] This *sui generis* volition is subordinate to the mind (*cittānuparivartin*, ii. 31), like the *avijñapti* which in our system arises from *dhyāna*, for the *avijñapti* of Kāmadhātu develops during sleep, etc. (i. 11)

No, for this *sui generis* volition is projected by a certain volition of decision (pure *cetanā*), its distant cause, and by a certain volition of action and voice, its near cause. Now however you would have it that the *vijñapti*, if it exists, would depend, like the projection of the *avijñapti*, on the force of the thought: for it is itself nonintelligent.

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The Vaibhāṣikas say that shape exists in and of itself, and that bodily *vijñapti* is shape.

3d. Vocal *vijñapti* is vocal sound.

Sound which is discourse by nature—that is, articulated sound (ii. 47)—is vocal *vijñapti*.

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*Avijñapti* has already been defined (i. 11; above n. 5).

The Sautrāntikas say that the *avijñapti* does not really exist as a substance: (1) because it solely consists of not doing an action after having undertaken not to do it; (2) because one designates a thing which would exist by reason of past primary elements (i. 11) as *avijñapti*; now past *dharma*s no longer exist (v. 25); and (3) because *avijñapti* does not have the nature of *rūpa*: the nature of *rūpa* is *rūpyate* and since the *avijñapti* is not “susceptible of destruction” (*apratigha*), it cannot be *rūpa* (i. 13).

[The Vaibhāṣikas prove the existence of *avijñapti*:]

4a-b. Scripture says that *rūpa* is of three types and that there is a pure *rūpa*; there is increase of merit; and there is a course of action for him who is not concerned with himself, etc.

[By the word *et cetera*, the Kārikā refers to reasons 5 to 8 below.]

1. A scripture says that there are three types of *rūpa*: “*Rūpa* is embraced within a threefold *rūpa*: there is visible *rūpa* susceptible of destruction (visible physical matter); there is an invisible *rūpa* susceptible of destruction (the eye, etc.); and there is an invisible *rūpa*, free from destruction,” and this latter can only be the *avijñapti*.<sup>21</sup>



2. The Blessed One said in a scripture that there is pure *rūpa*: "What are the pure *dharmas*? All *rūpa* of the past, the future and the present . . . all consciousness of the past, future, present, concerning which there arises neither affection nor antipathy: these are the pure *dharmas*." (see *Ekottarāgama*, TD 2, p. 13b-c).

Now, apart from *avijñapti*, there exists no *rūpa* which can be invisible and free from destruction, and no *rūpa* which is pure. [For bodily and vocal action does not pertain to one who has entered into the Truth of the Way, *mārgasatyasamāpanna*.]

3. A scripture says that there is an increase of merit, "... There are seven material meritorious works, (*aupadhika punyakkriyāvastu*, iv. 113) . . . when a believer, son or daughter of good family, who is endowed, walks, stands still, sleeps or is awake, his merit increases with intensity, without ceasing; merit continues adding to itself. What are these seven material works? . . . In this same way there are seven non-material meritorious works . . ." <sup>22</sup>

By reason of what *dharma*, other than the *avijñapti*, could merit increase even when the mind is not good, or when one is without thought?

4. If *avijñapti* does not exist, he who does not himself act, who gives orders to others, will not be endowed with a course of action (iv. 66). For a vocal action that consists of giving an order cannot constitute a course of action, killing etc.; this action in fact does not actually accomplish the action to be accomplished.

Would one say that when the action is accomplished the action that consists of giving the order becomes a course of action?

But it is evident that the nature of this action is not modified by the execution of the order.

5. The Blessed One said, "Monks, the *dharmas*, the external sources of consciousness not included within the eleven *āyatana*s, are invisible, and are free from destruction" (*Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 91c19). He did not say that the *dharmāyatana* is non-*rūpa*.

If the Blessed One did not intend to refer to the *avijñapti*, which is *rūpa* and so included in the *dharmāyatana* [and not in *rūpāyatana*], then what is the *rūpa* that is included in the *dharmāyatana*?

6. If *avijñapti* does not exist, the Way no longer has eight parts, for the parts, *samyagvāc*, *samyakkarmānta*, and *samyagājīva* (correct

speech, correct action, and correct livelihood, iv. 86), are incompatible with absorption (*samādhi*). (If the ascetic, in a state of absorption, possesses these three, it is because these three are by nature *avijñapti* vi. 67, 68).

But, one would answer, a scripture says, "When he knows thus, when he sees thus, *samyagdr̥ṣṭi*, *samyaksamīkalpa*, *samyagvyāyāma*, *samyaksmr̥ti*, and *samyaksamādhi* are cultivated and achieved; *samyagvāc*, *samyakkarmānta* and *samyagājīva* have been previously purified." Thus the last three are considered as *viññapti* and as previous to absorption.

This text, the Vaibhāṣikas say, does not refer to the last three parts of the Way, but rather to speech, action, and livelihood in a state of detachment which have been obtained through the worldly path. This does not prevent speech, etc., from not forming part of the Way under the aspect of *avijñapti*.

7. If the *avijñapti* does not exist, the Prātimokṣa discipline (*samvara*, iv.14a) would disappear.<sup>23</sup> For a person who has assumed the vows of religion is still a Bhikṣu or Bhikṣuṇī, when his mind is bad or neutral.

8. A scripture teaches that the renouncing of sin is a dike which arrests immorality.<sup>24</sup> An "absence" cannot be a dike: *virati* is thus a real *dharma* (the *avijñapti*), and not the mere fact of no longer accomplishing an action which one has renounced, as the Sautrāntikas maintain (p. 560, 562).

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[The Sautrāntikas answer:] These arguments are numerous and diverse, but are not conclusive. Let us examine them one by one.

1. The Sūtra teaches that *rūpa* is of three types. The Yogācārin<sup>25</sup> say that in the Dhyānas, through the force of absorption, a *rūpa* arises which is the object of the absorption, that is, which is perceived by the person in the absorption, [for example a skeleton in the *aśubhabhāvanā*, (vi.9).] This *rūpa* is not seen by the eye; it is thus invisible. It does not "cover," it does not occupy a place: it is thus "free from destruction." If you ask how this object of absorption can be *rūpa* [since it does not possess the usual characteristics of *rūpa*,] you forget that the existence of *avijñapti* would give rise to the same question.

2. The scripture says that there is a pure *rūpa*. The Yogācārins maintain that the *rūpa* that arises through the force of the absorption is pure, since the absorption is pure.

But other masters, [the Dārṣṭāntikas,]<sup>26</sup> maintain that the *rūpa* of the Arhats (organ of sight, etc.) and external *rūpa*, [namely the five objects of the senses (i.9a), are pure (*anāsrava*)] because they are not a support of the vices.

To this one can object that the scripture expresses itself [without making a distinction,] "What are the impure *dharmas*? All that which is organ of sight, all that which is visible . . ."

[The Dārṣṭāntikas answer that all the *dharmas* referred to in this scripture are qualified as] impure because they are not opposed to the vices: [in fact, only the mind and its mental states can oppose the vices and destroy them.]

To this one could object that the same *dharmas* would be impure, because they are not opposed to the vices, and at the same time pure, because they are not a support of the vices, with the unpleasant consequence that the characteristic of pure and impure would be confused.

No, answer the Dārṣṭāntikas, for these *dharmas* are not pure from the same point of view in which they are impure. Further, if the visible and the other *āyatana*s are exclusively impure, why would the scripture specify, "The impure and *upādāna*-provoking *rūpas*,"<sup>27</sup> . . . the impure and *upādāna*-provoking *dharmas* are the cause of the hardening of the mind and of hypocrisy." (v. 47)<sup>28</sup>

3. The scripture says that merit increases.

The ancient masters say: It is in the nature of things that merit increases when persons who have received a gift utilize this gift: by reason of the qualities of these persons (*dhyāna*, absorption of benevolence, etc.), by reason of the benevolence that they get out of the gift for themselves and for all creatures, the mental series of the givers, be they of bad or of neutral minds, is found to be perfumed by the volition of giving which has for its object the person who receives: their series undergo a subtle ascending transformation and arrives at the state where they are finally capable of bringing forth many results. It is in this sense that the text says, "Merit increases in an intense and uninterrupted manner, merit adds to itself."<sup>29</sup>

But how does one explain the increase of merit in the case of nonmaterial meritorious work?

[The mental series transforms itself] by reason of the repetition of volitions having for their object [the Tathāgata or the Śrāvakas]. Even during dreams these volitions are linked together.

On the contrary, we do not see how the [Vaibhāṣikas,] partisans of an *avijñapti*, can explain the growth of merit in the case of nonmaterial meritorious work. [This does not consist of bodily or vocal action, *viññapti*, but merely the joy experienced with regard to the Tathāgata or the Śrāvakas; it does not consist of an absorption. Now according to the Vaibhāṣikas, the *avijñapti* can only give rise to the *viññapti* or to an absorption. Hence it is impossible here.]

But according to other masters, [certain Sautrāntikas,] in the case also of material meritorious works, merit proceeds from the repetition of a volition having for its object [the person who receives.]

But this opinion is inadmissible in light of the scripture which says, "When an energetic Bhikṣu, endowed with morality, possessor of good *dharma*s, eats the alms of a donor, he then enters into and dwells in the absorption called 'infinities' (good-will, etc.), and by reason of this fact there is certainly produced for the donor an out-flowing of merit, and out-flowing of good and prosperity."<sup>30</sup> Now does the donor whose merit thus continues to increase, have a special volition whose object is the person who receives? [We should thus prefer the opinion of the first masters:] in the case of material meritorious works, the merit proceeds from a transformation of the series [of the donor by reason of the qualities of the person who receives.]

4. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, if the *avijñapti* does not exist, he who has an action accomplished by another will not be endowed with the course of action ("path-of-action," *karmapatha*). When an emissary charged with murder accomplishes the murder, it is in the nature of things that the mental series of the author of the instigation will submit to a certain subtle transformation by virtue of which his series will bear a result later. This holds likewise when one acts for oneself; when the course of action (murder, etc.) is achieved, at this moment the series undergoes a transformation. This transformation is called "course of action," and consequently the person whose series is transformed is endowed with the course of action—for the effect (transformation of

the series) receives the name which belongs more properly to the cause (course of action),—and this transformation is called bodily or vocal accordingly as it results from an action of the body or the voice. It is by virtue of these same principles that the partisans of *avijñapti* consider the *avijñapti* as a bodily or vocal course of action.

The Bhadanta<sup>31</sup> (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 617a18) proves in a different manner the nonexistence of *avijñapti*: "A person is touched by the sin of murder by reason of a tritemporal volition with regard to the *skandhas* which constitute a living being (iv.73), that is, when he thinks, 'I shall kill; I kill; he is killed.' "[The course of action is complete when there is preparatory action, principal action, and consecutive action, consisting solely of *cetanā*, iv. 68c.]

But this triple volition does not necessarily bring about the achievement of the course of action, for, according to the theory of the Bhadanta, there would be a mortal sin (iv.97) for the child who says, "my mother has been murdered," if she has not in fact been killed by the emissary charged with the murder.

Nevertheless all this exercise of volition, "I shall kill, I kill, he is killed" applies only to the person who kills: the intention of the Bhadanta is to refer to this type of murder.<sup>32</sup>

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But, [ask the Sarvāstivādins,] why do you, in your antipathy, deny the existence of the *avijñapti* and yet admit a transformation of the mental series (ii.36c-d)?

[In truth, *avijñapti*, a doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins, and the transformation of the mental series, a thesis of the Sautrāntikas, are both equally difficult to understand;] I thus have no antipathy [for these doctrines.] But, to say that there arises at the moment of the achieving of the course of action by a bodily operation dependent on a mind, a certain *dharma*, called *avijñapti*, [in him who has ordered the course of action,] either from the mind of him who has ordered, or separate from the body of him who has accomplished the murder, is a hypothesis that cannot satisfy us; but to say that there is produced at the moment of the achievement of the course of action by an operation ordered by a certain person, a transformation of the mental series of this person, is a

hypothesis that satisfies us. And it also satisfies us that the result arises from a transformation of the series and not from an *avijñapti*.

[Take into account also the arguments enumerated above:] "if the *viññapti* does not exist, [how could there be *avijñapti*?", "The *avijñapti* consists solely in no longer doing a certain action," "the *avijñapti* cannot depend on past primary elements."]

5. The *dharmāyatana* is not defined as nonmaterial. The response to this objection is as has been given above: there is an invisible *rūpa* free from destruction, forming part of the *dharmāyatana*: this is not the *avijñapti*; this is a *rūpa* which is the object of the absorption and which arises from the force of the absorption.

6. The Way, say the Vaibhāṣikas, would not have eight parts.

How does the saint, when he has attained the Way, [when he sees or meditates on the Truths,] possess correct speech, action, and livelihood? Does he pronounce correct speech, act in a correct manner, and correctly ask for the robes of a monk?

[Such is not our thought, answer the Sarvāstivādins.] In the Path, the saint takes possession of certain pure *avijñaptis*, so that, when he leaves the contemplation, it is by the force of these pure *avijñaptis* that he produces correct speech, actions, and livelihood, and does not produce incorrect speech, actions, and livelihood. A cause takes the name of its result: thus speech, action and livelihood are designated as *avijñapti*.

If this is so, why not accept my theory? There is no *avijñapti*; but the saint, when he finds himself in the Path, takes possession of a certain intention (*āśaya*) and of a certain personality (*āśraya*)<sup>33</sup> so that, when he comes out of this contemplation, by reason of the force of these two factors he henceforth produces correct speech, actions and livelihood. One gives to the cause (*āśaya* and *āśraya*) the name of their result; and we can thus affirm that the Path possesses eight parts.

According to another opinion, the parts of the Path solely consist of non-commission. What is non-commission? The person who is in absorption acquires, through the force of the Path, definite absolute abstention (*akaraṇaniyama*, vi.33a-b). This abstention, which is acquired having the pure Path as its support, is pure. This is a part of the Path.

Without doubt, the part (correct speech, etc.) is not a "thing"

(*dravya*), being only abstention: but these are not the only real and distinct things which constitute the *dharma*s; there are for example, the eight worldly *dharma*s:<sup>34</sup> possession and non-possession; glory and non-glory; praise and blame; pleasure and suffering. Non-possession of clothes, of food, etc., is not a thing. (*Anguttara*, iv. 157, *Digha*, iii.260)

7. If the *avijñapti* does not exist, say the Vaibhāṣikas, the Prātimokṣa discipline would disappear.

One refutes this objection according to the same principles, by making a state out of the force of the intention. Discipline is volition which, after it has been translated into the positive action (*vidhi*) of abstaining from transgression, into the pledge of no longer committing transgression, arrests bad actions and disciplines the body and the voice: the Prātimokṣa discipline should be understood in this manner.

The Vaibhāṣikas object that, if the Prātimokṣa discipline is volition, the monk who thinks a thought other than this thought of volition would cease being "disciplined," for he does not then possess the volition which disciplines.

This objection is worthless. In fact, the mental series is perfumed in such a way that, when a thought of transgression starts to appear, the memory of the vow undertaken also appears: the volition of abstention is then found to be present.

8. And this volition has the characteristic of a dike. When one is obliged not to commit transgression, one remembers this obligation, shame (*hrī*, ii.32) is present, and one constrains oneself in such a manner that one does not violate morality.

In your system, on the contrary, if immorality is dammed up by an *avijñapti* independent of memory, then even a person who has a faulty memory would not be able to commit a transgression, since the *avijñapti* is always there.

Let us stop this discussion here. The Vaibhāṣikas say that there exists a certain substantial thing (*dravya*), *sui generis*, which is *avijñaptirūpa*.

We have seen (i.11b) that the *avijñapti* arises dependent (*upādāya*) on the primary elements: the question is then posed whether it derives from the same primary elements which are the support of the *vijñapti*, that is, the primary elements of the body through which the action termed *vijñapti* (iv. p. 3, 33) is accomplished; or if it derives from other

primary elements.<sup>35</sup>

The *avijñapti* derives from primary elements different from those which serve as the support for the *viññapti*: for it is impossible that one and the same complex of four primary elements would produce both a subtle, derived *rūpa*,—the *avijñapti*—, and at the same time a gross, derived *rūpa*, the *viññapti*.<sup>36</sup>

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The *viññapti* is simultaneous to the primary elements from whence it derives; is such also the case for the *avijñapti*?

The general rule is that all derived *rūpa* is simultaneous to its primary elements. But certain derived *rūpa*,—of the present and the future,—derive from past primary elements:

4c-d. From the first moment, the *avijñapti* of Kāmadhātu arises derived from past primary elements.

The moment the *avijñapti* arises, it arises derived from primary elements simultaneous to its arising. From this first moment on, *avijñapti* of the sphere of Kāmadhātu—in opposition to the *avijñapti* arisen from the *dhyāna*, and pure *avijñapti* (p. 32)—arises, that is, it continues to be reborn, being derived (*upādāya*) from the same primary elements of the first moment, which are now past: these past primary elements constitute, from the second moment onward, the support of the *avijñapti*, for they are the cause of its *pravṛtti*, they are its projecting cause; the primary elements simultaneous to each of the moments from the second moment onward are the support of the *avijñapti*, for they are the cause of its *anuvṛtti*, they are its supporting cause. In the same way, the hand that has hurled the wheel and the ground that supports the wheel, are the causes, respectively, of the *pravṛtti* and the *anuvṛtti* of the movement of the wheel (see p. 576).

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To which sphere,—Kāmadhātu and the Four Dhyānas—do the primary elements belong, from whence the bodily and vocal actions of the different spheres derive?



5a-b. When impure, bodily and vocal action derive from the primary elements of the sphere to which they belong.

Bodily and vocal actions of Kāmadhātu derive from the primary elements of Kāmadhātu, and so on to the bodily and vocal actions of the Fourth Dhyāna which derives from primary elements of the Fourth Dhyāna.

5c. When they are pure, they are from the primary elements of the sphere to which the person who has produced them belongs.

When they are pure, bodily and vocal action derives from the primary elements of the sphere where the person who produces arises: for the pure *dharmas* are transcendent to the sphere of existence (Kāmadhātu, etc.); for there does not exist any pure primary elements from whence one could derive a pure action; for the pure bodily or vocal action arises by reason of the primary elements, and not only through the mind, since it is derived *rūpa* (*upādāyarūpa*) (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 723b29-c6)

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What are the characteristics of these two actions, *viññapti* and *avijñapti*? What are the characteristics of the primary elements from whence they derive?

5d. The *avijñapti* is not integral to the organism; it is also an outflowing; it belongs solely to living beings. Not of absorption, it derives from the primary elements which are an outflowing, which are integral to the organism, which are differentiated.

1.<sup>37</sup> The *avijñapti* is a derived *rūpa* exempt from mass (*amūrta*), nonextended (*apratigḥa*); thus it cannot be a support of the mind and of mental states; thus it is *anupātta*, not integral to the sense organism (i. 34c). The *avijñapti* is never morally neutral (iv. 7a): hence it is not arisen from retribution (i. 37); it is not of increase (i. 36); it remains then that it is an outflowing (i. 36), that is, produced by *sabhāgahetu* (ii.52). [The text says, "also of outflowing," because the *avijñapti* can be also *kṣaṇika* (i. 38b): the first pure *avijñapti* is not an outflowing.]

2. Not absorbed or, in other words belonging to Kāmadhātu, it derives from primary elements which are an outflowing,<sup>38</sup> and which are integral to the organism. These primary elements are differentiated, because each of the seven *avijñaptis*, the renouncing of killing, etc., which form the Prātimokṣa discipline, derive from a distinct group of the four primary elements.

6. Arisen from absorption, it derives from non-differentiated primary elements, not integral to the organism, and increase.

3. *Avijñapti* which arises from *samādhi*, is divided into two types, that is, (*avijñapti* arisen from) absorption, and (*avijñapti* arisen from) pure discipline. These two both arise from *samādhi*, are of increase, and not integral to the sense organism. They are both arisen from undifferentiated (i.e., identical) primary elements.

In the same way that the mind which engenders these renouncings is a unity, the primary elements upon which the renouncings are based constitute a unity.

[II. Concerning the *vijñapti*.]

The *vijñapti* is an outflowing; being bodily, it is integral to the organism.<sup>39</sup>

Does bodily *vijñapti*, by arising, destroy or not destroy the preexistent bodily figure which is retribution (*vipāka*)? The two hypotheses create difficulties. That it destroys it, is impossible; for it is contrary to the principles of the Vaibhāṣikas that a *rūpa*, retribution by nature, continues again, after having been interrupted (i.37, trans. p. 103). If on the contrary, bodily *vijñapti* does not destroy the previous figure, two figures,—the first of retribution, the second of outflowing,—would be found to coexist in one and the same spot.

We must admit that bodily *vijñapti* arises deriving from new primary elements, outflowing in its nature, and that it does not destroy the previous figure.

If this is the case, the part by means of which a bodily *vijñapti* is produced would be greater than has existed previously, being penetrated by new primary elements from whence this *vijñapti* derives. If the part has not been penetrated by these new elements, one could not say that the *avijñapti* is created by the whole part.

We could answer that the body—retribution in nature—presents

some voids: thus place is found for the new primary elements, outflowing by nature, from whence the *vijñāpti* derives.

We have said that action is of two types, *cetanā* and *cetanākṛta*, volition and action created by the volition; of three types, mental, bodily, vocal; of five types, *cetanā*, bodily *vijñāpti*, bodily *avijñāpti*, vocal *vijñāpti*, and vocal *avijñāpti*.

[What are these action, good, bad, or neutral? <sup>40</sup> To which realm of existence (*dhātu*), to which sphere (*bhūmi*) do they belong?]

7a. The *avijñāpti* is never neutral.

It is either good or bad.

In fact, neutral volition is weak; it is not capable of engendering a powerful action as is the *avijñāpti*, which continues reproducing itself after its initial cause has disappeared.

7b. Other action are of three types.

Other actions, namely volition and the *vijñāpti*, can be good, bad, or neutral.

7b-c. Bad action exists in Kāmadhātu.

Not in the other spheres, for, in the other spheres the three roots of evil (iv.8c-d and v.19), and non-shame and imprudence (ii.26c-d), are missing.

The restriction of the stanza refers only to bad actions; hence good actions and neutral actions are in all of the Three Dhātus.

7c. *Avijñāpti* also exists in Rūpadhātu.

"Also" that is to say: in Kāmadhātu as well as in Rūpadhātu; not in Ārūpyadhātu, for the primary elements are missing there [from whence the *avijñāpti* is derived (iv.6b).] Only where body and voice exist, do we find [the *avijñāpti* which] is the discipline of the body and voice.

Objection. There are no pure primary elements and yet there is a pure *avijñāpti*. Pure *avijñāpti* derives from the primary elements of the sphere wherein the person arises who produces the pure *avijñāpti*. In the same way, when a person arises in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu enters into an *ārūpya* absorption, he produces an *avijñāpti* of

Ārūpyadhātu deriving from the primary elements of Kāmadhātu or Rūpadhātu.

The case is not the same, for the pure *avijñapti* transcends the spheres; it has nothing in common with the defilements of the sphere where the person who has produced it is found; it is neither of the same type, nor of a different type through rapport with the primary elements of the sphere. On the contrary, an *avijñapti* of Ārūpyadhātu cannot derive from the primary elements, of a different type, of Kāmadhātu or Rūpadhātu.

Further, turning away from all *rūpa*—since any idea of *rūpa* is absent in it—an *ārūpya* absorption is not capable of producing an *avijñapti*, which is *rūpa*.

The Vaibhāṣikas say: Morality exists in opposition to immorality. Immorality is of the sphere of Kāmadhātu; morality, consisting of *avijñapti*, of the realm of Rūpadhātu is opposed to it. But the *ārūpyas* are removed from Kāmadhātu by the four estrangements of *āśraya*, *prakara*, *āālambana*, *pratipakṣa* (ii.67; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 495c23).

7d. *Vijñapti* exists in the two spheres where there is *vicāra*.

There is *vijñapti*, bodily and a vocal action, only in the spheres of Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna, where there is *vicāra* (i.32c, viii. 7).<sup>41</sup>

8a. The *vijñapti* termed *nivṛta* is also missing in Kāmadhātu.

[*Nivṛta* signifies *nivṛta-avyākṛta* (ii.66), defiled but neutral.

"Also," in the spheres where there is no *vicāra*, and "also" in Kāmadhātu.]

Such *vijñapti* does not exist in Kāmadhātu, [where all defiled *vijñapti* is bad, not neutral.]

This means that *vijñapti* of the *anivṛtāvyākṛta* class exists only in the world of Brahmā. It is reported that Mahābrahmā produced a false vocal action: in his assembly Mahābrahmā boasted falsely, in order to avoid the inquires of the venerable Aśvajit.<sup>42</sup>

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But if vocal *avijñapti* is absent above the First Dhyāna, how can sound (*śabdāyatana*) exist in the Second Dhyāna and above?

It exists there, but it has for its cause the external primary elements: sound caused by the wind, etc. (i.10b).<sup>43</sup>

Other masters say: *Vijñapti* exists in the Second Dhyāna and in the following Dhyānas; it is there in the *nivṛtāvyākṛta* class, undefiled-neutral, not good, but not defiled. In fact the beings who are born in these Dhyānas do not call forth a good or defiled mind of a lower sphere, by which mind they would be able to produce a good or defiled *vijñapti*. For the good mind of a lower sphere is of an inferior order; and the defiled mind has been abandoned.<sup>44</sup>

But [the Vaibhāṣikas] defend the first opinion.<sup>45</sup>

Why is the *vijñapti*, whatever it may be, absent above the world of Brahmā? Why is the *vijñapti* of the defiled-neutral class absent in Kāmadhātu?

8b. Because the cause which produces it is absent.

i. It is the mind associated with *vitarka* and *vicāra* which gives rise to the *vijñapti*: such a mind is absent in the Second Dhyāna and above. (iv.7d).

ii. The *nivṛtāvyākṛta* mind gives rise to a *vijñapti* of the same characteristics, since this mind belongs to the class "to be abandoned through Mediation." (See p. 575 and foll.)

[In Kāmadhātu, only the *nivṛtāvyākṛta* mind is the mind associated with *satkāyadrṣṭi* and with *antagrāhadṛṣṭi*.] Thus, it does not give rise to *vijñapti* (ii.67, v.12).

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Is it solely by reason of the nature of the mind which gives rise (*samutthapaka*) to them—good or bad nature—that the *dharma*s are good or bad?

The *dharma*s are good or bad in four ways: absolutely (*param-arthatas*), in and of themselves (*svabhavatas*), through association (*samprayogatas*), and through their original cause (*samutthanatas*).<sup>46</sup>

8b-c. Deliverance is absolute good.

Nirvāṇa, being the cessation of all suffering, is perfectly tranquil-and-happy;<sup>47</sup> hence it is absolute good. Comparison: like the absence of

sickness (*Majjhima*, i.510).

8c-d. The roots, respect and fear, are good in and of themselves.<sup>48</sup>

The three roots of good, respect and fear (and lack of greed) (ii. 25), independent of their associations and of their causes, are good in and of themselves. Comparison: like a salutary medicine.

9a. That which is associated [with the roots, etc.,] is good through association.

The *dhammas*, volitions, and mental states, which are associated with the roots of good, with respect, and with fear, are good by association. Associated with these principles, they are good; not associated with these principles, they are not good. Comparison: like a drink wherein one has mixed a salutary medicine.

9b. Actions, etc. are good by reason of their original cause.

Having their origin in *dhammas* good in and of themselves or good through association, bodily action, vocal action, [the *lakṣaṇas*,] *prāptis*, *nirodhasamāpatti*, *asamjñīsamāpatti* (ii.35 and foll.),<sup>49</sup> are good by reason of their original cause. Comparison: like the milk of a cow which has drunk a drink mixed with a salutary medicine.

How can *prāptis* be good when they have their origin in a mind which is not good? <sup>50</sup>

9c. Evil is the contrary.

The contrary of good is as shall now be taught:

1. *Samisāra*—or existence—has for its nature the process of all suffering: it is thus perfectly unhappy, and so absolute evil.

2. The roots of evil, the absence of shame and imprudence (ii. 26c-d) are bad in themselves.

3. The *dhammas* associated with these principles are bad in themselves.

4. Having their origin in the roots, etc., and in the *dhammas* associated with these roots, etc., bodily action, vocal action, their characteristics (arising, etc.) and the *prāptis* of the bad *dhammas*, are bad by reason of their original cause.

Comparison: sickness, unhealthy drugs, etc.

But, one would say, everything that is impure is integral to *saṃsāra*: hence can nothing which is impure be good or neutral?

From the absolute point of view, this is true. But putting oneself in the point of view of retribution, the impure *dharma* which is not defined as to how it should be retributed is called undefined, or neutral (ii.54), and the impure *dharma* which produces an agreeable retribution, is called good.

What is absolutely neutral?

9d. Two entities are neutral in the absolute sense.<sup>51</sup>

The two unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*, i.5), namely space and *apratisaṃkhyānirodha*, are, without ambiguity, neutral.

A difficulty. The Vaibhāṣikas teach that action, bodily or vocal, is good or bad by reason of its original cause, [namely a good or bad volition.] The same rule should apply to the primary elements which constitute bodily or vocal action (iv.2b, 3d).

No, answer the Vaibhāṣikas, for the intention of the agent corresponds to the action, not to the primary elements: [he wants to create a certain action, not any primary elements.]

But, we should say, how will the *avijñāpti* produced by absorption (iv.6c-d) be good? The agent, entered into absorption, does not have any intention with regard to the *avijñāpti* and so does not think, "Let us create an *avijñāpti*!" We cannot admit that the *avijñāpti* produced by the absorption has its origin in a non-absorbed mind which proceeds from the absorption, for this mind is of another class. Thus the *avijñāpti* produced by the absorption is not good; or rather, if the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that it is good, they should consider as good the divine eye and the divine ear which they regard as neutral (ii.72a, trans. p. 315, vii.45).

There is a difficulty here that the Vaibhāṣikas should resolve.

It has been said above (iv.8b) that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing does not give rise to *viññāpti*. Yet the Blessed One said, "From bad views there proceeds bad resolution, bad speech, bad action, bad livelihood." Now bad views are abandoned through Seeing (v.4).

This Sūtra does not contradict this theory. In fact

10a-b. That which gives rise (*samutthāna*) is of two types, which are known as *hetusamutthāna* and *takṣaṇasamutthāna*.<sup>52</sup>

*Samutthāna* is that through which the action arises. What is both cause (*hetu*) and *samutthāna* is *hetusamutthāna*. What is *samutthāna* at the very moment of the action is *takṣaṇasamutthāna*.

10c-d. Which are respectively first setter into motion and second mover.

The *hetusamutthāna* projects, that is to say, produces. It is thus promoter. The *takṣaṇasamutthāna* is second mover because it is contemporary to the action (see above, p. 568).

But what is [with regard to the action (*viññapti*)] the efficacy done by the *takṣaṇasamutthāna* which makes it the second mover?

If the *takṣaṇasamutthāna* is absent, the action will not take place, even if it was projected [by the agent; as, for example, the action does not take place when the one who has projected an action ("I shall go to the village") dies.]

[But if the *viññapti* does not take place in the absence of the second mover,] how is there *viññapti* for a person free from a mind which undertakes the discipline?<sup>53</sup> (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 586a8).

[One will then have recourse to another explanation.] The *viññapti* is clearer in him who is endowed with the mind, which is at the moment of the *viññapti*, the "second mover" mind. Such is the efficacy of this mind.

11a-b. The consciousness to be abandoned through Seeing is solely agent.

The mind which is abandoned through Seeing is alone the agent of the *viññapti*, because it is the cause of the mental process (*vitarka* and *vicāra*) which gives rise to the *viññapti*. It is not the second mover 1.) because it no longer exists at the moment when the *viññapti* takes place: this latter is put into motion by a thought "turned inward," [to be abandoned through Meditation, which is the second mover;] 2.) because, to suppose that it is a second mover, it would then follow that the *rūpa* (that is, the *viññapti*) created by it would also be abandoned by



this Seeing; [in the same way that the *vijñapti* created by a thought abandoned through Mediation is itself to be abandoned through Meditation.] And this hypothesis is in contradiction to the Abhidharma (i.40c-d).

In fact, *rūpa* (= *vijñapti*) is not contradicted either by *vidyā* (correct knowledge), or by *avidyā* (error, ignorance): hence it cannot be abandoned by means of Seeing the Truths.<sup>54</sup>

[The Sautrāntikas would answer that this affirmation, "*Rūpa* is not contradicted by *vidyā*,"] should be proved. For he who maintains the thesis of the abandoning of *rūpa* through Seeing would not admit that *rūpa* is not contradicted by *vidyā*.

[The Vaibhāṣikas say: If the *rūpa* (= *vijñapti*) which has its origin in a thought to be abandoned through Seeing is, itself also, to be abandoned through Seeing, then the primary elements which serve as a substrate (*āśraya*) to this *rūpa*, to this *vijñapti*, will be, themselves also, abandoned through Seeing, for they take their origin from the same thought. But this is inadmissible, for these primary elements belong to the class of undefiled-neutral *dharma*s, and everything that is to be abandoned through Seeing is defiled (*kleṣṭa*, ii.40c-d).]

We deny this consequence. In fact, the primary elements in question are not good or bad by reason of the thought which gives rise to them, whereas this is the case for the *vijñapti* (iv.9d). Or rather, we admit this consequence; the primary elements in question are abandoned through Seeing.

[The Vaibhāṣikas repeat that] this is impossible. The primary elements cannot be abandoned through Seeing; they are no longer not-to-be-abandoned. For the undefiled *dharma* is not contradicted either by *vidyā* or by *avidyā*.

[In fact, the undefiled *dharma*, either of the *anivṛtāvyaḥṛta*, undefiled-neutral class, or of the *kuśalaśāsrava*, good-impure class, is not contradicted by *vidyā*, that is to say through the pure (*anāsrava*) Path, as is the case for the defiled *dharma* which perishes by the fact that its *prāpti* is cut off by this said Path . . .

Hence the Sūtra quoted above (p. 575, line 32) does not invalidate our thesis: "The thought susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing does not give rise to *vijñapti*," for this Sūtra refers to false views

considered as agent. (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 610c22)

11b-c. The *manas* susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation is twofold.

The mental consciousness of the *bhāvanābheya* category is at one and the same time both agent and mover.<sup>55</sup>

11d. The five are solely mover.

The five *viññānakāyas*, [visual consciousness, etc.,] are solely mover, [being free from reflexion (*vikalpa*, i.33)]<sup>56</sup> (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 610a6)

There are thus four cases:

i. The mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing is exclusively agent.

ii. The five sense consciousnesses are exclusively mover.

iii. The mental consciousness susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation is both promoter and mover.

iv. The pure mind is neither promoter nor mover.<sup>57</sup>

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Is the "mover" of the same [nature—good, bad, neutral—] as the agent?

There is no rule on this subject:

12a-b. From a good agent, etc., a mover of three types.

A good, bad, or neutral mover can come from a good agent. The same for a bad or neutral agent.

12c. With regard to the Muni, mover of the same type.<sup>58</sup>

With regard to the Buddha the Blessed One, the mover is of the same species as the agent: from a good mover, a good mover; from a neutral agent, a neutral mover.

12c. Or good.

Or rather, it happens that a good mover comes out of a neutral agent, whereas a neutral mover never comes out of a good agent: the teaching of the Buddhas is not subject to diminution.<sup>59</sup>

According to other Schools,<sup>60</sup> the mind of the Buddhas is never neutral: they are always in absorption; their mental series is exclusively a series of good thoughts. This is why the Sūtra says, "The Nāga is absorbed when he walks, when he stands still, when he dreams, and when he is seated."

The Vaibhāṣikas say: The Sūtra expresses itself in this manner because the mind of the Blessed One does not disperse itself towards objects without his wishing it. [The Blessed One is always absorbed in the sense that memory is always present in him: walking, he knows that he walks.] But this is not to say that the Blessed One is exempt from neutral *dharma*s: *dharma*s of retribution (*vipākaja*), *dharma*s related to attitudes (*īryāpatha*), a mind capable of creating fictive beings (*nirmāṇacitta*) (ii.66).

We have seen that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation is at one and the same time agent and mover, and can be good, bad, or neutral.

12d. That which arises from retribution is neither of the two.<sup>61</sup>

The mind that has arisen from retribution (*vipākaja*, i. 36, ii.60, iv.85), is produced without effort, spontaneously, [and so is neither agent nor mover.]

Is the *viññapti* good, bad, or neutral, 1.) according to the characteristics of the agent, or 2.) according to the characteristic of its mover?

To what does this question lead?

i. First hypothesis. The two wrong views,—personalism, and past-and-future-of-the-personality—are the agent (iv.lla-b); they are of the defiled-neutral class. [If the *viññapti* to which they give rise follows their nature, one will then have, in Kāmadhātu, a defiled-neutral action: and you regard this consequence as inadmissible (iv.8b).] If you maintain your opinion with regard to this point, you must then admit, [contrary to your thesis, (iv.lla-b)] that all thoughts susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing are not agents: whereas *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* and the *antāgrāhadr̥ṣṭi* are not agents, the other wrong views are agents.

Second hypothesis. The *viññapti* through which a person undertakes the Prātimokṣa discipline will not be good, if this person, while he is receiving the ordination, has a bad or neutral mind.

ii. The Vaibhāṣikas answer. The *viññapti* is of the same nature as its

agent when this latter is of a mind susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation. It is not of the same nature as its agent when this latter is of a mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing, for example, the thought "the soul exists," for, in this case, another agent arises between the promoter and the action (*viññapti*), a thought susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation, turned inward, accompanied by *vicāra* and by *vitarka*, through which, for example, one preaches the existence of a soul. The first agent is neutral; the second is bad; the action is bad. From the agent susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing, there arises an agent susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation and which is good, bad, or neutral; from this second agent, there arises an action (*viññapti*) of the same nature.

iii. But if the action (*viññapti*) is not good, bad, or neutral by reason of the mover, the explanation that you have given (iv.10a-b) of the Sūtra does not hold. You have said in effect that the Sūtra considers a "wrong view" (*dṛṣṭi*) as agent and that, as a consequence, by affirming that a wrong view is the generator of *viññapti*, the Sūtra contradicts neither the principle that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing does not engender *viññapti*, nor its corollary that, in Kāmadhātu, there is no *viññapti* of the defiled-neutral class. One must say that the Sūtra considers a wrong view as an agent to which there follows, separating it from the action (*viññapti*), another agent which is susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation.

This is enough on this point which has been defined above (i.11, iv.3d).

13a-b. *Aviññapti* is threefold, discipline (*saṃvara*), un-discipline (*asaṃvara*), and different from either discipline or un-discipline.

It is of three types, 1.) *saṃvara*, discipline, so called because it constrains the flux of immorality, because it destroys or arrests the flux of immorality; 2.) *asaṃvara*, the opposite of discipline, un-discipline (iv.24c-d), and 3.) *naivasamvaranāsamvara*, [an *aviññapti* which has neither the characteristic of *saṃvara* nor *asaṃvara*.]

13c-d. Prātimokṣa discipline, pure discipline, discipline arising from *dhyāna*.

There are three types of discipline: 1.) the discipline called

Prātimokṣa: this is the morality of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, the morality of beings of this world; 2.) the discipline produced through *dhyāna* is morality of the sphere of Rūpadhātu; and 3.) pure discipline, which arises from the Path, pure morality.

[Chinese: What is the difference in the characteristics of the first two disciplines?]

#### 14a. The Prātimokṣa is of eight types.

It includes the discipline of the Bhikṣu, the Bhikṣuṇī, the Śikṣamāṇā,<sup>62</sup> the Śrāmaṇera (novice), the Śrāmaṇerikā, the Upāsaka (pious layman, iv.30), the Upāsikā, and the Upavāsastha ("faster," iv.28). These eight disciplines are the Prātimokṣa disciplines: thus, from the point of view of the names given to them, the discipline of the Prātimokṣa is of eight types.

#### 14b. In substance however, the Prātimokṣa is of four types.

Four types that present distinct characteristics: the discipline of the Bhikṣu, the Śrāmaṇera, the Upāsaka and the Upavāsastha.

In fact, the discipline of the Bhikṣuṇī does not differ, does not exist separately from the discipline of the Bhikṣu; the discipline of the Śikṣamāṇā and the Śrāmaṇerikā do not differ from the discipline of the Śrāmaṇera; and the discipline of the Upāsikā does not differ from that of the Upāsaka.

#### 14c. The name changes with the gender.

*Liṅga* is *vyañjana*, that which distinguishes men and women. It is by reason of gender that the names, Bhikṣu, Bhikṣuṇī, etc., differ.

When their gender is modified, the Bhikṣu becomes a Bhikṣuṇī; the Bhikṣuṇī, a Bhikṣu; the Śrāmaṇera, a Śrāmaṇerikā; the Śrāmaṇerikā, like the Śikṣamāṇā, becomes a Śrāmaṇera; the Upāsaka, an Upāsikā; and the Upāsikā, an Upāsaka. Now one cannot admit that a person, by changing his gender, abandons the former discipline and acquires a new one; the change of gender cannot have this influence.<sup>63</sup> Thus the four female disciplines are indetical with the three male disciplines.

When the disciplines are undertaken successively,—i.e., the discipline of the Upāsaka with its five precepts, the discipline of the Śrāmaṇera with its ten precepts, and the discipline of the Bhikṣu with its two hundred and fifty precepts,—do these disciplines differ solely through the successive additions of new precepts (*viratī*, renouncings), as the numbers five, ten, twenty differ, as one coin and two coins differ? Or rather do these disciplines, produced all of a piece, exist separately one from the other?

14d. [The disciplines exist] separately.

They are not mixed, for in the parts that are common to them all—Upāsakas, Śrāmaṇeras and Bhikṣus all renounce (*viratī*) killing, stealing, illicit sexuality, lying, intoxicating liquors—the three disciplines have some distinct characteristics.

Their differences lie in the difference of the occasions (*nidāna*) of transgression. In fact, the person who undertakes the observation of a greater number of rules, avoids by this action itself a greater number of occasions of intoxication-pride (*mada*, ii.33c-d) and of non-diligence (*pramādashāna*, ii.26a); he avoids, by this action, a greater number of occasions of transgression, killing, etc.<sup>64</sup> Consequently the three series of renouncings are not identical with one another. If it were otherwise, that is, if the disciplines of Upāsaka and Śrāmaṇera were integral to the discipline of a Bhikṣu, then the Bhikṣu who renounces the discipline of a Bhikṣu would renounce at the same time all three disciplines: a thesis that is not admitted. Hence the disciplines exist separately.

14d. But they do not contradict one another.

They can coexist: by undertaking the following disciplines, one does not abandon the preceeding ones.<sup>65</sup> Thus the fact that a Bhikṣu who renounces his quality of Bhikṣu remains in possession of the discipline of Upāsaka and Śrāmaṇera is explained.<sup>66</sup>

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How does one become an Upāsaka, an Upavāsastha, a Śrāmaṇera, or a Bhikṣu?

15. By undertaking the renouncing of the five things to avoid, of the eight, the ten, of all the things to avoid, one obtains the quality of Upāsaka, Upavāsastha, Śrāmaṇera, and Bhikṣu.<sup>67</sup>

1. By undertaking the renouncing of five items: 1. murder, 2. stealing, 3. illicit sexuality, 4. lying, and 5. intoxicating liquors, one places himself in the discipline of an Upāsaka.

2. By undertaking the renouncing of eight items: 1. killing, 2. stealing, 3. unchastity, 4. lying, 5. intoxicating liquors, 6. scents, garlands, and unguents; dances, songs, music;<sup>68</sup> 7. high beds, broad beds, and 8. meals at forbidden times, one places himself in the discipline of an Upavāsastha.

3. By undertaking the renouncing of these same items and, further, gold and silver, which make ten, one places himself in the discipline of a Śrāmaṇera. These make ten items, for one counts "scents, garlands, and unguents" separately from "dances, songs, and music."

4. By undertaking the renouncing of all the actions of the body and the voice which should be avoided, one is a Bhikṣu.

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The Prātimokṣa discipline is

16a-b. Morality, good conduct, action and discipline.

1. It is morality (*śīla*),<sup>69</sup> because it redresses that which is "unjust," for transgressors conduct themselves in an unjust manner with regard to beings. Etymologically, because it cools (*śī*), as it says in the stanza, "Happy is the undertaking of morality, because morality does not burn."

2. Good conduct, because it is praised by the wise.

3. Action (*karma*), because it is action (*kriya*) by nature.

Objection. Does not the Sūtra say that *avijñāpti* is "not doing" (*akaraṇa*) (see above p. 560, 562)? How can *avijñāpti* be action?

Without doubt, the *avijñāpti* makes the disciple, endowed with shame, to abstain from transgression; it is thus "not doing." But it is action, according to the etymology *kriyāta iti kriya*: it is doing (*kriyate*) either by a bodily-vocal action (*viññāpti*), or by the mind (*citta*).<sup>70</sup>

According to others, *avijñāpti* is action because it is the cause and the

effect of an action.<sup>71</sup>

4. Discipline (*saṃvara*), because it disciplines or constrains the body and the voice.

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The expression "Prātimokṣa discipline" designates all Prātimokṣa discipline since its origin.

16c-d. The Prātimokṣa is the first *viññapti* and the first *avijñapti*; these are courses of action (*karmapatha*).

1. The expression "Prātimokṣa" designates the first *viññapti* and the first *avijñapti* of the undertaking of the discipline.

The Prātimokṣa is called *prātimokṣa*, for through it there takes place *pratimokṣaṇa*,<sup>72</sup> that is, the abandoning of transgression: such is the efficacy of the first moment (*viññapti* and *avijñapti*) of the undertaking of discipline.

2. This *viññapti* and *avijñapti* are also "Prātimokṣa discipline" because they discipline the body and the voice.

3. They are courses of action, that is "courses of action properly so called" (*maula*, iv.66).

There is no longer any Prātimokṣa in the moment which follows the first moment and in the moments which follow, for the transgression is not rejected (*pratimokṣyate*) by the second moment, having been rejected (*pratimokṣita*) by the first; there is *prātimokṣasaṃvara*,<sup>73</sup> that is, discipline "of the Prātimokṣa type" or discipline "arisen from Prātimokṣa;" there are no longer courses of action properly so-called, but solely "consecutive action" (iv. 68).

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Who possesses each of the three disciplines?

17a. Eight persons possess the Prātimokṣa.

Eight persons, the Bhikṣu, Bhikṣuṇī . . . the Upavāsatha, possess the Prātimokṣa discipline.

Does this mean that non-Buddhists cannot possess a morality that they have undertaken?<sup>74</sup>



They can possess a morality, but they cannot possess the Prātimokṣa discipline. In fact, the morality that they undertake ("I shall abstain from killing," etc.), rests on an idea of existence; even when they have in view, not a heavenly existence, but that which they call "deliverance" (*mokṣa*), they conceive of deliverance as a certain type of existence. Hence transgression is not absolutely "rejected" by them, nor can they be "released" through the discipline they have undertaken.

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17b. He who possesses *dhyāna* possesses the discipline which arises from *dhyāna*.

"Which arises from *dhyāna*" (*dhyānaja*), that is, which arises from *dhyāna* (ablative) or by means of *dhyāna* (instrumental).

*Dhyāna*, means not only the Four Principal (*maula*) Dhyānas, but also the absorptions which are close to them (*sāmantaka*, viii. 22a). In the same way, when one says, "There is a field of rice or a field of wheat in this village," one means the village and its environs.

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17c. The Āryans possess pure discipline.<sup>75</sup>

The Āryans,—the Śaikṣas and Aśaikṣas,—possess pure discipline (iv. 26b-c).

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We have seen, in the definition of *sahabhūhetu* (ii. 51), that two disciplines "accompany the mind." What are these two disciplines?

17d. The last two disciplines are concomitants of the mind.

The discipline that arises from *dhyāna* and the pure discipline are concomitants of the mind; not of the Prātimokṣa discipline, for this latter continues to exist in a person whose mind is bad or neutral, or who is unconscious (*anyacittācittaka*, i. 11).

18a-b. Arising in the *ānantaryamārgas*, in *anāgamyā*, they are called "abandoning."<sup>76</sup>

In the nine *ānantaryamārgas* of *anāgamyā* these two disciplines, the discipline of *dhyāna* and pure discipline, are “abandoning disciplines” (*prahāṇasamivara*=abandoning and discipline), for through them one abandons immorality and the defilements which produce them (iv.122a).

There are thus disciplines arisen from *dhyāna* which are not abandoning-discipline. Four cases:

i. Discipline arising from *dhyāna*, impure, with the exception of what arises from the *ānantaryamārgas* of *anāgamyā*: discipline arisen from *dhyāna* which is not abandoning;

ii. Pure discipline obtained in the *ānantaryamārgas* of *anāgamyā*: abandoning, but not discipline arisen from *dhyāna*;

iii. Impure discipline in the *ānantaryamārgas* of *anāgamyā*: discipline arisen from *dhyāna* which is abandoning;

iv. Pure discipline arisen outside of the *ānantaryamārgas* of *anāgamyā*: discipline not arisen from *dhyāna* which is not abandoning.

According to the same principles, one would establish four cases relative to pure discipline which is not abandoning, to abandoning which is not pure discipline, etc. (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 231a13)

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The Blessed One said, “Good is discipline of the body, discipline of the voice, discipline of the mind, discipline in all things;”<sup>77</sup> and again, “He lives disciplined through the discipline of the organ of sight.”<sup>78</sup> What is the nature of these two disciplines, discipline of the mind, and discipline of the organs?

Neither are, by their nature *avijñapti* of *śīla*. But on the contrary,

18c-d. Discipline of the mind and discipline of the organs are, each of them, two things: attentive consciousness and mindfulness.<sup>79</sup>

In order that the reader should not come to believe that the first discipline is consciousness (*samprajāṇa*) and the second mindfulness (*smṛti*), the author says that each of them is two things.<sup>80</sup>

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Let us examine who possesses *vijñapti* and *avijñapti*, and to what period these belong in each case (iv.19-22, 23-24b).<sup>81</sup>

19a-c. He who is in Prātimokṣa always possesses *avijñapti* of the present moment, as long as he does not reject the *avijñapti*.

As we have said previously the person who dwells in the Prātimokṣa discipline (iv.14a), always possesses present *avijñapti* as long as he does not reject the *avijñapti* which constitutes this discipline (iv.38).

19c-d. After the first moment, he also possesses *avijñapti*.

After the first moment, which is designated by the expression Prātimokṣa (iv.16c-d), he also possesses earlier, past *avijñapti*: this of course, as long as he does not reject the discipline.<sup>82</sup>

As he who dwells in the Prātimokṣa discipline,

20a. So too is he who dwells in undiscipline.

He who dwells in undiscipline (*asaṃvarastha*, iv.24c-d), always possesses *avijñapti* of the present moment as long as he does not reject it; [he also possesses *avijñapti* of the past, and from the second moment on, of undiscipline.]

20b-c. He who possesses discipline arisen from *dhyāna* always possesses past and future *avijñapti*.

He who possesses the discipline arisen from *dhyāna* always possesses *avijñapti* of the past, and *avijñapti* of the future as long as he does not lose it, [for the *avijñapti* in question—namely the discipline arisen from *dhyāna*—accompanies the mind (iv.17d).]

From the first moment when he acquires the discipline of *dhyāna*, he takes possession of the discipline of former *dhyānas*, either of this existence, or of a previous existence, that he had lost.

20c-d. The Āryan, at the first moment, does not possess past *avijñapti*.

The Āryan possesses pure *avijñapti*, which constitutes his pure discipline, in the manner in which he who possesses the discipline arisen from *dhyāna* possesses the *avijñapti* arisen from *dhyāna*: he

possesses his past and future *avijñapti*; but with the difference that, when in the first moment of the Way he takes possession of pure *avijñapti* for the first time, he cannot, evidently, possess pure *avijñapti* of the past.

21a-b. The person who is in a state of absorption, the person who is placed in the Way, possesses *avijñapti* of the present moment.<sup>83</sup>

The person who is absorbed (*samāhita*), the person who is cultivating the Way (*āryamārgam samāpannaḥ*), possesses, at present, the *avijñapti* which is proper to him, arisen from *dhyāna*, and pure. But when he leaves the absorption, he does not [possess this present *avijñapti*, for this *avijñapti* only accompanies an absorbed mind.]

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As for the intermediary (*madhyastha*) [the person presently in neither-discipline-nor-undiscipline, who does not possess discipline like the Bhikṣu, nor undiscipline like the transgressor:]

21b-c. The intermediary, at the first moment, possesses, medially, *avijñapti*, when the *avijñapti* is produced.

Medially (*madhya*) means the present, situated between the past and the future.

Action (*avijñapti*) does not necessarily produce *avijñapti*. The intermediary does not necessarily possess *avijñapti*: if there is *avijñapti*—either *avijñapti* created by an act of immorality (killing, etc.), or *avijñapti* created by an act of morality (abstention from killing), or *avijñapti* is created by some other good or bad acts, the worship of a Stūpa, hitting and wounding—he possesses this *avijñapti*, of the present, at the moment when it arises.

21d. Afterwards, [he possesses *avijñapti*] of the present and the past.

[until the moment he rejects it.]

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Can a disciplined person possess bad *avijñapti*? Can an undisciplined person possess good *avijñapti*? And how long does the *avijñapti* last in these two cases?

22. As long as he is endowed with faith or with very active defilements, the undisciplined person possesses good *avijñapti*, and the disciplined person possesses bad *avijñapti*.

As long as there continues, in an undisciplined person, the strength of faith by which, accomplishing actions such as the worship of a Stūpa, he has created good *avijñapti*; as long as there continues, in a disciplined person, the power of the defilements by which, accomplishing actions such as killing, hitting, binding, he has created bad *avijñapti*, good or bad *avijñapti* continues.

At the moment of the action in question, the agent possesses *avijñapti* of the present; then he possesses *avijñapti* of the present and of the past.

23a-b. Those who have created one *vijñapti* possess it always, in the present.

All those who accomplish a bodily or vocal action (*vijñapti*) whether they are disciplined, undisciplined, or intermediaries, so long as they are accomplishing this action, possess it in the present.

23c-d. From the second moment onward, they possess *vijñapti* of the past, until the moment when they give it up.

From the second moment onward, that is, after the first moment.<sup>84</sup>

23d. One cannot possess future *vijñapti*.

No one possesses future *vijñapti*, because such *vijñapti* does not now accompany the mind.

24a-b. One does not possess past *vijñapti* of the *nivṛta* and *anivṛta* classes.

[That is to say the defiled-neutral and undefiled-neutral actions (see ii.66 and foll.).]

One does not possess these actions, once they are past, because the possession (*prāpti*) of a weak *dharma*, being weak itself, is not

prolonged.

Why is this *dharma*, a neutral action, weak?

By reason of the weakness of the mind which gives rise to it.

But then the possession (*prāpti*) of this mind too will not be prolonged.

No: the case is not the same. The *viññapti*, in effect, is stupid, for it does not know an object; furthermore it is dependent, for it depends upon the mind. Such is not the case with the mind itself. Thus the *viññapti* produced by a neutral mind is weaker than this mind itself; the possession (*prāpti*) of the *viññapti* is not prolonged, whereas the possession of the mind is prolonged.

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We have spoken of an undisciplined person, one who is in undiscipline. What is undiscipline (*asaṃvara*)?

24c-d. Undiscipline, bad conduct, immorality, action, course of action.

1. It is undiscipline, because there is no constraining of the body and voice.

2. It is bad conduct, because it is blamed by wise men, and because it produces painful results.

3. It is immorality, because it opposes morality (iv.122).

4. It is an action, as it is created by the body and the voice.

5. It is a course of action, as it is included in the principal action (*maula-saṃgrhātavāt*, iv.68).<sup>85</sup>

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He who possesses *viññapti* can also possess *aviññapti*. Four cases present themselves.

25a-b. The intermediary, acting with a weak volition, possesses a single *viññapti*.

He who is in neither-discipline-nor-nondiscipline and who, with a weak volition, does good or bad action (*viññapti*), possesses solely this

act (*vijñapti*), and does not possess any *avijñapti*.<sup>86</sup> All the more reason that there is no possession of *avijñapti* by an agent when his action is neutral (*avyākṛta*).

Nevertheless, even accomplished with a weak volition, 1.) material meritorious works (*aupadhikapunyakriyāvastu*, iv.112) and 2.) a course of action (iv.68) always create *avijñapti*.

25c-d. The Āryan possesses a single *avijñapti* when he has not produced, or has abandoned, the *vijñapti*.<sup>87</sup>

When an Āryan has changed his existence or when he has not created *vijñapti* (for example when he is in an embryonic state or when he is reborn in Ārūpyadhātu), or when he has lost the *vijñapti* (the *vijñapti* created with a neutral volition), he possesses only *avijñapti* (pure *avijñapti* acquired in the previous existence), and not *vijñapti*.

The two other cases, the possession of *vijñapti* and *avijñapti*, and the non-possession of either, are set up according to the same principles.

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How does one acquire the disciplines?

26a-b. The discipline that arises from *dhyāna* is acquired by one thought of the sphere of the *dhyāna*.

It is through one thought of the sphere of the *dhyāna*, that is, of the *mauladhyāna* (the Four Dhyānas) and the *sāmantakas* (the four absorptions which proceed the Four Dhyānas), and with an impure mind, that is, with a mind not forming part of the Way, that the discipline of *dhyāna* is acquired: this is a discipline concomitant with this type of mind.

26b-c. Pure discipline, by the same mind, when it is Āryan.

"Āryan" means pure, forming part of the Way (iv.17c).

We will explain below (viii.22) that the Āryan mind exists in six spheres of *dhyāna*, namely the Four Dhyānas, the *dhyānāntaras* and the *anāgamya* (the first *sāmantaka*).

26c-d. That which is called Prātimokṣa, through *paravijñāpana*, etc.

"*Paravijñāpana*" is informative action to or from another: the candidate makes known something to another, and another makes something known to him.<sup>88</sup> "Another" is the Saṅgha, through the acquisition of the disciplines of Bhikṣu, Bhikṣuṇī, or Śikṣamāṇā; or a person (*pudgala*), the acquisition of the five other *prātimokṣ* disciplines. disciplines.

According to *Vinaya* scholars of the Vaibhāṣika School, there are six types of ordination. In order to include them all within his definition, the author says, "... from the information of another *et cetera*."

1. Ordination by oneself,<sup>89</sup> in the case of the Buddha and the Pratyekabuddhas.

2. Through entry into the Path (*niyāmāvakrānti*, vi.26a), in the case of the Five, that is to say of Ājñatakaundinya and his companions.<sup>90</sup>

3. Through the summons, "Come, Oh Bhikṣu!," in the case of Ājñata.<sup>91</sup>

4. By recognizing the Blessed One as master, as in the case of Mahākāśyapa.<sup>92</sup>

5. By satisfying the Blessed One through one's answers, as in the case of Sōdāyin.<sup>93</sup>

6. By accepting the special obligation of monks and nuns, as in the case of Mahāprajāpati.<sup>94</sup>

7. By a messenger, as in the case of Dharmadinnā.<sup>95</sup>

8. By an official action as the fifth, that is, ordination before a Saṅgha of five Bhikṣus, as in frontier lands.<sup>96</sup>

9. By ten Bhikṣus, as in Madhyadeśa.<sup>97</sup>

10. By repeating three times the formula of Refuge, as in the case of the sixty Bhadravargas, ordained in a group.<sup>98</sup>

One sees that, according to these scholars, the Prātimokṣa discipline is not necessarily acquired by means of a *vijñāpti*, for example the ordination of the Buddha, etc.

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When one undertakes the Prātimokṣa discipline, for how long a time does one undertake it?



27a-b. One undertakes the discipline for a lifetime or for a day and a night.<sup>99</sup>

The first seven categories of the Prātimokṣa discipline are undertaken for a lifetime; the fasting discipline (*upavāsastha*) is undertaken for a day and a night. Such is the rule.

Why?

Because there are two limits of time, the period of a lifetime, and the period of a day and a night. As for the fortnight and the other durations of time, they consist in additions of day and night periods.

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What is the *dharma* that we term "time" (*kāla*)?

This is not an eternal substance (*padārtha*), as some believe. The word "time" is an expression by which the *saṃskāras* are designated as past, present, or future (i.7, v. 25).

When it is light in the four continents, it is daytime; when it is dark it is night (iii.80c).

Discussion: We admit, say the Sautrāntikas, that the Prātimokṣa discipline is solely produced for the duration of a lifetime. In fact, even if one were to undertake to observe these rules in a future life, one would not now produce this discipline for this other life: 1. the person (*āśraya*) that one would become, would be different (see *nikāyasabhāga*, ii.41); 2. this new person would not be able to apply himself to the rules undertaken; and 3. he would not remember undertaking them.<sup>100</sup> But if a person assumes the duties of a faster for more than a day and a night,—for five days, or for ten days,—what obstacle would this be to his producing in himself many disciplines of the fast?

It needs be that there would be an obstacle since the Blessed One, in a Sūtra, says that one undertakes the fast for a day and a night.

Why did the Blessed One express himself in this manner: did he think that the discipline of fasting could not be produced for a longer duration?

He thought that persons in whom the senses are difficult to subdue would be well capable of undertaking the fast for a day and a night. But, in truth, nothing is wrong with producing the discipline of the fast for more than one day.

As the Blessed One does not speak of the fast as lasting any longer, the Vaibhāṣikas do not admit this manner of viewing the matter.

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What is the duration of undiscipline (*asaṁvara*).

27c. There is undiscipline for a day and a night.

Undiscipline never last longer than a day and a night, like the discipline of the fast, for it is produced by the acceptance of transgression for one's entire life.

How is this?

27d. For, says the School, one does not undertake it thus.<sup>101</sup>

No one undertakes undiscipline in the manner in which one undertakes the fast, by saying, "I wish to remain a day and a night in undiscipline." Rather, he carries out, in effect, shameful actions.

Objection: No one undertakes undiscipline by saying, "I wish to remain for my life undisciplined." Thus one does not undertake undiscipline for an entire lifetime.

Answer: It is not in this manner, in fact, that one undertakes undiscipline. One does not undertake undiscipline by means of a ritual. One acquires undiscipline by acting with the intention of always acting badly; one does not acquire undiscipline by the intention of acting badly for a time. In the case of the fast, the intention is not "for always;" nevertheless one obtains the discipline through the force of the action which consists of saying, "I wish to remain a day and a night in the discipline of the fast," and one accomplishes this action because one desires to acquire this discipline. If someone desires undiscipline, he could without doubt give himself over to undiscipline for this period of time. But the case does not present itself; hence we do not recognize undiscipline "for a time."

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According to the Sautrāntikas, undiscipline does not exist in and of itself (*dravyatas*) apart from volition. Undiscipline is the intention to

commit evil, that is, a certain volition with the traces which allow this volition. And, as long as this volition with its traces has not been destroyed by a contrary volition, the person, even when he has a good thought, remains filled with undiscipline, a person undisciplined.

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How should one undertake the discipline of a day and a night, or the discipline of the fast?<sup>102</sup>

28. One should undertake the fast (*upavāsa*) in a humble attitude, speaking after, with ornaments removed, until the morrow, complete, the morning, from another.<sup>103</sup>

1. In a humble attitude, squatting or kneeling; with the hands joined in *kapotaka* (by placing the four fingers of one hand between the thumb and the index finger of the other) or in the position of *añjali*; except in the case of sickness. Without a respectful attitude, discipline is not produced.

2. The candidate does not speak before the ordainer or the giver, the person who "gives" the fast; nor at the same time. In this way, it is from another that one undertakes the fast; otherwise, there would be neither receiving nor a thing received.<sup>104</sup>

3. The candidate does not wear any ornaments; he wears his normal dress, because he does not draw forth vanity from it.<sup>105</sup>

4. One undertakes it until the morrow, until the rising of the sun.

[5. One undertakes the complete fast, with its eight rules, and not with any rules missing (Takakuku, *I-tsing*, p. 188; Chavannes, *Cinq centes contes*, p. 136).

6. The morrow, at the rising of the sun, since this is a discipline lasting a day and a night (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 647b29).

He who, previously, has formed the undertaking, "I will always practice the fast, the eighth day of the fortnight, etc.," undertakes the fast, even though he eats.<sup>106</sup>

7. From another, nor from oneself. If one encounters a cause of transgression, through honesty with regard to the giver, he will not violate the obligations undertaken.]

When these rules are not observed, one has nevertheless done a

good action (*sucarita*), but one does not obtain the discipline of the fast. When the rules are observed, the fast is even more useful for the person who commits transgressions by day and by night (hunting, murder, stealing, adultery).

i. The fast is termed *upavāsa*,<sup>107</sup> because, embracing a way of life conforming to that of the Arhats, he places himself near (*upa*) the Arhats.<sup>108</sup> According to another opinion, it is because he places himself near the "lifelong discipline" (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 648c29).

ii. It has for its end procuring an increase of the roots of good of persons who have only small roots of good. As it procures (*dhā*) an increase (*poṣa*) of good, the Blessed One said, "It is called *poṣadha*."<sup>109</sup>

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Why is the discipline of the fast undertaken with eight parts?<sup>110</sup>

29a-c. Part of morality (*śīla*), part of vigilance (*apramāda*), parts of ascetic vows (*vrata*), have respectively four, one, three parts.

Four parts,—the renouncing of killing, stealing, adultery and lying,—constitute the parts of morality (*śīlāṅga*) by which what is transgression by nature is abandoned.<sup>111</sup>

One part, the renouncing of intoxicating drinks, constitutes the rule of vigilance by which non-vigilance is arrested. For even if a person who has undertaken morality drinks intoxicating liquor, he will be non-vigilant. (ii.25-26, iv.34c-d).

Three parts,—the renouncing of high beds, music, etc., and meals at forbidden times,—constitute the rule of asceticism, for they are favorable and conform to disgust.

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What necessity is there for undertaking the rules of vigilance and of asceticism?

29d. In order to avoid weakness of mindfulness and arrogance.

When one drinks intoxicating liquor, one loses one's mindfulness of what one should and should not do. When one uses high and wide beds, when one attends dances, singing and music, the mind becomes

arrogant. In both cases, one is not far from violating morality.

When one observes the rule of eating at the proper times, and when one avoids eating outside of this time, one retains a mindfulness of the obligations of the fast, and disgust is produced. In the absence of the eighth rule, mindfulness and disgust would be absent.

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i. According to certain masters, the fast or *upavāsa* consists of the fast proper, and the renouncing of food at forbidden times; whereas the other renouncings are the rules or parts of the fast (*upavāsāṅga*). The abstention from food is not a part; thus, with an end to the obtaining the number of eight parts, one should distinguish two parts in the seventh rule; first, the renouncing of dancing, singing, and music; and the second, the renouncing of perfumes, garlands, and unguents.

This interpretation is not in accord with the Sūtra, [say the Sautrāntikas]; for, according to the Sūtra, immediately after the renouncing of meals at forbidden times, the faster should say, "By these eight rules, I imitate the rule, I conform myself to the rule of the Āryans, the Arhats."<sup>112</sup>

ii. Then what would the fast be, distinct from its rules, and yet embracing eight parts?

According to the Sautrāntikas, it is the very collection of parts which one says possesses parts; it is to this very collection that one attributes parts. The expression, "a fast having eight parts" should be understood in the same way as the expressions, "a part of a carriage," "a four-part army" (*caturāṅgabala*), or "a powder made up of five parts" (*pañcāṅgapīṣṭa*).<sup>113</sup>

iii. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the abstaining from food at forbidden times is at one and the same time the fast and a part of the fast. In the same way that Right Views (*samyagdṛṣṭi*) are at one and the same time the Path and a part of the Path (*mārgāṅga*); in the same way that Investigation into the *Dharmas* (*dharmapracicaya*) is at one and the same time Bodhi and a part of Bodhi (vi.68); and in the same way that Samādhi is at one and the same time *dhyāna* and a part of *dhyāna* (viii.7-8).

iv. But we would say [with the Sautrāntikas] that it is impossible for

Right Views, Investigation into the *Dharmas*, and Samādhi to be parts of themselves. Would you say that earlier Right Views, etc., are parts of later Right Views, etc.? This would be to admit that the first moment of the Path does not have eight parts. This would be to admit that the last moment of the parts of Bodhi is itself not a part.<sup>114</sup>

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Is the possession of the discipline of the fast kept only by Upāsakas?<sup>115</sup>

30a-b. Others can possess the fast, but not without taking the Refuges.

When a person who is not a Upāsaka, takes, in the same day and night, the Three Refuges before he undertakes the rules of the fast, then the discipline of the fast is produced within him. But not without taking the Refuges; on the condition that there has been no error, etc. (iv.31d).

The *Mahānāma-sūtra* says, "Oh Mahānāma, the layman with white clothes, male and possessing the male organ, who, after having taken refuge in the Buddha, in the Dharma, and in the Saṅgha, pronounces these words, 'Consider me as an Upāsaka:' only through this does he become an Upāsaka."<sup>116</sup> Does this mean that one becomes an Upāsaka by only taking the Three Refuges?

The Aparāntakas answer yes. (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 645c19).

The Kāśmīreans affirm that one cannot be an Upāsaka when one does not possess the Upāsaka discipline.

But does this not contradict the Sūtra?

No.<sup>117</sup> Because

30c-d. The discipline is produced through the fact that he accepts the qualities of an Upāsaka.<sup>118</sup>

The discipline of the Upāsaka is produced in him by the mere acceptance of the quality of the Upāsaka, when he says, "Consider me, from today onwards, for the rest of my life, as a *prāṇāpeta* Upāsaka."<sup>119</sup>

[What is the meaning of the expression *prāṇāpeta*?]

One should understand, *prāṇātipātāpeta* through ellipsis, as free from killing, having renounced killing (see below, note 127).

Thus, by accepting the quality of an Upāsaka, one undertakes the discipline [since one shows himself as having renounced killing]. Yet, in order that he understands the points of the rule (*śiṣṣāpada*),

30d. One explains them to him, as is also the case for a Bhikṣu.

Through an ecclesiastical action the Bhikṣu has acquired the discipline of the Bhikṣu: yet he is made to undertake the most important rules: "You are to abstain from this, from that. Your co-religionists will tell you the rest."<sup>120</sup> The same holds for the Śrāmaṇera.<sup>121</sup> The same holds for the Upāsaka: he obtains the discipline by undertaking once, twice, three time the Three Refuges; he is then made to undertake the rules, "Abandoning killing, I renounce killing." Thus one is not an Upāsaka without possessing the discipline of the Upāsaka.

31a-b. If all Upāsakas possess the discipline of the Upāsaka, how can an Upāsaka be an *ekadeśakārīn*, etc.?

If all Upāsakas place themselves within the discipline of the Upāsaka, why did the Blessed One describe four types of Upāsakas, the Upāsaka of one rule (*ekadeśakārīn*), of two rules (*pradeśakārīn*), of three or four rules (*yadbhūyaskārīn*), and of five rules (*paripūrṇakārīn*).<sup>122</sup>

31c. These terms, say the School, refer to the fact of observing the rules.<sup>123</sup>

The Upāsaka who in fact observes one of the rules [of all which he has accepted] is said to practice (*kar*) this rule. [It should not be understood that the *ekadeśakārīn* is an Upāsaka who undertakes to practice only a single rule]. Yet all the Upāsakas are equally placed within this discipline.<sup>124</sup>

The Sautrāntikas object: Your doctrine contradicts the Sūtra.

In what way does it contradict the Sūtra?

i. You say that one acquires the discipline by the mere fact of accepting the quality of a *prānāpeta* Upāsaka, "Consider me . . . as a *prānāpeta* Upāsaka." But, such is not the text of the Sūtra. In fact, the Sūtra that interests us is the *Mahānāma-sūtra* which gives the definition of an Upāsaka, and not another Sūtra. And the *Mahānāma-sūtra* does not have the expression "*prānāpeta*."

You hold that you are authorized by another Sūtra,<sup>125</sup> which has, "From today, for the rest of my life, [consider me as an Upāsaka], risking my life (*prāṇopeta*),<sup>126</sup> having taken refuge, believing perfectly (*abhiṣrasanna*)."<sup>127</sup> Now this text refers to persons who have seen the Truths, who have acquired the faith of intelligence (*avetyāprasāda*, vi. 73), and who, as a consequence, adhere to the Good Law even at the price of their lives: "We are incapable of abandoning the Dharma, even in order to save our lives." This text does not give a definition of the Upāsaka discipline.

Further, the expression *prāṇāpeta*, upon which you establish your theory, is nowhere to be found, either in the *Mahānāma-sūtra*, nor the *Dṛṣṭasatya-sutra*. Who could admit a similar expression the sense of which is lacking in precision?<sup>127</sup> Who, based on faith in this expression, would admit that the Upāsaka has undertaken the five renouncings before he has undertaken them ritually?

ii. If the expression *ekadeśakārī* designates a person who violates the discipline, the question raised in the Sūtra (note 122) is not justified, nor its answer. In fact, who is it that, being acquainted with the discipline of an Upāsaka and knowing that it is made up of five rules, would be incapable of explaining, "He who does not violate a rule observes a rule" and so on.

On the contrary, someone who does not know the extent of the discipline of an Upāsaka, seeing the persons capable of observing one, or two, or three, or all the rules, would he be able to pose the question, "What does one do to become an Upāsaka of all the rules?"

The Vaibhāṣikas answer: If one were an Upāsaka without possessing the discipline of an Upāsaka, one could also as well be a Bhikṣu or a Śrāmaṇera with an incomplete discipline.

Answer: How can we know the extent, the number of the rules of the disciplines of the Upāsaka, the Śrāmaṇera, or the Bhikṣu? Evidently through the teaching of the Master. Now the Master speaks of the Upāsaka not possessing the discipline in its entirety; but he does not speak of an incomplete discipline of the Bhikṣus or of the Śrāmaṇeras.<sup>128</sup>

The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr do not admit this opinion.

31d. All the disciplines are weak, etc., according to the mind.



The weakness, the mediocrity, and the force of the eight rules depend on the weakness, on the mediocrity, or on the force of the mind through which one has undertaken them.

But if such is the case, the Prātimokṣa discipline of an Arhat could be weak, and that of a Pṛthagjana could be strong.

Is one an Upāsaka if one solely undertakes the discipline (*samivara*) without undertaking the Refuges?

No; except in the case of ignorance by the person who gives and by the person who receives.

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When a person takes refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and in the Saṅgha, what does he take refuge in?

32. He who takes the Refuges takes refuge in the *āsaikṣa dharmas* which form the Buddha, in the two types of *dharmas* which form the Saṅgha, and in Nirvāṇa.<sup>129</sup>

i. He who takes Refuge in the Buddha takes refuge in the *dharmas* of the Arhat which form a Buddha, the *dharmas* which are the causes of the designation "Buddha," that is, the *dharmas* by reason of which, as principle cause, a certain person is called a Buddha;<sup>130</sup> or rather the *dharmas* by the acquisition of which a certain person, understanding all things, is called a Buddha. These *dharmas* are the Knowledge of Extinction (*kṣaya-jñāna*), the Knowledge of Nonarising (*anutpāda-jñāna*) and Right Views (*samyagdṛṣṭi*) (vi.50, 67) with the *dharmas* which accompany these *jñānas*, that is, with the five pure *skandhas*.<sup>131</sup>

As for the material body (*rūpakāya*)<sup>132</sup> of the Buddha, that is not subject to modification through the acquisition of the quality of Buddha. Thus one does not take refuge in the material body of the Buddha which is, in fact, the material body of the Bodhisattva.

Does one take refuge in all the Buddhas or in one Buddha?

According to the nature of things, and in the absence of an explicit declaration, in all the Buddhas. For the Buddhas have always followed the same path, a worldly path and a transworldly path (vii.34).<sup>133</sup>

ii. He who takes Refuge in the Saṅgha takes refuge in both the *saikṣa* and the *āsaikṣa dharmas*, of the non-Arhat and of the Arhat,

which form the Saṅgha, that is, the *dharma*s through the acquisition of which the Eight Saints become a Saṅgha; becoming unanimous they cannot be divided with regard to that which concerns the Path.

Does one take refuge in all the Saṅghas or in one Saṅgha?

According to the nature of things, in all: for the Path followed by the Saints is always the same. Without doubt, the Buddha said to the two merchants, "Also take refuge in the Saṅgha which shall exist in the future,"<sup>134</sup> but the Master expressed himself in this manner in order to exhalt the qualities of the Jewel of the Saṅgha which would soon be visible to the merchants.

iii. He who takes Refuge in the Dharma takes refuge in Nirvāṇa, that is to say, in *pratisamkhyānirodha* (i.5, ii.55d). He takes refuge in all Nirvāṇa, for Nirvāṇa has for its unique characteristic the cessation of the defilements and suffering of oneself and others (see vi. 73c, the meaning of the word *dharma* in *dharma avetyaprasāda*).

iv. Discussion.

If the Buddha is none other than the *asaikṣa dharma*s, the *dharma*s pertaining to an Arhat, how could the fact of wounding the Buddha with a bad thought constitute a mortal transgression (iv. 96)?

The Vaibhāṣikas (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 177b8) answer: "When one wounds the material elements which are the support of these *dharma*s, these *dharma*s themselves suffer injury."

But the Śāstra (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 177a27) does not say that the Buddha is solely *asaikṣa dharma*s. It says that the Buddha is the *dharma*s that form a Buddha, that is to say, either the worldly or transworldly *dharma*s which are the object of the designation "Buddha," are the Buddha. Thus the Śāstra does not deny that the *āśraya*—the organism, the support made up of the five worldly *skandhas*—forms part of the quality of Buddha. Hence the objection taken from wounding the Buddha is without value.

If it were otherwise, if the Buddha was only *asaikṣa dharma*s, and if the Saṅgha (that is, the Saints, Śaikṣas and Arhats) were only *saikṣa* and *asaikṣa dharma*s, a person whose mind is presently "worldly" would not be able to be either a Buddha or a Saṅgha. And by virtue of these same principles, one would have to say that a Bhikṣu is only morality, the discipline of a Bhikṣu.

But, say the Vaibhāṣikas, if the body is, itself, among the *dharma*s

which form the Buddha, why does the Śāstra say, "He who takes refuge in the Buddha, takes refuge in the *asaikṣa dharmas* which form the Buddha?"

We would answer: In the same way that one who honors Bhikṣus, honors the morality which makes up the Bhikṣus.

According to another opinion, one who takes refuge in the Buddha takes refuge in the eighteen *āveṇikadharmas* (vii.28) of the Buddha.

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What is the nature of the undertakings of the Refuges?

They are vocal *vijñapti* (iv. 3d).<sup>135</sup>

What is the meaning of "Refuge" (*śaraṇa*)?

The Three Refuges are so named because, by going to them for refuge one obtains definitive deliverance from all suffering.

The Blessed One said in fact,<sup>136</sup> "Tormented by fear, persons most frequently<sup>137</sup> take refuge in mountains, in forests, in woods, and in sacred trees. This is not a good<sup>138</sup> refuge, the supreme refuge; it is not by taking refuge in these that one is delivered from all suffering. But one who takes Refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, when one sees through wisdom the Four Noble Truths,—Suffering, the Arising of Suffering, the Extinction of Suffering, and the Holy Eightfold Path which leads to Nirvāṇa,—this is the good refuge, this is the supreme refuge; by taking refuge in this, one is delivered from all suffering."

This is why the undertaking of the Refuges is the entrance to the undertaking of all the rules of discipline.

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The other rules of discipline contain the renouncing of all sexual activity (*abrahmacaryavirati*); but the discipline of the Upāsaka only contains the renouncing of sexual misconduct (*kāma mithyācāra*, iv. 74). Why is this?

33a-b. Sexual misconduct, because it is much censured, because one easily abstains from it, because the Āryans have obtained abstention from it.

1. Sexual misconduct is much censured in the world because it is the corruption of another's wife, and because it leads to retribution in a painful realm of rebirth.

2. It is easy for householders to abstain from it, but it is difficult for them to abstain from all sexual activity: householders do not leave the world because they are not capable of difficult things. (*Dīvyā*, 303).

3. The Āryans possess *akaraṇasamivara* with regard to sexual misconduct, that is, they have obtained definite abstention from it; in fact, in their future existence, they will be incapable of violating this precept. Such is not the case concerning all sexual activity. As a consequence, the rules of discipline of the Upāsaka contain only the renunciation of sexual misconduct: it is inadmissible in fact that the Āryans, in a subsequent existence, would be capable of violating the discipline of an Upāsaka which could happen if this contained the renunciation of all sexual activity. *Akaraṇasamivara* means *akriyāniyama*, (that is *akriyāyam ekāntatā*, the certain abstention from one action).<sup>139</sup>

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Has the man who marries after having undertaken the Upāsaka discipline, undertaken renouncing with regard to the woman whom he marries?

Yes, answer the Vaibhāṣikas; for, in the contrary hypothesis, this man would have undertaken a restraining discipline (*prādesika*, iv.36a-b).

But then this man violates the discipline when he gets married!

No:

33c-d. They have acquired it as they have accepted the discipline; they have not accepted it with regard to some persons.

They have acquired it as they have undertaken the discipline. They undertake it by saying, "I renounce sexual misconduct," that is, "I renounce all sexual activity with all prohibited females;" they do not undertake it by saying, "I shall refrain from all sexual activity with such persons."<sup>140</sup> Consequently, they do not violate the discipline by getting married.

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Among the transgression of speech, why does the renouncing of lying constitute one of the rules of the Upāsaka, whereas the renouncing of other transgressions of speech are omitted?

For the same reasons: because lying is much censured in the world, because householders abstain from it easily, and because the Āryans are not capable of lying; and also for a fourth reason:

34a-b. Because, having violated any other rule he would lie.<sup>141</sup>

[If lying were not forbidden], he would lie when he violates any other rule, saying, "I have not done it." Consequently the Upāsaka should renounce lying, thinking, "I shall confess what I transgress."

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Why are not the transgressions of disobedience<sup>142</sup> included in the discipline of the Upāsaka?

The question is not justified:

34c-d. One renounces strong liquor, which is a transgression of disobedience,

Why should the Upāsaka renounce a single transgression of disobedience and not others?

34d. In order that the other rules may be kept.

One who drinks strong liquor will not keep the other rules.

i. The Ābhidhārmikas maintain that strong liquor does not have the characteristic of being a transgression by its nature. A transgression by its nature is committed only by a person whose mind is defiled: now it happens that, as a remedy, one can drink strong liquor in a quantity where it is not inebriating. But the mind of one who drinks knowing that such a quantity is inebriating is defiled; the mind is not defiled when one drinks knowing that such a quantity is not inebriating.

ii. Such is not the opinion of the Vinayadharas. [According to them, strong liquor is a transgression by its very nature.]

1. To Upāli, who asked him, "How should one attend to illnesses?" the Blessed One answered, "Except, Upāli, by transgression of nature."<sup>143</sup> And, the Blessed One did not permit strong liquors to sick Śākyaans: "Those who recognize me as their master should not drink any strong liquor, even a drop on the point of a blade of grass."<sup>144</sup> Since the Blessed One forbade only transgression by nature in the case of illness (as in the *Upālisūtra*) and yet does not permit strong liquor, it is clear that strong liquor is a transgression by its very nature.

2. The Āryans, even in a following existence, do not drink strong liquor, not any more than they would commit the other transgressions of nature, killing, etc.<sup>145</sup>

3. Scripture,—the *Nandikasūtra*<sup>146</sup> and elsewhere,—places strong liquor among the misdeeds of the body.<sup>147</sup>

iii. The Ābhidhārmikas answer:

1. In general, the transgression of disobedience is permitted to the ill, as the answer to Upāli proves. But strong liquor is an exception: though solely a transgression of disobedience, it is forbidden to the ill, and this with a view to preventing the unpleasant consequence of strong liquor,<sup>148</sup> because its inebriating quantity is undetermined.<sup>149</sup>

2. If the Āryans certainly abstain from strong liquor, it is not because it is a transgression by its very nature, but because they are filled with the force of modesty;<sup>150</sup> [if they do not drink in secret<sup>151</sup>], this is because strong liquor makes mindfulness fail; even if they do not drink a drop, this is because the inebriating quantity is not determined, as for poison.

3. Scripture considers strong liquor as a bodily misdeed, because strong liquor is a "cause of non-vigilance." In fact, the rule of training relative to strong liquor includes the expression, "Abandoning the *pramādashāna* which is strong liquor, *surā* and *mairēya*, I renounce *pramādashāna* . . ." This is not the case for the other transgressions: one does not say "I renounce the *pramādashāna* which is killing," and that is because the other transgressions are transgressions by their very nature.

The Scripture says that one is reborn in hell through the practice of strong liquor.<sup>152</sup> As a consequence of strong liquor, there is continual activity of a series of bad thoughts; from whence, there is either projection of a new action retributable in hell, or else the entry into activity, at the moment of death, of an old action.

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What is the meaning of the expression *surāmaireya madya-pramādashāna*.<sup>2153</sup>

*Surā* is a fermented drink of rice; *maireya* is a fermented drink of various ingredients (sugar cane juice, etc.).

At a certain moment, the liquor is no longer inebriating; at a certain moment, it is no longer that: this is why the word *madya* (inebriating) has been added. Even the areca-nut, the paspale (*kodrava*, etc.) are termed *surā* and *maireya* when they inebriate.<sup>154</sup>

Strong liquor is only a transgression of disobedience. The formula thus contains the words *pramādashāna* in order to have one understand that one should renounce strong liquor because it is the cause of all failures of mindfulness.

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Do the three discipline have the same object?

35a-b. One acquires the discipline of Kāmadhātu relative to all actions, relative to the two types of beings and to the two types of actions, relative to things of the present.

The discipline of Kāmadhātu is the Prātimokṣa discipline.

This discipline is relative to all actions, preparatory actions, actions themselves, and consecutive action (iv.68).<sup>155</sup>

This discipline is relative to living beings and to non-living beings, for example persons and trees.

This discipline is relative to the transgressions by nature and to the transgression of disobedience, both of which are capable of relating to living beings (killing; touching the hand of a woman when one is a monk) or to non-living beings (cutting the leaves of a tree; accepting gold when one is a monk).

This discipline is relative to things—*skandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus*—of the present, for the things of the past and of the future are neither living beings, nor non-living beings.<sup>156</sup>

35c-d. One acquires the discipline of *dhyāna* and the pure

discipline relative to actions themselves and to things of the three time periods.

One acquires these two disciplines relative to actions themselves, not relative to preparatory actions or to consecutive action, and not relative to the transgression of disobedience; and relative to the *skandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus* of the past, present and future.

There are thus some *skandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus* relative to which one acquires the Prātimokṣa discipline and not the two others. Four cases: 1. Preparatory and consecutive actions, transgressions of disobedience, of the present—alluded to by the Prātimokṣa. 2. Courses of action of the past and future—alluded to by the last two disciplines. 3. Courses of actions of the present—alluded to by the three disciplines. 4. Preparatory and consecutive actions of the past and the future, with regard to which one cannot undertake any of the three disciplines.

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Objection: It is not correct to say that one undertakes the discipline relative to the course of action of the present time: for, when one undertakes the discipline, no bad course of action is present relative to which one could undertake the discipline. One should say, "One undertakes the discipline relative to the course of action whose object is present." I can abstain from a future action relative to a person or to a thing existing at the present time, but I cannot abstain from a past or future action.

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Does one acquire discipline or undiscipline with regard to all beings, relative to all of their parts, and by reason of all causes?

36a-b. One acquires discipline with regard to all beings; one must distinguish regarding the parts and the causes.

1. One acquires discipline with regard to all beings, not with regard to only some of them.

The discipline of the Bhikṣu is acquired relative to all parts:



abstention from the ten courses of action. The other disciplines are acquired relative to four parts: abstention from killing, from stealing, from forbidden sexuality, from lying, for, by parts of the discipline, one should understand abstention from the courses of action.

If, by cause of the acquisition of discipline, one understands the three roots of good (non-desire, non-hatred, non-delusion), then the discipline is acquired by reason of all these causes. If one understands by cause—the cause of the origin, *samutthāpaka* (iv.9b)—the mind by which one acquires the discipline, then this cause is considered as threefold: strong mind, mediocre mind, weak mind. The discipline is acquired by reason of one of these three minds.

From this last point of view, four alternatives can be distinguished (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 608a20).

1. There is a person abiding in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, but not disciplined relative to all the parts, nor disciplined by reason of all causes: he who, through a strong, or mediocre, or weak mind, has acquired the discipline of the Upāsaka, the Upavāsastha or the Śrāmaṇera. 2. There is a person abiding in the discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings and relative to all the parts, but not disciplined by reason of all causes: he who has acquired the discipline of the Bhikṣu through a strong, mediocre, or weak mind. 3. There is a person residing in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, relative to all the parts, by reason of all the causes: he who has acquired each of the three disciplines of the Upāsaka, the Śrāmaṇera and the Bhikṣu through minds which are, respectively, weak, mediocre, and strong. 4. There is a person residing in discipline, disciplined with regard to all beings, disciplined by reason of all the causes, but not disciplined relative to all the parts: he who has acquired each of the three disciplines of the Upāsaka, the Upavāsastha and the Śrāmaṇera through minds which are, respectively, weak, mediocre, and strong.

No one abides in discipline who is not disciplined with regard to all beings: he acquires the discipline through a good mind having for its object all beings. The person who makes a restriction is not completely rid of the intention of transgression.

The Prātimokṣa discipline includes the absence of the fivefold restriction: 1. with regard to beings, "I renounce transgressions with regard to certain beings;" 2. with regard to parts of the discipline, "I

renounce certain actions;" 3. with regard to place, "I renounce committing transgressions in a certain place;" 4. with regard to time, "I renounce transgressions for a month;" 5. with regard to circumstances, "I renounce transgressions except in the case of a quarrel." He who undertakes such undertakings does not acquire the discipline; rather, he does a good action similar to the acquisition of the discipline.<sup>157</sup>

ii. How can one acquire the discipline with regard to all beings? How can one acquire the discipline with regard to beings who are out of range, or with regard to beings whom one cannot kill?

Because, we believe, one acquires the discipline through the intention of not killing any being.

The *Vaibhāṣikas* (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 623b19, second masters) give a different explanation. If the discipline was acquired only with regard to beings who are within range, the discipline would be liable to augmentation and to diminution: for some humans, who are now within range, will be reborn as gods, which are out of range; and vice versa. The discipline would thus be acquired with regard to gods who become human, and lost with regard to humans who become gods, without there being any cause either of the acquisition, or of the loss of the discipline.

This argument does not move us: the transmigration of beings within range and out of range does not entail the augmentation or the diminution of the discipline. For the discipline that one undertakes with regard to grass neither increases nor diminishes when new grass arises, nor when old grass dries up.

The *Vaibhāṣikas* deny the value of this comparison. Grass exists after having been nonexistent, and no longer exists after having existed. Living beings, on the contrary, continue to exist, sometimes as humans, and sometimes as gods. Humans, becoming gods, only pass out of range, whereas grass is annihilated.

But when living beings enter into *Nirvāṇa*, they no longer exist, exactly like grass, so the discipline acquired with regard to living beings is subject to diminution. Thus the explanation of the *Vaibhāṣikas* is invalid.

If one objects, "In the case where the *Prātimokṣa* discipline would be acquired with regard to all beings, then the discipline of later Buddhas would be reduced in comparison with that of former Buddhas, for it

would not be relative to beings who have already entered into Nirvāṇa, to former Buddhas and their disciples", <sup>158</sup> we would reply: all the Buddhas discipline all beings; and if former Buddhas were to exist again, later Buddhas would be disciplined by them.

36c-d. Undiscipline, with regard to all, relative to all parts, and not by reason of all causes.

One acquires undiscipline with regard to all beings and relative to all courses of action. No one is undisciplined with an incomplete undiscipline. One is not undisciplined by reason of all causes, undiscipline being undertaken by a weak, mediocre, or strong mind. Let us suppose that an undisciplined person has undertaken his undiscipline with a weak mind and commits a murder with a strong mind: his undiscipline remains weak, but he is adorned with a strong *vijñapti*, with a strong murder.

The term "undisciplined" is explained etymologically as one "who resides in undiscipline (*asamivara*), one who possesses undiscipline."

The butchers of sheep, bird-catchers, the butchers of pigs, fisherman, hunters, bandits, executioners, jailers, elephant hunters, the slaughterers of dogs, and the *vāgurikas* are all undisciplined. It also holds that kings, office holders, judges, etc., are undisciplined.

A butcher of sheep (*aurabhrika*) is the person whose profession is to kill sheep (*urabhra*). The same etymology holds for the names of the other professions. <sup>159</sup>

ii. We understand that discipline, undertaken with the intention of universal benevolence, would be acquired with regard to all beings. But the butchers of sheep do not have the intention of maltreating their parents, their children, or their servants; they would not want to kill them, even at the price of their lives. How, [ask the Sautrāntikas], can one say that they are undisciplined with regard to all beings? (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 608b20).

The Vaibhāṣikas: Because they have the intention of killing with regard to their parents who have become sheep through transmigration. <sup>160</sup>

But they do not kill their parents who have become sheep knowing that they are their parents! Furthermore, if their parents obtain the quality of an Āryan, these parents will not be reborn as sheep or as

animals: hence the butcher is not undisciplined with regard to them. Finally, the argument turns against you: if the butcher is undisciplined with regard to his present parents because he will kill his parents who have become sheep, one would say as well that he is not undisciplined with regard to some other sheep since he is not disposed to kill the sheep which are reborn as humans, as his own children.

The Vaibhāṣikas: He who has the intention to kill his parents who have become sheep is certainly undisciplined with regard to them.

But, [the Sautrāntikas say,] he who does not have the intention of killing the sheep who have become his children is certainly not undisciplined in their regard. Another point: how can the butcher who does not steal, who is not an adulterer, and who is mute, be undisciplined relative to all these transgressions?

The Vaibhāṣikas: Because his intention is perverted. A mute can express himself through gestures.

But what is there to say of a man who has accepted two or three parts of morality?

For the Vaibhāṣikas, nondiscipline is never incomplete, that is, relative only to certain parts; nor is it partial, that is, including restrictions (time, place, etc.) in the practice of a certain transgression.

For the Sautrāntikas, discipline and undiscipline with the exception of the Prātimokṣa discipline can be incomplete and partial. This depends on the manner in which one undertakes discipline or undiscipline: one "binds" oneself to a part of immorality, or to a certain part of morality.

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How does one acquire undiscipline? How does one acquire the *avijñaptis* which are neither discipline, nor undiscipline?

37a-b. One acquires undiscipline through action or through accepting it.<sup>161</sup>

Persons born in a family of undisciplined persons acquire undiscipline when they accomplish the actions preparatory to killing (iv. 68c). Persons born in other families acquire undiscipline when they adopt such a style of life, thinking "We too shall live in this manner."

37c-d. One acquires the other *avijñapti* by reason of the field, of undertaking, of an action seriously undertaken.<sup>162</sup>

1. Certain persons are a field of such a nature that by offering them a garden, etc., one reduces *avijñapti*. [See below, iv.112, the doctrine of good material works.]

2. One produces *avijñapti* by undertaking vows, for example, "I shall not eat unless I have paid homage to the Buddha," "I shall give alms food on the fast day, for a fortnight, for a month, for a year," etc.<sup>163</sup>

3. Action undertaken seriously, with a burning faith, with a burning passion (iv.22d), produces *avijñapti*.

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How does one lose discipline?

38. The Prātimokṣa discipline is lost through abjuration, through death, through hermaphroditism, through the cutting off of the roots, and by the night coming to an end.

The stanza calls the Prātimokṣa discipline *dama* because it subdues (*dāmyati*) the six organs.

Excluding the discipline of the fast, the Prātimokṣa discipline is lost:

1. through abjuration, intentionally renouncing the rule<sup>164</sup> in the presence of a person capable of understanding it; 2. through the death or abandonment of the *nikāyasabhāga* (ii.41); 3. through the appearance of the male or the female organ according to the case; and 4. through the cutting off of the roots of good (iv.79).

The discipline of fast is lost through these four causes and, further, when night come to an end.

Abjuration constitutes a *viññapti* in contradiction to the undertaking; death and hermaphroditism constitute the abandoning and the overturning of the personality who undertook the Prātimokṣa (see iv.27a); the cutting off of the roots is the cutting off of the foundation of the discipline itself. Finally the discipline of the fast has been created, or projected, for a day and a night: it comes to its end when the night is finished.

39a. Some say through a *patanāya*.

According to the Sautrāntikas, the discipline of the Bhikṣu and the novice is also lost through any one of the four *patanīyas*, or transgressions involving a falling away.<sup>165</sup>

39b. Through the disappearance of the Good Law, say some other masters.

According to the Dharmaguptakas, the Prātimokṣa discipline is lost when the Good Law disappears: there are no longer any rules, any boundaries, nor any ecclesiastic actions.

39c-d. The Kāśmīreans believe that the transgressor possesses morality and immorality, in the manner that a person can have riches and debts.

i. The Vaibhāṣikas of Kāśmīr say: A monk guilty of a grave transgression, that is, of a *patanīya*, does not lose his Bhikṣu discipline. It is not admissible that one loses the entire discipline by destroying only a part of the discipline.<sup>166</sup> He who commits a transgression other than a *patanīya* is not immoral. He who commits a *patanīya* is at one and the same time moral and immoral: as a person who has both riches and debts; but when this transgressor has confessed his transgression, he is no longer immoral, but solely moral: as a person who has paid his debts.

ii. But the Blessed One has said, "He is not a Bhikṣu, he is not a monk; he no longer belongs to the sons of Śākya; he falls from the quality of Bhikṣu; his quality of monkhood is cut off, fallen, erased, tumbled down, annihilated."<sup>167</sup>

The Vaibhāṣikas: In this text "Bhikṣu" signifies a "true Bhikṣu:" the transgressor, being incapable of seeing the Truths, is not a true Bhikṣu.

An inadmissible explanation: you avoid the question that the Blessed One made "in a clear sense:" furthermore, you lead defiled persons to the practice of immorality.

The Vaibhāṣikas: How can you prove that this quotation is of clear sense and should be taken literally?

The Blessed One has explained this himself. "There are four Bhikṣus: a *saṃjñābhikṣu*, a Bhikṣu in name only, is a person who is called Bhikṣu without his having been ordained; a *pratijñābhikṣu*, a self-styled Bhikṣu, is one who is immoral, unchaste, etc.; a person called Bhikṣu because he begs,<sup>168</sup> is a beggar only; and the person who is called

Bhikṣu because he has cut off the defilements, that is to say, the Arhat."<sup>169</sup> In the text which concerns us<sup>170</sup> ("He is not a Bhikṣu, he is not a monk . . ."), this refers to a fifth Bhikṣu, namely a person who has been properly ordained but who, through *patanīya*, loses this quality and this discipline; it is certainly not a question of his being a true Bhikṣu, an Arhat, for one capable of a *patanīya* is not a true Bhikṣu, an Arhat, but is susceptible of losing the quality of being a true Bhikṣu.

iii. The argument that one does not lose the entire discipline through the losing of one part of it, is refuted by the Master himself who in fact compares a transgressor monk to a palm tree whose head is cut off, henceforth incapable of becoming green, of growing, of developing, or of growing larger:<sup>171</sup> this means that, when one part of the discipline, the part which is the root of the discipline, is cut off, the rest of the discipline is incapable of growing. The *patanīya* or the *maulī āpatti* is in contradiction to the state required of being a Bhikṣu; he embraces an extreme absence of fear of transgression (*anapatrāpya*, ii.32a-b); he breaks off the root of discipline: all his discipline is lost.

The Master excludes persons guilty of *patanīya* from all commerce<sup>172</sup> with the Bhikṣus, he prohibits them from participating with them for even one mouthful of food, he forbids them from even setting one foot into the monastery. He says, "He who is not a Bhikṣu but who has the aspect of a Bhikṣu—destroy this tare, uproot this rotten tree, drive out this plant without seed!"<sup>173</sup> What indeed can be the Bhikṣu quality of this criminal?

iv. The Kaśmīreans answer: He possesses the quality which consists of his quality of Bhikṣu. For the Blessed One said, "Cunda, there are four monks and not a fifth: the *mārgajina*, who triumphs through the Path; the *mārgadaśika*, who teaches the Path; the *mārgajivin*, who lives in the Path; and the *mārgadūṣin*, who soils the Path, the immoral monk."<sup>174</sup>

We believe that the Blessed One gives the name of "monk" to an immoral monk because his external form is that of a monk. Does one not speak of burning wood, of a dried up pond, of a parrot-nose (a motif of architectural decoration), of rotten seed, of a circle of fire, or of a dead being?

v. Answer of the Kaśmīreans: One does not lose the quality of monkhood through *patanīya*, since the Blessed One admits a monk

guilty of unchastity as a penitent.<sup>175</sup>

We do not say that any Bhikṣu guilty of unchastity is a *pārājika*, a fallen or destroyed Bhikṣu. But whoever is a *pārājika* is no longer a Bhikṣu. It is the idea of hiding the crime which is decisive here: if, thanks to the excellence of his moral dispositions, thanks to the excellence of his "series," the guilty one does not have the thought of concealing his fault for an instant, then the King of the Law admits him as a penitent.

The Kāśmīreans: If a *pārājika* is no longer a Bhikṣu, why is he not again admitted to ordination?

Because he is susceptible to discipline: his mental dispositions are ruined and overturned by the excess of imprudence (*anapatrāpya*, ii.32a-b). Also, even if he had renounced the rules (*nikṣiptaśikṣa*, iv.38) [after his transgression], he cannot be ordained again. To what good does this discussion lead? If a similar Bhikṣu is a Bhikṣu, we pay homage to this quality of Bhikṣu.<sup>176</sup>

vi. When the Good Law disappears, all ecclesiastical acts become impossible, and as a consequence also all acquisition of the discipline. But he who possesses the discipline will not lose it (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 608cll).

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How does one lose the discipline of *dhyāna* (iv.17b) and the pure discipline?

40a-b. The "good" of the sphere of *dhyāna* is lost through a change of state and through falling.<sup>177</sup>

All of the good of the sphere of *dhyāna*, that is, material and non-material good, is lost through two causes: 1. through arising in a superior or inferior stage: this refers to the "good" which appears to persons arisen in the heavens of Rūpadhātu; 2. through falling away: when the ascetic falls away from this absorption.

One should add a third cause, [according to vi.21:] the Pṛthagjana loses certain good *dharma*s through death even when he is reborn in the same heavenly stage from whence he died.

40c. The same for the good of Ārūpyadhātu.



It is lost through the changing of the stage or through falling away. Note that discipline does not exist in this sphere.

40c-d. Pure good is lost through the obtaining of a result, through perfection of the faculties, or through falling away.

1. By obtaining a result, the Āryan abandones the good *dharma*s of the path of the candidate (*pratīpannakamārga*, which is threefold, *prayoga*, *ānantarya*, *vimukti*, vi.65b); 2. when he perfects his faculties (*indriyaśaṁcāra*, vi.29), he abandons the path of weak faculties; and 3. when he falls, he abandons the result or the path of a superior result (vi.32).

41 a-b. Undiscipline is lost through the acquisition of discipline, through death, or through hermaphroditism.

i. Acquisition of the discipline: either he ritually undertakes the Prātimokṣa discipline; or, through the efficacy of an internal cause (*hetu*=*sabhāga**hetu*, ii.52) or an external cause (the teaching of another), one obtains the absorption which constitutes the discipline of *dhyāna*.<sup>178</sup> The discipline of *dhyāna* cuts off undiscipline, being a threefold change hostile to undiscipline.

Death and hermaphroditism are, respectively, the abandoning and the overturning of the person through which undiscipline had been undertaken.

ii. An undisciplined person who rejects the tools of his work, dagger and net, even with the intention of no longer committing murder, does not by this cut off his undiscipline if he does not undertake the discipline. Illness does not improve without medicine, even though one may avoid the causes of illness.

iii. Does an undisciplined person who undertakes the discipline of the fast remain undisciplined when he departs from the fast, or rather, does he find himself in the intermediary state, neither-disciplined-nor-undisciplined?

Opinions differ. For some,<sup>179</sup> he is found to be undisciplined, for the person who undertakes the fast does not have the intention of definitively renouncing transgressions: a mass of iron turned red returns to its original state.

For others,<sup>180</sup> once an undisciplined person has departed from the fast, he is no longer undisciplined, for the acquisition of indiscipline supposes a physical or vocal action (*vijñapti*).

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How does one lose *avijñapti* which is neither discipline nor undiscipline (iv.131-b)?

41c-d. Intermediate *avijñapti* is lost through the cutting off of the force, the undertaking, the action, the object, the life, and the roots.

We have seen (iv.37c-d) how one acquires *avijñapti* which differs from discipline and from indiscipline.

This *avijñapti* is lost by reason of six causes: (1) when the intense force of faith, or the defilements which have projected the *avijñapti*, come to an end. Example: the movement of the arrow and the potter's wheel; (2) when one renounces the undertaking, "From this moment onward, I shall no longer do that which I was engaged in doing;"<sup>181</sup> (3) when one cuts off the action, that is to say, when one does not do that which one was engaged in doing, [for example: venerating the Buddha, making a *maṇḍalaka* before eating (see note 163)];<sup>182</sup> (4) when the object is cut off: the *caitya*, the garden, the monastery, the bed, the seat, which one was in engaged in venerating or in giving; the instrument, the net, etc.;<sup>183</sup> (5) when life is cut off; and (6) when one begins to cut off the roots of good.<sup>184</sup>

42a-b. Good non-material action, of the sphere of *Kāmadhātu*, is lost through the cutting off of the roots, and through arising in a superior sphere.

We have explained how material action, namely bodily action, vocal action, and the *avijñapti*, is cut off. Good non-material action of *Kāmadhātu* is lost thorough the cutting off of the roots of good, and through birth in *Rūpadhātu* or *Ārūpyadhātu*.<sup>185</sup>

42c-d. That which is defiled and non-material is lost through the arising of its opposite.

All that which is defiled, of whatever sphere, is lost through the arising of the Path which opposes this defilement. This refers to a path of abandoning (*prahāṇamārga*, distinct from *vimuktimārga*, vi.65b) which can be Seeing or Meditation, and which can be worldly or transworldly. This Path causes the abandonment of a certain category of *upakleśa*<sup>186</sup> and, with it, all its attendant *prāptis*, etc.

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What beings are susceptible to discipline and to undiscipline?

43a-d. Humans—with the exception of the two categories of eunuchs, hermaphrodites, and the Kurus—are susceptible of undiscipline; the same for the discipline which pertains also to the gods.

Undiscipline exists only among humans. One must furthermore except *śaṇḍhas* and *paṇḍakas*, hermaphrodites<sup>187</sup> and beings in Uttarakuru.

Discipline exists among humans, with the above-mentioned exception, and among the gods:<sup>188</sup> thus, it exists in two realms of rebirth.

1. Eunuchs are not susceptible of discipline: this results from the Sūtra, "Oh Mahānāma, white clothed laymen, male and possessing the male organ . . ." (iv.30a-b), and from the *Vimaya*, "One must expel such a person."

Why is this?

Because they possess, to an extreme degree, the defilements of the two sexes; because they are incapable of the reflection necessary to combat these defilements; and because the vigor of respect and fear (*hrī*, *apatrāpya*, ii.32a-b) is absent in them.

Why are they not susceptible to undiscipline?

Because the intention of committing transgressions is not strong among them; because undiscipline is opposed to discipline; and only one who is susceptible to discipline is susceptible to undiscipline.

2. The Uttarakurus are lacking the undertaking of any discipline, from whence there is an absence of the Prātimokṣa discipline; and they lack absorption,<sup>189</sup> from whence there is an absence of the other two

disciplines. On the other hand, the intention of committing transgressions is absent in them.

3. In the painful realms of rebirth there is no vigor of respect and fear: now a vigorous respect and fear are necessary for discipline; in order for there to be indiscipline, it is necessary to destroy respect and fear (iv.97b).

Neither discipline nor undiscipline can arise in the bodies, or in the persons, of eunuchs, hermaphrodites, and beings in the realms of painful rebirth, for these bodies are similar to soil saturated with salt wherein there can neither grow wheat, nor bad herbs.

Objection: The Sūtra says, "Oh Bhikṣu, there is a Nāga born from an egg (iii.9a) which, each eighth day of the fortnight, leaves its dwelling, and comes to undertake the eightfold fast." (*Saṃyutta*, iii.,241; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 648c19; compare with *Visuddhimagga*, 300).

This refers, for the Nāgas, not to discipline, but to good actions.

Discipline exists thus solely among humans and among the gods.

43d. The three disciplines exist among humans.

These three are the Prātimokṣa discipline, discipline arisen from *dhyāna*, and pure discipline.

44a-b. Discipline of *dhyāna* exists among the gods of Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu.<sup>190</sup>

Not in higher spheres.

44b-d. So too the pure discipline, with the exception of the gods of the intermediate *dhyāna* and the Asaṃjñīsattvas; and also in Ārūpyadhātu.<sup>191</sup>

It exists in Rūpadhātu with the exception of the *dhyānāntarīkas* of beings arisen in intermediate *dhyāna*, and the Asaṃjñīsattvas; and in Ārūpyadhātu. The gods of Ārūpyadhātu never in fact manifest this discipline, since discipline is matter, *rūpa*; but they can "possess" it (see iv.82).<sup>192</sup>

Following the examination of action, the author now defines the diverse categories of action which are taught in different Sūtras.

There are three actions, good, bad, and neutral (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 263a6).

45a-b. Good action is salutary, bad action is pernicious, and action differing from good and bad is different from the salutary and the pernicious.

Such is the definition of good action, etc.

Good action is salutary, because it is of agreeable retribution and as a consequence it protects one from suffering for a time (: this is good, but impure action); or rather, because it brings about the attainment of Nirvāṇa and, as a consequence, definitively protects one from suffering (: this is good, pure action).

Bad action is pernicious: this is action of disagreeable retribution.

Action concerning which the Blessed One does not say whether it is good or bad, that is, morally neutral action, is neither salutary nor pernicious.

45c-d. There are meritorious actions, demeritorious actions, and non-agitated actions; and three actions of which the action of agreeable feeling is the first.

There are three actions: meritorious action, demeritorious action, and non-agitated action. There are three actions: action of agreeable feeling, action of disagreeable feeling, and action of neither disagreeable nor agreeable feeling.

46a-b. Meritorious action is a good action in Kāmadhātu; non-agitated action is a good action above there.<sup>193</sup>

Good action of the sphere of Kāmadhātu is called "meritorious" action, because it purifies, and because it produces an agreeable retribution.<sup>194</sup>

"Good action above there," that is to say, of the two higher spheres, is called "non-agitated."<sup>195</sup>

But did not the Blessed One say that the first three Dhyānas are agitated? Did he not say that "the Āryans say that the *vitarkita* and the *vicarita* of the First Dhyāna are agitation?"<sup>196</sup>

The Blessed One said in fact that the first three Dhyānas are agitated, but he is saying this from the point of view of the corrupted

characteristics of these *dhyānas* (iii.101c, vi.24a, and the full explanation viii.11); their vices are what agitate them. But in the *Īñjitasūtra*,<sup>197</sup> the Blessed One declared that these *dhyānas* are non-agitated because he considers them a pathway favorable to non-agitation.<sup>198</sup>

But why term that which is agitated non-agitated?<sup>199</sup>

46c-d. Because, with regard to that which concerns its retribution, action of the domain of the higher stages does not vary.

Action of the sphere of Kāmadhātu is agitated in its retribution. The place of retribution is not fixed: one action which produces, naturally, a certain realm of rebirth, can be retributed in another one; an action which produces a heavenly realm of rebirth can be retributed in another heavenly realm of rebirth. In fact it happens that actions which produce power, a good figure, beauty, or objects of enjoyment, instead of being retributed in a heavenly realm of rebirth, are retributed in a human, animal, or Preta realm of rebirth through the efficacy of certain causes. But no cause can make an action of the sphere of Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu be retributed in any but the sphere which is proper to it.

Bad action is demeritorious. This is well known in the world and there is no good reason to insist on what is well known in the world.

As for actions of agreeable feeling, etc.:

47a-b. Good action, up to the Third Dhyāna, is of agreeable feeling.<sup>200</sup>

Agreeable sensation<sup>201</sup> does not exist above the Third Dhyānas: it thus has Kāmadhātu and the first three Dhyānas for its domain. Hence the retribution of good action is of agreeable feeling up to the Third Dhyāna. Action having such a retribution is called "of agreeable sensation" (see iv.49).

47b-c. Above, it is of neither agreeable nor disagreeable sensation.<sup>202</sup>

Agreeable and disagreeable sensation do not exist above the Third Dhyāna. There only remains the sensation of indifference, which is the only retribution of good action retributed above the Third Dhyāna.

47c-d. Bad action, here below, is of disagreeable sensation.<sup>203</sup>

Bad action is of disagreeable sensation. The *kārikā* says "here below" in order to indicate that this action exists only in Kāmadhātu.

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Is the result of all these actions only sensation?

No; they also have the apparatus of sensation as their (retributive) result.<sup>204</sup>

48a. According to some, intermediary action also exists below.<sup>205</sup>

According to others, intermediary action—that is, action which has for its retribution neither agreeable nor disagreeable sensation—also exists below the Fourth Dhyāna, (contrary to the doctrine iv.47a-c; see *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 596b13; two arguments, 48b and 48c-d.)

48b. Since there is no retribution with regard to *dhyānāntara*.<sup>206</sup>

If intermediary action is absent below the Fourth Dhyāna, there would not be any retribution of *dhyānāntara* action,<sup>207</sup> or rather,<sup>208</sup> there would not be any retribution of any action whatsoever in *dhyānāntara*,<sup>209</sup> for there are no agreeable and disagreeable sensations therein.

[Responding to this argument,] some say that the retribution of *dhyānāntara* action is the sensation of pleasure (*sukhendriya*, ii.7; viii.9b) of the *dhyāna* itself;<sup>210</sup> some others say that the retribution of this action is not sensation, (but *rūpa*, etc.).<sup>211</sup>

These two opinions are in contradiction to the Śāstra (*Jñāna-prasthāna*, TD 26, p. 973a20), "Does it happen that an action is solely mental sensation? Yes, the retribution of a good action which was free from *vitarka*."<sup>212</sup>

48c-d. Because it is admitted that the retribution of the three types of action takes place at the one and same time.

This is the second reason why one should admit that intermediary action exists below the Fourth Dhyāna.

The Śāstra says in the same place, "Does it happen that there is at one and the same time retribution of the three types of action? Yes.

There can take place at the same time: (1) the retribution of an action of agreeable sensation, namely of material *dharmas*, [the organ of seeing, etc.]; (2) the retribution of an action of disagreeable sensation, namely the mind and the mental states [excluding dissatisfaction, ii.10b-c]; (3) the retribution of an action of neither agreeable nor disagreeable sensation, namely the *dharmas* dissociated from the mind, [vital organ, etc., ii.35].”

Now, the three types of action cannot be retributed simultaneously outside of Kāmadhātu, for the retribution of action of disagreeable sensation takes place only in Kāmadhātu (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 615c4).

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Is the action of neither agreeable nor disagreeable sensation [when it belongs to a stage lower than the Fourth Dhyāna] good or bad?

It is good, but of weak force.

But didn't you say that "good action, up to the Third Dhyāna, is of agreeable sensation (iv.47a)?"

This definition refers to cases in general.

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But how can one say that action is of agreeable sensation? Action, by its nature, is not sensation.<sup>213</sup>

One expresses oneself in this way because action is favorable to agreeable sensation; or rather, because its retribution is agreeably sensed. In the same way that one calls bathing clothes, *snānīyakāśāya*, "the clothes with which one bathes," in that same way one terms "to be sensed" (*vedanīya*) action through which one senses a retribution.

Further,

49. There are five ways of being *vedanīya*, "sensed," "experienced:" of itself, through sensation, as an object, by being retributed, and by the fact of its presence.<sup>214</sup>

1. Sensation, by its nature, is feeling. Agreeable sensation is agreeable experience, etc. (i.14c; ii.24).

2. Contact is feeling because it is associated with sensation: contact



of agreeable sensation, etc. (*Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 88a4 *et passim*, *Samyutta*, v.211; *Kośa*, ii. trans. p. 169 and 180).

3. The six objects (*viśaya*) of the six organs are feeling in the role of object (*ālambana*), "Seeing color with the eye, he experiences, he feels the color, but he does not feel the color with affection."<sup>215</sup> Color is thus the object of sensation.

4. Action is feeling in its role of being retributed, "an action experienced in the present existence" (*Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 433all).

5. Sensation is feeling through the fact of its appearance. "When he feels, when he experiences agreeable sensation, two sensations, the disagreeable and the neutral, are then found to be obstructed by it."<sup>216</sup> hence when agreeable sensation is functioning, there is no other sensation through which one would feel it. Thus if one says that this sensation is "to be felt" (*vedanīya*), this is because it is present.

50a. This action is determinate or indeterminate.<sup>217</sup>

The action (agreeable sensation, etc.) that we have just described is either determinate, that is, "which will necessarily be felt," or indeterminate, "which will not be necessarily felt."

50b-c. Determinate action is of three types, to be experienced in the present life, etc.<sup>218</sup>

Determinate action is: (1) to be experienced in the present life; (2) to be experienced after having been reborn, in other words in the next immediate life; and (3) to be experienced later.

By adding indeterminate action, this makes, from the point of view of the modality of retribution, four types.

50c-d. According to one opinion, action is of five types.<sup>219</sup>

By dividing indeterminate action into two categories: that which is indeterminate with regard to the period of its retribution, but whose retribution is in any case certain; and that which is indeterminate with regard to its retribution, which can be not retributed.

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Action experienced in the present life is action which ripens or is

retributed in the same existence in which it was accomplished. Action experienced after being reborn is action which is retributed in the existence which follows that in which it was accomplished. Action experienced later is action which is retributed in a later existence, from the third existence on.

But, some other masters, [the Sautrāntikas], cannot admit that a very strong action has a weak retribution. Consequently, the retribution of an action experienced in the present life can continue into other existences; yet, as this retribution begins in the present life, this action is said "to be experienced in the present life."

The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept this way of looking at it. There is, they say, some actions whose results are near, and some actions whose results are distant. In the same way flax bears its fruit after two and a half months, but wheat and *godhūma* after six months.<sup>220</sup>

#### 51a. Others distinguish four alternatives.<sup>221</sup>

The Dārṣṭāntikas<sup>222</sup> distinguish four cases: 1. Action determined with regard to the period of its retribution, but indeterminate with regard to its retribution. If this action is retributed, it will certainly be retributed at such a moment, but it is not necessarily retributed: this is *niyatavedanīya*, but *anīyatavipāka* action. 2. Action determined with regard to its retribution, but indeterminate with regard to the period of its retribution. This action will be retributed, but the period of its retribution remains undetermined: *niyatavipāka*, but *anīyatavedanīya*. 3. Action determinate from two points of view: *niyatavipāka* and *niyatavedanīya*. 4. Action indeterminate from two points of view: *anīyatavipāka* and *anīyatavedanīya*.

According to this system there are eight types of actions: 1. action experienced in the present existence and of certain retribution, 2. action experienced in the present existence and of possible retribution . . . 7. action which can be experienced in any existence, but of certain retribution; and 8. action which can be experienced in any existence and of only possible retribution (*anīyatavipāka*).

But actions defined in Scripture as "to be experienced in this life," etc., are always of certain retribution; action defined as "indeterminate" may not be retributed (iv.50a-c).<sup>223</sup>

Does it happen that a person produces or projects all four types of actions at one and the same time?

Yes. Suppose that a man has murder, stealing, and lying committed by another person; he himself commits adultery; and that these four actions, which belong respectively to the four types, are committed at the same instant (iv.67).

#### 51b. Three types of actions project existence.

Action experienced in the present existence does not project the present existence (*nikāyasabhāga*, ii.41a); this has been projected by a former action.

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How many types of action can be produced in the different spheres of existence and in the different realms of rebirth?

#### 51c. Fourfold production throughout.

In the three spheres of existence and in all of the realms of rebirth the four types of good or bad action can be produced. But this general rule has some restrictions. On the one hand, there is no bad action above Kāmadhātu; on the other hand (51d - 53):

#### 51d. Good action, in the hells, is solely of three types.

In the hells, one can produce good action to be experienced in the next existence, good action to be experienced in a later existence, and good action which is indeterminate; but no good action to be experienced in the present existence, for there is no agreeable retribution in the hells.

52a-b. When he is firm, the fool does not produce any action to be experienced, at the stage from whence he is detached, in his next existence.

"When he is firm," that is, when he is not subject to falling away (*aparihāṇadharman*, vi.56; see *Puggalapaññatti*, p. 12)

"The fool" refers to a Pṛthagjana.

"When he is detached from a certain stage," that is, when he is

delivered from attachment with regard to a certain plane of existence (Kāmadhātu, the First Dhyāna . . . ), in this stage he never produces action to be experienced in his next rebirth.

52c. The Āryan no longer produces any action to be experienced in a later existence.

When he is firm, the Saint does not produce, in the stage from whence he is detached, any action to be experienced either in the next existence or in a later existence.

In fact, the Pṛthagjana incapable of falling away is not reborn, in the next existence, in the stage from whence he is detached; and a Saint incapable of falling away is never reborn at this stage.

Both produce, relative to the stage wherein they are born, actions to be experienced in the present existence, and indeterminate action.

52d. The Āryan, not firm, when he is detached from Kāmadhātu or from Bhavāgra, the same.

An Āryan detached from Kāmadhātu is an Anāgāmin (vi.36).

An Āryan detached from Bhavāgra or *naivasaṃjñānāsāṃjñāyatana*, the last stage of Ārūpyadhātu, is an Arhat (vi.45).

Even when they are subject to falling away, that is to say, susceptible of losing the results obtained, these Saints do not produce action to be experienced in the next existence, nor in a subsequent existence, either in Kāmadhātu or in Bhavāgra.

We shall explain (vi.60) how the Saint, subject to falling away, always reacquires the results before dying.

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Does the intermediate being (*antarābhava*, iii.12c) produce any actions?

53a-b. The intermediate being, in Kāmadhātu, produces twenty-two types of actions.<sup>224</sup>

The embryo passes through five states, *kalala*, *arbuda*, *peśin*, *ghana*, and *prasākhā*. A human being passes through five states, as an infant, an adolescent, a grown person, a mature person, and an old person.<sup>225</sup>

The intermediate creature produces determinate actions to be experienced as an intermediate being, as *kalala*, as *arbuda* . . . as an infant, as an adolescent . . . there are eleven types of determinate actions. In this same way he produces eleven indeterminate actions.

53c. These actions bear their results in the present existence.

The eleven determinate actions of the intermediate being belong to the category "to be experienced in the present existence."

Why?

53d. For all these states form, together with the intermediate existence, only a single existence.<sup>226</sup>

The intermediate existence and the ten states which follow it are projected by a single action (iii.13). Thus one does not distinguish an action "to be experienced in the intermediate existence:" this is projected, in fact, by the action itself which is to be experienced in the life which follows the intermediate existence.<sup>227</sup>

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By virtue of what characteristics is an action determinate, that is to say, necessarily retributed?

54. Action accomplished through intense defilement or through intense faith, with regard to the field of qualities, continually, and the murdering of a father and a mother, are determinate.

Action accomplished through intense defilement, action accomplished through intense faith, action accomplished with regard to a field of qualities, and action continually accomplished, are determinate.

"Field of qualities" signifies either the Three Jewels, or certain persons, namely the possessors of the results, or Saints (*Srotaāpanna*, etc.), and the possessors of certain absorptions (*nirodhasamāpatti*, ii.44d; *araṇā*, vii.35c; *maitrī*, viii.29). Action accomplished with regard to these fields, even in the absence of an intense thought of defilement or of faith, or of continuity, is determinate, whether it is good or bad.

The same for the murder of one's father or mother, with whatever intention it was committed.<sup>228</sup>

All other action—which is done with a weak defilement, etc.—is indeterminate.

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By virtue of what characteristic is an action experienced in the present existence?

55a-b. Action bears result in the present existence by reason of certain characteristics of the field and the intention.<sup>229</sup>

By reason of the excellence of the field, even though the intention may be weak: for example, the Bhikṣu who becomes a woman through having insulted the Saṅgha, "You are nothing but women!"

By reason of the excellence of the intention: for example the eunuch who delivered bulls from the danger of being castrated, and so regained his own sexuality.<sup>230</sup>

Or still further:

55c. And also, when one is definitively detached with regard to the stage in which the action appears.

When a person is definitively detached from a certain stage (iv.52), he cannot anymore be reborn in this stage: as a consequence, action retributable in this stage, but in another existence, whether it is good or bad, changes its nature and becomes retributable in the present existence.

55d. Action "determinate with regard to retribution."<sup>231</sup>

This refers to action having a necessary retribution, but indeterminate with regard to the period of its retribution: this action will be retributed in the present life.

As for action determinate with regard to the period of its retribution, it will be retributed in the period for which it is determinate: the person for whom actions should be retributed, in this first rebirth, in a certain stage, cannot be definitively detached from this stage.

As for action non-determinate with regard to the retribution itself, it will not be retributed if one detaches himself from the stage where it could have been retributed.

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Which field confers on an action which is in a relationship with it, the quality of being necessarily retributed in the present existence?

In general, it is the Saṅgha of Bhikṣus having at its head the Buddha; to enumerate its persons, there are five types of persons:

56. Persons who have left either *nirodha*, or *maitrī*, or *araṇā*, or Seeing the Truths, or the result of Arhat: all good and all bad with regard to them is immediately retributed.<sup>232</sup>

The person who leaves the absorption of extinction (*nirodha-samāpatti*, ii.41c, viii.33): in this absorption he has obtained an extreme tranquility of thought, for this absorption is similar to Nirvāṇa. When he leaves it, it is as if he had gone to Nirvāṇa and has returned from it.

The person who leaves the absorption which arrests the defilements of another (*araṇāsamāpatti*, viii.35c): in this absorption, his mental series is endowed with the intention of placing an infinite number of beings into the absence of defilement; when he leaves it, his series is penetrated with an intense and measureless merit.

The person who leaves the absorption of compassion (*maitrī-samāpatti*, viii.29): in this absorption, his series is endowed with the intention of increasing the well-being of an infinite number of beings; when he leaves it, his series is penetrated with an intense and measureless merit.

The person who leaves the Path of Seeing the Truths:<sup>233</sup> in this Path, he has abandoned all the defilements which are abandoned through Seeing the Truths. When he leaves it, his series is thus pure, since his personality has just been renewed.

The person who leaves the result of Arhat, that is to say, who has just acquired the result of Arhat: he has just achieved the abandoning of all the defilements which are abandoned through Meditation on the Truths. His series is pure, since his personality has just been renewed.

This is why good or bad actions, well or badly done, with regard to these five persons, bear a result in the present existence (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 782c27).

The Paths of Meditation through which one obtains the results of Sakṛdāgāmin and of Anāgāmin, are incomplete in themselves and in

their result. Persons who leave the conquest of these two results are not fields of merit comparable to an Arhat. Their series is not pure; their personalities have not been recently renewed.

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The essential element of retribution is sensation.

Can the retribution of a certain action be exclusively mental sensation, and not bodily sensation (*kāyikī*, ii.7)? And can the retribution of a certain action be bodily sensation, and not mental sensation?

57a-c. Sensation, the result of good action free from *vitarka*, is exclusively mental.

Actions of the the sphere of *dhyānāntara*, the interval between the First and Second Dhyānas (iv.48b), and the actions of the higher stages are free from *vitarka* (ii.31, viii.23c). Like bodily sensation, that is to say, associated with the five sense consciousnesses, which always embraces *vitarka* and *vicāra* (i.32), it cannot be the result of a retribution of an action free from *vitarka*.<sup>234</sup>

57d. Sensation, which is the result of a bad action, is exclusively physical.

A sensation, the result of retribution of a bad action, is painful; painful mental sensation is what is termed a sensation of dissatisfaction. We have established that dissatisfaction is never the result of retribution (ii.10b-c).<sup>235</sup>

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But if dissatisfaction, or painful mental sensation, is not retribution, in which consciousness—visual consciousness, etc., mental consciousness—is mental trouble or trouble-of-the-mind, which is painful sensation, produced? [Apparently it is the retribution of a bad action].

58a. Mental-trouble is produced in the mental consciousness.<sup>236</sup>

The expression that the Kārikā uses, *manascitta*, "mental thought,"



is equivalent to the expression *manovijñāna*, "mental consciousness, consciousness of the *manas*."

The five sense consciousnesses cannot be troubled because they are free from imagining, inquiry and memory, and mental trouble is the imagining of that which does not exist (*asadvikalpa*, i.33).

58b. It arises from the retribution of action.

Mental trouble arises from the retribution of action.

The person who troubles and deranges the mind of another through curses and formulas; the person who causes another to drink poison or alcohol when he does not want to drink it; the person who frightens game, either in the hunt, or by setting the jungle on fire, or by the hollowing out of traps; and the person who, by whatever means, troubles the memory and the presence of mind of another, will have his own mind troubled, deprived of the aid of his memory through the effect of the retribution of these actions.<sup>237</sup>

58c-d. Through fear, the attack of demons, irritation of the elements, and fear.<sup>238</sup>

1. Demon beings,<sup>239</sup> with horrible features, will approach such a person: seeing them, the person is frightened and his mind is troubled. 2. Furious at the evil conduct of humans, demon beings will hit them in their vital parts. 3. The primary elements of the body will lose their equilibrium: the wind, heat and liquid will be irritated. 4. Fear also troubles the mind, for example in the case of *Vāsiṣṭhī*, etc.<sup>240</sup>

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But, one would say, if mental trouble, or trouble of the mental consciousness, arises from the retribution of action, how can one say that this mental sensation is not retribution?

We do not say that trouble of the mind—a troubled mind—is retribution of action, but that it arises from the retribution of action. The primary elements in a state of disequilibrium are retribution: the troubled mind proceeds from it; it thus arises from retribution. One says that the mind is troubled when,—by reason of the disequilibrium or the irritation of the humors, which results from action,—the mind is

deranged, anarchic, devoid of mindfulness.

Four alternatives: 1. The mind troubled without being disturbed: the mind undefiled but troubled; 2. the mind disordered without being troubled: the mind defiled, but tranquil; 3. the mind troubled and disordered; [and 4. the mind neither troubled nor disordered].

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Among whom is trouble of the mind produced?

58d. Among beings in Kāmadhātu, with the exception of the Kurus.

Among the gods of Kāmadhātu, there are two madnesses; all the more so is there madness among humans, Pretas, and animals.

Beings in hell always have troubled minds: their vital parts are incessantly hurt by thousands of different torments; they are crushed down by suffering; they do not recognize themselves, so they do not distinguish that which they should do and that which they should avoid. We give as an example a being in hell who laments by saying, "Ah! The mind!"

With the exception of the Buddha, the Āryans are not free from trouble of the mind: their thoughts can be troubled following the disequilibrium of the elements. But their disequilibrium of the elements is never retribution: for "determinate" actions where retribution could produce trouble of the mind are retributed before they have obtained the Path, and "indeterminate" actions will not bear their results due to the fact that the Path is obtained. Neither terror, nor the attack of demon beings, nor fear can trouble the mind of the Āryans, for they are above the five fears,<sup>241</sup> they do no disobedient actions which excite the fury of demon beings, for they completely know the nature of things.<sup>242</sup>

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The Sūtra teaches that there are three crookednesses, crookedness of the body, speech, and mind; and thus three corruptions and three stains.

59a-b. What is termed crookedness, corruption, stains,<sup>243</sup> is action arisen from hypocrisy, hatred, and attachment.

Action of the body, speech, and mind which arises from hypocrisy, proceeds from crookedness, and is called crookedness (*kauṣṭilya*, vi.50b); action which arises from hatred, proceeds from hatred, and is called corruption; and action which arises from attachment, proceeds from stain, and is termed stain.<sup>244</sup>

59c-d. Action is of four types, white, black, etc.<sup>245</sup>

The Sūtra teaches that action is of four types: black, of black retribution; white, of white retribution; black-white, of black-white retribution; neither black nor white, without black or white retribution; and that which destroys the other actions.

60. Bad actions, good action of Rūpa, good actions of Kāma, are, respectively, black, white, black-white; action which destroys the other actions is pure action.<sup>246</sup>

1. Bad action, being defiled, is absolutely black; retribution, being painful, is black.

2. Good action of the sphere of Rūpadhātu, not mixed with the bad, is absolutely white; its retribution, being agreeable, is white (see above p. 621, *ānirījya* action).

Objection: Why not say the same for good action of the sphere of Ārūpyadhātu?

Because<sup>247</sup> the qualification "white" applies only to action which has two retributions (i.e., in intermediate existence and in an existence proper),<sup>248</sup> and which is threefold, bodily, vocal and mental. Now action of the sphere of Ārūpyadhātu does not present these characteristics.

But the Sūtra describes action of the sphere of Ārūpyadhātu as white and of white retribution.<sup>249</sup>

3. Good action of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, being mixed with the bad, is black-white; its retribution is mixed, so it is thus black-white.

This definition is to be understood as applying, not to the nature of the action itself, but to the "series" or the person; in one and the same mental series, good action is mixed with bad action. There is no action which is black-white, nor any retribution which is black-white, which would be a contradiction.<sup>250</sup>

Objection: But bad action is also mixed with white action, hence bad action should be defined as black-white.

Bad action is not necessarily mixed with good action; whereas, in Kāmadhātu, good action is necessarily mixed with bad, because, in this sphere, the bad is stronger than the good.<sup>251</sup>

4. Pure action destroys the other three types of action. Not being defiled, it is not black; not being retribution, it is not white. It is "non-white" (*asukla*).

This expression of the Sūtra, *asukla*, is "intentional:" the Blessed One wishes to oppose pure action to white action; but, speaking in the *Mahāśūnyatāsūtra*<sup>253</sup> of the *dharma*s proper to the Arhat, he expresses himself thus, "The *dharma*s of the Arhat, Oh Ānanda, are absolutely white, absolutely good, absolutely irreproachable." And one reads in the *Treatise*,<sup>254</sup> "What are the white *dharma*s? The good *dharma*s and the neutral *dharma*s?"

Pure action does not have any retribution, for it is not of the domain of the spheres of existence; in fact, it arrests the process of existence.<sup>255</sup>

Does any pure action destroy all the actions of the first three categories, black, white, or black-white?

No.

61. A volition may be of twelve types, namely the volition of the *dharma*kṣāntis and of the first eight paths of abandoning in the detachment of Kāmadhātu: such is the action which destroys black action.<sup>256</sup>

Four volitions correspond to the four *dharma*kṣāntis of the Path of Seeing the Truths; eight volitions correspond to the first eight paths of abandoning in the detachment of Kāmadhātu: in all twelve volitions, all pure actions which destroy bad actions.

62a-b. The volition of the ninth is the action which destroys black-white action.

The volition which corresponds to the ninth path of abandoning in the detachment of Kāmadhātu is the pure action which causes the abandoning of black-white action and black action, for at this moment one abandons, in its entirety, good action of Kāmadhātu (which is black-white) and the ninth and last category of bad action.

62c-d. Volition which arises in the last paths of abandoning of the detachment of the *dhyānas* destroys good action.

The volition of the ninth and last path of abandoning which produces detachment of Kāmadhātu with regard to each *dhyāna* is fourfold volition which destroys white action.

Objection: The first eight paths of abandoning in the detachment of Kāmadhātu destroy black action. But you attribute the power to destroy white-black and white action (good and impure actions: *kuśalasāsrava*) solely to the ninth path of abandoning. Why is this?

There is not, properly speaking, abandonment of any good *dharma*s, for even if they are abandoned, the good *dharma*s can reappear; but when the defilement which has this *dharma* for its object is destroyed this *dharma* is said to be abandoned. Therefore as long as the last category of defilement which can grasp it as its object is not destroyed, this good *dharma* is not considered abandoned. [Now it is the ninth path of abandoning which breaks the *prāpti* of the ninth category of defilement relative to each sphere (Kāmadhātu, *dhyānas*) and, as a consequence, allows one to obtain disconnection (ii.57d) from this defilement).<sup>257</sup>

63a-b. According to others, the first two actions are retributed in hell and retributed moreover in Kāmadhātu.

According to other masters (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 590a) action which should be experienced in hell is black action; action which should be experienced elsewhere in Kāmadhātu, in addition to hell, is black-white action. Infernal retribution is produced exclusively through bad action: as a consequence, action which should be experienced in hell is black action. Retribution in Kāmadhātu, with the exception of hell, is exclusively produced by good-bad action (that is, by good action mixed with bad action).

63c-d. According to others, arisen in Kāma, actions are black when they can be abandoned through Seeing the Truths; they are black-white in the contrary case.<sup>258</sup>

According to other masters (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 590c5) action which is abandoned through Seeing the Truths, not being mixed with the

good,<sup>259</sup> is black. All other actions of Kāmadhātu, namely action which is abandoned through Meditation, is black-white, that is, good mixed with bad.

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The Sūtra says, "There are three silences, silence of the body, voice, and of the mind."<sup>260</sup>

64a-c. *Aśaikṣa*, that is, an Arhat's, actions of the body, voice and mind, are, in this order, the three silences.<sup>261</sup>

Silence of the body and silence of the voice is bodily and vocal action which belongs to the Arhat.<sup>262</sup> Silence of the mind is the mind or thought which belongs to an Arhat: this is not mental action.

Why is this?

Because the mind is the true Silent One, the true Muni.

The Vahāṣikas say that one knows through inference—by reason of the actions of the body and voice—that the mind is *aśaikṣa*.

But an Arhat's bodily and vocal action, is, in its nature, "abstention," whereas the action of the mind is not, by nature, "abstention," because three is no *avijñapti* of the mind.<sup>263</sup>

But "silence" is abstention, thus the mind itself "which abstains" receives the name of silence.

Why does only the mind of the Arhat receive this name?

Because the Arhat is the true Silent One through the cessation of all murmuring of his defilements.

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The Sūtra says, "There are three purifications, purification of the body, purification of the voice, and purification of the mind."<sup>264</sup>

64c-d. The threefold good practice in its entirety is the threefold purification.

All the good practices of the body, pure or impure, are a purification of the body, because, either for a time or in a definitive manner, they efface the impurity of the defilements and bad practices.

The same holds for the voice and mind.

This teaching has for its goal the instruction of persons who take a false silence for silence, and a false purification of purification.<sup>265</sup>

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The Sūtra<sup>266</sup> says that there are three bad practices.

65a-b. The bad actions of the body, speech and mind are regarded as being the three bad practices.

Bad actions of the body are the bad practices of the body and so on.<sup>267</sup>

65c-d. Even though greed, wickedness, anger and false views are not actions, they constitute a threefold bad practice of the mind.

Further, there are three bad practices of the mind which, by their nature, are not mental action:<sup>268</sup> greed, wickedness or harm, and false views.

The Dārṣṭāntikas<sup>269</sup> say that greed, wickedness and false views are, in fact, mental actions, for the *Samcetanīyasūtra* considers them as actions.<sup>270</sup>

The Vaibhāṣikas: In this hypothesis, defilements and actions would be the same thing.

The Dārṣṭāntikas: What harm do you see in that?

The Vaibhāṣikas: To admit that defilement is action is to contradict the Sūtra and the definition that it gives of action (iv.lb). As for the *Samcetanīyasūtra* to which you allude, it is volition itself that it designates when it says "greed," because volition comes into play under the influence of greed.

Because these produce a painful retribution, and because they are condemned by good persons, these practices of the body, speech and mind are bad; they are thus termed bad practices.

66a. Good practice is the opposite.<sup>271</sup>

The opposite of bad practice is good practice: good actions of the body, speech, and mind; further, non-greed, non-wickedness and right views.

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How can false views or right views be regarded as bad, or good?<sup>272</sup> In fact, the first does not contain an intention to do evil, and the second does not contain an intention to do good to another.

This is true, but they are the root of this twofold intention.

66b-d. By taking, among these practices, the most evident, one defines the ten courses of action, good and bad respectively.<sup>273</sup>

The Sūtra defines ten courses of action: good courses of action, by taking the most important,—which are the easiest to see—from among the good practices; and bad courses of action, by taking the gravest from among the bad practices.

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What practices, bad or good, are not included in the courses of action?

A part of the bad practices of the body, namely (1) preparatory and consecutive actions of bodily courses of action (*prayoga, prṣṭhabhūta*, iv.68c); and (2) certain defiled actions of the body, for example, drinking alcohol, hitting, binding, etc. (*Majjhima*, iii.34), are not included among the courses of action, because these practices are not extremely grave. Among the bad practices of the body are courses of action which deprive another of his life, of his goods, or of his wife: one must absolutely abstain from them.

That which is very grave among bad practices of speech, is, for this same reason, declared to be a course of action, not preparatory, consecutive, or minor action.

One part of the bad practice of the mind, volition, is also excluded from the bad courses of action.<sup>274</sup>

The good courses of action do not include 1. either a part of the good practice of the body: preparatory or consecutive; abstention from inebriating drinks, etc.; alms, worship, etc.;<sup>275</sup> 2. or one part of the good practice of speech, affectionate words, etc.;<sup>276</sup> 3. or one part of the good practice of the mind, good volition.



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Among the courses of action,

67a. Six bad courses of action can be exclusively *avijñapti*.<sup>277</sup>

When one has six courses of action—murder, stealing, lying, malicious speech, harmful speech, or inconsiderate speech—performed by another, then these six courses of action are only *avijñapti*. He who had these actions carried out is lacking the principle *viññapti*, that is, the act of killing itself, etc.<sup>278</sup>

67b. One bad course of action is always of two types.

Adultery is always *viññapti* and *avijñapti*, for it must be perpetrated in person. When one has it committed by another, he does not procure the same pleasure.

67b. Six, when one carries them out himself, are of two types also.<sup>279</sup>

When one executes them himself, the six courses of action specified above (67a) are at one and the same time *viññapti* and *avijñapti* if death takes place<sup>280</sup> at the same moment as the *viññapti* (that is, at the moment of the stroke by which one intends to kill): if death takes place later, there is only *avijñapti*.

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Among the good courses of action,

67c. Seven good courses of action are of two types.

Seven courses of material actions, that is, of the body and the voice, are of two types, *viññapti* and *avijñapti*. In fact the morality that one undertakes depends on one *viññapti*.

67d. They are only *avijñapti* when they have arisen from absorption.

The courses of action which are included in *dharmasāla*, that is, in the discipline of *dhyāna* and in the pure discipline, are qualified as

"arisen from absorption." These two disciplines depend on a single thought: the courses of action are thus not *viññapti*.<sup>281</sup>

Is this also the case for preparatory and consecutive actions as for the principle action or the course of action proper?

68a. The *sāmantakas* are *viññapti*.

The *sāmantakas* or preliminary actions are actions which prepare for the courses of action of the sphere of Kāmadhātu. They are always *viññapti* (iv.2b, 3d).

68b. They may or may not be *aviññapti*.

When they are accomplished with a great violence of passion (*paryavasthāna*, v.47, *ābrikyā*, ii.32, etc.), or with an extreme strength of faith (*prasādaghanarasena*, iv.22), they are *aviññapti*. If not, then no.

68c. The opposite concerning consecutive action.<sup>282</sup>

Consecutive actions are, on the contrary, necessarily *aviññapti*. They are *viññapti* when, having accomplished a course of action, one continues to commit actions analogous to the course of action.

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What is it that constitutes preparatory action, the course of action proper, and consecutive action?<sup>283</sup>

A man, desiring to kill an animal, rises from his bed, takes some silver, goes to the market, feels the animal, buys the animal, leads it, pulls it, makes it enter, mistreats it, takes a sword, strikes the head once or twice: as long as he does not kill it, the action preparatory to killing lasts.

At the stroke by which he deprives the animal of its life—that is, at the moment when the animal dies—the *viññapti* of this moment and the *aviññapti* which is simultaneous to this *viññapti*, are the course of action proper. For it is by reason of two causes that one is touched by the transgression of murder: by reason of the preparatory action and by reason of the achievement of the result [of the preparatory action].<sup>284</sup>

The moments that follow, the moments of *aviññapti* created by the killing, are the consecutive action; the series of the moments of *viññapti*

are also consecutive action: moments that constitute pulling the hide off the animal, washing it, weighing it, selling it, cooking it, eating it, and congratulating oneself on it.

In the same way one can explain, with the necessary changes, the other six courses of bodily and vocal action.<sup>285</sup>

There is no reason to distinguish preparatory and consecutive action for greed, wickedness and false views: at the moment when they manifest themselves, by the sole fact of their presence, they are courses of action proper.

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Objection: A question is raised. Is the course of action made up of *viññapti* and *avijñapti* at the moment when the animal is in *marāṇa-bhava*,<sup>286</sup> that is, at the moment when the animal dies? Or is the *viññapti* and the *avijñapti* of the moment when the animal is in *mṛtabhava*, that is, when it is dead?

If you accept the first hypothesis, a person would be guilty of the transgression of killing when he kills at the very moment when the killed animal dies: but your system (*siddhānta*, iv.72a-b) does not admit this. And in the second hypothesis, you have rightly said that, "at the stroke by which he deprives the animal of its life, the *viññapti* of this moment and the *avijñapti* simultaneous to this *viññapti*, are the course of action proper." [You should have said, *mṛte prāṇini yā viññaptiḥ* . . . "The *viññapti* which took place when the animal dies . . ."]

Further, if you accept the second hypothesis, you contradict the explanation that the Vaibhāṣikas give to the phrase, "while the *prayoga* has not yet disappeared," that one reads in the *Mūlaśāstra* (*Jñāna-prasthāna*, TD 26, p. 975a8). This Śāstra says, "Can it be the case that a living being has already been killed but that murder has not yet occurred?<sup>287</sup> Yes, when the living being has already been deprived of life, but when the *prayoga* [of the murder] has not yet disappeared."<sup>288</sup> The Vaibhāṣikas (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 617a3) explain this text by saying that the word *prayoga* ("conjoined with")—which normally signifies preparation—here has the meaning of consecutive action. Now you contradict this explanation since, placing the course of principle action at the moment when the animal dies, it is indeed the course of principal

action which, according to you, has not disappeared at the moment when the animal dies. You interpret the word *prayoga* of the Śāstra in the sense of the principal action.

The Vaibhāṣikas: One must explain the Śāstra in such a manner that it does not lend itself to criticism. And how is that? In the text in question, *prayoga* signifies principal course of action: [at least when one envisions the moment which immediately follows the death of the animal; when one envisions the moments which follow this moment, *prayoga* signifies, as the *Vibhāṣā* says, the consecutive action.]

But how could the *vijñapti* of the moment when the animal is already dead be the principal course of action?

The Vaibhāṣikas: Why would it not be?

Because it is ineffective. [The animal is dead: one does not cause it to die again.]

The Vaibhāṣikas: But how is *avijñapti*, which is always ineffective, a course of action? It is not their efficacy which makes a *vijñapti* and an *avijñapti* courses of action; it is the fact that they are produced at the moment of the achievement of the result of the preparatory action.<sup>289</sup>

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Can it be the case that one course of action is either a preparatory action or a consecutive action of another course of action?

Yes. For example the ten courses of action can be a preparatory action for murder. A man desires to kill his enemy; in order to assure the success of this enterprise, he takes the goods of another and offers an animal in sacrifice; as a means to this same end, he commits adultery with the wife of his enemy in order to make her an accomplice; through lying, malicious, injurious, and frivolous words, he causes a falling out between his enemy and his friends who would be able to defend him; he covets the goods of his enemy; he wishes to do evil to his enemy; he nourishes false views with regard to the murder that he wants to commit.

In this same way the ten courses of action can be the consecutive action of murder. And the same for the other courses of action, stealing, etc.<sup>290</sup>

But, greed, wickedness and false views are never preparatory

actions, for they are not the beginning of an action; nor are they preparatory actions, for they are solely a production of the mind.<sup>291</sup>

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The Sūtra says, "There are, Oh Bhikṣus, three types of killing: killing arisen from desire, killing arisen from hatred, and killing arisen from ignorance," and thus following to, "There are, Oh Bhikṣus, three types of false views." What are these different killings, etc.?

All the courses of action are not indifferently achieved by desire, hatred, or ignorance; but

68d. Preparatory action arises from three roots.<sup>292</sup>

The preparatory action of all of the courses of action can indifferently arise from the three roots. The Blessed One, by expressing himself as we have seen, refers to the first cause, the cause which gives rise (*samutthāpaka*, iv.10a-b) to the course of action.

1. Killing (iv.73) arisen from desire:<sup>293</sup> killing in order to seize a certain part of an animal; killing in order to seize some goods; killing for pleasure; killing in order to defend oneself, or one's friends.

Killing arisen from hatred, in order to satiate hostility.

Killing arisen through ignorance. To consider the sacrifice as a pious action and so to kill;<sup>294</sup> when a king, according to the authority of the legalists kills through duty, "The first of the meritorious actions of the king is to punish evil-doers"; when the Persians say, "One should kill one's aged and sick parents";<sup>295</sup> when one says, "One should kill serpents, scorpions, and *tryambuka* flies (*Mahāvīyutpatti*, 213, 91), etc., because these creatures are poisonous;<sup>296</sup> one must kill game, cattle, birds, and buffalos in order to nourish oneself."<sup>297</sup>

And finally killing which is provoked by false views: murder committed by a person who denies a future life and whom nothing can stop.

2. Stealing (iv.73c-d) arisen from desire. Either one steals the object desired, or one steals in order to then gain possession of another object, to acquire honor and respect,<sup>298</sup> or in order to defend oneself and one's friends.

Stealing arisen from hatred, in order to satiate hostility.

Stealing arisen from ignorance. A king, upon the authority of the legalists, seizes the goods of evil-doers. The Brāhmins say, "All things have been given to the Brāhmins by Brahmā; and it is through the weakness of the Brāhmins that the Vṛṣalas enjoy it. Consequently, when a Brāhmin steals, he takes that which belongs to him; he eats what is his, wears what is his, and gives what is his."<sup>299</sup> And yet, when Brāhmins take, they indeed have the notion of the goods of another.

Stealing provoked through false views is also stealing from ignorance.

3. Illicit sexuality (iv.74a-b) arisen from desire. Sexual intercourse with the wife of another, either through love, or in order to obtain honor and respect, or in order to defend oneself and one's friends.

Illicit sexuality arisen through hatred, in order to satiate hostility.

Illicit sexuality arisen from ignorance. The Persians, etc., have intercourse with their mothers and other forbidden women.<sup>300</sup> In the *gosava* sacrifice,<sup>301</sup> a Brāhmin drinks water in the manner of an animal, grazes through the grass, has intercourse with his mother, his sister, or a woman of his *gotra*; he must copulate with them wherever he finds them: in this manner this bull will triumph over the world. And such too are those that say, "Women are like rice mortars, flowers, fruits, cooked food, ladders, roads, and ferryboats: they are there to be used."<sup>302</sup>

4-7. Lying (iv.74c-d) and other vocal transgressions arisen from ignorance and from hatred, as above.

Lying arisen from ignorance. "Oh King, playful lying, lying to women, in marriage, or in danger of death, does not hurt: one says that these five lies are not transgressions."<sup>303</sup> This is lying provoked by false views.

Malicious words and other vocal transgressions arisen from ignorance. These are provoked through false views. Further, the false discourses of the *Vedas*, etc., are frivolous words arisen from ignorance.

8-10. How do greed, wickedness and false views (iv.77-78) arise out of desire, etc.? Since they are not preparatory action, this creates a difficulty:

69a-b. Greed and the other two mental courses arise from the three roots because they appear subsequent to these roots.

When they appear immediately after desire, they arise from desire;

the same for the other two roots.

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We have explained the bad courses of action in their relationship with the roots. As for the good courses of action,

69c-d. Good actions, with their preparatory and consecutive actions, arise from non-desire, non-hatred, and non-ignorance.

Good courses of action, with their preparatory and consecutive actions, have a good mind for their originating (*pravartaka*, iv.10) cause. This good mind, being necessarily associated with the three roots, arises from the three roots.

The renouncing of a preparation of a bad course of action is a preparation of a good course of action; the renouncing of the action proper which constitutes a bad course of action is itself a good course of action; the renouncing of a consecutive action of a bad course of action is a consecutive action of a good course of action.

Let us give as an example: the ordination of a novice. From the moment when the novice enters into the *nānāvasa*,<sup>304</sup> salutes the Saṅgha, addresses his request to the Upādhyāya, until the first or second *karmavācana*, this is the preparatory action.<sup>305</sup> At the achievement of the third *karmavācana* there takes place a *vijñapti*, and an *avijñapti* simultaneous to this *vijñapti*, which constitute the course of action itself. After this moment, when one notifies the new monk of the *nīśrayas*, when he makes known that he accepts them,<sup>306</sup> and as long as the series of the *avijñapti* created by the principal action continues—that is to say, as long as the monk does not lose the Prātimokṣa discipline (iv.38)—this is the consecutive action.

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We have seen that bad courses of action were not indifferently "achieved" by the three roots.

70a-b. Killing, wickedness, and injurious words are achieved through hate.

Solely by hate. They are achieved when one thought of murder,<sup>307</sup> or one thought of violence (concerning wickedness and injurious words) manifests itself.

70b-d. Adultery, greed, and stealing are achieved through desire.

"Adultery" is illicit sexuality.

71a. False views, through ignorance.

Through an extreme ignorance.

71b. The others, by the three.

The other courses of action,—lying, malicious words, and inconsiderate words,—are achieved either through desire, hatred, or ignorance.

The courses of action, which have just been divided into four sections, three (70a-b), three, one and three, have respectively for their

71c-d. Object: living beings, objects of enjoyment, *nāmarūpa*, and *nāman*.<sup>308</sup>

Living beings are the objects of killing, wickedness and injurious speech; the objects of enjoyment are the objects of adultery, greed and stealing; *nāmarūpa*, that is, the five *skandhas*, are the object of false views; *nāman*, that is, the *nāmakāya* (ii.47) is the object of lying and the other two transgressions of the voice.<sup>309</sup>

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When one has decided to kill someone, and if the murderer dies either before the intended victim, or if he dies at precisely the same moment as the victim, is there a principal course of action for the author of the murder?

72a-b. If one dies before or at the same time, there is no principal course of action.<sup>310</sup>

This is why the *Vibhāṣā* says, "Question: When a person has made the preparation for killing, can it be that, at the moment when the result of this preparation is achieved, this person is not touched by the



transgression of killing?<sup>311</sup> Answer: Yes, when the murderer dies before or at the same time [as the victim].” The reason is clear: as long as the victim is living, the murderer is not touched by the transgression of murder; and when the victim dies, he (=the murderer) no longer exists if he died at the same time or before.

72b. Because a new body has come into existence.

The body—the personality—by whom the preparation had been accomplished, the body of the murderer, is destroyed; the murderer takes up a new body which belongs to another *nikāyasabhāga* (ii.41a): this body did not make the preparation, is not *prayoktar* and, as a consequence, cannot be touched by the transgression of murder.

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When many persons are united with the intention to kill, either in war, or in the hunt, or in banditry, who is guilty of murder, if only one of them kills?

72c-d. As soldiers, etc., concur in the realization of the same effect, all are as guilty as the one who kills.

Having a common goal, all are guilty exactly as he who among them kills, for all mutually incite one another, not through speech, but by the very fact that they are united together in order to kill.

But is the person who has been constrained through force to join the army also guilty?

Evidently so, unless he has formed the resolution, “Even in order to save my life, I shall not kill a living being.”

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What does he do in order that he who kills should commit the course of action? Same question for the other transgressions up to and including false views.

73a-b. Murder is to kill another, consciously, without making an error.

When a person kills by thinking, "I am killing such a one," and kills this same person, and not another through error, then there is murder.<sup>312</sup>

But is there murder when a person kills, doubting if he hits a living being or a thing, or if he hits another?

This person possesses the certitude, "This is certainly him"; he hits him; and as a consequence, there is the thought of *parityāga*.<sup>313</sup>

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How can there be murder, or destruction of the *prāṇa* (*prāṇātīpāta*), since the *skandhas* are momentary?<sup>314</sup>

*Prāṇa*, the "vital breath", is a wind whose existence depends on the body and the mind.<sup>315</sup> This *prāṇa* is annihilated by a murderer in the same way in which one annihilates a flame or a sound of a bell, that is to say, by obstructing the continuation of its reproducing itself.

Or rather,<sup>316</sup> *prāṇa* is the vital organ (*jīvītendriya*, ii.45a): when a person creates an obstacle to the arising of a new moment of the vital organ, he annihilates it, and is touched by the transgression of killing.

But to whom do you attribute the vital organ? Who do you say is dead when life is absent?<sup>317</sup>

The true value of the pronoun "to whom" or "of whom" will be examined in the chapter on the Refutation of the Pudgala (Chapter IX).<sup>318</sup> Let us observe that the Blessed One said, "When life, heat and consciousness leave the body, it lies abandoned, like a piece of wood, deprived of feeling."<sup>319</sup> One says that the body lives when it is endowed with the organs; and that the body is dead when it is devoid of them.

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According to the Nirgranthas,<sup>320</sup> a transgression (*adharma*) results for the doer from killing, even committed without knowing it, or without desiring it, in the way that contact with fire results in burning.

But if this is the case, then one is guilty when one sees, or touches, without wanting to, the wife of another; he who trims the hair of the Nirgranthas is guilty; the master of the Nirgranthas is guilty since he preaches terrible austerities; he who gives the Nirgranthas food which

provokes cholera and death is also guilty. The mother and the embryo which are both the cause of suffering, are guilty; guilty also is the person killed, for he is bound to the action of killing as the object killed: and fire burns its own support. But on the other hand, he who has murder committed by another is not guilty, for one is not himself burned when one has another person touch the fire. Since you do not take intention into consideration, wood and other materials, even though lacking consciousness, are guilty of murder when a house collapses and living beings perish.<sup>321</sup> If you would avoid these consequences, recognize that but one example—the example of the fire—and it alone, not accompanied by any argument, cannot prove your thesis.

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73c-d. Stealing—taking what is not given—is to appropriate to oneself the goods of another through force or in secret.<sup>322</sup>

The reservation above holds: “with the condition that there has been no error.”<sup>323</sup>

To appropriate to oneself, through force or in secret, that which is possessed by another, when one does not confuse the person from whom one wants to steal with another person, constitutes stealing.

The plunder of a Stūpa is to take a thing that has not been given by the Buddha: for, at the moment of Nirvāṇa, the Blessed One accepted, appropriated to himself all the gifts made to Stūpas.<sup>324</sup> According to others, this is to take a thing which has not been given by the guardians of the Stūpa.<sup>325</sup>

To take a thing that does not have an owner is to take what is not given by the ruler of the country.

To take the goods, the robes, etc., of an deceased monk,<sup>326</sup> is to take what is not given by the Saṅgha of the parish,<sup>327</sup> in the case when an ecclesiastical action has not been done; in the opposite case, this is to take what is not given by all the disciples of the Buddha.

74a-b. Illicit sexuality, fourfold, is intercourse with a woman with whom one should not have intercourse.<sup>328</sup>

1. Intercourse with a forbidden woman, that is, the wife of another,

one's mother, one's daughter, or one's paternal or maternal relations;<sup>329</sup> 2. Intercourse with one's own wife through a forbidden way;<sup>330</sup> 3. in an unsuitable place: an uncovered spot, a *caitya*, an *araṇya*;<sup>331</sup> 4. at an unsuitable time: when the wife is pregnant, when she is nursing,<sup>332</sup> or when she has taken a vow.<sup>333</sup> Some say: when she has taken a vow only with the consent of her husband.

The reservation relative to killing, "with the condition that there has been no error," also extends to illicit sexuality, and there is no course of action when one has intercourse with the wife of another if one thought that he was with his own wife.<sup>334</sup>

Opinions differ on whether there is a course of action when one takes the wife of a certain one for the wife of another one. For some, yes, for it is the wife of another who was the object of the preparatory action; it is also the wife of another that one enjoys. For others, no, as in the case of killing with an error of person: the object of the preparatory action is not the object of the enjoyment.<sup>335</sup>

With regard to whom is intercourse with Bhikṣunis illicit sexuality?

With regard to the master of the land, who is not disposed to tolerate it. As for the master of the country himself, if his spouse, when she has undertaken a vow, is forbidden to him, all the more reason are nuns so forbidden.

Intercourse with a young girl is illicit with regard to the man to whom she is engaged, and, if she is not engaged, with regard to her guardian; if she has no guardian, then with regard to the king. (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 585a20)

74c-d. Lying is discourse held, with differing thoughts, with a person who understands the meaning.<sup>336</sup>

1. Lying is discourse held, with thoughts different from the sense expressed, with a person who understands the meaning. When the person addressed does not understand, such discourse is only frivolous words.

2. Discourse (ii.47a-b) is sometimes made up of numerous syllables. Which will be the course of action? Which will be lies?

The last syllable, which is *viññapti* and which is accompanied by *aviññapti*. Or rather, the syllable whose hearing causes the meaning to be understood. The preceding syllables are a preparation for the lie.

3. How should one interpret the expression *arthābhijñā*, "a person who understands the meaning?" Does this refer to the moment when the person addressed understands the meaning? Does it refer to a person addressed capable of understanding the meaning? In the first hypothesis, you admit that the course of action takes place when the person addressed has understood the meaning; it follows then that the course of action is solely *avijñapti*: for the person addressed understood the meaning through mental consciousness, which is consecutive to auditory consciousness; and the *viññapti*, or vocal action, perishes at the same time as the auditory consciousness. There is no longer any *viññapti* at the moment when the person addressed understands. In the second hypothesis, this difficulty is not present. But what must one do in order that the person addressed is "capable of understanding the meaning?"<sup>337</sup>

The person who knows the language and in whom auditory consciousness has arisen is "capable of understanding the meaning."

One must interpret the text in a manner in which it will not give rise to criticism.

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The Sūtra<sup>338</sup> teaches that there are sixteen "vocal actions," eight of which are bad: to say that one has seen what one has not seen, to say that one has heard, cognized, or known what one has not heard, cognized, or known; to say that one has not seen when one has seen; and to say that one has not heard, cognized, or known when one has heard, cognized, or known; and eight are good: to say that one has not seen when one has not seen . . .

What is the meaning of the words seen (*dṛṣṭa*), heard (*śrūta*), cognized (*viññāta*), and known (*mata*)?

75. What is perceived through the visual consciousness, through the auditory consciousness, through the mental consciousness, and through three consciousnesses, is called, in order, seen, heard, cognized, and known.

What is perceived through the visual consciousness receives the name of seen, . . . what is perceived through the consciousness of smell,

taste, and touch, receives the name of known.

How do you justify this last interpretation?

The Vaibhāṣikas say that odors, tastes and tangible things, being morally neutral, are as dead (*mṛtakalpa*); this is why they are called *mata*.

The Sautrāntikas: According to what authority do you maintain that the expression *mata* refers to what is smelled, tasted, and touched?

The Vaibhāṣikas: According to the Sūtra, and by virtue of reasoning.

The Sūtra says, "What do you think, Oh Mālakimātar,<sup>339</sup> the visible objects that you have not seen, that you have not seen formerly, that you do not see, about which you do not think 'Would that I could see them,' do you have, by reason of them, any longing, lust, desire, affection, attachment, appetite, or searching out?<sup>340</sup> No, Lord. Oh Mālakimātar, with regard to the subject seen, you will only think, 'it is seen,' with regard to the subject heard, cognized, and known, you will only think, 'it is heard, cognized, known (*matamātram bhaviṣyati*).'"

The words "seen," "heard," and "cognized," certainly refer to visible things, to sounds, and to the *dharma*s: hence the word *mata* refers to smells, tastes, and tangible things (opinion of Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga*, 451). If it were otherwise, the experience relative to smells, tastes and tangible things would not be referred to in this teaching of the Blessed One.

The Sautrāntikas: This Sūtra does not have the meaning that you believe it does, and it does not confirm your interpretation of the word *mata*. The Blessed One does not aim to define the characteristics of the four experiences, having seen, having heard, having cognized, having *mata*. His mind is evidently, "In the fourfold experience, seeing, etc.,—each of which bears on the sixfold objects, visible things, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible things and *dharma*s,—you maintain only that this experience takes place, that you see, etc., without attributing (*adhyāropa*) to the object the characteristic of disagreeable or agreeable."

Then what should one thus understand by seen, heard, *mata* (known) and cognized?

According to the Sautrāntikas, that which is immediately perceived by the five material organs, is seen, *dṛṣṭa*; that the consciousness of which is transmitted to us by another, is heard, *śrūta*; what is admitted

by reason of correct reasoning, is *mata*, known; and what is perceived by the mental organ is cognized, *viññāta*.<sup>341</sup> Thus five categories of objects—visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible things—are seen, heard, known, and cognized; the sixth category—*dharmas*—is not seen: such is the fourfold experience that the Sūtra refers to. It is thus false that, in the hypothesis where *mata* does not designate odors, tastes, and tangible matter, the experience relative to these objects would be omitted in the Sūtra: thus the argument of the Vaibhāṣikas does not hold.

According to former masters,<sup>342</sup> "seen" is what is perceived by the organ of seeing; "heard" is what is perceived by the organ of hearing and what one learns from another: "known" is what is personally accepted or experienced;<sup>343</sup> and "cognized" is what one feels in and of oneself (i.e., agreeable sensation, etc., or an intuition that one has in an absorption).

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Does he<sup>344</sup> who, by means of his body and not by means of speech, causes to be understood what is not in his mind, commit lying?

Yes. The Śāstra says in fact, "Question: Can one be touched by the transgression of killing, without acting, without attacking bodily? Answer: Yes, when one acts vocally."<sup>345</sup> Question: Can one be touched by the transgression of lying without vocal action? Answer: Yes, when one acts bodily. Question: Can one be touched by the transgression of murder, by the transgression of lying, without either bodily or vocal action? Answer: Yes, for example the Ṛṣis, guilty of murder through their anger,<sup>346</sup> and a Bhikṣu, guilty of lying through his silence in the confession ceremony."<sup>347</sup> (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 617c25).

But, we would say, how could one admit that Ṛṣis and a Bhikṣu accomplish a course of action which is at one and the same time *viññāpti* and *avijñāpti*? Neither the Ṛṣis nor a Bhikṣu have bodily or vocal action: hence there is no *viññāpti*; and *avijñāpti* of the sphere of Kāmadhātu cannot exist where *viññāpti* is absent (iv.2a). This is a difficulty that must be resolved.<sup>348</sup>

76a-b. Malicious or slanderous speech is the discourse of a

person with a defiled mind with a view to dividing.<sup>349</sup>

The discourse that one has, with a defiled mind, with a view to dividing others and creating enmity, is malicious speech.

The restrictions formulated above, "when the person addressed understands, when there is no confusion of persons," applies here.

76c. Injurious words are abusive discourse.

Discourse pronounced with a defiled mind, outraging, understood by him whom one addresses, addressed to him whom one wants to address, is injurious speech.<sup>350</sup>

76c-d. All defiled discourse is inconsiderate speech.<sup>351</sup>

The Kārikā has "all defiled . . ."; but it refers here to discourse.

All defiled discourse is inconsiderate speech; one who utters it is thus an "inconsiderate speaker"; but the Kārikā has *bhinnapralāpita* in place of *sambhinnapralāpa*.

77a. According to others, inconsiderate speech is the defiled discourse which differs from the others.

Lying, malicious and injurious speech and defiled discourse: the name "inconsiderate speech" is reserved for the defiled speech which is neither lying, nor malicious, nor injurious.

77b-c. For example, boasting, singing, declamations; for example, bad commentaries.

For example, a monk boasts about himself in order to obtain alms, etc.;<sup>352</sup> through frivolity<sup>353</sup> some others sing; in the course of plays or dances, the dancers, in order to entertain the public, hold inconsiderate discourse; adopting the doctrines of bad philosophers, non-Buddhists read bad commentaries. And in addition, there are lamentations and loquaciousness,<sup>354</sup> carried out with a defiled mind but which differ from lying, malicious speech and injurious speech.

But is it not true that, in the period of a Cakravartin King, there are songs that do not have inconsiderate words?

In this period, songs are inspired by a spirit of detachment, not by sensuality.<sup>355</sup> Or, according to another opinion, there is, in this period,



inconsiderate words, since one speaks of *āvāha*, of *vivāha*, etc.;<sup>356</sup> but this inconsiderate speech does not constitute the course of action of this name.

77c-d. Greed is the desire to appropriate to oneself, by illegitimate means, the goods of another.

To desire to appropriate to oneself the goods of another in an illegitimate manner, in an unjust manner, by force or secretly—"Would that the goods of another were mine!"<sup>357</sup>—is the course of action called greed, *abhidhyā*.

According to another opinion, *abhidhyā* means all desire of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, for the *Sūtra of the Five Nīvaraṇas*,<sup>358</sup> on the subject of *kāmacchanda*, expresses itself thusly, "Having abandoned *abhidhyā* . . ."

But, say other masters, Cakravartin Kings and the Uttarakurus are not guilty of the course of *abhidhyā* action, and yet they are not delivered from desire of the sphere of Kāmadhātu.

Let us admit that all desire of the sphere of Kāmadhātu is *abhidhyā*: but all *abhidhyā* is not a course of action. Only the most notable among the bad practices are included among the courses of action (iv.66b).

78a. Wickedness is a hatred of living beings.<sup>359</sup>

It is a hatred of living beings, by which one desires to harm the person of another.<sup>360</sup>

78b-c. False view is the opinion that there is neither good nor bad.<sup>361</sup>

As it is said in the Sūtra, "There is no gift, no sacrifice, no oblation, no good action, no bad action . . . there are no Arhats in the world." False view, as this Sūtra shows, consists of negating action, its results, and the existence of Āryans. The Kārikā only indicates the beginning.

Such is the definition of the ten bad courses of action.

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What is the meaning of the expression "course or pathway of action" (*karma-patha*)?

78c-d. Three are courses of action; seven are also action.<sup>362</sup>

Greed, wickedness and false views are courses of action—courses of action that one terms volition (*cetanā*, iv.1b). In fact, volition which is associated with them is moved by their movement, in that, by their force, it acts in conformity with them: it moves by their out-going.

Murder and the other six transgressions are action, for they are, by their nature, actions of body and voice; and they are also courses of this action that is called volition, for the volition that gives rise to them (*tatsamutthānacetanāyāh*, iv.10) has in these transgressions its end and reason for existence.

The expression "course of action" thus simply means course of action when one applies it to greed, etc.; it signifies action and course of action when it is applied to killing, etc. A similar composition is justified by the rule of *asarūpāṇām apy ekaśeṣah*: "A single meaning is maintained even when the terms of a compound are different" (*Pāṇini*, i.2.64).

In the same way one should understand the good courses of action, the renouncing of killing, etc., non-greed, etc.

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Why are not preparatory and consecutive actions considered as courses of action (iv.66b-d)?

Because preparatory action is accomplished with a view to the action proper; and because consecutive action has for its roots the action itself.<sup>363</sup> Furthermore, the most notable among good and bad practices alone are courses of action. And finally, courses of action are actions the augmentation and diminution of which have for their result the augmentation or the diminution of things and living beings (iv.85, iii.89).

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The Sāutrāntikas do not recognize volition as a mental action; for them, there is no mental action outside of greed, etc. (iv.65c-d).

How then do they explain the fact that the Sūtra gives the name of

course of action to greed etc.? This is a question they must answer.

The response is not difficult. Greed, wickedness (anger) and false view are mental actions and they are pathways leading to bad realms of rebirth; or rather they are both courses of action, for greed sets into motion wickedness (anger) and false view, and vice versa.

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The ten bad courses of action are in complete contradiction with the good *dharma*s.

79a. The view of negation cuts off the roots of good.<sup>364</sup>

The cutting off of the roots of good takes place through the false view of the ninth degree, strong-strong (iv.79d).

Objection: You affirm that only false view cuts off the roots of good, but the *Treatise*<sup>365</sup> says, "What are the strong roots of evil? They are the roots of evil which cut off the roots of good, the roots of evil which are initially abandoned when one acquires detachment from Kāmadhātu." This text proves that greed and the other roots of evil cut off the roots of good.

Answer: Only false view cuts off the roots of good; but false view is brought about by the roots of evil: hence the *Treatise* attributes to these last the operation which more properly belongs to false views. In the same way that one says that bandits burn a village because it is they who light the fire that burns the village.

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What roots of good are cut off?

79b. The innate roots of the sphere of Kāmadhātu.<sup>366</sup>

The roots of good of the sphere of Kāmadhātu are cut off when one cuts off the roots of good; for one who cuts off the roots of good of Kāmadhātu is not endowed with the roots of good of Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu.

If this is so, how should one understand this text of the *Prajñāpti*, "What cuts off this person's roots of good of the three spheres?"

(quoted in *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 184b17).

This text means that, at this moment, the acquisition of the roots of good of the superior spheres become distant, because this person, who was formerly fit for these acquisitions, ceases to exist through the cutting off of the roots of good of Kāmadhātu.

It refers to the innate roots of good: for one who cuts off the roots of good has already fallen from the acquired roots of good (*prayogika*, ii.71b, trans. p. 314, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 183b5).

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What is the object of the false view which cuts off the roots of good?

79c. The false view which negates cause and result.

Negation of cause is to think, "There is neither good nor bad action." Negation of result is to think, "There is no retribution, no result of good or bad action" (iv.78b-c, v.7).

According to another opinion, these two false views,—that which negates cause, and that which negates result,—contribute to the cutting off of the roots of good in the same way as *ānantaryamārga* and *vimuktimārga* contribute to the cutting off of the defilements (vi.28, 65b).

Some say that the negation which cuts off the roots of good has for its object (that is, denies) *sāsrava*, the impure, or the first two Truths, and not *anāsrava*, the pure, or the last two Truths; rather it has for its object the sphere where one is to be found, and not Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu. In fact, the negation which bears on the "pure" or the higher spheres is weak, because it is in relation with these objects only by association (v.17-18).<sup>367</sup>

But the *Vaibhāṣikas* say:<sup>368</sup>

79d. Completely.

The roots of good are cut off completely by false view, whether this refers to cause or result, pure or impure, Kāmadhātu or the higher spheres.

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Some say that the nine categories of the roots of good, weak-weak roots of good, weak-medium, weak-strong, medium-weak, etc., are cut off all at once through one moment of false view, in the same way that the defilements which are abandoned by Seeing into one Truth are, in all their categories, abandoned through the Seeing of this Truth (vi.lc-d).

But the Vaibhāṣikas say:

79d. Gradually.

The roots of good are cut off in the manner in which the defilements to be abandoned through Meditation on the Truths (*satyabhāvanā*, vi.33) are abandoned: this means that the strong-strong root of good is cut off by a weak-weak false view, and thus following to the weak-weak root of good which is cut off by a strong-strong false view.

This theory is not in agreement with the text,<sup>369</sup> "What are the 'small and concomitant' roots of good.<sup>370</sup> They are those which are abandoned lastly to the cutting off of the roots of good; those through the absence of which a person is termed one-who-has-the-roots-of-good-cut-off."

Objection: If the cutting off is gradual, how should one understand the text, "What are the strong-strong roots of evil? The roots of evil through which one cuts off the roots of good?"

This text refers to the achievement of the cutting off of the roots of good, for it is through the strong-strong roots of evil that the roots of good totally disappear. As long as the last category of the roots of good, the weak-weak, is not cut off, it can determine the reappearance of the others.<sup>371</sup>

According to certain masters, the cutting off of the nine categories takes place at one time, without interruption,<sup>372</sup> like the abandoning of the defilements through the Path of Seeing into the Truths. But the Vaibhāṣikas say that it takes place either without interruption, or at several times.

According to certain masters, the abandoning of discipline (*saṃvaraprahāṇa*, iv.38) preceeds the cutting off of the roots. But the Vaibhāṣikas say that the discipline is lost when one loses the mind of which this discipline is the result (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 183c8).<sup>373</sup>

What beings are capable of cutting off the roots of good?

79d. The cutting off takes place among humans.

Only humans cut them off; not the creatures in the painful realms of rebirth; for their discernment (*prajñā*), whether defiled or not, is not firm; not the gods, for the result of action is manifest to them.<sup>374</sup> And only humans of the three continents cut them off, not those of Uttarakuru, for they do not possess bad *āśayas*.<sup>375</sup>

According to another opinion,<sup>376</sup> only humans in Jambudvīpa cut off the roots of good. But this is in contradiction with the text, "The inhabitants of Jambudvīpa possess a minimum of eight organs; the same for the inhabitants of Pūrvavidena and of Avaragodāniya."<sup>377</sup>

80a. Men and women cut off the roots.

According to another opinion, women do not cut off the roots because their will and their application are weak. But this is in contradiction with the text, "Whoever possesses the female organ necessarily possesses eight organs" (ii.18d).

The sensualist does not cut off the roots of good because his *āśaya* is in movement; the only one who cuts them off is

80a-b. The rationalist.<sup>378</sup>

Because his *āśaya* is bad, firm, and hidden.<sup>379</sup>

By virtue of these same principles, eunuchs, etc.,<sup>380</sup> do not cut off the roots of good, because they are counted among the sensualists, and because their discernment, like that of the creatures of painful realms of rebirth, is not firm.

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What is the nature of the cutting off of the roots of good?

80b. The cutting off is non-possession.

When the possession of the roots of good is obstructed in rearing, in continuing, then ten non-possessiones (*aprāpti*), or non-endowedments (*asamavāgama*, ii.37) arise.

When *aprāpti* has arisen, there is a cutting off of the roots of good.

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When the roots of good have been cut off, how do they rearise?

80c. Rearising through doubt, through insight into the existence of cause, etc.

It can happen that a person whose roots of good have been cut off produces, relative to cause and result, either doubt or insight into their existence, which is Right View. When Right View has arisen, then one says that the roots of good have arisen,<sup>381</sup> because the possession of these roots is henceforth present. The roots arise in their nine categories; but they will only gradually manifest themselves, in the same way that one initially regains one's health and then, gradually, one's strength.<sup>382</sup>

80d. Not here, for one guilty of *ānantarya*.<sup>383</sup>

Other persons who have cut off the roots of good can take them up again in this life, but not one guilty of an *ānantarya* transgression (iv.97) who has thus cut off the roots of good. It is with regard to this transgressor that it is said, "This person is unfit to again take up the roots of good in this life; but he certainly will take them up either by dying in hell, or by being born."<sup>384</sup> "By being born" means to be found in an intermediate state [which preceeds existence in hell]. "By dying" means disposed to die [in hell]. The roots of good are taken up by being born since they have been cut off by the force of the cause; and by dying, since they have been cut off by the force of a condition. Same difference when they have been cut off by one's own force, or by the force of another.<sup>385</sup>

The person who is *āśayavipanna*<sup>386</sup>—that is to say, lost (*vipanna*) by the fact of his false view—can take up again the roots of good in the present existence. The person who is both *āśayavipanna* and *prayogavipanna*—that is, one who is furthermore lost through the fact of his *ānantarya* transgression—takes up the roots again only after the destruction of his body.<sup>387</sup> [This is a variant of what has just been said, "One who has cut off the roots by his own force, or by the force of another . . ."]. Same difference for one who is *dr̥ṣṭivipanna* (lost through false view) and one who is at the same time both *dr̥ṣṭivipanna*

and *śīlavipanna* (lost further by an *ānantarya* transgression).<sup>388</sup> [This is a variant on the immediately preceding passage].

One can cut off the roots of good and not be destined to hell (*mithyātvaniyata*, iii.44c-d). Four cases: 1. Pūraṇa and the other five masters;<sup>389</sup> 2. Ajātaśatru; 3. Devadatta; and 4. persons who have not cut off the roots and who have committed an *ānantarya* transgression.

A person with a false view, who has cut off the roots of good, is punished in Avīci Hell; a person guilty of an *ānantarya* transgression is punished in Avīci, or elsewhere.<sup>390</sup>

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Volition is the principal action. We shall explain with how many courses of action volition can coexist.

81a-c. With regard to the painful realms of rebirth, volition can coexist at most with eight courses.

Volition can coexist with one course of action, as when either greed, anger, or a false view manifests itself, without any "material" (*rūpin*) course of action having taken place; or rather the person who has prepared one of the material courses of action finds himself to have a non-defiled, that is, a good or neutral mind, at the moment when, on his instigation, this course of action is perpetuated.<sup>391</sup>

Volition can coexist with two courses of action, as when a person with an angry mind kills; or when a person who is prey to greed steals, or commits adultery, or speaks in an inconsiderate manner.<sup>392</sup>

Volition can coexist with three courses of action, as when a person with an angry mind kills and steals at the same time.<sup>393</sup>

But haven't we seen that stealing is only achieved by desire alone (iv.70)? This restriction refers to the achievement of stealing committed by a person who only thinks of stealing.<sup>394</sup>

Volition can coexist with three courses of action, as when greed is present at the moment when two material courses of action are completed that one has committed by another.

Volition can coexist with four courses of action, as when one lies or when one injures with the intention of dividing: there is one mental course of action and three vocal courses of action.<sup>395</sup> Or rather, when the



mind is in the prey of greed, etc., at the moment when three material courses are completed.

Volition can coexist with five, six, or seven courses of action, as when the mind is in the prey of greed, etc., at the moment when four, five, or six material courses of action are completed.

Volition can coexist with eight courses of action, as when a person has made the preparatory action of six courses of action, murder, etc.; at the moment when these six courses of action are completed, he is in the prey of greed and commits adultery.

Volition cannot coexist with nine courses of action, or with ten courses, because greed, anger, false view are not simultaneous.

81c-d. Concerning good courses of action, volition can coexist with ten.

The ten good courses of action can be simultaneous to volition.

81d. Volition does not coexist with one, eight, or five courses of action.<sup>396</sup>

Volition can coexist with two courses of actions, as when a person in the absorption of *Ārūpyadhātu*, in possession of *keṣayañāna* or *anutpādañāna* (vi.45, 50): his five consciousnesses are good. There are thus two courses of action: non-greed and non-anger.<sup>397</sup>

Volition can coexist with three courses of action, as when the mental consciousness is associated with Right View and when the seven good material courses of action are absent.

Volition can coexist with four courses of action. When, with a bad or neutral mind, one undertakes the discipline of an Upāsaka or a Śrāmaṇera which embraces four material good courses of action, non-killing, etc.

Volition can coexist with six courses of action, as when, the five consciousnesses being good, one undertakes the same disciplines: four good material courses of action, non-greed and non-anger.

Volition can coexist with seven courses of action. When, with a good mental consciousness, one undertakes the same discipline, add Right View. Or rather, when, with a bad or neutral mind, one undertakes the discipline of Bhikṣu: only seven material courses of action.

Volition can coexist with nine courses of action. [Three cases:] One

undertakes the discipline of a Bhikṣu, the five consciousnesses (visual consciousness, etc.) being good: Right View is absent; one undertakes this same discipline at a moment when, in an absorption of *Ārūpyadhātu*, one possesses *kṣayajñāna* or *anutpādayajñāna*. [This is the case, examined above, of the two courses of action: one must add the seven courses of action of discipline, which is here not *avijñapti*]; in the course of an absorption of a *dhyāna*, one possesses *kṣayajñāna* or *anutpādayajñāna* [Right View is absent; the seven material courses of action exist as part of the discipline of *dhyāna* (*avijñapti*)].<sup>398</sup>

Volition can coexist with ten good courses of action. In the different cases: when one undertakes the discipline of a Bhikṣu with a good mental consciousness, except in the case of *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayajñāna*; and all volition concomitant with the discipline of *dhyāna* and pure discipline when this volition is not associated with *kṣayajñāna* or *anutpādayajñāna*.

We have shown under what conditions volition coexists with the good courses of action included in the disciplines. If one looks at the good courses of action independent of the disciplines, volition can also be found with one course of action, five courses of action, and eight courses of action:

1. When one renounces a transgression and when one has a mind different from that which provokes this renouncing, that is, a defiled or neutral mind; 2. when one renounces two transgressions and when one has a good mental consciousness: this good mental consciousness includes the three mental actions to which is added two renouncings, two material actions; and 3. when, under the same conditions, when one renounces five transgressions.<sup>399</sup>

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What are the courses of action which exist, either in fact or as potentiality,<sup>400</sup> in the different realms of rebirth?

82a-b. Inconsiderate words, injurious words, anger, of two types, exist in hell.<sup>401</sup>

Inconsiderate words exist in hell, for beings in hell lament: injurious words, for beings in hell mutually reproach one another;<sup>402</sup> and anger,

because they hate one another for the duration of their lives.

82c-d. Greed and false views, as potentiality.

Beings in hell possess greed and false views, but these do not actually exist in hell: because of the absence of any object to which one could become attached,<sup>403</sup> and because the result of action is manifested.

In hell killing is absent, for beings in hell die through the exhaustion of their actions (*karmakṣaya*, ii. trans. p. 235-6); stealing and adultery are absent, for beings in hell do not have property or objects of property, or women; lying is absent, for it is useless; and malicious words are useless, for beings in hell are at a distance and are always separate from one another.

82d. Three exist in Uttarakuru.

Greed, anger and false views exist in Uttarakuru in the sense that the inhabitants of Uttarakuru are in possession of a potentiality for greed, anger and false views. But, in fact, greed is absent there, for no one has anything of his own; in the same way anger is absent, because they are soft, and because there is no cause for displeasure; so too false views are absent, because there is no bad *āśaya* (*apāpāśayatvāt*, iv.80d).

83a. The seventh course exists there in fact also.

Inconsiderate words exist there in fact; for, sometimes, the inhabitants of Uttarakuru sing with a defiled mind.

Because bad *āśaya* is absent there; because the duration of one's life is determined there (iii.78c; ii. trans. p. 236); and because no one possesses any property or object of property, or women, and also through its lack of usefulness, killing and the other courses of action are absent in Uttarakuru.

If the men of Uttarakuru do not have wives, how can they have unchaste behavior? They take the women with whom they desire to enjoy pleasure by the hand and go to a tree. If sex with this woman is allowable, the tree covers up the couple with its branches; in the contrary case, the tree does not cover up the couple.<sup>404</sup>

83b. The ten bad courses of action exist elsewhere in Kāma-dhātu.

The ten bad courses of action exist in fact in Kāmadhātu with the exception of hell and Uttarakuru.

Concerning animals, Pretas and gods, the bad courses of action are not necessarily connected with undiscipline (*asaṁvāsanirmukta*, see iv.24c); with regard to humans, the bad courses of action are either necessarily connected, or not necessarily connected to undiscipline.

Does killing exist among the gods? The gods do not, amongst themselves, kill one another, but they kill beings belonging to other realms of rebirth, Pretas, etc. According to another opinion, the gods also kill by cutting the head or the body.<sup>405</sup>

83c-d. Three good courses of action exist everywhere, as potentiality and in fact.

Everywhere, in the three spheres of existence and in the five realms of rebirth, non-greed, non-anger and Right Views exist both as potentiality and in fact.

84a-b. In the Ārūpyas, among the Unconscious Ones, seven courses of action exist as potentiality.

Among the beings of Ārūpyadhātu and the Asāṁjñīsattvas (ii.41d), the seven good material courses of action, bodily and vocal, exist solely as potentiality.

In fact, Āryans who are born in Ārūpyadhātu possess the past and future discipline of pure morality, and the Unconscious Ones possess the discipline of *dhyāna* (iv.13c) under the same conditions.

The past pure discipline that the Āryan who is in Ārūpyadhātu possesses, has for its base of support the stage or stages (Four Dhyānas) which he has produced and destroyed; the future pure discipline that he will possess, has on the contrary the five stages (Kāmadhātu and the Four Dhyānas) for its base of support.<sup>406</sup>

84b-d. For the rest, good courses of action also exist in fact, with the exception of beings in hell and the Uttarakurus.

The rest, that is, in the other spheres of existence, and in the other realms of rebirth.

Beings in hell and the Uttarakurus do not undertake any morality. Elsewhere the seven good material courses of action exist in fact.

One must make a distinction. Among the animals and Pretas, the good courses of action are never necessarily connected with discipline; in Rūpadhātu, they are always necessarily connected with discipline; elsewhere they can be of one or the other category.

85a-b. All the other courses of action have retributive results, outflowing result, and predominating results.<sup>407</sup>

Good or bad, the ten courses of action have a threefold result.

1. Through each bad course of action practiced (*āsevita*), cultivated (*bhāvita*), developed (*babulīkṛta*),<sup>408</sup> a transgressor is reborn in hell.<sup>409</sup> Such is the retributive result.<sup>410</sup>

2. If a transgressor is reborn in a human existence, through murder he will be of brief lifespan; through stealing he will be poor; through illicit sexuality, he will have an unfaithful spouse; through lying, he will be slandered; through malicious speech, his friends will become enemies; through injurious speech, he will only understand disagreeable speech; through inconsiderate speech, his words will not come to be believed; through greed, he will have great desires (*mahecccha*, vi.6); through anger, he will have great hate; and through false views, he will have great ignorance, for ignorance is great in false views. Such is the outflowing result.

But, one would say, a human existence, even if it is short, is the retribution of a good action. How can one regard it as an outflowing result of murder?

We do not say that this existence is the result of murder; we say rather, that a murderer will have a short life by reason of the murder; murder is the cause which rends a human existence short, an existence otherwise caused by a good action.

3. By reason of the intense practice of killing, external things<sup>411</sup>—plants, the sun, etc.—are of little vitality; by reason of stealing, they are crushed by rains of stones, dust and acid;<sup>412</sup> by reason of illicit sexuality, they are covered by dust or acid; by reason of lying, they are of bad odor; by reason of malicious speech, they are in a hole or on a hill; by reason of injurious speech, the land and the sun are impregnated with salt and are sterile, and the plants are detestable and pernicious; by reason of inconsiderate speech, the seasons are reversed; by reason of greed, fruits are small; by reason of anger, fruits are sour; and by reason of false

views, fruits are very few, or are totally absent. Such is the predominating result.

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Is it by reason of killing that a murderer is reborn in hell and then only enjoys a short human life?

According to some, it is by reason of killing. Existence in hell is a retributive result, whereas shortness of life is an outflowing result of the killing. [In fact, retribution is always sensation, *vedanā*].

According to others, existence in hell comes from the preparatory action of killing; the fact of having a short life comes from the action itself. It is true that the Sūtra speaks of killing as the cause of existence in hell, but it understands by killing, not only killing, but killing with all the actions that accompany it. What is called outflowing result does not here exist separately from the retributive result and the predominating result. It is called outflowing by reason of the resemblance between the cause and its effect (to kill—to have a short life; to steal—to be poor, etc.).

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Why is the result of the courses of action threefold? One who commits murder causes the victim to suffer, causes him to die, and destroys his vigor:

85c-d. The result is threefold, because one makes him suffer, because one makes him die, and because one destroys his vigor.<sup>413</sup>

Because one causes suffering, there is a retributive result, that is, suffering in hell; because one makes him die, there is an outflowing result, that is, his life is short; and because one destroys his vigor,<sup>414</sup> there is a predominating result, that is, external things are of little vigor.

The same for the other courses of action.

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The same for the three results of the good courses of action: through having practiced, cultivated, and developed the renouncing of killing, one is reborn among the gods; if one is reborn down here in human condition, one will have a long life. The results of all good actions oppose bad actions (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 589a18-21).

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The Blessed One distinguishes wrong speech (*mithyāvāc*), wrong action (*mithyākarmānta*), and wrong manner of livelihood (*mithyājīva*).<sup>415</sup> Is this to say that wrong livelihood is separate from wrong speech and wrong action?

It does not exist separately:

86a-c. Bodily and vocal actions which arise from attachment are "wrong manner of livelihood"; it constitutes a separate category, because it is difficult to purify.<sup>416</sup>

Bodily action and vocal action arising from hate and ignorance are, respectively, wrong action and wrong speech. Arisen from attachment, both constitute wrong manner of livelihood, distinguished in this way because the manner of livelihood is difficult to purify.

Attachment is by its nature, a bandit: one watches with difficulty the mind of the actions which provoke attachment. Consequently, since the manner of livelihood is, as long as one lives, difficult to purify, the Blessed One, with an end that one should apply himself to purifying it, made a separate category of wrong livelihood. There is a stanza,<sup>417</sup> "The layman purifies his views with difficulty, for he is always in the prey of multiple views; the monk purifies his manner of livelihood with difficulty, for his subsistence depends on others."

86c-d. If one says that it is solely action issued from attachment to the resources necessary for life, no; for this is in contradiction with the Sūtra.

If someone thinks that to dance, to sing, etc., for one's own pleasure is not a wrong manner of livelihood,—because wrong manner of livelihood is only bodily and vocal actions inspired by attachment to the means of subsistence,<sup>418</sup>—we would answer: no. In fact, the Blessed

One, in the *Śilaskandhikā*,<sup>419</sup> taught that looking at elephant fights, etc., is a wrong manner of livelihood. And why? Because this is to enjoy bad objects.

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We have seen (ii.56) that there are five results, predominating results, results of virile activity, outflowing results, retributive results, and disconnection or liberation. How many results are included in the different types of action?

87a-b. Impure, in the path of abandoning, action embraces the five results.

The path of abandoning is so called because it has abandoning for its goal, or because the defilements are abandoned due to it. This is the *ānantarya* path which will be defined later (vi.28, 49) and which is of two types, pure and impure.

Action which forms part of the impure path of abandoning, includes the five results: 1. retributive result: an agreeable retribution which belongs to the same stage as the action; 2. an outflowing result: *dharmas* arisen from the absorption, similar to the action, and later than it;<sup>420</sup> 3. a disconnective result: disconnection from the defilements, the abandoning of the defilements; 4. a result of virile activity: the *dharmas* that this action gives rise to, namely (a) the path of deliverance (*vimuktimārga*, vi.28), (b) the coexisting *dharmas*,<sup>421</sup> (c) the future *dharmas* of which this action causes one to obtain possession, and (d) the abandoning itself;<sup>422</sup> and 5. a predominating result: all the conditioned *dharmas* with the exception of the action in question, and with the exception of the *dharmas* already arisen (ii.59).

87c. Pure, it includes four results.

The preceding ones, with the exception of the retributive result.

88a-b. The rest of pure action and neutral action, three results.

The rest of pure action—that is, pure action not included in the path of abandoning, but forming part of the *prayoga-vimukti-viśeṣa-mārgas* (vi.65b)—embrace neither disconnective result, since it is not the cause



of abandoning, nor retributive result, since it is pure.

The same two results are absent also in neutral action, whether it is defiled nor not.

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What is the nature,—good, bad, or neutral,—of the results of different actions?

88c-d. The good, bad, neutral *dharma*s, constitute four, two, and three results of good action.

Outflowing results, disconnective results, virile activity, and predominating results of good action are good *dharma*s. Retributive results are neutral by nature (ii.57).

Virile activity and predominating results of good action are bad *dharma*s.

Outflowing results of a good action are necessarily good; disconnective results are good by their nature.

Retributive results, virile activity, and predominating results of good action are neutral *dharma*s.

89a-b. Good, bad, neutral *dharma*s, constitute, respectively two, three, and four results of bad action.

The expression *anukraman* ("respectively") signifies *yathākraman*.

Two results,—virile activity and predominating results of bad action,—are good *dharma*s.

Three results—by omitting retributive results and disconnective results—are bad *dharma*s.

Four results—by omitting disconnective results—are neutral *dharma*s.

It is admitted then that an outflowing result of bad *dharma*s can be made up of neutral *dharma*s. How is this? <sup>423</sup>

Two neutral *dharma*s,—the belief in personality (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) and the belief in the past and in the future of a soul (*antagrāhadṛṣṭi*) (v.6b)—are an outflowing result of bad *dharma*s: namely of the universal defilements (ii.54, v.12) which one abandons through the Seeing of Suffering and Arising, and of the defilements of the *rāga* class,

etc., which one abandons through the Seeing of Suffering.

89c-d. The same *dharmas*—good, bad, neutral *dharmas*—make up two, three, and three results of neutral action.

Two results,—virile activity and predominating results,—are good *dharmas*.

Three results—by omitting retributive results and disconnective results—are bad *dharmas*. In fact some bad *dharmas* of the five categories (ii.52b), to be abandoned through Seeing the Truth of Suffering, etc., are an outflowing result of two neutral *dharmas*, namely of *satkāyadṛṣṭi* and *antagrāhadṛṣṭi*.

Three results—the same as above—are neutral.

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With regard to the time period, and the stage, etc.,

90a. Some *dharmas* of all types constitute four results of past action.

All the *dharmas* or some *dharmas* of all types, that is, past, present and future, can constitute four of the results of past action.<sup>424</sup> One must exclude the disconnective result which is outside of time.

90b. Some future *dharmas* constitute four results of median action.

Median action, that is, present action, has four results—by excluding disconnection—which are future *dharmas*.

90c. There are two which are median *dharmas*.

Some present *dharmas* are predominating results and virile activity of median action.

90c-d. For action not yet arisen, there are three results made up of future *dharmas*.

That is, retributive results, predominating results, and virile activity. Future action does not have outflowing results (ii.57c).

91a-b. Some *dharmas* of the same stage constitute four results, whereas some *dharmas* of another stage constitute three or two results.

An action of a certain stage produces four results—by excluding disconnection—which are *dharmas* of its own stage.

Some pure *dharmas* belong to a stage different from that of the action which constitutes three results of this action: virile activity, predominating result and also outflowing result, after the rule given in ii.53.

Some impure *dharmas* belong to a stage different from that of the action which constitutes virile activity and the predominating result of this action.

91c. Some Śaikṣa *dharmas*, etc. constitute three results of Śaikṣa action.<sup>425</sup>

Some *dharmas* "characteristic of the Saint who is not an Arhat" (Śaikṣa) constitute outflowing results, virile activity, and predominating results of Śaikṣa action.

The same for *dharmas* "characteristic of the Arhat" (Aśaikṣa).

Neither-Śaikṣa-nor-Aśaikṣa *dharmas* constitute virile activity, predominating results and disconnection results of Śaikṣa action.

91d-92b. Śaikṣa *dharmas*, etc., constitute one result, three results, and two results of Aśaikṣa action, etc.

Śaikṣa *dharmas* are a predominating result of this action.

Aśaikṣa *dharmas* are a predominating result, an outflowing result, and virile activity of this action.

Neither-Śaikṣa-nor-Aśaikṣa *dharmas* are predominating results and virile activity of this action.

92c-d. Some Śaikṣa *dharmas*, etc., constitute two results, two results, and five results of action differing from the two preceding.

This refers to neither-Śaikṣa-neither-Aśaikṣa action.

Some Śaikṣa *dharmas* and some Aśaikṣa *dharmas* are virile activity and predominating results of this action.

Some neither-Śaīkṣa-nor-Aśaīkṣa *dharma*s are five results of this action.

93a-b. *Dharma*s susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing the Truths (*darśanaheya*), susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation (*bhāvanāheya*), and not susceptible of being abandoned (*apraheya*), constitute three results, two results, one result of action susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing the Truths.

Some *darśanaheya dharma*s are predominating results, virile activity and outflowing results of *darśanaheya* action.

Some *bhāvanāheya dharma*s are four results of this action: excluding disconnection.

Some *apraheya dharma*s are predominating results of this action.

93c-d. The same *dharma*s constitute two, four, and three results of action susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation.

*Darśanaheya dharma*s are virile activity and predominating results of *bhāvanāheya* action.

*Bhāvanāheya dharma*s are four results of this action: excluding disconnection.

*Apraheya dharma*s are virile activity, predominating results, and disconnection of this action.

94a-b. The same *dharma*s constitute, respectively, one result, two results, and four results of action not susceptible of being abandoned.

*Darśanaheya dharma*s are predominating results of *apraheya* action.

Some *bhāvanāheya dharma*s are predominating results and virile activity results of this action.<sup>426</sup>

Some *apraheya dharma*s are four results of this action: omitting the retributive result.

The text has *yathākraman*, "respectively," the same as the above passage (iv.89b) has *anukraman* in the sense of *yathākraman*. It repeats here "respectively": one concludes from this that this word should be supplied in each definition. Such is, in effect, the process of abbreviation.

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In the teaching of the doctrine of action the following question is again posed: the Treatise (the *Jñānaprasthāna*) speaks of proper action (*yogavibhā*), improper action (*ayogavibhā*), and neither-proper-nor-improper action. What is the meaning of these three actions?

94c-d. Improper action is defiled action; according to some, irregular action also.<sup>427</sup>

Some say that improper action is defiled action, because this proceeds from a wrong judgment.<sup>428</sup> According to others, irregular action is also irregular action: when a person walks, stands still, eats, or dresses himself in a manner other than that which he should, this action—which is undefiled-neutral—is improper, for this person acts contrary to received usage (*ayoga*).

There is the same divergence of view with regard to proper action: this is either good action, or good and regular action.

Action which differs from proper action and improper action is neither-proper-nor-improper action.

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Does one action project one birth or many births? Do many actions project one birth or many births?

According to the system of the School:

95a. One action projects one arising.<sup>429</sup>

By arising, *janman*, one should understand, not merely birth (*jāti*), but an existence (*nikāyasabbhāga*, ii.41a). He who comes into an existence is said to be born.

1. One action projects one arising and no more.

The Sautrāntikas: This thesis is in contradiction with what the Sthavira Aniruddha says, "Through the retribution of this single alm (*piṇḍapāta*), after having been born up to seven times among the Thirty-three Gods, I am finally born in the family of the rich Śākyaans."<sup>430</sup>

Answer: Aniruddha, through this alm, obtained a great prosperity;

he obtained a memory of his past lives; and he accomplished many new meritorious works. By expressing himself as he did, he intends to indicate his point of departure. It is thus that a person who had acquired a sum of one thousand by means of a single penny, could say, "It is through one penny that I have acquired this fortune."

One answers again:<sup>431</sup> By reason of his alm, Aniruddha produced many streams of volition: one result appeared to each volition.

2. Many actions do not together project one arising: for if this were the case, the projection of existence would take place in parts. But admitting that one existence is projected by a single action,

95b. Many actions complete an existence.

The same way that a painter with one stroke delineates the outline of an image, and then fills in this image:<sup>432</sup> so too, even though their quality of being a human is the same, certain humans have perfect organs, major and minor members; certain humans are beautiful through the excellence of their hue, figure, shape and power, whereas, in certain humans this or that is lacking.<sup>433</sup>

It is not solely action which projects one existence: all retributive *dharma*s, namely sensation, etc., also project it.<sup>434</sup>

However

95c-d. Neither the two absorptions of unconsciousness nor the *prāpti*s project (an existence).

Even though they are retribution, the two absorptions of unconsciousness (ii.42) do not project an existence, because they do not coexist with action. The *prāpti*s (ii.36) do not project an existence, because they do not have the same result as does the action with which they coexist.<sup>435</sup>

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The Blessed One said that there are three *āvaraṇa*s or obstacles: the obstacle of action (*karmāvaraṇa*), the obstacle of the defilements (*kleśāvaraṇa*), and the obstacle of retribution (*vipākāvaraṇa*).<sup>436</sup>

What are the three obstacles?

96. *Ānantarya* actions; chronic defilements; and bad realms of rebirth, and *Asaṃjñisattvas* and *Kurus*, are the threefold obstacle.<sup>437</sup>

The obstacle which consists of action are the five mortal (*ānantarya*) transgressions: matricide, patricide, the killing of an Arhat, schism, and wounding the Tathāgata with thoughts of hatred.<sup>438</sup>

The obstacle which consists of the defilements is chronic defilement. Defilement is of two types, chronic and violent: chronic defilement is continual defilement, and violent defilement is strong defilement. Chronic defilement constitutes an obstacle, as is the case, for example, among eunuchs. Defilements which surge up from time to time, even if their impulse is strong, can be overcome, but not continual defilement, even though it is at rest. The person in whom this is found does not find the time to make an effort to overcome it. From being small, they become medium sized; and from medium sized, they become strong: thus they form an obstacle.

The obstacle which consists of retribution is the three painful realms of rebirth—existence in hell, animal existence, and Preta existence—and one part of the good realms of rebirth—human existence in *Uttarakuru*, and heavenly existence among the Unconscious Ones.

What does "obstacle" mean?

That which causes an obstacle to the Way and to the roots of good preparatory to the Way, *uṣmagatas*, etc. (vi.17).

Objection: One should mention as actions forming obstacles other categories of actions besides mortal transgressions. Actions which necessarily produce painful realms of rebirth, etc.,<sup>439</sup> which produce birth in eggs, birth in sweat, birth as a woman, or an eighth birth, form obstacles.

Answer: Only actions easily discernible by others and by the agent himself,—and that from five points of view—are mentioned here. Actions which are mortal transgressions are murder, lying, and preparation for murder; its result are painful; the rebirth realm which it produces is hell; the period of its retribution is the next existence; the murderer himself receives the name of patricide . . . : from five points of view, action which is mortal transgression is easy to discern.<sup>440</sup>

Among the obstacles, the gravest is the obstacle of defilement, followed by the obstacle of action. For these two obstacles rend one incapable of health, not only in the present existence, but also in the next existence.

According to the *Vaibhāṣikas* (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 601a2-7), the obstacle of defilement is the gravest because it produces the obstacle of action; the obstacle of action is heavier than the obstacle of retribution because it produces this obstacle.

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What is the meaning of the word *ānantarya*?<sup>441</sup>

The five moral transgressions are called *ānantarya* because they cannot be "traversed" (*antarita*), that is to say, prevented in their retribution through actions which should be retributed in the next existence.<sup>442</sup> Or rather a person guilty of a mortal transgression is reborn, after this life, immediately (*anantaram*) in hell; the guilty person is thus *antara*, "one without intermediate (existence)"; thus the *dharma* the possession of which makes the guilty one an *anantara* is called *ānantarya*, like one terms *śrāmaṇya* the *dharma* which makes someone a *Śrāmaṇa* (vi.51).

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In what sphere of existence are the obstacles found?

97a. Mortal transgressions exist in the three continents.<sup>443</sup>

The inhabitants of Uttarakuru and living beings which are not humans are not capable of mortal transgressions. And all the more reason mortal transgression is absent in the higher spheres. And, among humans, only men and women can commit mortal transgressions:

97b-c. It is not admitted that eunuchs, etc., are capable of this transgression, because of the mediocrity of their kindness and respect.

For the same reasons that rend eunuchs, etc., incapable of



indiscipline (iv.43c); and, further, because their parents, having given to the eunuch only an incomplete body and having only a mediocre affection for their son, are mediocre benefactors; <sup>444</sup> because, on the other hand, the eunuch does not experience a strong respect (*lajjitva = hrīyapatrāpya*, ii.32) for his parents the destruction of which would render him guilty of a mortal transgression.

For the same reasons then, Pretas and animals, if they were to kill their parents, are not guilty of mortal transgressions. Nevertheless, the Bhadanta said that animals in whom intelligence is lively, for example, the *ājāneya* horse, are capable of mortal transgressions (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 619c4-7). <sup>445</sup>

For the same reasons, a human born of demon (or non-human) parents does not commit a mortal transgression in killing them.

97d. The other two obstacles exist in the five realms of rebirth.

Birth in Uttarakuru is an obstacle of retribution for humans; birth among the *Asarñjñisattvas* is such for the gods.

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What are, by their natures, the different actions of mortal transgression?

Four are bodily action; one is vocal action; three are killing; one is lying; and one is the preparation for murder, <sup>446</sup> for the *Tathāgatas* cannot be killed by the attack of another. <sup>447</sup>

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We say that schism (*saṅghabheda*) is lying, and that this lying is the fourth mortal transgression. How is this?

If we make schism a mortal transgression, this is because we give the name of schism to lying which is the cause of schism; or rather the word "schism" should be explained as "that which divides Saṅgha." In fact,

98a-c. Schism is, by its nature, disharmony; this is an undefiled-neutral *dharma* disassociated from the mind. <sup>448</sup>

Schism, that is, disharmony, is a *saṃskāra* not associated with the mind (ii.35, trans. note 180), and is undefiled-neutral: how could it hence be a mortal transgression? As much as it is a person who divides the Saṅgha, the schismatic is not in possession of the schism. On the contrary

98d. It is the Saṅgha which possesses the schism.

It is that which is divided, and not the schismatic, which “possesses” the *saṃskāra* called “division of the Saṅgha.”

But what does the schismatic possess?

99a-b. The transgression of schism is lying; it belongs to the schismatic.

The schismatic possesses the transgression of schism, which is lying. This lying arises at the same time as the schism itself; it consists of vocal *vijñapti* and *avijñapti*.

Possessed of this lying,

99c. The schismatic falls into Avīci for a *kalpa*.

He falls into the great Avīci hell for an intermediary period (*antarakalpa*, iii.83).<sup>449</sup> Those guilty of other mortal transgressions are not necessarily in Avīci.

Yet all mortal transgressions are retributed in the next existence: what would happen if a person is guilty of many mortal transgressions?

99d. Suffering grows by reason of supplementary transgression.

A person guilty of many moral transgressions possesses in Avīci a large body and very tender flesh by which he feels twofold, threefold, fourfold, or fivefold, and his torments are extremely numerous and insupportable.

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Who is capable of dividing the Saṅgha?

100a-b. A Bhikṣu who is an intellectual, who is virtuous, divides.<sup>450</sup>

It is a Bhikṣu who divides, not a layman, not a nun, etc.<sup>451</sup> This Bhikṣu should be an intellectual, not a sensualist;<sup>452</sup> he should be virtuous, not immoral: for the words of an immoral Bhikṣu lack authority.

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Where does schism take place?

100b. Elsewhere.

Not where the Tathāgata is found. Schism is impossible where the Master is to be found, for the Tathāgata cannot be conquered and his word is full of authority.

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Who does the schismatic divide?

100b. Fools.

Only fools and not Āryans, for Āryans see the Dharma with direct insight. According to another opinion, the schismatic can no longer divide possessors of *keśānti*.<sup>453</sup>

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What does the Saṅgha do that it is divided?

100c-d. When it admits another Master, or another Path, it is divided.<sup>454</sup>

Once it is divided, how long does it remain divided?

100d. It does not exceed a day.

A night of the same day.<sup>455</sup> When the Saṅgha is divided, infallibly, the Saṅgha will again be in concord at sunrise.

The schism that we have just described, and which is a "mortal transgression,"

101a. Is what we understand by breaking the Wheel.

The Wheel of the Law of the Blessed One is then broken, because the progress of the Path is hindered. As a consequence there is, at the same time, both breaking of the Wheel and a division of the Saṅgha.<sup>456</sup>

Where is breaking of the Wheel produced?

101b. In Jambudvīpa.

Not in the other continents where the Buddhas do not appear.  
By how many Bhikṣus?

101b. By nine or more.<sup>457</sup>

The maximum number is not fixed. The Saṅgha susceptible of being divided counts at a minimum eight Bhikṣus; the ninth monk necessary is the schismatic. In order for there to be schism, it is necessary that a Saṅgha be divided into two parts—the first is for the Buddha, the second is for the schismatic—forming thus two Saṅghas of four Bhikṣus each, which is the minimum number required in order to constitute a Saṅgha (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 602c5-13).

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Another type of schism, different from the breaking of the Wheel and which is not a mortal transgression results from a division in ecclesiastical actions: when, in one parish (*sīmā*), the monks divide themselves in order to perform ecclesiastical actions, *poṣadha*, etc.

101c. Ritual schism in three continents.<sup>458</sup>

Only there where the Religion exists.

101d. This schism supposes eight Bhikṣus or more.

It is necessary to form two groups of four Bhikṣus; but, here, there is not one schismatic who declares himself a Master.

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At six periods, the schism of the breaking of Wheel cannot take place.

102. The breaking of the Wheel is impossible at the beginning; at the end; before the abscess; before a pair; when the Sage is extinguished; or when a parish has not been delimited.<sup>459</sup>

At the beginning, that is, when a little time has passed since the setting into motion the Wheel of the Law; and at the end, that is, at the period of the Parinirvāṇa of the Blessed One: in these two periods the Saṅgha is penetrated by a single sentiment.<sup>460</sup> In the interval, breaking is impossible before the appearance of an abscess:<sup>461</sup> as long as the abscess of precepts and the abscess of views does not appear in the dispensation (*śāsana*). It is also impossible before the apparition of a pair: as long as a pair of excellent disciples has not appeared, because the Saṅgha should not pass a night in a state of division, and because this pair of disciples has for its task the reestablishment of harmony. Breaking is impossible when the Sage is extinguished, for, once the Master has entered into Parinirvāṇa, a schismatic would have no opponent. Finally, when a parish has not been delimited,<sup>462</sup> for one says that the Saṅgha is divided when there two parties in one parish.

All Buddhas do not have their Wheels broken as does Śākyamuni: this depends on their former actions.<sup>463</sup>

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Why are the transgressions enumerated above, matricide, etc., mortal transgressions to the exclusion of other transgressions?

103a-b. Because they destroy or hurt a field of benefaction, or a field of qualities.<sup>464</sup>

Matricide and patricide are mortal transgressions because they destroy a benefactor. One's mother and father are benefactors because they have given birth.

How does the murderer destroy them?

By killing them.<sup>465</sup>

The murder of an Arhat and the last two mortal transgressions are mortal transgressions because an Arhat, the Saṅgha and the Buddha are fields of qualities.<sup>466</sup> One does not destroy the Saṅgha and the Buddha, but one can hurt them.

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But if the gender of the mother and father changes, does the quality of mother and father no longer exist within the mother and father?

103c. Even if their gender changes, there is mortal transgression in killing him who was the mother, and in killing her who was the father.

It is said in fact (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 619c19-23), "Can a person be guilty of a mortal transgression killing a man who is not his father, or who is not an Arhat? Yes, if he kills his mother whose gender has changed. Can a person be guilty of a mortal transgression by killing a woman who is not his mother, or who is not an Arhat? Yes, if he kills his father whose gender has changed."

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When the embryo of a woman falls out and when another woman deposits it in her womb,<sup>467</sup> which of these two women is reputed to be the mother whose murder constitutes a mortal transgression?

103d. The mother is the woman from whose blood one is born.

The second woman takes up the offices of a mother: she is the one who gives the child liquid to drink, who nourishes it, and who raises it.<sup>468</sup>

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There is no mortal transgression if, wanting to kill one's mother a person kills someone else; there is no mortal transgression if, wanting to kill another person, a person kills his mother.<sup>469</sup> For example, a man who kills his mother stretched out on a bed where he believes there is a man asleep, and the child of the laundryman who kills his father wanting to kill a mosquito, do not become guilty of mortal transgressions.<sup>470</sup>

If a man kills his mother and another person with the same stroke, there are two *avijñaptis*, an *avijñapti* of simple murder, and an *avijñapti* of a mortal transgression; but the *vijñapti* is solely of the mortal transgression, by reason of the force of the mortal transgression. Yet,

according to Ghosaka (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 617b23-25), there are two *viññaptis*, for a *viññapti* is made up of atoms.

The person who kills an Arhat without knowing him to be an Arhat, thinking only to definitely kill such a person, does not have any discrimination with respect to the person to be killed.

The person who kills his father, when his father is an Arhat, is guilty of only one mortal transgression, namely the killing of an Arhat: for the father and the Arhat make up only a single person.

Objection: <sup>471</sup> [The Arhat Rudrāyaṇa, assassinated by order of his son Śikhaṇḍin, said to the assassin,] "Go! Tell Śikhaṇḍin that he has committed two mortal transgressions, patricide and the murder of an Arhat." How do you explain these words?

Rudrāyaṇa means that his son committed a mortal transgression through two causes of mortal transgression; or rather Rudrāyaṇa said "two mortal transgression" in order to doubly condemn the conduct of his son.

Does the person who, with a bad mind, cause the blood of the Tathāgata to flow, necessarily commit a mortal transgression?

He commits a mortal transgression when he has the intention to kill:

104a. No, when he only had the intention of striking the Buddha. <sup>472</sup>

Is a person guilty of a mortal transgression when he injures to death a person who becomes an Arhat after being injured?

104b. No, with regard to the person who became an Arhat after the blow.

Add, according to that which precedes, "no mortal transgression." In fact, the preparation for murder had for its object a person who was not an Arhat.

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Can a person who made preparation for a mortal transgression, obtain detachment and its result by arresting it? <sup>473</sup>

104c-d. Detachment and its results are impossible for one who has made preparation for a mortal transgression.<sup>474</sup>

Why?

Because there is an absolute contradiction between the intention of a mortal transgression and the acquisition of detachment or a result.

A person who enters the Path after having done the preparation for any other evil deed, will not produce this deed, by reason of the absolute contradiction between his new personality and the deed.<sup>475</sup>

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What is the gravest of the mortal transgressions?

105a-b. Lying with a view to schism is considered the gravest transgression.

A person who, knowing what is Dharma and non-Dharma, lies with a view to dividing the Saṅgha and teaching falsely, by this makes himself guilty of the gravest transgression among all misdeeds. In fact, he wounds the Dharma body of the Tathāgatas, he creates an obstacle to temporal well-being and to the deliverance of creatures. As long as concord is not established in the Saṅgha, there is hindrance to entry into the Path (*niyānāvakraṇṭi*, vi.26a), to the acquisition of results, to the acquisition of detachment, and to the destruction of the defilements: all actions relative to *dhyāna*, study and reflection are also arrested; the worlds of gods, Nāgas and humans are troubled and saddened, they are not masters of themselves, and misguided. This is why the retribution for this crime lasts a cosmic age and takes place in Avīci.

Among the other mortal transgressions, the fifth, the third and the first are, in descending order, the heaviest. Patricide is the lightest.<sup>476</sup>

Objection: The Blessed One said that mental *daṇḍa* is the most culpable of the three *daṇḍas*;<sup>477</sup> he said also that false view is the gravest among all the transgressions.

One must understand that, among the mortal transgressions, schism is the gravest transgression; that mental *daṇḍa* is the gravest among the three actions; and that false view is the gravest among the bad views. Or rather schism is the gravest transgression if one considers



the extent of its retribution; *manodanda*, if one considers the number of persons destroyed by it;<sup>478</sup> and false view, if one considers the roots of good which false view alone cuts off.

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Among the good actions, which bears the greatest result?

105c-d. Among the good worldly *dharmas*, a volition for Bhavāgra bears the greatest result.<sup>479</sup>

"Volition for Bhavāgra" means the mental action through which one is reborn in the highest stage of Ārūpyadhātu. This action is the most fruitful of good worldly actions, for its retribution is a perfect tranquility for twenty-four thousand cosmic periods (iii.81).

This is understood from the point of view of its retributive results. From the point of view of its disconnective result (ii.57d) the most fruitful action is volition associated with Vajropamasamādhi (vi.44d; see iv.112b), for this volition has for its result the cutting off of all the bonds. This is why the Kārikā says, "Among the good worldly *dharmas* . . ."

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Is it only through a mortal transgression that a person is necessarily reborn in hell?

A person is also necessarily reborn in hell through transgressions similar to mortal transgressions. Others add: but not immediately (*anantaram*) so.<sup>480</sup>

106-107b. To defile one's mother, to defile an Arhantī; to kill a predestined Bodhisattva; to kill a Saikṣa; and to steal the goods of the Saṅgha are transgressions similar to mortal transgressions; the fifth is the destruction of a Stūpa.<sup>481</sup>

These five transgressions, in this order, are similar to mortal transgressions: to defile one's mother, to defile an Arhantī (=matricide); to kill a predestined Bodhisattva (=patricide); to kill a Saint who is not an Arhat (=murder of an Arhat); to rob the Saṅgha of its means of

substance (=schism); and to destroy a Stūpa (=to wound the Tathāgata).

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Other actions embracing retribution are impeded in three circumstances:

107c-d. He absolutely impedes actions by the acquisition of Kṣānti, the quality of Anāgāmin, and the quality of Arhat.<sup>482</sup>

When, upon leaving the stage of *mūrdhānas*, he obtains the stage called patience (*kṣānti*, vi.23), the actions which should be retributed in painful realms of rebirth, being impeded, remain below, because he passes beyond the state of retribution of these actions. In the same way the creditors of the man who is about to emigrate from his country rise up.

When he obtains the quality of Anāgāmin (vi.36d), the actions which should be retributed in Kāmadhātu, being impeded, remain below,—with the exception of those which should be retributed in the present existence.

The same for the actions which should be retributed in Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu when he obtains the quality of Arhat.

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We have seen that the killing of a Bodhisattva is a quasi-mortal transgression.

108a. Since when is one a Bodhisattva?

From what moment on does one receive the name of Bodhisattva?

108b. When he begins to cultivate actions which produce the marks.<sup>483</sup>

Starting from the moment when he begins to cultivate actions which have for their retribution the thirty-two marks, he is “predestined.”

How is this?

From this moment onward, he always

108c-d. Has good realms of rebirth; he is born into noble families; he possesses all the organs (*avyakṣaḥ*); he is a male; he remembers his past lives; and he does not desist (*avivṛt*).

One says that he is *sugati* ("well gone"), because his rebirth realms are excellent, for he is born among gods and humans.

He is born in the wealthy families<sup>484</sup> of Kṣatriyas, Brāhmaṇas, and Gṛhapatis, not in humble families.

The man whose organs are not complete is *vikalendriya*; if his organs are complete, he is an *avyakṣa*, a synonym for *avikalendriya*.<sup>485</sup>

He is always male, never female, and, even more so, never non-sexual (*śandha*, etc.).

In all of his existences, he remembers his past births.

One desists by giving in; as he does not give in, he is *avivṛt*, a synonym for an *avaivartika*, one who does not desist or regress: in fact, with an end to being useful to all creatures, he is not cast down by all sorts of sufferings, or by any outrages.<sup>486</sup> He is called the slave not purchased by the world,<sup>487</sup> indeed the Bodhisattva: this great-souled one, who yet possesses the most sublime perfections (*saṃpad*, vii.34), acts through pure compassion; he acts without egoism, like a dog,<sup>488</sup> in the presence of all creatures; he bears, on the part of all creatures, outrages and bad treatment; he assumes all fatiguing and painful tasks.

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He cultivates actions which have the marks for their retribution.

109. In Jambudvīpa, being a male; in the presence of the Buddhas, thinking of the Buddhas; having their origin in reflection; in the course of one hundred supplementary cosmic ages.<sup>489</sup>

The Bodhisattva cultivates actions which ripen in the marks solely in Jambudvīpa, not elsewhere, for the inhabitants of Jambudvīpa are of lively intelligence;<sup>490</sup> he is a male and not a female, for he has already gone beyond the state of female; and he is only in the presence of Masters, for his volition has the Buddhas for its object. These actions have their origin in reflection, not in hearing or in the absorptions. The

Bodhisattva accomplishes these actions in the course of one hundred supplementary cosmic ages,<sup>491</sup> and not during a longer time.

Nevertheless the Blessed Śākyamuni, through the purification of his energy, leaped over nine of these cosmic ages<sup>492</sup> and carried out the actions ripening in marks in the course of ninety-nine cosmic ages so that, in this way, one hundred were completed. This is why, speaking to Aśibandhaka, he said, "Oh village chief, remembering ninety-one cosmic ages from now, I do not see any family that has been impoverished or inconvenienced by the giving of cooked foods."<sup>493</sup> The Blessed One expressed himself in this way because his natural memory bore on this number of cosmic periods. (See vii.30, 37, 42)

Former masters<sup>494</sup> say: It is when he finished the first cosmic age that the Bodhisattva abandoned the four defects and obtained the two qualities.

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### Of the marks

110a. Each arises from one hundred merits.<sup>495</sup>

What is the measure of each of these one hundred merits?

According to some, it is equal to the merit which has for its result the pleasure of all beings, with the exception of the Bodhisattva close to Bodhi—that is to say, accomplishing actions which ripen in marks.

According to others, it is equal to the collective action of all beings, which, through its predominating result (ii.56b), produces the creation of the world.<sup>496</sup>

According to others, only the Buddhas know the measure of this merit.

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How many Buddhas did the Blessed One venerate when he was a Bodhisattva?

In the course of the first *asaṃkhyeya kalpa*, he venerated seventy-five thousand Buddhas; seventy-six thousand in the course of the second; and seventy-seven thousand in the course of the third.<sup>497</sup>

Who were the Buddhas at the end of each *saṃkhyeya kalpa*?  
In the reverse order of their enumeration,

110b-c. At the end of the three *asaṃkhyeyas*, Paśyin, Dīpa, and Ratnaśikhin.

In the period of the perfect and complete Buddha Ratnaśikhin, he completed the first *asaṃkhyeya kalpa*; in the period of the Blessed Dīpaṅkara he completed the second; and in the period of the Tathāgatha Vipāśyin he completed the third.

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Of all the Buddhas that he venerated

110d. The first was Śākyamuni.

It was an ancient Śākyamuni (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p.89c), a perfect Buddha, under whom the Blessed One, the then Bodhisattva, formulated for the first time the vow of Bodhi by saying, "May I too become a Buddha in all ways similar to you!" This Śākyamuni, as ours, appeared during a bad age of the world;<sup>498</sup> also his Law lasted only one thousand years.

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How did the Bodhisattva complete each Pāramitā (p. 694, line 17)?

111a-b. He completed Giving by giving everything to everyone, out of compassion.<sup>499</sup>

When he gave everything to everyone, even to his eyes and the marrow of his bones, out of compassion, without desiring any happiness for himself, he completed the virtue of Giving.

111c-d. Morality and Patience were completed by his not being irritated, even when his limbs were broken, although he was still tied to desire.<sup>500</sup>

When, even though he was not detached, he was not at all irritated when his limbs were broken, he then completed the virtues of Morality

and Patience.

### 112a. Energy, by praising Puṣya.<sup>501</sup>

The Blessed One, when he was a Bodhisattva, saw the Tathāgata Puṣya who had become incandescent<sup>502</sup> in the interior of a cave in a mountain.<sup>503</sup> He praised him for seven days and seven nights, standing, repeating the stanza, "Neither in heaven nor on earth, nor in this world, nor in the abode of Vaiśravaṇa, nor in the palace of the Maru, nor in other celestial abodes, nor in any of the ten directions, would one find, Oh Chief of Men, an ascetic who is your equal, even if one were to traverse, if one wished, the entire world, with all of its people, with its mountains and with its forests."<sup>504</sup> Then, according to this School, he was found to have fulfilled the virtue of Energy and nine cosmic ages were passed over.

### 112b. Absorption and Intelligence, immediately before.<sup>505</sup>

At the moment of Vajropamasamādhi,<sup>506</sup> immediately before Bodhi, he accomplished the virtues of *dhyāna* and *prajñā*.

The Pāramitās receive the name of *pāramitā*<sup>507</sup> because they have arrived (*gamanāt*) at the other shore (*pāram*) of the other shore of the totality of the perfections proper to each of them.

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The Sūtra teaches that there are three items of meritorious work (*punya-kriyāvastu*), which consist of Giving, Morality, and Meditation. How are Giving, Morality, and Meditation items of meritorious work?

112c-d. Three are merit, action, occasions of the exercise of action, as in the case of deeds.<sup>508</sup>

These three,—Giving, Morality, and Meditation,—each according to its nature, are merit, action, or occasion of exercise, either in combination, or in isolation; the same way that the deeds are either at one and the same time actions and deeds, or only deeds.

To consider first the item of meritorious work which consists of Giving, one must distinguish: 1. bodily and vocal action which is an item of meritorious work on three grounds: merit, because its retribution is

agreeable; action, because it is action by nature; and an occasion for the exercise or an object of the volition of giving which provokes it; 2. the volition of giving, which is merit and action; 3. and the *dharmas* (sensations, etc.) which accompany bodily and vocal action, and which are solely merit.

The item of meritorious work which consists of Morality is exclusively bodily and vocal action; it is necessarily merit, action and occasion of exercise of action.

For the item of meritorious work which consists of Meditation, let us consider the Meditation of Compassion (*mañtrī*, viii.30): 1. this mediation is merit; it is also an occasion for the exercise of a meritorious action, namely that of a volition associated with compassion; 2. the volition in question is merit and action. The same also for the Morality which constitutes *dhyānasamvara*, the discipline of *dhyāna*, which a person who practices the Meditation of Compassion possesses; 3. the other *dharmas* (faith, etc.) concomittant to this Meditation are solely merit.

Or rather the expression *punya-kriyā* signifies *punya-kāraṇa*, or *punya-prayoga*. Giving, Morality and Mediation are *vastus* of *punya-kriyā*, because, with a view to realizing them, one undertakes the preparation of merit.<sup>509</sup>

According to another opinion, *punya-kriyā* is, to speak precisely, good volition; Giving, Morality and Meditation are its *vastu*, an occasion for the exercise of this volition.

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What is Giving, *dāna*?

Without doubt, *dāna* in general is what is given (*deya*), but here

113a. Giving is what gives.<sup>510</sup>

But one gives through fear, or with the hope of reciprocity, or through attachment, etc.: now this does not refer to this type of giving. Consequently, in order to specify, the author says, "Giving is what gives."

113b. Through the desire to render homage or service.<sup>511</sup>

What is it that gives?

113c. It is bodily and vocal action and that which produces this action.

A collection of mind-and-mental states gives rise to a bodily or vocal action: this collection and this action give. As the stanza says, "When a person, with a good mind gives what belongs to him, then one says that the good *skandhas* give."<sup>512</sup>

113d. It has for its results great joys.<sup>513</sup>

The *punyakriyāvastu* which consists of Giving (*dānamaya*) has great joys as its result.

The suffix *maya*, which we translate "which consists of," should be understood as "having as its nature," the same way that one says, "a house made of grass" (*trṇamaya grha*), or "a vase made of leaves."<sup>514</sup>

114a-b. Giving is beneficial to oneself, to others, to both or neither.

A gift made to a Caitya is not useful to another; but it is useful to him who gives when he is an Āryan not detached from desire, or a Pṛthagjana detached or not detached (see iv.121).

The gift that a detached Āryan makes to another—with the exception of the case when this gift ripens in the present existence—is not useful to this Āryan, for the Āryan who is detached has definitively passed beyond the sphere (i.e., *Kāmadhātu*) where the retribution of the gift could have taken place in a later existence. This gift is only useful to another.

The gift that a non-detached Āryan makes to another, to a detached or non-detached Pṛthagjana, is useful both to himself and to another.

The gift that a detached Āryan makes to a Caitya—with the exception of the case when this gift will ripen in the present existence—is not useful either to himself, or to another. This gift has for its effect only the expression of homage and recognition.

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We have said, in a general manner, that giving produces great joys:



114c-d. Giving is excellent by the excellence of the giver, of the object given, and of the field.<sup>515</sup>

115a. The giver is excellent through his faith, etc.

The giver is excellent when he is endowed with faith, with morality, with learning, with generosity, with wisdom, with few desires, etc. When the giver is excellent, the gift is excellent; when the gift is excellent, its result is excellent.

115b. He gives with respect, etc.<sup>516</sup>

Such a giver gives with respect, by his hand, at the right time, without doing evil to anyone (*parān anupahatya*; compare *Milinda*, 276).

115c-d. From whence he obtains honors, superior joys, at the right time, sheltered from all loss.

The giver who gives with respect obtains honors; giving by his hand, he will find satisfaction in superior joys; giving at the right time, he will obtain these joys at a suitable time and not when he cannot enjoy them; giving without doing any evil, these joys will be indestructible: they will not be stolen, annihilated through fire, etc.

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We have explained in what the excellence of the giver consists and how the gift is excellent through the excellence of the giver. How is the object given excellent?

116a. The object perfect in color, etc.<sup>517</sup>

Add: "is excellent."

The object is excellent when that which one gives is perfect in color, in odor, in taste, in contact.

What will one obtain through the giving of such an object?

116b-d. From whence beauty, glory, joy, great lightness of the body and contacts corresponding to the season.<sup>518</sup>

He who gives an object perfect in color will be beautiful.

He who gives an object perfect in odor will have his reputation extend to all directions, in the same way that an odor spreads.

He who gives an object perfect in taste will be happy, like a sweet taste.

The body of him who gives an object perfect to the touch, will be very delicate, like the jewel-like wife of a Cakravartin king, and his limbs will have only agreeable contacts, hot or cold according to the season.

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How is the field excellent?

117a-b. The field is excellent through the realm of rebirth, suffering, benefactors, and qualities.

A field is excellent through the realm of rebirth. The Blessed One said, "If a person gives to an animal, the giver will receive a retribution one hundred times greater than the gift made to the animal, but if this person gives even to a human who has transgressed the precepts, he will receive a retribution one thousand times greater than the gift made to this human."<sup>519</sup>

A field is excellent through suffering. The Blessed One, among the seven *aupadhika punyakriyāvastus*, enumerated giving to a sick person, giving to a hospital attendant, giving during cold seasons, etc.,<sup>520</sup> and he continued: "One cannot enumerate the measure of the merits of a son or daughter of good family who is endowed with these seven material meritorious works."

A field is excellent through benefactors. This is giving to one's father, to one's mother (*Divya*, p. 52), to one's master, or to other benefactors. Example: the *Jātakas* of the bear, of the antelope, etc.<sup>521</sup>

A field is excellent through its qualities.<sup>522</sup> The Blessed One said, "A retribution one hundred thousand times greater than a gift made to a person who upholds the necessities . . ." and so on.

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Among all the gifts,

117c. The best is the gift from a delivered person to a delivered

person.<sup>523</sup>

The Blessed One said that a gift given by a detached person to another detached person is the best of material gifts.

117d. Or a gift from the Bodhisattva.<sup>524</sup>

Or rather, the gift that a Bodhisattva gives for the welfare of all beings; this gift, although given by a non-detached person to other non-detached persons, is the best gift.

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With the exception of the gift from the Bodhisattva,

117d. Or the eighth.

The eighth among the eight gifts that the Blessed One taught.

What are the eight gifts?<sup>525</sup> 1. An *āsadya* gift; 2. a gift through fear; 3. a gift made "because he gave to me"; 4. a gift made "because he gives to me"; 5. a gift made "because my fathers and my grandfathers gave (*dattapūrvam me pitṛbhiḥ ca pitāmahaś ceti dānam*, compare *Jāpaka*, 444.52, vol. iv, 34); 6. a gift made in order to obtain heaven; 7. a gift made with an eye to one's reputation; 8. a gift made in order to adorn one's mind (that is to say, in order to obtain *ṛddhi*, vii.48); in order to fill the mind [with the parts of the Path, *mārgāṅga*, vi.67b]; in order to equip it with a view to *yoga*; and in order to acquire the supreme goal (that is to say, in order to obtain the quality of Arhat or Nirvāṇa).

What is an *āsadya* gift?

Some ancient masters explain this as an immediate gift to those who are near, who approach one.<sup>526</sup>

A gift through fear is a gift that a person makes who sees that the object is going to perish: "Better it should be given," he thinks.<sup>527</sup>

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The Sūtra (*Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 722b22) says, "An incalculable retribution proceeds from a gift made to a *śrotaāpannaphalaṇṇapannaka*; an even more incalculable retribution proceeds from a gift made to a *śrotaāpanna*." But there are also five persons who, even

though Pṛthagjanas, confer an incalculable retribution on the offering that is made to them:

118. Even though they are not Āryans, offerings made to one's father and mother, to a sick person, to a preacher, to the Bodhisattva in his last birth are without measure.<sup>528</sup>

These offerings are without measure from the point of view of their retribution.

A "Bodhisattva in his last birth" means a "Bodhisattva in his last existence."

To what category does a preacher belong? Among what field should he be placed?

He forms part of the category of benefactors: he gives the eye of wisdom to multitudes blinded by ignorance; he proclaims what is good (*sama* = *dharma*) and bad (*viṣama* = *adharma*);<sup>529</sup> he erects the pure body of the Law;<sup>530</sup> in a word, he accomplishes all the work of a Buddha: hence he is a great "spiritual friend."

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In order to appreciate the lightness and the gravity of actions, one should, in short, take into consideration six causes:

119. Accordingly as these causes—consecutive, field, *adhiṣṭhāna*, preparation, volition, or intention—are small or large, action also is small or large.

Consecutive: after having done the action, that is, consequential action.

Field: the person to whom one does good or evil.

*Adhiṣṭhāna*: the deed itself.

Preparation: bodily or vocal action with a view to the preceding.

Volition: that through which the deed is achieved. Intention: to project the thought, "I shall do this or that to them; then I shall do this or that."<sup>531</sup>

It happens that an action can be grave only by reason of its consecutive action, for example, when this confers on the retribution the character of necessity.

It happens that an action can be grave by reason that, if the field is the same, a certain *adhiṣṭhāna* renders an action grave while another *adhiṣṭhāna* makes it light: for example, to kill one's father and mother is a grave action but to steal from one's father and mother, to lie to them, etc., is not grave by comparison. One can explain in this same way the gravity resulting from the preparation, etc.<sup>532</sup>

When all these causes are great, the action is very grave; when they are small, the action is very light.

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Action "done" (*kṛta*) is distinguished from "accumulated" (*upacita*) action.<sup>533</sup> What are the characteristics and conditions of accumulated action?

120. Action is termed "accumulated" by reason of its intentional character, by its completion, by the absence of regret and opposition, by its accompaniments, and by its retribution.<sup>534</sup>

By reason of its intentional character: Action done voluntarily or intentionally is accumulated action;<sup>535</sup> action done involuntarily or unconsciously,<sup>536</sup> and action not done in haste, even if it is voluntary, is action that is "done."

"By reason of its completion:" Some go to painful realms of rebirth through misdeeds; some by two; some by three (bodily, vocal, and mental misdeeds); some through one deed, through two, through three ... through ten. Since it is a rule that a person goes to a painful realm of rebirth through a certain quantity of actions, if this measure is not completed, the action is done, but not accumulated; but when this measure is completed, it is accumulated.<sup>537</sup>

"By reason of the absence of regret and opposition:" When remorse (*vipratīṣāra*, *anutāpa*, ii.28) is absent, or when opposition,—confession, etc.,—is absent, action is then termed "accumulated."<sup>538</sup>

"By reason of its accompaniments:" When an action is bad and has a bad escort: [or when one rejoices at having committed it,] it is "accumulated."

"By reason of its retribution:" Action is accumulated which necessarily gives forth retribution (*vipākadāne niyatam*, iv.50).

The same for good action.

Action which does not present these characteristics is done, but is not accumulated.

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We have seen (iv.114a) that a gift made to a Caitya by a person not detached from desire is a gift of benefit for him who made it. But no one enjoys the thing given: how can this gift be meritorious?

The merits of the gift are of two types: 1. merit produced by abandoning, that is, the merit which results from the sole fact of abandoning; 2. merit produced by its enjoyment,<sup>539</sup> the merit which results in joy in the object given, by the person who receives.

121a. The merit of a gift to a Caitya is merit produced by abandoning.<sup>540</sup>

How can the gift produce merit when no one receives it?

We would answer this objection by asking why would the gift produce merit when someone receives it, and why it would not produce merit when no one receives it?

Because, in the second case, no one is satisfied, or favored by the gift.

If the satisfaction of a person who receives is a condition for merit, you then deny that the Immeasurable Mediations (Mediations of Compassion, etc., viii.29) and the Meditation of Right View are meritorious. The gift to a Caitya thus produces merit,

121b. Even though no one receives it, as is the case with compassion, etc.

In the case of the Meditation on Compassion, no one receives, no one is satisfied, and yet merit arises for the compassionate person, through the very force of his thoughts of compassion. In the same way, even though the Excellent Being has passed away, a gift to a Caitya made with devotion to him is meritorious by reason of the thought of the believer himself.

Should we conclude then that material offerings and worship are superfluous?

No, for the devotion which produces these actions very much

outweighs the devotion of a person who worships and who gives in mind only. When a person who has the intention of killing his enemy, continues his bodily and vocal actions on the dead body of his enemy which this intention provokes, thinking, "This is my enemy," that is to say, he thinks, "This enemy is not yet dead," he obtains demerit very much greater than he would have through merely the intention;<sup>541</sup> in the same way, even though the Master has passed away, the person who does actions of giving and worship inspired through devotion obtains a much greater merit than he would have only through devotion.

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If a seed given to a good field bears an agreeable result, should we think that it bears a disagreeable result if given to a bad field?

121c-d. Even seeded into a bad field, the gift bears agreeable results, for there is never opposition between the result and the seed.<sup>542</sup>

From the seed of the vine,<sup>543</sup> there arises solely the sweet fruit of the vine; from the seed of the *nimba* (*Azadirachta Indica*) there arises only the sour fruit of the *nimba*: even seeded into a bad field, the seed bears the result which is appropriate to it. In the same way, this seed which is the gift of a person who has the intention of being useful to another, even if placed into a bad field, can only produce an agreeable result. But, through the evil of the field, the result will be small or almost nil.

We have explained meritorious work which consists of Giving, together with its related questions.

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We must now explain meritorious work which consists of the Precepts.

122a-b. Immorality is bad *rūpa*. Morality is the renouncing of immorality.<sup>544</sup>

Bad *rūpa* is called immorality. The renouncing of immorality, which is morality, is

## 122b. Of two types.

Renouncing is *viññapti*, the action by which one renounces, and *aviññapti*, the fact of abstaining (see above, pp. 560, 562, 583).

Morality is not solely the renouncing of immorality.

122c. It is, further, the renouncing of that which is prohibited by the Buddha.

To renounce that which is prohibited by the Buddha, the Blessed One,—without being in and of itself immoral, for example renouncing meals at forbidden times,—is also morality. This renouncing is also *viññapti* and *aviññapti*. He who has undertaken to observe the rules and who then violates them, commits immorality.

The morality that we have just described, in short, is

122d. Pure, when it is endowed with the four qualities.

Morality endowed with the four qualities is pure; it is impure in the contrary case.

123a-b. Not troubled by immorality, by the causes of immorality; it takes as its support the opposite of immorality and “peace.”

“Not troubled by immorality” we have described; “not troubled by the causes of immorality,” that is, by the *kleśas* and *upakleśas* (v.41), “it takes as its support the opposites of immorality,” because it relies on the four *smṛtyupasthānas* (vi.14); and it relies on “peace,” not on rebirth in celestial realms, because it is directed to Nirvāṇa.

According to another opinion, five causes make morality pure: 1. the purity of the deed itself [the renouncing of bad deeds]; 2. the purity of their attendants [renouncing the preparation or the means of killing, etc.]; 3. the absence of disturbance from the *vitarkas* [*kāma*, *vyāpāda*, and *vibhīṃsāvītarka*]; 4. its supervision through mindfulness [Buddha, Dharma, Saṅghānusmṛti—which includes the renouncing of undefined actions]; and 5. its application to Nirvāṇa.<sup>545</sup>

According to another opinion, morality is of four types: 1. the morality of fear, which one observes from the fear of the loss of the resources necessary to life, from fear of a bad reputation, from fear of



chastisement, from fear of bad realms of rebirth;<sup>546</sup> 2. mercenary morality, which one observes from attachment to agreeable realms of existence, to pleasures, to honors; 3. a morality suitable to the parts of Bodhi, which persons who possess Right View possess, with a view to their deliverance; and 4. pure morality, which, being free from stains, is free from vices.

We have explained morality.

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123c-d. "Good absorption" or good in absorption, is *bhāvanā*, meditation, soaking in, or impregnation.<sup>547</sup>

What do we understand by *samāhita*, absorbed? That which is absorption (*samādhi*, ii.24, viii.1) by its nature, and that which coexists with what is absorption by nature.

Why does "good absorption" receive the name of *bhāvanā*?

123d. Because it perfumes, impregnates the mind.

Good absorption impregnates the mind to an extreme degree, because it (i.e., the mind) grasps the qualities of this good, in the same way as sesame seeds are impregnated by flowers in their grasping the odor of these flowers.

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We have said (iv.113d) that the result of giving consists of joys. What result does one obtain from the precepts and from meditation?

124a-b. Essentially, the precepts have heaven for their result; meditation has disconnection for its result.<sup>548</sup>

Giving also has heaven for its result, but the precepts are the principle, normative cause of it. Disconnection, or Nirvāṇa, (ii. trans. p. 280) has meditation for its cause, which, in the path of abandoning (*prahāṇamārga*, vi.60c-d) immediately produces disconnection from the defilements; but the precepts contribute to it, since stilling (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*) presuppose the precepts.

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The Sūtra says that four persons produce "Brahmin" merit, *brāhmapunya*.<sup>549</sup> What is this merit?

According to the Vaibhāṣikas (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 425c13), this is the merit which has been defined above in order that we might know the measure of the action which has the marks of the Bodhisattva for its result (iv.110).<sup>550</sup>

The ancient masters<sup>551</sup> said:

124c-d. Four possess Brahmin merit, because they are happy in the heavens for a *kalpa*.<sup>552</sup>

The merit of such a measure that one is happy in heaven for a *kalpa* is the Brahmin merit, for the lifespan of the Brahmapurohitas is a *kalpa* (iii.80d).<sup>553</sup> And in another Canon, one reads, "He engenders Brahmin merit, he is happy in the heavens for a *kalpa*."

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We have studied material giving.<sup>554</sup>

125a-b. The gift of the Dharma is the correct teaching, not defiled, of the Sūtras etc.<sup>555</sup>

The gift of the Dharma is to teach, correctly and with a mind not defiled, the Sūtra and the other parts of Scripture. Consequently, those who teach the Dharma either falsely, or with a defiled mind, through a desire for gain, for respect, and for reputation,<sup>556</sup> destroy the great merit which would otherwise fall to them.

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We have explained the three types of good according to the distinction of the three items of meritorious work. Furthermore,

125c-d. Good is threefold, merit, Nirvāṇa and penetration.

Good merit, or good "favorable to merit" is the good which leads to an agreeable retribution.<sup>557</sup>

The good which is deliverance<sup>558</sup> is the good which, when it arises, becomes a *dharma* of Parinirvāṇa.<sup>559</sup> It is recognized that whoever, understanding the sermons concerning the defects of Saṃsāra, the non-self, and the qualities of Nirvāṇa, has his hairs stand on end and who pours forth tears,<sup>560</sup> possesses the *mokṣabhāgīya* root of good; in this same way, one knows that there was a seed in the *khalabīla*,<sup>561</sup> when, in the rain, one sees a plant put forth shoots.

The good of penetration is fourfold, *uṣmagatas*, etc.; it will be explained later (vi.17).<sup>562</sup>

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What is the nature of what is popularly called writing, carving (*mudrā*), eloquence, poetry (*kāvya*), and calculation?

126. An industrious action, of the body, of the voice or of the mind, with that which gives rise to it, are such things as writing, carving, eloquence, poetry, and calculation.<sup>563</sup>

"Industrious," that is, due to a certain technique.

"Threefold action" is bodily, vocal, and mental action.

"Writing and carving" are bodily actions, industrious, together with what gives rise to this action, namely the collection of the mind and its mental states.

"Eloquence and poetry" are vocal actions.

Consequently, writing, carving, eloquence, and poetry, are by their nature, the five *skandhas*.

"Calculation" is mental action: this refers to the mental enumeration of the *dharmas*.<sup>564</sup>

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Now let us explain some synonyms:

127a-b. Defiled *dharmas* are *sāvadya*, *nivṛta*, and *hīna*.

Some synonyms of "defiled" are: *sāvadya*, associated with *avadya*, or bad; *nivṛta*, that is, "covered" by the defilements: and the defilements themselves are covered by other defilements; *hīna*, or ignoble, because

they are low or abandoned by the Āryans.

127b-c. Good and pure *dharma*s are *pranīta*.

*Pranīta*, "excellent," is a synonym for *śubha*, that is, *kuśala*, good, and of *amala*, immaculate or *anāsrava*.

The *dharma*s which are neither ignoble nor excellent, are thus median (*madhya*).<sup>565</sup>

127c-d. Good conditioned *dharma*s are *sevyā*.

*Sevyā*, "to be cultivated" is synonymous with "good" and "conditioned."

It then follows that other *dharma*s, some unconditioned, others conditioned but defiled or non-defiled-neutral, are not to be cultivated. In fact, unconditioned *dharma*s are not susceptible of being produced, or cultivated, since the unconditioned has no result: now, it is with a view to a result that one cultivates.

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All the other *dharma*s are inferior.<sup>566</sup>

127d. Deliverance is the highest.

There is nothing which outweighs Nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa, being eternal and good, outweighs all.

1. *Āṅguttara* iii.415: *cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kamman vadāmi, cetayitvā kamman karoti kāyena vācāya manasā* Compare *Atthasālinī* p. 88; *Kathāvatthu*, p. 393; *Madhyamaka*, xvii.2 and 3: *cetanā cetayitvā ca karmoktam paramarṣiṇā / ... tatra yac cetanety uktam karma tan mānasam smṛtam / cetayitvā ca yat tūktam tat tu kāyikavācīkam // Madhyamakāvatāra*, vi.89, quoted in *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (v.3, ix.73), p. 472.

2. Vocal action is "voice," *vāg eva karma*. However *kāyakarma* is defined as *kāyena kāyasya vā karma*.

3. On *cetanā*, see ii.24. Mrs. Rhys Davids (*Psychology*, p. 8), translates this as "thinking"; Aung (*Compendium*, p. 16) translates it as "volition." "Volition" is only slightly satisfying, for we shall see (below p. 565) that action includes a subsequent *cetanā*, "I have killed."

For the Jains, mental action is only semi-action (*addhakamma*), *Majjhima*, i.372 (*Kośa*, iv.105), *Uvāsakadāsā*, ii. App. 2, p. 18; *SBE*. xiv, pp. 83, 165, 179, 242, 315. *Kośa*, iv.73a-b.

4. *Vyākhyā*: *Cetayitā ceti / evaṃ cedam karisyāmi*. *Madhyamakavṛtti*, 397.1: *evaṃ caivaṃ ca kāyavāgbbhāṃ pravartisyā tū evaṃ cetasā saṃcintya yat kṛtyate tat cetayitvā karmety ucyate*.

5. (a) *Vijñāpti* is "that which informs" (*vijñāpayati*), the manifestation of a mind either by means of the body, or by means of the voice. It is bodily in the first case, vocal in the second: *kāyavijñāpti*, information through the body, which we call an action, *śarīraceṣṭā*, or *viṣpanda* (*Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 307), the *kāyavipphandana* or "bodily suffusion" of Mrs. Rhys Davids (*Dharmasāṅgī*, 636, *Atthasālinī*, p. 323); *vāgvijñāpti* is information through the voice or words (*Kośa*, iv.3d).

The School holds (*Kośa*, iv.2b-3b) that *kāyavijñāpti* is not an action, a movement of the body, but a disposition, a "shape" of the body. The Sautrāntikas deny that shape exists in and of itself (iv.3c).

But should *vijñāpti* be considered as being, in its nature, action? This is the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas and the heretics of the *Kathāvatthu*, viii.9, x.10 (the Mahīśāsakas, Saṃmitiyas, and Mahāsāṅghikas) who believe that "action" and words constitute "action after having been willed" of which the Blessed One speaks (iv.1b), an action distinct from volition, and *rūpa* in its nature. But for the Theravādins (*Atthasālinī*, p. 88, 96, 323, *Āṅguttara*, ii.157, *Saṃyutta*, ii.39) and for the Sautrāntikas (below p. 559) action is volition (*cetanā*); "bodily action" does not mean "information by the body," but a *kāyasamcetanā*, a volition relative to the body and which leads the body. (The version of Aung, *Points of Controversy*, p. 225, is not totally correct.) (b) *Avijñāpti* (i.11, iv.4) is an action "which does not inform anything to another"; *avijñāpti* is *rūpa*, but does not form part of the *rūpāyatana*: it is classed within the *dharmāyatana* and is only known by the mental consciousness.

In order to make all this easier to comprehend, the person who commits a murder or takes the vows of a Bhikṣu produces after his volition (*cetanā*) a bodily or vocal "information"—an action or a word—and, at the same time, an invisible action, nevertheless material and made up of the primary elements, which continues to exist in him and to increase, by reason of which he is either a murderer or a Bhikṣu. This invisible action, created by certain visible or audible actions and which "informs," is called *avijñāpti*, "non-information"; it is considered to be either bodily or vocal accordingly as it is created by an action or by a word.

When a person gives orders to an assassin, he does not accomplish the action by which the murder is committed; the order that he gives is solely a preparation for murder; he is then not guilty of "the bodily information of murder." But, at the moment when the person assassinated is murdered, a "non-information" of murder arises in him: he is, by this fact, guilty of murder.

When a person enters into a Dhyāna—which supposes detachment from the defilements of Kāmadhātu—he does not pronounce the vows by which one renounces killing, etc. He does not produce "vocal information" by which the monk produces this "non-information" which constitutes his monkhood and which is called discipline (*saṃvara*, iv.13). But in a Dhyāna, the mind is strong enough to create, by itself and without intervention of "vocal information," the action of "non-information," or discipline.

6. The text has *apare*, "according to others." The *Vyākhyā* holds that the "others" are the Vātsīputriyas. The gloss of the Japanese editor, Saeki, mentions the Saṃmitiyas.

7. According to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, bodily *viññapti* is "to advance, withdraw, to fix the gaze, to look at all sides, to advance the arms, to withdraw them, etc."

8. Hsüan-tsang: "For when the body moves, it moves by reason of action."

9. The *Vyākhyā* adds: "or rather a *kṣaṇa* is the minimum length of time" (iii.85d). See ii.46a-b.

10. Hsüan-tsang: "since it perishes later."

11. Extinction does not have a cause, see *Kośa* ii.46; *Madhyamakavṛtti* pp. 29 note 5, and p. 173 note 8, 222, 413. The *Ṣaḍdarsanasamuccaya* (ed. Suali, 46) quotes a Sūtra of the Sautrāntikas: *pañcemeṇi bhikkavaḥ samññāmātrāṇi pratīññāmātrāṇi samvṛttimātrāṇi vyavahāramātrāṇi / katamāṇi pañca / atīto'dhvā anāgato'dhvā sahetuko vināśaḥ ākāśam pudgala itī / Vedāntasūtra* ii.2, 23; *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* (Viz. S.S.), 383.

12. According to the *Vyākhyā*: *Sthāviravāsubandhuprabhṛtibhir ayaṃ hetur uktaḥ*. According to the gloss of Saeki, "According to the School of the Sthāviras."

13. *Kṣaṇa eva kṣaṇe* means *kṣaṇe kṣaṇa eva* which is further glossed by *tasmim eva kṣaṇe*. It arises by reason of merit, and immediately perishes by reason of demerit; reborn by reason of merit . . . Or it arises by reason of demerit, perishes by reason of merit . . . Or rather *kṣaṇa eva kṣaṇe* signifies *mukhye kṣaṇe'naupacārike kṣaṇe*.

14. *Vyākhyā*: *Śakyas caṣṭha kāraṇaparikalpa itī vistaraḥ / dharmād adharmaḥ vināśa itī kāraṇaparikalpa itī sarvatra saṁskṛte dṛyaṇukādaṁ anīyeṣu rūpādīṣu karmaṇi ca śakyate kartum ato na vaktavyam etad agniśāmyogāt kṣṛthādīnāṁ vināśa itī evamādī*.

15. According to Saeki, the *Saṁmitīyas*.

16. Compare *Asaṅga, Śūrālamkāra*, xviii.82.

17. Hsüan-tsang, who is translated above, departs from the original: "... this is to simply repeat your affirmation, since the existence of similar atoms is not proved. If it were proved, then these atoms could be joined together; but the self nature of the parts of a shape is not proved, as is the case for the parts of a thing of color (*na ca saṁsthānāvayavānāṁ varṇādīṣu svabhāvaḥ siddhaḥ*) that is to say, the parts of a "long" thing are not "long," etc.: how can these parts, by their coming together, bring about a determined shape?

18. One sees an army without seeing its soldiers; but this does not prove that an army exists apart from its soldiers. In the same way one sees shape without distinguishing its color.

19. According to Hsüan-tsang. The Tibetan has: First there is produced a certain resolution (*saṁkalpa*). When one has thus willed, a volition is produced whose function or action it is to set into motion (*vartayati*), and which is "the action after having been willed."

20. For *aviññapti* of the sphere of Kāmadhātu depends on *viññapti*, bodily and vocal action, or *rūpa*; it does not accompany the mind as does the *aviññapti* of Rūpadhātu. But see iv.75c-d.

21. The *Rūpasamgrahasūtra*. Compare *Dīgha*, iii.217; *Vibhaṅga*, pp. 13, 64.

22. The *Vyākhyā* here quotes a part of the discourse of the Buddha to Cunda on the two types of meritorious works (see Minayev, *Recherches*, p. 185-186, and below iv.117a-b), an extract of the story of Ghoṣila in the *Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins*, see E. Huber, *Sources du Divyāvadāna*, BEFEO. 1906, p. 18.

Upadhi means the thing (*ārāma*, *vihāra*, etc.) given to a monk or to the Saṁgha; the merit that proceeds (*tadbhava*) from this *upadhi* is called *aupadhika*.

*Mahācundaśūtra* (*Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 427c29): *saptemāṇi Cunda aupadhikāṇi puṇya-kriyāvastūni mahāphalāṇi jāvan mahāvaiśārīkāṇi yaḥ samanvāgatasya śrāddhasya kulapūtrasya vā kuladuhitṛ vā carato vā tiṣṭhato vā svapato vā jāgrato vā satatasamītam abhivārdhata eva puṇyam upajāyata eva puṇyam / katamāṇi sapta / iha Cunda śrāddhaḥ kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā cāturdśīḥ bhikkṣusamghāyānāmaṁ pratipādayati / idam Cunda prathamam . . .*

The non-material meritorious works do not include offerings: they essentially consist of the joy that the believer experiences from the nearness, from the presence, from drawing near to the Tathāgata or a Śrāvaka. The seventh includes the taking of the Refuge and the undertaking of the prohibitions.

*Iha Cunda śrāddhabh kulaputro vā kuladubhitā vā śṛṇoti tathāgatam vā tathāgataśrāvakam vā amakam grāmaksetram upanīśṛīya viharatūi śrūtvā ca punar adbhigacchati prūṣṭprāmodyam udāram kusalam naiskramyopasamibhitam / idam Cunda prathamam nīrupadhikam pūnyakriyā-vastu.*

See *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 137 (*Ratnarāsīsūtra*). *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 309 and the sources quoted in the notes.

Pāli sources: *Anguttara*, ii.50, 54; and the discussion in the *Kathāvatthu*, vii.5: *paribhogamayaṃ puññam vaddhati* and x.9: *samādānabhetukam sīlam vaddhati*. The *Kathāvatthu* touches on some other points relative to the doctrine of *avijñapti*, viii.9, x.8, 11-12.

23. The *Kathāvatthu* denies that *saṃvara* is *kamma* (xii.1).

24. Compare *Sumaṅgalavilāsini*, 305, the third type of *virati*, proper to the Āryans and not susceptible of being cut off, or *setuḡhātavirati*; *Atthasālinī*, p. 103, has *samucchedavirati*; below v.33a-b.

The *Dhammasaṅgani*, 299, defines right speech (*sammāvācā*): *catūhi vacāduccaritehi āraṭi virati . . . anasikkamo setuḡhāto*. According to Buddhaghosa (*Atthasālinī*, p. 219) *setuṃ hanatūi setuḡhāto*: right speech is the destruction (*ghāta*) of the dike through which the transgressions of the voice pass. The translator (*Psychology*, 87) adopts this interpretation and refers to *Anguttara* i.220, 261, ii.145. But, in these passages *setuḡhāto* = *setubandha* = *setu* = a dike, obstacle: "The Blessed One has declared that *maithuna* is a *setuḡhāto*." "Thus, monks, there is a *setuḡhāto* with respect to laughing." "The Nigantha teaches that one destroys former actions through penitence and that one dikes them up (*setuḡhāto*) by abstention (*akaraṇa*)." The *Mahāvīryupatti*, 255.9, has *sāṃparāyikāpāṇi setusamudghātāya*; Tibetan version: "with a view to arresting the defilements by means of a dike"; Chinese version: "with a view to arresting the defilements like a torrent." See also *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 525 the definition of Nirvāṇa *jalapravāṇirodhabhūtasatusthānīya*.

25. *mal 'byor spyod pa dag*. Paramārtha: The ancient masters of the Yogācāra (*hsien-chiu kuan-hsing shih* 先舊觀行師). Hsüan-tsang: *yü-chia shih* 瑜伽師.

Saeki has a long note 7b-8a.

It follows from the *Vyākhyā* that the term Yogācāra does not here designate the follower of a certain philosophic school but simply an ascetic: "The Yogācārin who actualizes the Path (*mārgam saṃmukhikurvāṇa*) takes possession of a mental disposition (*āśaya*) and a psycho-physical substrate (*āśraya*), whereas he takes possession of pure morality (*anāsrava śīla*) as he takes possession of right view: having acquired this pure morality, he abides in a natural morality (*prakṛtiśīlata*). Or rather (*atha vā*) the Masters maintain that, in this same pure absorption, there is a *rūpa* of the same nature, that is to say pure (*anāsrave'pi samādhanu tadevaṃvidham rūpam ta ācārya icchanti*).

*Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 138: *yadi bhikṣavo yukto yogācāro mama śikṣāyām pratipannam sarvasaṃskāreṣu anāyadarsi . . .*

On *yogācāra* in the *Mahāvastu*, i.120.9, see the remarks of the editor, i.469. The passage is obscure.

There follows some relevant references in the *Abhidharmakośa*:

i.17. *Vyākhyā*: In the system (*darśana*) of the Yogācāras, the *manodhātu* is distinct from the six *vijñānas*.

i.41. The *Vijñānavādins* defend the thesis: *vijñānam paśyati*.

ii.24. The *Vyākhyā* quotes the definition that the *yogācārācūtas* give rise to *adhimuktī* (note 117 of our translation).

ii.44e. The doctrine of the former masters of the *samāpattis* quoted by the *Sautrāntikas* (p. 231 of our translation).

iii.15c. Definition of a Gandharva. *Bhāṣya*: "The former masters"; *Vyākhyā*: *Pūrvācārya yogācārya Āryasāṅgaṇaprabhṛtayaḥ*.

iii.63a-b. Phases of the moon. Opinion of the former masters; but according to the *Vyākhyā*, the Yogācārins.

iv.75. *Bhāṣya*: "The former masters," but, according to the *Vyākhyā*: In the system (*°nāyena*) of the Yogācārins.

v.8. *Vyākhyā*: "According to the Yogācārins (*°matī*), there are one hundred and twenty-eight *kṛśas*."

v.43b-c. Definition of the *avarabhāgīyas* attributed to *apare*. These "other masters" as the Yogācārins (*Vyākhyā*).

vi.10a-b. The ascetics (*yogācārya*) who practice *asubhā* are of three types, *ādīkarmika* . . .

26. According to the gloss of Saeki. On this point of doctrine, see i.31d and *Vyākhyā*, p. 14.

27. The expression *sāsava upādānīya* in *Samyutta* iii.47, *Ānguttara* iii.248 (definition of the *upādānaskandhas*).

28. *Pañca cetokhila*, *Dīgha*, iii.237, q.v.; *Mahāvīyapatti*, 10.24; *vyāpādakṣiladvēṣa*.

29. Hsüan-tsang adds here: If one says "How do the qualities and the actions of a certain person produce a transformation in another person who is thinking of another thing?" This difficulty also presents itself in the theory of *avijñapti*: how do the qualities and the actions of a certain person cause a certain thing, the *avijñapti*, to arise in another person?

30. Compare *Ānguttara*, ii.54 and the *Ratnarāṣisūtra*, quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 138. The phraseology of our Sūtra differs from these two sources; Hsüan-tsang differs here from the Tibetan. He has: "An outflowing of merit moistens his series and a *sukha* without measure flows into his body."

31. According to P'u-kuang, the Bhadanta is Dharmatrāta (See i.20a-b). See TD 41, p. 108b6.

32. According to Hsüan-tsang: However whoever has this threefold volition while carrying out himself, without any error of person, the action of murder, is touched by the transgression of murder. If the Bhadanta refers to this case, then he is correct.

33. *Vyākhyā*: *Āśayaś cāśrayaś ceti / āśayaḥ prānātipātādyakaraṇāśayaḥ śraddhādyāśayo vā / āśraya āśrayaparāvṛttiḥ*. "Intention" refers to the intention of not committing murder, or the intention of faith. When one says that an ascetic obtains a certain *āśraya*, one means that he has undergone a modification (*parāvṛtti*) of his psycho-physiological substrate. (The *āśraya* is defined ii.5, 6, 36c-d, 44d).

P'u-kuang explains: *Āśraya* consists of *chanda*, or of *adbhimukṣi*, or of *chanda* and of *adbhimukṣi* . . . The *āśraya* is the *cetanā* which is produced at the same time as the *āśraya*; it serves as the support (*āśraya*) of the *āśraya* . . .

The meaning of *parāvṛtti* is clearly stated in *Vyākhyā* iv.14c: "When the gender of the mother or the father is *parāvṛtti*, that is to say, when the quality of mother or father is destroyed by the *parāvṛtti* of gender . . ."

The tradition of Asaṅga is heir to the expression *āśrayaparāvṛtti*, *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, ix.12. This refers, as S. Lévi says, to a revolution of the very basis of the being, of the appearance of a new personality: a Pṛthagjana becomes an Āryan, a woman becomes a man, a man becomes an animal, etc.

On *parāvṛtti*, see vi.41.

34. Numerous and divergent definitions of the eight *lokaadharma*s, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 871b29-cl.

35. Here Hsüan-tsang has two *pādas* which are absent in Paramārtha "It depends (*upādāṭṭi*) on primary elements which are the support (*āśraya*) of the *viññapti*." *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 684c12.



36. Certain masters say that *viññapti* and *avijñapti* arise from the same four primary elements. They ask: "Are there four primary elements which produce two *āyatana*s, or two *rūpa*s? Yes, they produce *rūpāyatana* and *dharmāyatana*, *śabdāyatana* and *dharmāyatana*." The Bhadanta Ghosaka says: "The Abhidharma masters say that this is not correct; it is impossible that the same four primary elements produce both a subtle result and a gross result ..." (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 684c23.)

37. The Tibetan version omits this first paragraph.

38. *Vyākhyā*: *Samutthāpakacittākeṣatvād asamāhītacittāviññaptiyadbikārāc ca na svapnasamādhyaupacayikamahābhūtajā*.

39. Hsüan-tsang makes two *pādas* out of this phrase: "The *viññapti* is solely an outflowing ..." The *Bhāṣya* of Hsüan-tsang adds: "For the rest, it is like the *avijñapti* of a non-absorbed state."

40. *Avyākṛta*, see ii.54, iv.9c at the end.

41. According to the principle *vitarkaḥ vicāryavacanā bhāṣate*, ii.33a-b, p.

42. *Dīgha*, i.18, 221; above ii.31; below v.49c, 53c; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 670b24-c25.

43. But the Śāstra says: *śabdadhātunā kaḥ samanvāgataḥ / āha / kāmārūpāvacaṣaḥ / ko'samanvāgataḥ / ārūpyāvacaṣaḥ* / If the beings of Rūpdhātu are "endowed" with sound, it cannot be a question of an external sound, one not belonging to a living being (*asattvaśamābhūta*). Thus one should attribute to the beings of Rūpdhātu the type of sound that one makes with the hands, etc. In order to avoid this criticism, some other masters say, "*Viññapti* ..."

44. Two opinions: 1) the *viññapti* which is produced in the Second Dhyāna and above is of the sphere of the First Dhyāna, being produced by a mind of the sphere of the First Dhyāna, according to the rule given in viii.13. This is the opinion of the *Vaiśāṅghika*s. 2) This *viññapti* is of the Second Dhyāna and above. One *viññapti* of a higher sphere is thus produced by a mind of a higher sphere. When the beings of these Dhyānas talk among themselves, etc. (*parasparasambhāṣanādikurvātām*), their *viññapti* is *anivṛtāvyaṅkṛta*.

45. Hsüan-tsang: "The first opinion is correct." Gloss of Saeki: "Such is the opinion of the author."

46. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 741a10. The Bhadanta says: There are four reasons why one uses the word *kuśala*: because it is good by nature, by association, in origin, and absolutely. Good by nature: some say: *bhī* and *anapatrāpya*; some say: the three *kuśalamūlas* ... Absolutely good: Nirvāṇa, called good because it is calm (*kṣema*).

According to the *Vibhajyavādin*s, *jñāna* is good by nature; the *viññāna*, etc. associated with *jñāna*, is good by association; the actions of the body and the voice which proceed from it are good in origin; and Nirvāṇa absolutely good. The definitions of *akuśala* are parallel (i.e., *moha* is bad by nature).

47. The other *kuśalas* are not.

48. *Dīrgha*, 255.16. On the good, bad, and neutral roots, see v.20.

49. According to the Tibetan. *Paramārtha* and Hsüan-tsang: "Bodily action, vocal action and the *cittaviprayuktasamāskāras*." This is also the reading of the *Vibhāṣā*. *Samghabhadra* (TD 29, p. 546b27 and following): Bodily action, vocal action, *jāti*, etc. (*lakṣaṇa*, ii.48c) and the *prāpti*s of the two absorptions without mind (*nīrodha* and *asamijñāsamāpatti*).

50. When one again takes possession of the roots of good through doubt (*vicikīṣā*) (iv.80), the *prāpti*s of these roots are good: now they are neither good in and of themselves, by association, in origin, nor absolutely so. In the same way, the *prāpti*s of innate good (ii.71b) are good and are not included in any of the four categories. *Samghabhadra* responds to this objection, TD 29, p. 546b27 and following.

51. The doctrine of the *Kathāvatthu* on good, bad, and neutral, is presented xiv.8; Nibbana is *avyākata*, xi.1, xiii.9 xiv.8.

52. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 610a5.

53. Paramārtha: "If this were the case, then when a person free from mind (*acittaka*) produces *avijñapti*śīla, where would his *anuvartaka* mind be?" Hsüan-tsang: "If this were the case, how could a person free from mind produce *śīla*?"

Suppose that a person, while he is receiving ordination (*upasampādayamāna*) and is thus "binding" his bodily actions (*kāyavijñaptim ābadhnan*), enters into *nirōdhasamāpatti* and so becomes free from mind. When he produces restraint (*saṃvara*) in himself, how can bodily action (*kāyavijñapti*)—which supposes restraint (*0 antargata*)—take place after this ceremony (*karmavācanāvasāna*)?

54. *Rūpa* (the action, *vijñapti*) is not "contradicted," that is to say "abandoned," by means of *vidyā*, that is by the Path of Seeing, as is the case for the false opinion of personalism, etc. (*sakkāyadṛṣṭi*): for the very persons who have seen the Truths are "endowed" (*samanvāgata*) with *rūpa*. It is not contradicted by *avidyā*, as is the case for the Pure (*anāsava*) Path, for *avidyā* exists while one creates *rūpas* (actions) which are defined or non-defined as having a moral value, and while the *prāptis* (ii.36b) of these *rūpas* continue; and it also exists in the contrary case.

Thus, one cannot say that this *rūpa* is to be abandoned by Seeing, or is no longer not to be abandoned. It is only to be abandoned through Meditation.

55. The *Vyākhyā* explains: "Because it is turned inwards and outwards (*antarabāhirmukha-pravṛtta*)." Hsüan-tsang: "Because it is accompanied by *vikalpa* (*savikalpakatva*), and because it is turned outwards."

56. Hsüan-tsang: "Because they are turned outwards, they are free from *vikalpa*."

57. Hsüan-tsang places iv.12d here: "(1) The pure mind is neither initiator nor mover, because it is only produced in absorption; nor (2) a mind arisen from retribution (*vipākaja*), because it is produced spontaneously, without effort (*anabbisaṃskāravādīn*)."

58. Hsüan-tsang: "A mover generally of the same type, but sometimes different."

59. "Teaching," *anūsāsānā*. Hsüan-tsang: "The mind of the Buddhas, in the teaching of the *dharmā*, etc., either increases or at least does not decrease."

60. According to Saeki, the *Mahāsārngghikas*, etc. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 410b26: The *Vibhajyavādins* praise the Blessed One, saying that his mind is always absorbed, because his right memory and knowledge are firm; they say that the Buddha is never sluggish (*middha*), because he is free from obstacles (*āvaraṇas*).

61. *Anguttara*, iii.346, *Theragāthā*, 696-697: *gaccham samāhito nāgo phito nāgo samāhito / sayam samāhito nāgo misimmo pi samāhito / sabbattha saṃvuto nāgo esa nāgassa sampadā* / The Sanskrit has: *caran samāhito*.

The *Vyākhyā* establishes that, in the Sūtra, the Buddha Bhagavat receives the name of Nāga: *Tathāgata Udayim sadevake loke . . . āgo na karoti kāyena vācā manasā tasmān nāga ity ucyate*.

62. A *Śikṣamānā* is a "probationer." According to one opinion which Takakusu (*I-tsing*, p. 38; 97) quotes, a *Śikṣamānā* is a woman who undertakes the precepts with a view to becoming a *Śrāmaṇerikā*; she is included (in the Pāli list) among the *Śrāmaṇerikās*. But as we shall see, the *Śikṣamānā* discipline is identical to the discipline of the *Śrāmaṇerikā*. But the *Śikṣamānā* is a candidate for the state of *Bhikṣuṇī*; see iv.26c-d and *Cullavagga*, x.1.4 (*Vimaya Texts*, i. p. 296).

*Yogācārin*s: Why did the Blessed One, with respect to the *Bhikṣu* precepts, establish two precepts, that of *Bhikṣu* and that of the *Śrāmaṇera*, whereas he established three sets of precepts with respect to the *Bhikṣuṇī* precepts, that of *Bhikṣuṇī*, *Śikṣamānā*, and *Śrāmaṇerikā*? Because women have many defilements: thus they progressively take up the *Bhikṣuṇī* precepts. If a woman

shows joy and faithfulness to a small number of the Śrāmaṇerikā precepts, one should give her the Śikṣamāṇā precepts, one should not precipitously give her the full number of precepts; rather, she should cultivate two years during which . . .

The *Ta-chih-tu lun*, TD 25, p. 161c4. The Śrāmaṇera, the possessor of the ten precepts, is called to undertake the full number of precepts. Why is there a Śikṣamāṇā in the Bhikṣuṇīdharma? In the time of the Buddha, the wife of a merchant, pregnant without her knowing it, left the householder's life and received all the precepts . . . It was established that women cultivate the precepts for two years, undertaking six *dharma*s, and then they could undertake the full number of precepts.

According to the *Vinayamāyākāśūtra* (8.25) the discipline of the Bhikṣu contains two hundred and fifty *dharma*s; that of the Bhikṣuṇī, five hundred *dharma*s. According to the *Ta-chih-tu lun*, TD 25, p. 161c4, the Bhikṣuṇī undertakes five hundred precepts; if one were to detail them, then there would be eighty thousand precepts; the Bhikṣu undertakes two hundred and fifty precepts; if one were to detail them, then there would be eighty thousand precepts.

63. The causes that determine the loss of restraint are enumerated iv.38.

64. The *Vyākhyā* gives an example: the monk who renounces food "at the wrong time" is less exposed to committing killing than a layman.

65. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 646c10: He who undertakes a later discipline does not abandon the earlier discipline. The Upāsaka who undertakes the Śrāmaṇera precepts does not abandon the five precepts of the Upāsaka; he takes up the precepts of the Śrāmaṇera; he thus possesses at one and the same time fifteen rules of discipline . . . The Bhikṣu will thus possess two hundred and sixty-five precepts. Some other masters say that the Upāsaka takes up Śrāmaṇera precepts, but not by abandoning the five Upāsaka precepts and taking up the five Śrāmaṇera precepts: he thus possesses ten precepts . . . If a person possesses at one and the same time two sets of precepts, or three sets of precepts (Upāsaka, Śrāmaṇera, Bhikṣu), why is he called according to the latter name,—Bhikṣu, and not Upāsaka? . . .

66. The Tibetan and Paramārtha say: "If it were otherwise, he who abandons the Bhikṣu precepts would not be an Upāsaka." Hsüan-tsang: "... Upāsaka, etc." Saeki says that a Bhikṣu who renounces the Bhikṣu precepts becomes a Śrāmaṇera; likewise, a Śrāmaṇera becomes an Upāsaka.

67. *Divya*, 160: *Rambhaka āramika Rddhilaṃātā upāsaka śramaṇoddeśikā Cundaḥ śramaṇoddeśa Uṣṭalavarṇā bhikṣuṇī* . . .

*Āṅguttara*, ii.78: *bhikkhusu bhikkhunisu upāsakesu upāsikesu antamaso āramikasamaṇud-desesu*.

*Prātimokṣa* of the Sarvāstivādins, v.57 (J.As. 1914, p. 515).

The *Vyākhyā* reproduces under iv.30d the formula pronounced by the *śramaṇoddeśa*, the liturgical name of the Śrāmaṇera.

68. See *Mahāvīryapatti*, 268, where the sixth *virati* is formulated: *gandhamālyavilepamavarṇaka-dhāraṇavirati*.

69. The *Vibhāṣā* (TD 27, p. 229c29-230b3) gives ten explanations for the word *śīla*: cold or cooling; calm sleep, for he who observes *śīla* obtains calm sleep, and always has good dreams; repeated exercise (*abhyāsa*), by reason of the incessant practice of the good *dharma*s; absorption (*saṃādhi*); ornament (compare *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, p. 55); stage or pond, according to the stanza: "In the pure stage of the Law of the Buddha, morality is the pond, and the Āryans wash themselves of all defilements and arrive to the other shore of the qualities." *Śīla* defined iv.122.

70. The *avijñāpti* which constitutes the *Prātimokṣa samvara* results from a *viññāpti*. The *avijñāpti* arisen from a Dhyāna and pure *avijñāpti* arise from the mind in a state of absorption, from an impure mind of the sphere of the Dhyānas, or from a pure mind.

71. It is a cause of action, because the restraint (*samvarastha*), with a view to guarding the restraint (*parirakṣaṇārtham*), accomplishes actions (*kriyā*) consisting of bodily and vocal actions. It is an

effect of action, because—in the case of the *avijñapti* of the *Prātimokṣa*—it is the result of a *viññapti*; and because—in the case of the *avijñapti* arisen from an absorbed mind—it is the result of a volition (*cetanā*) arisen from absorption.

72. According to this etymology, we have *prātimokṣa*, but there is a *svārthe vṛddhividhāna*, as in *vaiṣṭam* = *vikṛtam*, and *vaiśasam* = *viśasam* (*Vyākhyā*).

On the meaning of *prātimokṣa*, see Kern, *Manual*, p. 74 (something serving as a spiritual cuirass); Oldenberg, *Bouddha* (1914), p. 419, note (Entlastung, *pratimuc* = loslassen, *Divya*, 94.18, 137.15, *Manu*, x.118). Moreover *pratimuc* also signifies "to bind."

Indeed the idea of "obligation" or "restraint" expresses the definition of the *Mahāvagga-Niddesa* which also adds an etymological explanation: *sīlāṃ paṭiṭṭhā ādicarāṇaṃ saṃyamo saṃvaro mukhaṃ pamukhaṃ kusalanāṃ dhammānaṃ samāpattiyā*.

73. But *Visuddhimagga*, p. 16: *pāṭimokkham eva saṃvaro pāṭimokkhasaṃvaro*.

74. In the *Abhidhamma* (*Atthasālinī*, p. 103), *samādānavirati*, "abstention following upon engagement" (in opposition to *saṃpattavirati*) refers to the *virati* obtained through the *Prātimokṣa*.

*Samādānaśīla*, the morality that one obtains by undertaking an engagement, a resolution: "I shall not do either this or that" (the *Prātimokṣa* precepts), is distinguished from *dharmatāpṛāvilambhikaśīla*, the morality acquired without engagement or vocal action: this is the discipline acquired through the fact of the possession of a *Dhyāna* (for one only takes possession of a *Dhyāna* by disengaging himself from the defilements of *Kāmadhātu*, iv.26), or by entry into the Path (pure discipline which includes the certain abstention from certain actions = the *samucchedavirati* of the *Atthasālinī*, p. 103). See above note 24 and iv.33a-b.

75. This is the *samucchedavirati* of *Atthasālinī*, p. 163; it includes *akaraṇaniyama*, the impossibility of committing a transgression.

76. *Anāgāmya* (viii.22c) is the stage of absorption preliminary to the First *Dhyāna*. In this stage the ascetic obtains detachment from the defilements of *Kāmadhātu*: he does not detach himself from these defilements in the First *Dhyāna*, for, in order to enter the First *Dhyāna*, he should be detached from these same defilements.

There are nine categories, strong-strong, strong-medium, strong-weak, medium-strong, ... of the defilements of *Kāmadhātu*: these nine categories are destroyed or abandoned by nine paths, the *ānantaryamārgas*.

The practice of each of these *mārgas* thus includes "abandoning" and, at the same time, "discipline."

The nine *vimuktimārgas* of *anāgāmya* do not include abandoning (vi.28, 65c); the *ānantaryamārgas* and the *vimuktimārgas* of the *Dhyāna* properly so-called and of *dhyānāntara* (viii) have no relationship with the defilements of *Kāmadhātu*, since they are detached from the defilements proper to the *Dhyānas*.

In the *ānantaryamārgas* and *vimuktimārgas*, the ascetic either cultivates the worldly path, and in this case the discipline is called "arisen from *Dhyāna*"; or he cultivates the superworldly path and in this case the discipline, even though arisen from a *Dhyāna*, or in the middle of the *Dhyāna*, is called pure (vi.49).

77. *Samyutta*, i.73; *Dhammapada*, 361; *Udānavarga*, vii.11. *kāyena saṃvaro sādhu sādhu vācāya saṃvaro / manasā saṃvaro sādhu sādhu sabbattha saṃvaro*. The Chinese translators translate *sādhu* as an exclamation, "Good!" The text of the final stanzas of the *Prātimokṣa* (L. Finot, *Journal Asiatique*, 1913, ii.543) has *kāyena saṃvaraḥ sādhuḥ sādhuḥ vācā ca saṃvaraḥ*; but Kumārajīva translates "What happiness!"

78. *Anguttara*, iii.387: *cakkhundriyasamvarasamvuto viharati*.

79. The *Vibhāṣā* (TD 27, p. 984c21) gives some other definitions: "According to some, *indriyasamvara* is mindfulness and attentive consciousness; according to others, *apramāda*;

according to others, the six perpetual attitudes (*satatavihāra*); according to others, the non-possession of *aparibhāna* and *aparijñāna*, and the possession of the Path that opposes them; and according to others, the undefiled *dharmas*."

On the different *saṃvāras* of the *Visuddhimagga* (*pāṭimokkha sati, ājāna, khaṇṭi, viriya-saṃvāra*), see Warren's analysis *JPTS* 1891, p. 77 and following, and the text p. 7-11.

80. In order to prove this thesis, the *Vyākhyā* quotes the *Āgama*: *anyatarā kila devatā bhikṣuṃ viṣayeṣu indriyaṇi vicārayantam avocat / bhikṣo bhikṣo vṛṇaṇam mā kārṣi iti / bhikṣur āha / pīdhāsyāmi devate / devatāba / kumbhamātraṃ bhikṣo vṛṇaṇam kṛtvā katvaṃ pīdhāsyasi / bhikṣur āha / smṛtyā pīdhāsyāmi samprajanyena ca*.

In *Āṅguttara*, v.347, 350, the person who does not watch over his sense organs is one who *na vaṇṇaṃ paṭicchādetā*.

81. The possessor, the possessor of the *prāpti* of . . . : the presence, in the complex that constitutes the self, of the *viprayuktadharma* which is the *prāpti* (ii.36). One can have *prāpti* of a past, present, or future *dharma* (v.25).

82. Hsüan-tsang adds: "It results from this that these persons do not possess future *avijñapti*: the *avijñapti* which is not of absorption is not possessed in a future state."

83. "He who is absorbed and he who is placed within the Path": this last expression presents a difficulty. If one understands *āryamārgastha* in the sense of "a person in possession of the Path" (*mārgasamanvita*), one arrives at the conclusion that an Āryan, even outside of an absorption, i.e., in a normal state (*prakṛtiṣṭha*), possesses present *avijñapti*. *Stha* would thus be understood in the sense of "having mounted upon" (*abbhirūḍha*), as one says: *naustha*, "on a boat": thus *āryamārgastha* = *mārgam abbhirūḍhaḥ samāpannaḥ* = the Āryan who, at the present time, meditates on the Path, a meditation which only takes place in a state of absorption.

It is simpler to follow another opinion (*anyaḥ punar . . .*) according to which the *Kārikā* should be understood: "a person absorbed and one who, being in the Path, is absorbed" (*samābhūṭāryamārgasthaḥ = samābhūṭaḥ samābhūṭāryamārgasthaḥ ca*).

84. *Vijñapti* can be (1) *saṃvaralakṣaṇā*, for example, all the actions of a monk which conform to his discipline. The monk possesses all these actions, of the past, up to the moment when he loses his restraint (*śikṣānikṣepaṇādibhiḥ*, iv.38); (2) *saṃvaralakṣaṇā*, all the killings which have been committed by a butcher: the butcher possesses all these actions, of the past, up to the moment when he renounces this lack of restraint and takes it upon himself to kill no more; or (3) *naivasaṃvaranāsaṃvaralakṣaṇā*, the worship of a Stūpa, etc.: one loses these actions, these *vijñaptis*, when the ardour of one's faith ceases . . .

85. Hsüan-tsang adds: "Lack of restraint is a *karmapatha* only at the moment when it arises."

86. But he produces (*samutthāpayati*) and possesses *avijñapti* when he is agitated with a strong volition (*tīvracetana*).

87. It may be that the *Prthagjana* also possesses *avijñapti* without possessing *vijñapti* (*Vyākhyā*).

88. Tibetan: "The *Prātimokṣa* discipline, if another is informed of it, is also acquired in informing another." Paramārtha, in the *Kārikā*: "through mutual information of another"; *Bhāṣya*: "If another informs concerning this, this informs another." Hsüan-tsang: "Information from another. One who informs another is called another." (Thus we have: "Information from another = information from another who himself informs.")

89. *Svāma upasampadā, Mahāvastu*, i. p. 2; *Mahāvagga*, i.6, 28-29; *Mūlinda*, p. 76, 265.

90. The Tibetan text has simply "of the Five," the *Vyākhyā* explains: "that is, *Ājñākaṇḍīnya*, etc." Paramārtha: "in the case of the five Bhikṣus, Kaṇḍīnya, etc., at the moment when they obtained

*dubkhe dharmajñānakṣānti* (vi.25d).” The fragment published by Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains*, i. p. 13, has *pañcakāmañ jñānābhīsamayena upasampadā*.

91. According to the Tibetan: “in the case of Ājñāta”; in *Mahāvagga*, i.6.32, Ājñātakauṇḍinya is ordained by the formula: “Come, Oh Bhikṣu . . .” But Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang: “in the case of Yaśas, etc.”

The technical name of this ordination is *ebhikkhukayā upasampadā*; the person summoned by *ebhikkhukā* (*ebhikkhukayā ābhāṣita*) becomes a monk. These words are addressed to a single person or to many: *ebhikkhukā cara brahmacariyam . . . eta bhikkhavaṇṇa carata brahmacariyam*; it is accompanied by the miracle that the *Vyākhyā* describes (according to a text close to the stanza, *Dīvyā*, 48, 281, 342): *ebhikkhukā tathāgatena tāyīmā / mundaṣ ca kāsāyadhara babbhūva . . .* (Compare *Mahāvastu*, iii.430; *Dhammapada Commentary* 21-23, Fausboll, 1855, p. 167, Burlingame, i. p. 280, etc.) We have *ebhikkhukā* in *Mahāvastu*, i.2, *Avadānaśataka*, i.330, ii.113, *Dīvyā*, and *Kośa*: *ebhikkhukātā* in the Hoernle fragment; *ebhikkhukapabbajjā* in *Dhammapada*, 1855, p. 119; *ebhikkhukunivāda*, *Dīvyā* 616. See the formulas of *Mahāvagga*, i.6.31, *Majjhima*, iii.2. *Par. i.8.1* (*Vinayaṭṭhaka*, iii. p. 24). Compare *Sāpattha*, i.4.2.

92. All of the images that Kāśyapa saluted broke into pieces; he came close to the Blessed One and did not salute him, fearing that the body of the Blessed One would perish (*mārya rūpavimāso bhūḍi*). Knowing his intention, the Blessed One said: “Salute the Tathāgata!” Kāśyapa saluted, and seeing that the body of the Blessed One was not harmed, he said: *ayaṁ me sāsā*, “He is my master.” By this, he was ordained. Compare *Mahāvastu*, iii.51, 446; *Sūtrāṅkētra*, trans. Huber, p. 161.

93. *Prasārādhanena*: the Blessed One was satisfied (*ārādhitā*) by the answers (*praśnavisarijanena*). . . In the Hoernle fragment we should read: [*sodā*]yimaṇ *praśnavyākaranena upasampadā*.

94. *Gurudharmābhyyupagameṇa*, *Cullavagga*, x., *Anguttara*, iv.76, *Bhikkhupāṇāsa* (*Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, 1920).

95. She was locked in the harem and sent a messenger to the Buddha in order to obtain the *pravrajya*. On *Dhammadinnā*, see *Majjhima*, i.299 and *Therīgāthā*, 12, where the story is very different.

96. The officiant (*vinayadhara*) is the *jñāptivācaka*. A frontier land or a border land: *pratyantikeṣu janapadeṣu*. *Mahāvagga*, vi.13.11, ix.41; *Dīvyā*, 21.18 (*pratyantimeṣu*); *Mahāvastu*: *pañcavargeṇa gaṇena upasampadā*.

97. See Minayev, *Recherches*, 272; Takakusu, in Hastings' *ERE*, vii.320.

98. *Vyākhyā*: *Buddham śaraṇaṁ gacchāma* *īti trivacanenopasampat*. Paramārtha: “By saying the Three Refuges three time,” translation confirmed by vi.30d.

In *Mahāvagga*, i.14, the Sixteen are ordained by the formula, “Come! . . .” See the ordination of Subhadda, *Dialogues*, ii.169.

99. *Vyākhyā*: *Samvurter* *īti samvatasā*.

100. *Vyākhyā*: *Tena visabhāgāṣṭrayeṇa tatra samādāne prayogāt / asaraṇāc cetarāṣṭrayeṇa tat samādānena na smarati*.

101. Hsüan-tsang: “One does not undertake it as one undertakes the good [restraint].”

102. On the *upavāsa*, see Wiegner, *Bouddhisme chinois*, i.149 (*Vinaya in Ten Recitations*); Oldenberg, *Bouddha*, 2nd edition, p. 372; Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, 1907, pp. 139-141; Minayeff, *Recherches*, p. 166. *Anguttara*, i.205; *Suttanipata*, 400.

On the *upavāsa* repeated or of long duration, see De Groot, *Code du Mahāyāna*, 62. The six days of *upavāsa*, Watters, *Yuan-Chwang*, i.304, Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, i.26, note 2; the four days and their dates, Takakusu, *I-tsing*, 63, 188.

The half-month of the Blessed One, *Mahāvastu*, iii.97, is a prolonged abstinence in the manner of the Jains (see the editor's *Introduction*).

103. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang, in the *Kārikā* and the *Bhāṣya*, digress from the order of the Tibetan.

Smras bzlas pa yis = "murmuring after he had spoken" (?). Paramārtha = *anu paścāt vādin*; *Bhāṣya*: "immediately upon the giving [of the *upavāsa*], after he speaks . . ."

104. *Vibhāṣā* (TD 27, p. 647b23): From whom should one undertake the *upavāsa* discipline? One obtains this discipline by taking it from the seven classes of persons (*ch'i-chung* 七衆: the seven "*pariśads*" of Takakusu, I-*tsing*, p. 96; monk, novice, nun, probationer, female novice, layman and laywoman). Why? Persons who have not undertaken the precepts (*chieh* 戒) during their whole life are not worthy of being precept masters (*chieh-shih* 戒師).

105. Paramārtha: "He rejects ornaments which are not old. Why? The ornaments that one uses constantly do not produce vanity as do new ornaments." "Habitual" should be *nityaka*; *nityaka bhōjana*, *Mahāvastu*, i.602, iii.253, is understood as "ordinary."

106. The restraint of the fast arises (for him) at sunrise, and the efficacy of making this restraint arise belongs to the mind which he has formed to oblige himself to undertake the fast. The *Vyākhyā* says, "*Sa bhuktvāpi grhṇīyāt*" *iti / sūryodaya eva samīvara uttiṣṭhate samādānānīyamacūṭa-syottbāpakatvāt / bhuktvāgrahanaṃ tv abhivyaktyartham*. Paramārtha translates word for word *sa bhuktvāpi grhṇīyāt*. Hsüan-tsang: "... if some obstacle is encountered, he nevertheless obtains complete abstinence."

107. On the diverse readings and interpretations, *uposatha*, *upoṣadha* (*Lālita*, *Mahāvastu*, ii.177, *Avadānaśālistā*, vi.76), *poṣadha* (*Mahāvīryapatti*, 266), *posaba* (Jaina), see S. Lévi, *Observations sur une langue précanonique du Bouddhisme*, J.A.s. 1912, ii.501.

*gṛo-sbyon* is explained: "that which nourishes [merits], and which washes away [transgressions]."

*Upoṣadhbikā*, such as Māyādevī at the descent of the elephant = *nīyamavati*, iv.74a-b. *Poṣadhbikā*, *Mahāvīryapatti* 270.13.

108. See the *Upoṣathasutta* (*Visuddhimagga* 227), *Āṅguttara*, i.211.

109. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang quote the stanza: "As it increases the good pure mind of oneself and others, the Blessed One (Buddha Sugata) called it *Poṣadha*."

110. In *Āṅguttara*, iv.388, the *Upoṣatha* is made up of nine items: one adds the meditation of compassion.

111. *Vyākhyā*: *Śīlāṃ pārājikābhāvaḥ saṃghāvaśeṣādyabhāvaḥ*. On the expression *pārājika* (= *pārājika*), *saṃghāvaśeṣa*, *saṃghādivesa* (= *saṃghādivēṣa*), see S. Lévi, *Langue précanonique du Bouddhisme*, J.A.s. 1912, ii.503-506. The *saṃghāvaśeṣas* would be the transgressions which "separate the transgressor from the rest of the community" in contrast to the *pārājikas* which "imply definitive exclusion." Ryōsaburo Sakaki (*Vyūtpatti*, 255-256) quotes Burnouf, Kern, and Lévi. The Chinese translate *seng-ts'an* 僧 = That which destroys the Saṅgha.

112. Compare *Āṅguttara* iv.248, where the order of the items differs.

113. On *piṣṭa* see *Harṣacarita*, 45.2, 123.2, 273 (F. W. Thomas).

114. Saṅghabhadra responds to this objection.

115. On *Upāsakas* and the place they occupy at the side of the Saṅgha, Burnouf, *Introduction*, 279-282; Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*; Oldenberg, *Buddha* 1914, p. 182, 317, 429; Minayev, *Recherches*, 296; Foucher, *Art greco-bouddhique du Gandhara*, ii.86; Przyluski, *Légende d'Açoka*, p. 207-8.

Cullavagga, v.20, *Āṅguttara*, iii.366, iv.344, important concerning the relations of the Saṅgha and *Upāsakas*.

The major text is the *Mahānāmasūtra* many passages of which are discussed in the *Kośa*. Other relevant passages in the notes of Buddhaghosa, *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, p. 235.

relevant passages in the notes of Buddhaghosa, *Sumaṅgalavilāsini*, p. 235.

The Upāsaka is considered a "monk" (*Āṅguttara*, ii.8), since he has the right to "give" the *upavāsa* (see the *Vibhāṣā* above note 104), since he is called to confess his transgressions (iv.34a-b): he is a "tertiary." But Upāsaka signifies "he who worships [the Three Jewels]" (*Sumaṅgalavilāsini*, p. 234), and we shall see that, for the Sautrāntikas, one can be an Upāsaka without taking upon himself the rules of training (*śikṣāpada*) the observation of which makes him a perfect Upāsaka (note 116.vi).

Whether a layman can obtain the "results of the religious life" (*śrāmaṇyaphala*), and especially the quality of Arhat, see *Kathāvatthu* iv.1, *Milinda*, 242, 265, 348. According to one group of sources, the layman, even if he is a *kāmabbogin*, can enter the Path; if, even if living in the world, he upholds chastity (*brahmacaṛin*; see for example Ralston, *Tibetan Tales*, 197), he can obtain the result of Anāgāmin; but in no case does he become an Arhat [It is in this sense that one should understand *Dhammapada* 142; *Udāna*, vii.10; *Majjhima*, i.466, 483, 490; the texts do not clearly say whether a lay *kāmabbogin* can obtain the result of Srotaāpanna and Sakṛdāgāmin. But *Āṅguttara* iii.451 enumerates twenty layman who have obtained the quality of Arhat; see *Samyutta* v.410. *Milinda*, like the *Kośa*, believes that a layman can become an Arhat: but at the moment when he becomes an Arhat, he becomes a monk; that very day he enters the Order; if the Order does not exist, he enters an ascetic brotherhood. [Wassilieff, p. 218, followed by Minayev, *Recherches*, p. 220, is mistaken on the meaning of the Tibetan source, see *Kośa*, vi.30.] Normally, heaven is the reward for the person who, incapable of abandoning the pleasures whose inanity he understands (*Theragāthā* 187), and recoiling before the obligation of chastity (*Suttanipāṭa* 396, *Dīvyā*, 303), contents himself with observing the Five Precepts and the *upavāsa*.

On the teaching given to the laity, sermons on generosity, the precepts, heaven, etc., see *Majjhima*, i.379: *Cullavagga*, vi.4, 5, *Mahāvagga* i.7, 5, etc.; *Dīgha* ii.113. *Samyutta* iv.314; *Dīvyā*, 300, 617; Przyluski, *Légende d'Aśoka*, 196, 353. Senart, *Piṇḍarī*, ii.208. See iv.112.

The sick or dying layman visited by the *āvārika* (resident monk), etc., *Āṅguttara* iii.261, *Majjhima*, iii.261; lacking monks, by layman, *Samyutta*, vi.408.

The layman reveals the Sūtras to the Bhikṣus, *Mahāvagga* iii.5.9.

Superstition, the danger of the layman (*Kośa*, iv.86).

116. The *Mahānāmasūtra* in *Āṅguttara* iv.220 and *Samyutta* v.395 (*Sumaṅgalavilāsini* 243) has simply: *yato kha mahānāma buddham saraṇam gato hoti dhammam saraṇam gato hoti saṅgham saraṇam gato hoti ettāvata kha mahānāma upāsako hoti* = One becomes an Upāsaka by taking the Three Refuges.

The Sanskrit *Mahānāmasūtra* (*Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 236b17) contains in addition a short formula added to the taking of the refuges "Consider me as an Upāsaka." (The same in *Dīvyā*, 47, where we have: *Upāsikāṃś cāsmān bhagavān dhārayatu*). This Sūtra is partially quoted in the *Vyākhyā*: *Kiyatā bhaddanta upāsako bhavati / yataḥ khalu mahānāman grhī avadātavasanaḥ puruṣaḥ puruṣendriyasamanvāgataḥ . . . upāsikāṃś mān iyatopāsako bhavati*. (*Vyākhyā*: *Grhīty uddesa-padam / avadātavasana īti nirdeśapadam / puruṣa ity uddesa-padam / puruṣendriyasamanvāgata īti nirdeśapadam*). Hsüan-tsang adds to the words of the candidate the words *karuṇām upādāya . . . dhāraya*.

iii. A more complete formula with the same variants, *Āṅguttara* i.56, *Samyutta* iv.113, v.12, *Cullavagga*, vi.4.5, *Dīgha* i.85: *So aham bhagavantam saraṇam gacchāmi dhammam ca bhikkhu-saṅgham ca / upāsakaṃ mān bhagavā dhāretu ajjatagge paṇupetaṃ saraṇam gatam*. Commentary of the *Sumaṅgalavilāsini*: *mān bhagavā "upāsako ayam" ti evaṃ dhāretu jānāyu*: "May the Blessed One recognize me as being an Upāsaka." *Paṇupetaṃ ti pānehi upetaṃ*: that is, "As long as my life lasts, may the Blessed One consider me as *upeta* (having come to him), not having any other master, an Upāsaka having taken the Three Refuges, doing what is suitable (*kappiya*). May one cut off my head if I say of the Buddha that he is not Buddha . . ." See note 126.

iv. The formula that Vasubandhu describes as that of the *Dṛṣṭasatyasūtra* (see note 125), and which is quoted, in its first part, by the *Vaiḍhāṣikas* (page 598, line 28) with the reading *prāṇāpeta* in place of *prāṇopeta* (reading interpreted and discussed p. 598, line 31 and p. 600, line 10): *Upāsakaṃ mān dhāraya adyāgreṇa yāvajjīvaṃ prāṇāpetaṃ [saraṇam gatam abhiṭṭasannam]*.



v. The Sarvāstivādin formula (given in the *Shih-sung chieh-mo pi-ch'iu yao-yung*, TD 23, p. 496a14, edited and translated by Wiegner, *Bouddhisme Chinois*, i.146-7): "I, so-and-so, from today to the end of my life, take refuge in the Buddha, the best of two legged beings . . . Know that I am an Upāsaka having taken definitive refuge in the Buddha, Dharma, Saṃgha, rejoicing (*abhiṣprasanna* = 樂) in the Dharma of the Buddha Śākyamuni, having undertaken the Five Śīlas." This is repeated three times. Then one explains the Five Śīlas and the candidate answers that he will observe them. The expression "having undertaken the Five Precepts" (*shou wu chieh* 五戒) replaces the *prāṇāpeta* of formula iv.

vi. We possess the Sanskrit original of the expression: "having undertaken the Five Śīlas," in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, commenting on the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*, p. 137. We learn that the *Vinaya* has two readings (*pāṭha*). According to the first, the candidate begs the master (who receives him as an Upāsaka) to consider him as an Upāsaka who has taken the Three Refuges; according to the second, to consider him as an Upāsaka who has taken the Three Refuges and the Five Precepts.

*Trisaranaparigrahāt* (read *°gamanāt*) *pañcaśīkṣāpadaparigrahac* *copāsakas tathopāsiketī dvādhābbedah* / *trisaranaparigrahāt* (read *°gatam*) *upāsakam mām ācāryo dhārayatu* / *tathā trisaranagatam pañcaśīkṣāpadaparigrahāt upāsakam mām ācāryo dhārayatu* *ūi viniyadvidhāpābhāt*. (According to a bad copy of the Calcutta MSS, Rajendralal, *Buddhist Literature*, p. 194).

There are thus two types of Upāsaka: one who has undertaken only the Refuges, and one who has undertaken the Three Refuges and who also undertakes the Five Precepts.

vii. Nepalese formulary which is very confused (the renouncing of the ten transgressions precedes the taking of the Five Precepts) in *Ādikarmapradīpa* (p. 189 of my edition in *Bouddhisme*, 1898), summarized by Minayev, *Recherches*, p. 296.

117. Paramārtha: "No, for the person in question produces the five renouncings."

118. We have iv.38 *dama* = *samvara*, but the Tibetan translates *dama* as 'dul-ba.

119. See above note 116.iv.

120. *Vyākhyā*: *Yathāiva hi bhikṣur labdhasamvaro'pi jñāpticatutthena karmaṇā śikṣāpadāni yathāsthalam grāhyate prajñāpyate / itas cāmutaś ca pārājikādibhyas tava samvarah / anyāni ca te sabrahmacārinah kathyāpiyanti*.

121. When the Śramaṇa says: *Aham evamināmā taṁ bhagavantaṁ tathāgatam arhamtaṁ samyaksambuddhaṁ śākyamuniṁ śākyādhirājaṁ pravrajitaṁ anupravrajāmi grasthalingam partyajāmi pravrajalingam samādadaṁi / śramaṇoddesaṁ mām dhāraya* and repeat this formula (*evam jāvat trir apī*), he acquires the discipline of the *śramaṇera* which is then explained to him in detail.

122. The *Mahāvīryapatti*, 84, adds *aparipūrṇakārin* before *paripūrṇakārin*; the Chinese and Tibetan versions translate *pradesakārin* = one who observes (*spyod-pa*, *hsing* 行) for a day (*ñi-tshe* = "one day" and also *pradesa*).

The *Vyākhyā* quotes the Sūtra (*Mahānāmasūtra*, *Saṃyukta*, TD 2, p. 236b): *Kiyatā bhadanta upāsaka ekadeśakārī bhavati . . . paripūrṇakārī / iba Mahānāman upāsaka prāṇāpātāṁ prabhāya prāṇāpātād virato bhavati / iyatā Mahānāman upāsaka śikṣājām ekadeśakārī bhavati . . . dvābhyām pravivirataṁ pradesakārī bhavati / tribhyah pravivirataṁ caturbhyo vā yabdhūyaskārī bhavati / pañcabhyah pravivirataṁ paripūrṇakārī bhavati*.

Chavannes, *Cinq cent contes*, i.244, illustrates this text.

123. Paramārtha: "They are so called because they observe;" Hsüan-tsang: "So termed with reference (*yueh* 月) to their observing."

124. Hsüan-tsang continues: "If it were otherwise, the Upāsaka of one precept would be called 'undertaker of one rule' . . ." The question is to know whether there are not some Upāsakas, not endowed with the discipline in all its five parts, but who are engaged in observing one, two, three, or four rules. No, according to the Vaibhāṣikas: the *ekadeśakārī* is an Upāsaka who violates four of

the rules that he has undertaken.

In *Āṅguttara*, iii.215, the Upāsaka Gavestin, *sīlesu aparipūrākārīn*, declares to his comrades: "From this day forward, consider me as *sīlesu aparipūrākārīn*." Then he undertakes, one by one, the obligations of a Bhikṣu [who is the only person with the complete precepts]. *Āṅguttara*, iv.380, v.131.

125. According to the *Vyākhyā*, the *Drṣṭasatyasūtra*: with reason, as this results from the very text of Vasubandhu, page 600, line 10: "Further . . ."

*Drṣṭasatyasūtra* signifies "the Sūtra in which a candidate, an Upāsaka, has seen the Truths." This refers to the text *Divya*, 75, or to a similar text: the Blessed One destroyed the false opinion of personalism of the Brahmin Indra, who obtains the result of Srotaāpanna: . . . *sa drṣṭasatyah kathayati / atikerānto'ham bhadantātikērāntah* (The Pāli reads *abbhikkantam . . .*) / *eyo'ham bhagavantam buddham saraṇam gacchāmi dharmam ca bhikṣusamgham ca / upāsakam ca mām dhāraya adyāgreṇa yāvajjīvam prāṇopetam saraṇam gatam abhiprasannam* (Edition: *gatam / abhiprasanno'thendro brāhmaṇa . . .*; same text, *Divya*, 462, with the best reading).

Saeki says that the *Drṣṭasatyasūtra* is the Sūtra of Śroṇa the son of Gṛhapati (*Saṃyukta*, TD 2, p. 6b25): "Śroṇa, having removed all dust, abandoned all defilement, obtained the pure eye of the Law, at the moment when he saw the Law . . . he rose and said to Śāriputra, 'I, from today onward, take refuge . . .'" Possessors of the eye, candidates for the quality of Upāsaka, are the kings Udena and Soṇa (S, iv.113): but they employ the ordinary formula: *upāsakam mām Bhāradvājo dhāretu ajjatagge pāṇupetam saraṇam gatam*, omitting the *abhiprasanna* of the Sanskrit (On *abhiprasanna*, see *Saṃyutta*, v.225, 378).

126. Such is indeed the meaning of the expression *prāṇopeta* = *srong dan bso ba* = "risking one's life" = "giving up, abandoning one's life" (Hsüan-tsang). We see in note 112.iii, that this is the interpretation of Buddhaghosa.

127. *Pāṇupetam* can be explained by *prāṇebhyo'petam*, *prāṇair apetam*, *prāṇātipātādibhyo'petam*. This last version "freed from killing, etc." justifies the Vaibhāsika doctrine. To say "Know that I am an Upāsaka free from killing" is to undertake abstaining from killing.

128. The *kuddānukubbakas* do not form part of the precepts, *Āṅguttara*, i.231.

129. See the translation of Saṃghabhadra's commentary, xxiii.4, fol. 84 and following, in the *Introduction*.

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 177a16. Some say that taking Refuge in the Buddha is taking refuge in a body made up of the head, the neck, the stomach, the back, the hands, and the feet of the Tathagāta. It is explained then that this body, born of a father and mother, is impure (*sāsrava*) *dharmas*, and is thus not a locus of refuge: rather, the Refuge is the *Āśaikṣa dharmas* of the Buddha which form Bodhi, the *dharmakāya*. Some say that taking Refuge in the Dharma is to take refuge in the Three Truths of [Suffering, Arising, and the Path]; or in the good, bad, and neutral *dharmas*, etc.; or in the rules imposed upon the Bhikṣus: "One should do this, one should not do that." It is explained then that all these *dharmas* are conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) and impure; that they are thus not the refuge; and that the Refuge is solely the Truth of Extinction (*nirōdhasatya*), the end of thirst, Nirvāṇa.

Some say that taking Refuge in the Saṅgha is to take refuge in the Saṅgha of Pravrajitas of the four castes (*ssu-hsing ch'u-chia* 四姓出家). It is then explained that the attitudes (*īryāpatra*), etc. (*wei-i hsing-hsiang* 威儀形相) of this Saṅgha are impure: the Refuge is thus the *Saikṣa* and *Āśaikṣa dharmas* which make up the Saṅgha.

130. The designation "Buddha" also refers to other *dharmas*, and other *gūṇas*, but not principally so (*apradhānyena*).

131. This is the *dharmakāya*, vii.34; *Muséon*, 1913, p. 266.

132. Hsüan-tsang: *rūpādikāya*. See vii.31.

133. *Vyākhyā*: *Laṅkāikamārgasya puṇyajiñānasambhānūlakṣaṇasya lokottarasya ca kṣayajiñānādīlakṣaṇasyāvilakṣaṇa tvāt tulyatvāt*.

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 177c21. If one takes Refuge in a Buddha, the refuge will be partial; and if one takes Refuge in all the Buddhas, why does one say: "I take Refuge in the Buddha," and not "in all the Buddhas?" ... To take Refuge in the Buddha is to take Refuge in all the Buddhas whose number exceeds that of the sands of the Ganges ... The word "Buddha" embraces all of the Buddhas, because they are of the same species. When one takes Refuge in the Saṅgha, is this to take refuge in one disciple of the Buddha or in all of them? ...

134. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 178a24, quotes the same text: *tatra bhagavāms trapusabballikau vaṇijāv āmantrayate sma / ete yuvāṃ buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchatam / dharmaṃ ca / yo'sau bhaviṣyaty anāgate'dhvani saṃgho nāma tam api saraṇaṃ gacchatam*. (Excerpt from the Introduction to the *Samghabhedavastu* of which a fragment, discovered in Turkestan [(Miran)], has been published in *JRAS*. 1913, p. 850). Compare *Mahāvagga*, i.4; *Mahāvastu*, iii.304; *Lālita*, p. 386; *Dulva*, iv.54b. Numerous variants.

135. Many opinions, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 177d.

136. *Dhammapada* 188-192; *Udānavarga*, xxvii.28-30; *Divyāvadāna*, p. 164; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 177a4.

137. We have *babuṃ ve saraṇaṃ yaṃti* ...; *Divya*: *babavaḥ saraṇaṃ yaṃti*, which Paramārtha translates. The Tibetan *Udānavarga* has *phal-cher*.

138. *Khema*, *Divya*: *śreṣṭha*; *Udānavarga* and the principal Chinese versions.

139. *Vyākhyā*: *Akriyāyām akaraṇe niyama ekāntatā akriyāniyamaḥ / so'karaṇasamivaraḥ akaraṇalakeṣaṇaḥ samivaraḥ / na samādānikāḥ samivara ity arthaḥ / sa ca Sautrāntikanayenānvasthāviṣeṣa eva / Vaibhāṣikanayena tu śīlāṅgaṃ avijñaptir iṣi*.

See above note 24, some references to the Pāli sources, *setuḥhātavirati* = *samucchadavirati*, *sampattavirati*, *samādānavirati*; p. 48, the distinction between *samādānaśīla* and *dharmaṭāprātilambhikaśīla*. The Abhidhamma has many points of similarity with the Abhidharma, but the correspondence is not perfect.

The *Vaibhāṣika*s attribute pure *samivara*, or restraint, to an Āryan (iv.17c); this *samivara* is not simply *akaraṇa*, but a certain *rūpa*, *avijñapti*, a *setu* (see note 24); the Sautrāntikas do not admit the existence of *avijñapti*: for them the series of the Āryan has become incapable of certain actions (see note 145), the seeds of these actions having been eliminated: *akaraṇasamivara*, an immovable *avijñapti* which the *Vaibhāṣika*s postulate, is not a thing in and of itself but is *akriyāyām ekāntatā*, a certain abstention resulting from a transformation of the personality.

140. Hsüan-tsang: "They have not, with respect to the series of all beings, said, 'I renounce incontinence.'" Paramārtha: "They have not, with respect to this series (*asmāt samitānāt*), said, 'I renounce ...'"

141. Hsüan-tsang translates: "If lying is authorized, he would transgress all the rules. Having transgressed the rules, at the time when he is interrogated,—if lying has been authorized,—he would say, 'I have not done it,' and because of this there would be many transgressions of the rules. Also the Blessed One, desiring that one uphold the rules, places the renouncing of lying in all of the rules, asking, 'How could an Upāsaka, if he violates the rule, declare it himself and prevent new transgressions?'"

Compare the Sūtra to Rāhula on lying, *Majjhima*, i.415; the edict of Bhābra.

142. *Pratikṣepaṇasāvadya*, *pratisedha*<sup>o</sup>, *prajñapti*<sup>o</sup>, in opposition to what is a transgression by its very nature or *prakṛtisāvadya*. This is transgression of one who does a forbidden action, because he does not respect the law (*śāsana*) of the Blessed One (iv.122c).

143. On *jalogi*, see *Conciles bouddhiques*, *Muséon*, 1905, p. 290; Lévi, *J.Ar.* 1912, ii. p. 508.

144. The text is quoted in the *Vyākhyā*: *Mām śāstāraṃ uddiśabdhiḥ kuśāgreṇāpi madyaṃ na pātavyam*. In *Divya*, 191, we have: *mām bho bhikṣavaḥ śāstāraṃ uddiśabdhiḥ madyam apeyam*

*adeyam antataḥ kuśāgrenāpi*, which Speyer corrects to *uddiśya [bhava]dbhir...* Huber, *Sources du Divya*, BEFEO, 1906, 31, sanctions this correction, and shows the relation of the *Divya* with the 79th *prāyaścittika*.

The Blessed One not only forbids strong liquor in inebriating quantities (*madanīya*). For the sick Upāsaka who consents to eat dog meat but not to drink wine, and who quotes the "Sūtra of the House," see *Sūtrālamkāra*, Huber, 434. Chavannes, *Cinq cents contres*, iii.14.

Four *upakkilesas*: *surāmerayapana*, *methuna*, *jātarūpa*, and *micchājīva* (*Anguttara*, ii.53, *Atthasālinī*, 380).

145. See above p. 604. If one puts milk mixed with alcohol into their mouths, the milk would enter their mouths, but not the alcohol, *Sumaṅgalavilāsini*, p. 305.

146. Mdo (Csoma), xxvi, 425.

147. Four *kāyaduṣcaritas*, killing, stealing, forbidden sex, and *surāmaireyapramādashāna*. Alcohol is missing from the classical lists of the *kāyaduṣcaritas*, *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, 91, etc.

148. Hsüan-tsang translates: "because, by reason of the transgression of this rule, one would commit a transgression which is by its nature a transgression." The *Vyākhyā* says: If drunk but once, strong liquor is mortal (*vyasanibhavet*), for the Blessed One said: *trīṇi sthānāni pratiṣevamāṇasya nāsti tṛptir vā alamtā vā paryāptir vā / madyam abrahmacāryam styānamiddham ceti*. Same teaching in *Anguttara*, i.261 (*soppassa bhikkhave paṭisevanāya natthi titti, surāmerayapānassa ..., methunadhammasamāpattiya...*).

149. The same quantity of *madya* is *madanīya* or non-*madanīya* depending upon circumstances.

150. The five *balas* of the Śaikṣas are *śradhā*, *vīrya*, *brī*, *apatrāpya*, and *prajñā*. The order differs in *Anguttara*, iii.1.

151. *Vyākhyā*: *Yadi hrīmativāt tadanadhyācaraanam ajñātam udakādivat kasmān na pibanti*.

152. The *Nandikāsūtra* says: *surāmaireyamadyapramādashānenāsevītena bhāvītena babulīkṛtena kāyasya bhedān narakēṣūpapadyate*. Compare *Digha*, iii.182: *surāmerayapramādaṭṭhānānyuyogo apāyaniko*; the same for *jūṭappamādaṭṭhāna*.

153. *Digha*, iii.195, 235, *Anguttara*, iii.212, *Saṃyutta*, ii.167.

154. Notes of Palmyr Cordier.

a) *Surā* = *annāsava*. *Vyākhyā*: *Annāsava iti taṇḍulakṛtaḥ*. Rice beer or alcohol. This is what Hemādri says *ad Aṣṭāṅgabrādaya* 1.5.67: *śālipiṣṭakṛtaṁ madyam*. This is also confirmed by the *Vaidūryakabhāṣya* or the autocommentary of Vāgbhaṭa, where *surā* = 'bru-chañ = gro-chañ, cereal beer, wheat beer, grain alcohol, in conformity with the *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, 230.36 where *surā* = 'bru'i chañ (*Amarakośa*, 2.10.39, *surā* = chañ).

*Surā* = arrack or raki (rice aquavit, a Persian word Sanskritized under the form of *akra*, a word which is missing, in this sense, in non-medical dictionaries).

b) *Maīreya* = *dravyāsava* (*rdzas las sbyar ba's btuñ bo*) = tafia. *Vyākhyā*: *Dravyāsava itīkṣurasādikṛtaḥ*.

According to Aruṇadatta's commentary on the *Aṣṭāṅgabrādaya*, 1.7.40, *maīreya* = *kharjūrāsava* = alcohol from dates. The *Vaidūryakabhāṣya* explains *bu ram chañ* = rum or tafia; whereas Candranandana (*Padārthacandrikā*) and Hemādri say *dhanyāsava* = alcohol from grains. *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, 230.38, *sbyar ba's chañ*; *Amarakośa*, 2.10.42, makes *maīreya* the synonym of *āsava* (*me-tog chañ*), a liqueur from flowers (of *Lythrum fruticosum*, etc.) and of *śidhu* (*bur chañ*); rum, tafia.

c) *Pūgaphalakodravādayo'pi ... Vyākhyā*: *Ādisabdena nīpāvādayo'pi grhyante* [MSS. *neṣyāva*<sup>0</sup>].

*Pūgaphala*, areca nut (areca cathecui, palm). Sanskrit synonyms, *pūgīphala* = *kramuka* = *pohala* = *guvāka*. *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, 231.34, *Pūgaphala* = *glā gor sho śa* = *kramuka*, *Aṣṭāṅgabrādaya*, 4.12.25 and <sup>0</sup>*nighaṇṭu*, 121. *Amarakośa*, 3.4/3.21 *go yu*.

*Kodrava, tsi-tsi, Aṣṭāṅganighaṇṭu*, 198; Śarat Candra, *tsi tse tsi tsi*; *Mahāvīryūtpatti*, 228.14 *ci tse*. *Nīṣpāva*, common lablab (a type of bean). Missing in the *Mahāvīryūtpatti* and, at least in the botanical sense, in the *Amarakośa*.

155. According to the *Vaiḥāsikas*, the preparation, the chief action and the consecutive action of undertaking the *Prātimokṣa* discipline (iv.69c-d) have respectively for their purpose to "bind" the preparation, the chief action and the action consecutive to murder, etc. The preparation of the *Prātimokṣa* considers the preparation of killing, to which it is opposed, and says to it in some manner: "I bind you (*saṁvṛṇomi*); do not arise!"

156. An important point in the theory of the existence of the past and the future, v.25 (see also i.34d, trans. p. 99).

157. Compare *Yogasūtra*, ii.31. We see, *Dīvyā*, p. 10, that the butcher of sheep, taking up the obligation of morality (*śīlasamādāna*) for the night, obtains great benefits: a daytime hell, a nocturnal paradise.

158. The Tibetan has: "relative to former beings who, having become Buddhas, have entered into *Nirvāṇa*."

159. "To kill sheep"; to kill is translated by *gsod*.

"Elephant-driver," *nāgabandhakā hastipakāḥ* (*Vyākhyā*). *Glan po che 'chor ba* or *'tser ba*, "he who hunts with an elephant, who torments an elephant" (compare the *gaddhabādhin* of *Cullavagga*, i.32).

"Slaughterer of fowl," *kukkūṭān ghnantūi kukkuṭikāḥ*, (*Vyākhyā*); compare *Mahāvīryūtpatti*, 286.93, *khyi 'chor ba* or *'tser ba*: "he who hunts with dogs, who torments dogs" through confusion of *kukkura* with *kukkūṭa* (?).

*Vāgurika*, according to *Mahāvīryūtpatti*, 186.92 (*rgyas 'chor ba* = he who hunts with a net) and *Amarakośa*, 2.10.27 (*vāgurā* = *ri dvags 'dzin* = *mṛgabandhinī*; *vāgurika* = *bya brñi ba* = *jālika* = *bya rgya pa*) which means "poacher, trapper." But the *Vyākhyā* makes an animal of *vāgurā*: *paṃpā* (?) *nāma prāñijātir vāgurākyā tām ghnantūi vāgurikāḥ* and the Tibetan version transcribes (*ba gu ri 'chor ba*).

Compare the lists of *Āṅguttara*, i.251, ii.207, iii.303, 383.

160. Chavannes, *Cinq cents contres et apologues*, iii. p. 117, no. 415 (*TD* 4, number 203).

161. Paramārtha: "One obtains lack of restraint in two ways: through personal action, and through approval"

162. See iv.41c-d.

163. According to the Chinese versions. The original has: "I shall constantly give food for a day, a month, a fortnight (*tiṣṭhībhakta*, *ardhamāsabbhakta*).

*Vyākhyā*: *Ādisābdena maṇḍalakaraṇādi grhyate* (see below note 182).

164. Compare *Mahāvagga*, ii.36.1, etc.; *Pārājika*, i.8.2.

165. *Mahāvīryūtpatti*, 266.16. *Patanty aneneti patanīyam*. These are the four *Pārājikas*: unchastity, stealing of a certain importance (*yathoktāpramāṇam adattādānam*), killing of a human being (*manuṣyavadha*), and lying relative to one's supernatural powers (*uttarimanuṣyadharmamṛṣāvāda*) (Finot, *J.As.* 1913, ii.476). See some instructive glosses in Wiegner, *Bouddhisme chinois*, i. p. 215 (1910). On the word *Pārājika*, see S. Lévi, *J.As.* 1912, ii.505, and Wogihara, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, p. 36.

166. The *Vyākhyā* mentions an argument taken from Scripture. It says in the *Vinaya*: "An immoral (*duḥśīla*) monk who gives advice (*anuśāsti*) to a nun commits (*āpadyate*) a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* transgression." Now "immoral" means "guilty of a *Pārājika*," for the text opposes a *prakṛtiśabha*

*śīlavān* monk to an immoral monk. Thus the monk guilty of a *Pārājika* remains a monk, since he can be rendered guilty of a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*. *Vinaya uktam / duṣṭīlāś ced bhikkṣur bhikkṣuṃśm anuśāsti saṃghāvaśeṣam āpadyata iti / āpannapārājiko hi bhikkṣur duṣṭīlo'bhīpreto nānāpannapārājikaḥ prakṛtiśtibhāḥ śīlavān iti viparyayaṇa vacanāt / ato'vagamyate / asty asya duṣṭīlasyāpi sato bhikkṣubhāvo yasmāt saṃghāvaśeṣam āpadyata ity uktam iti*

167. This text (the Sarvāstivādin *Vinaya In Ten Recitations*, TD 23, p. 157a7-b2) has passed into *Mahāvīyūtpatti* 278: *abhiṣuḥ aśramāṇaḥ, aśākyaputrīyaḥ, ābhvasyate bhikkṣubhāvāt, hatam asya bhavati śrāmaṇyam mathitām patitām parājītam, apratyuddhāryam asya bhavati śrāmaṇyam, tadāyathā tālo mastakacchinno'bhavyo haritavāya / duṣṭīlāḥ pāpadharmo'ntappūtīr avasrutāḥ kaśambakajātāḥ*.

Compare *Kṣitigarbhasūtra* in *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 67. On *kaśambaka*, below p. 615.

168. All the editions of the *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, 270.37-40.

169. The regularly ordained Bhikṣu (*jñāpticatutthopasampanna*), 270.41.

*Saṃghabhadra* (TD 29, p. 557c14) recalls that there are five *saṃgha*: 1. *saṃgha* with modesty, 2. *saṃgha* of speechless sheep, 3. *saṃgha* of followers (*p'eng-tang* 朋黨) 4. *saṃgha* in the popular meaning of the word (*lokaśāmvṛtisaṃgha* = *saṃmutisaṃgha*), and 5. *saṃgha* in the proper sense of the word (*paramārthasaṃgha* = *dakṣhiṇeyyasamgha*).

170. Compare *Pārājika*, i.8.1: . . . *ayam (ñāticatutthena upasampanno) imasmim atthe adhippeto bhikkhū ti*. Vasubandhu: *asmimś tv arthe . . .*

171. See note 167; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 356b25; this comparison, in *Majjhima*, i.250, 331, 464, ii.256, refers to the defilements.

172. Compare *Cullavagga*, i.25.1, *Vinaya Texts*, iii. p. 120.

173. *Kāraṇḍava*, *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, 228.23, an herb that resembles the *yava*.

*Kāśambaka*, *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, 278.16; also *Kāśambakajāta* (*Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 67, *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, p. 181), *kaśambūka*, *kaśambūka* (*Wogihara*) = *pūṭikāśṭham*.

*Uṭplāvī* (?) *nāma vṛṣhimadhye'bhyanatarāṇḍulavīhināḥ* (*Vyākhyā*). The original has: *attho palāvinam*, as the Pāli shows: *Āṅguttara*, iv.169 and *Suttanipāṭa*, 281 quoted in *Milinda*, 414: *kāraṇḍavanāṃ niddhamattha kaśambūṃ apakassattha tato palāpe vābhettha assamaṇe samaṇamānīne*.

174. The *Cundasutta* in the *Uragavagga*; *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, 223.55-58; *mārgajina* (*Saṃyutta*, i.187), according to the *Vyākhyā*, the *Āśaiṣa* and the *Saiṣa*; according to Saeki, the Buddha and the Pratyekabuddhas; *mārgadaśīka*, the Buddha or Śāriputra, etc.; *mārgajīva*, Nanda, etc., according to Saeki (*mārge jīvati śīlavān bhikkṣur māraganimittam jīvanā*). *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 341c6. *Āṅguttara*, iv.169, *samaṇadūṣi samaṇapālāpo samanākekāraṇḍava*.

175. *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, 270.10, *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, xi.4. *Vyākhyā*: a monk, through extensive lust, is rendered guilty of unchastity (*śrīyā abrahmacāryam kṛtvā*); immediately alarmed (*jāśasānivega*) he thinks, "I have committed a frightful (*kaṣṭa*) action," without a single thought of hiding his crime arising within him, he approaches (*upagāmya*) the *Saṃgha* and confesses: "I have done this transgression." On the instructions of the *Saṃgha* (*āryasaṃghopadeśāt*), he carries out his penance (*daṇḍakarma kurvāṇaḥ*) which consists of abstaining from contact with the Bhikṣus (*sarva-bhikkṣvanavakrāntikatva*), etc. He is called a *śikṣādattaka*. If his immorality destroys his quality of Bhikṣu, he will no longer be a Bhikṣu, or a penitent. Notice too that he is not to receive a new ordination. According to the glosses of Yuan-hsien (quoted by Wieger), the penitent is placed after the monks, but before the novices; he does not take part in ecclesiastical actions; but he will be rehabilitated if he becomes an Arhat.

176. *Milinda*, p. 257, has some curious theories on the privileges that an immoral Bhikṣu still maintains.

177. The good of the sphere of Dhyāna belongs to the gods of higher spheres and to the ascetics who, here below, cultivate the Dhyānas.

178. The acquisition of the pure discipline is not mentioned as a cause of the abandoning of the lack of restraint; for the discipline of Dhyāna always precedes pure discipline.

179. The masters of Gandhāra; Saṅghabhadra (TD 29, p. 566c27) accepts this opinion.

180. The Kāśmīrians. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 608b24.

181. When one says: *ālam samādānena*; in other words *pratyākhyānavacanena*.

182. *Avijñāpti* is lost for one who does not act according to his undertaking, *yathāsamāttam akurvatāb*.

*Vyākhyā*: *Tadyathā buddhaṁ avanditvā maṇḍalakam akṛtvā vā na bhokṣya iti tadakṛtvā bhujñānasya*... In the *Bhikṣuṇīkarmavācānā* (*Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, 1920, p. 128) there is mentioned the *trimaṇḍala* which is constructed before the taking of refuge. De La Vallée Poussin thought that this *trimaṇḍala* was the *triratnamāṇḍala* mentioned in the ritual of the Bodhisattvas (*Adikarmaṇḍapa*, in *Bouddhisme, Études et Matériaux*, 1989, p. 206).

183. Paramārtha transcribes *yantra* (*yen-to-lo* 延多羅). "Etc." refers to *śāstra*, *viśa*, etc.

184. *Vyākhyā*: One should say that the *viññāpti*, which has given rise to this *avijñāpti*, is abandoned at the same time that it is, for its *prāpti* is cut off by these six causes. But there can be *avijñāpti* without a *viññāpti*, as we see from iv.67; and [elsewhere], one speaks of the *avijñāpti* as if one were speaking of the *viññāpti*. According to others, the *prāpti* of a *viññāpti* included in neither-restraint-nor-lack of restraint does not continue (*anubandhinā*); thus the author does not here have to occupy himself here with the abandoning of *viññāpti*.

185. Further, in certain cases, by detachment from *kāma* (*vairāgya*): for example good dissatisfaction (*kuśala daurmanasyendriya*, ii.1, trans. note 79).

186. All the *kleśas* are *upakleśas*, but not all *upakleśas* are *kleśas*. See v.46.

187. *Mahāvīryūpatti*, 271.13-20.

188. The Theravādins (*Kathāvatthu*, iii.10) maintain that there are no precepts among the gods because there is no lack of restraint among them. See below iv.44a-b.

189. By reason of their *māndya*.

190. Not the *Prātimokṣa* discipline, because the gods do not have *saṁvega*, terror-disgust.

191. The Tibetan version of the *Bhāṣya* skips this Kārikā.

By the practice of *dhyānāntara* (viii.22-23) one is reborn in the elevated part of heaven of the Brahmāpurohitas, which is called *dhyānāntarika*, where the Mahābrahmās dwell (ii.41d; iii.2d). But birth among the Mahābrahmāṇas is an obstacle (*āvaraṇa*) (iv.99), for entry into the Path and the pure precepts which make up the Path are impossible for Brahmā, who thinks that he is *svayambhū*, self-created; etc. (vi.38a-b).

192. Paramārtha: The pure precepts among the gods of Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu, with the exception of the *dhyānāntarikas* and the *asamīkṣitasattvas*, and among the gods of Ārūpyadhātu... The gods born in Ārūpyadhātu virtually possess the restraint of ecstasy and the pure precepts, but not at the present time.

193. The *Abhisamayālaṁkāraloka*, ad *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, p. 62, quotes the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: *kāmapratīsamīyuktam kuśalam puṇyam rūpārūpyapratīsamīyuktam ānīṣṭyam*. Commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, iii.10.

194. Absent in the Tibetan version, but given by Paramārtha. Hsüan-tsang: "Good action in Kāmadhātu is called *puṇya* because it does good to another and produces an agreeable retribution; bad action is called *apūṇya* because by it, one harms another and produces a disagreeable retribution."

195. The *Vyākhyā* (iii.101d) admits two readings, *āneṣya* from *ejj* (*kampāne*) and *ānīṣṭya* from *igi*

(*gatya*the). Variants mentioned by Wogihara in his edition of the *Mahāvīryapatti*, 21.49, 244.124: *anīṅga*, *anīṅya*, *anīṅjya*, *ānīṅjya*. Modern opinions, *Lotus*, p. 306; Childers (*inj*); Senart, *Mahāvastu*, i.399 (MSS *ānīṅja*); Leumann, *Album Kern*, 393; Kern, note in *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, p. 80 (Vedic *anēdyā* = *anīndya*); E. Muller, *Simplified grammar*, p. 8. (See De La Vallée Poussin's note in *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 365).

ii. *Āneṅja* action. The three *abbisamikkhāras* (*puñña*, *apuñña*, *āneṅja*), *Dīgha*, iii.217, *Saṃyutta*, ii.82, *Madhyamakavṛtti*, xvi.1. (*āneṅja*). This is the action "leading to immovability" of Warren (p. 180, according to the *Visuddhimagga*, p. 571); the action "of imperturbable character" or "for remaining static" of Mrs. Rhys Davids (trans. of *Kathāvatthu*, p. 358, ad xxii.2). [This is without doubt the action which Vasubandhu describes here, the action in the domain of the higher spheres.]

iii. *Āneṅja* mind, *cittassa āneṅjatā*, "non-agitation of the mind"; mind, absorption, *dhyāna*, or the saint qualified as *āneṅjapatta*, *ānīṅjyapṛāpta*: *Udāna*, iii.3, *Nettipakkaraṇa*, 87, *Puggalapaññatti*, 60, *Anguttara*, ii.184, *Visuddhimagga*, 377, Wogihara, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, 19. This is a mind in the Fourth Dhyāna where, according to the heretics of *Kathāvatthu* xxii.3, the death of an Arhat takes place (compare *Kośa*, iii.43, *Dīgha*, ii.156, *Avadānaśataka*, ii.199); *acala* mind, *nirīṅjana*.

The *āneṅja* mind, the foundation of magical powers (*iddhi*) is, in *Visuddhimagga*, p. 386, a mind which is not inclined (*na iñjati*) towards *rāga*, etc. This is not a mind in the Fourth Dhyāna, but a good and absorbed (*samāhita*) mind. (On *iddhi*, see *Kośa*, vii.48). In *Saṃyutta*, iv.202, the *anīṅjamāna*, *apbandamāna*, etc., mind is rid of *maññitas*, *iñjitas*, *phanditas*, *papañcitas*, and *mānagatas* which consist of saying "I am," etc. The same for the *iñjita* of *Anguttara* ii.45.

v. In *Majjhima*, ii.254, 262, the *viññāṇa* becomes 1. *āṇāṇipaga* 2. *ākīñcaññāyatanaupaga* 3. *nevasaṇṇānāsāññānāyatanaupaga*. *Āṇāṇja* is obtained by abandoning the notion of *kāma* and *rūpa*; *ākīñcaññā* by abandoning, in addition, the notion of *āpāṇja*; *nevasaṇṇānāsāññānāyatana* by abandoning, in addition, the notion of *ākīñcaññā*. It appears that *āṇāṇja* corresponds to the first two stages of Ārūpyadhātu (see *Kośa*, viii).

196. *yad atra vitarkūṇaṃ vicaritaṃ idam atrāryā iñjitaṃ ity ābuh / yad atra prīṭir avigatā idam atrāryā iñjitaṃ ity ābuh / yad atra sukhāṇi sukhāni itī cetasa ābhoga idam atrāryā iñjitaṃ ity ābuh*. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 743a. Compare *Majjhima*, i.454... *idam kho āhāṃ Udāyi iñjitasmiṃ vadāmi / kiṃ ca tattha iñjitasmiṃ / yad eva tattha vitakkevicārā aniruddhā honti idam tattha iñjitasmiṃ*.

197. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang: In the *Anīṅjyasūtra*: *pu-tung ching* 不動經.

198. *Vyākhyā*: *Anīṅjyānujvalabhāginam ākamyānukūlabhāginam mārgam ārabhya*.

According to Hsüan-tsang: "The Blessed One declares them non-agitated, and considers them (lit. "points out," *chū* "grasping in the hand") as producing a non-agitated retribution (*vīpaka*"); according to Paramārtha: "... with reference to (*vyāk*) the Path capable of producing a *pratyaya* of non-agitated good."

199. Hsüan-tsang: "How can an agitated Dhyāna produce a non-agitated retribution? Even though this Dhyāna includes agitation due to its defilements (*apakeśāla*), nevertheless it is called non-agitated, because, with respect to its retribution..."

200. According to *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 596b13. Put more clearly, the retribution of good action is agreeable sensation when it takes place in Kāmadhātu and in the first three Dhyānas.

201. *Sukhā vedanā* means (1) the sensation of pleasure (*kāyika sukha*) and the sensation of satisfaction (*saumanasya*) in Kāmadhātu and the first two Dhyānas; (2) the sensation of satisfaction in the Third Dhyāna (ii.7, viii.9b).

202. See iii.43.

203. See iv.13c-d: "the precepts of beings of this world," *aśikāśūlam*. Paramārtha: In Kāmadhātu, bad action is termed disagreeable sensation... The Kārikā says "in Kāmadhātu" in order to indicate that this action does not exist elsewhere.

204. Objects, or the psycho-somatic complex (*āśraya*), ii.57.



205. Quoted in *Vyākhyā*, iii.43.

206. i. *Dhyānāntara* is an intercalary *dhyāna* between the First and Second Dhyānas, or, as the Tibetans translate it, a *dhyāna* higher (*kyad par*) than the first through the absence of *vīṭarka* (see viii.22d); it is a type of annex or prefatory absorption of the First Dhyāna. (See above p. 620).

*Samādhidhyāna*, the *dhyāna* consisting of absorption, or bliss, is distinguished from *upapattiidhyāna*, existence in a certain heaven corresponding to each Dhyāna.

Action in *dhyānāntara* (*dhyānāntarakarmaṇ*) is action by which one obtains *dhyānāntara*-bliss and *dhyānāntara*-existence.

ii. The *Kārikā* allows two interpretations as indicated by the *Bhāṣya*: *dhyānāntarakarmaṇo vipākatas* = since there is retribution of action from *dhyānāntara*; and *dhyānāntare vipākatas* = since there is retribution in *dhyānāntara*.

Paramārtha translates the original literally; Hsüan-tsang: "Because intermediate [action] produces retribution."

207. *Vyākhyā*: *Dhyānāntarakarmaṇo dhyānāntaropapattau vipākena vediteṇa bhavitavyam / tatra sukhā dukhā vā vedanā nāsti / tasmā asyāduḥkṛtsukhā vedanā vipakā itī . . .* = "Dhyānāntara action should, in *dhyānāntara* existence, have a retribution which is sensation. Now, in *dhyānāntara*, there is neither agreeable, nor disagreeable sensation, so neither-agreeable-nor-disagreeable sensation [which is found there] is the retribution of the said action. Thus above the Fourth Dhyāna there exists action which is neither-agreeable-nor-disagreeable in feeling."

208. "Or rather" = if we consider the second interpretation of the *Kārikā*.

209. *Vyākhyā*: "Dhyānāntare vā kasya cit karmaṇo'nyasya vipāko vedanā na syāt na sambhavati." "Or rather, in *dhyānāntara*, there will no retribution in the form of sensation of any action different from *dhyānāntara* action, for one cannot say that a retribution experienced in *dhyānāntara* is a result of an agreeable action in the First Dhyāna, that it is a result of a disagreeable action in *Kāmadhātu*, nor that it is a result of an action of the sphere of the Fourth Dhyāna."

Hsüan-tsang translates: "Or rather there will be no action [which is retributed in *dhyānāntara*]" (*huo ying wu yeh* 或應無業).

Paramārtha: "If this were the case [=if intermediate action is absent below the Fourth Dhyāna] then *dhyānāntara* action would not have any retribution; or rather, in *dhyānāntara*, there would be an action different in nature [= retributed]." [Now one cannot say that *dhyānāntara* sensation is the retribution of any other action].

210. Hsüan-tsang: "This action produces the sensation of pleasure (*sukhendriya*) of the principal *dhyāna* as its retribution." [Gloss of Saeki: of the First Dhyāna.] Which means: the action which the *dhyānāntara* produces, is retributed in sensation, but in the principle Dhyāna.

211. Do these masters maintain that there is no sensation in *dhyānāntara* existence (*dhyānāntaroapapattau*)? No. But they say that this sensation is not a retributive result, but an outflowing result (ii.57c).

212. Good action free from *vīṭarka* is the action which produces *dhyānāntara*; its retribution is solely mental sensation. Thus it is false that the retribution of action which produces the *dhyānāntara* is the sensation of pleasure of the *dhyāna* itself (of the First Dhyāna of which the *dhyānāntara* is the higher annex); it is false also that this retribution is not sensation. For action free from *vīṭarka* exists only in *dhyānāntara* and above.

213. What one feels (*anubhū*) is *sukha*, or pleasure, not action . . .

214. According to *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 596a23, where however the order differs ("twofold" becomes "fivefold").

215. Same text *Samyutta*, iv.41.

*Vyākhyā*: *Rūpaṃ pratyannubhavati na ca rūparāgaṃ pratyannubhavatūy arthaḥ / atha vā na ca rūpaṃ rāgeṇa pratyannubhavaty ālambata itī*.

216. *Mahānidānadharmaparyāya*: *yaśmīn samaye sukhāṇi vedanāṇi vedayate dve aśya vedane tasmin samaye niruddhe bhavataḥ*; compare *Dīgha*, ii.66.

217. The problem of the necessity of the retribution of action presents some difficulties. One must take into consideration the multiple givens of the problem. See notably (iv.120) the distinction between action which is "done" (*kṛta*) and that which is "accumulated" (*upacīta*): action will not be "counted" or "accumulated" if it is followed by repentance, confession, etc. In fact, action is only completed by its *prṣṭha* or consecutive action (iv.89); the gravity of an action depends on the gravity of its preparatory action, its principal action, and its consecutive action (iv.119). Accumulated action is not necessarily retributed. The character of the retribution of an action can necessarily change: such an action to be experienced in hell in the next life can be retributed here in this world (*Āṅgulināla* is a good example) (iv.55). In fact, with the exception of mortal transgressions (iv.97), crimes do not hinder one—except in the case of "false views" cutting off the roots of good (iv.79): and even persons with these can be reborn after this life (iv.80c-d)—from becoming "detached from *Kāmadhātū*," and, as a consequence, of being reborn in the next life in the heavens of *Rūpadhātū* (iv.55): in which case the transgressions which are not of necessary retribution were as if they had not been committed; the others are retributed here below. These transgressions, with the exception of those which necessarily ripen in the bad realms of rebirth, do not hinder one from entering the Path: from this then the mind, perfumed by the powerful roots of good (purity of conduct, respect for the Three Jewels) becomes refractory to the maturation of former actions—which are non-determinate—which could produce a bad realm of rebirth: "An ignorant person, even if he has committed a small transgression, avoids the bad place. Compact, a small mass of iron sinks; the same iron, in a great mass but fashioned into a vessel, floats" (vi.34a-b, *Āṅguttara*, i.249). By planting a little root of good in the field of merit which are the Buddhas, one suppresses the retribution of actions of unnecessary retribution (vii.34 *ad finem*). The *Kośa*, iv.60, speaks of "pure" (*anāsrava*) action which destroys other actions.

Another problem is that of the order in which different actions are retributed: they are heavy, numerous, close (see *Kośa*, ix, "Refutation of the *Pudgala*," at the end; *Visuddhimagga*, p. 601). The Buddha declared that the retribution of action is incomprehensible, and he forbade any attempt to understand it (*Āṅguttara*, ii.80 *Madyamakāvātāra*, vi.42, *Milinda*, 189, *Jātakamālā*, xxxiii.1-3). A very clear point for the Buddhists, but one that is obscure for us, is that there is action and retribution, but that there is no agent. It has been discussed whether all suffering is retribution or whether it has come out of retribution (*Visuddhimagga*, 602, *Kathāvatthu*, vii.10, *Madhyamakāvātāra*, vi.41, *Karmaprajñapti*, at the end). Compare Deussen, *Vedānta* (1883, 497-8); Vasubandhu devotes one chapter, his "Refutation of the *Pudgala*," to this problem.

Interesting to Buddhism and to the Lokottaravādins are the following questions: does the Buddha experience the retribution of his former transgressions? (iv.102, at the end), and, how does one explain the animal rebirths of the Bodhisattvas? (vi.23c).

218. See Childers, 178b; Warren, 245; *Visuddhimagga* 601, *Compendium*, 144. The older sources oppose *dīṭṭhadhamma vedanīya* to the action which leads to hell (*Āṅguttara* i.249), and to action experienced later, *sariparāyavedanīya* (*ibid.*, iv.382).

219. Hsüan-tsang: "Or rather one says that there are five actions"; Paramārtha: "Furthermore, there are five actions."

220. The Chinese translators depart from the original: "There are some actions whose result is close and small; there are some actions whose result is distant and great . . ."

This is indeed what the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 594a15, teaches: "Action to be experienced in the present life produces a near result: one can thus say that it is strong; how can one say that other actions, of distant result, are very strong? Action to be experienced in the present life produces a near result, but weak: one cannot say that this action is very strong . . . The *yava* obtains its fruit after six months, a result more distant but greater than that of flax; the *khadira* (*ch'u-lí-shu* 法梨樹) has its fruit after five, six, twelve years, but this fruit is greater than it; the *tāla* has its fruit after one hundred years, but this fruit is the greatest."

221. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang: "Some other masters say "There are four alternatives (*chü*= word, *pāda*)."

222. *Vyākhyā: Dārṣṇīkabhāṣa sūtrāntikāḥ*.

223. Hsüan-tsang adds two words to the Kārikā:

"Four, good"; that is to say: "The doctrine of the four actions (50a-c) is good." *Bhāṣya*: "Actions 'to be experienced in the present life,' etc. are the three determinate actions; indeterminate action is the fourth. We say that this is good, for, by solely indicating here action determinate or indeterminate with respect to the time period of its retribution, the four categories of action taught in the sūtra are explained." Gloss of Saeki: "By saying that this is correct, the Śāstra does not condemn the theory of five or eight actions."

224. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 595c18.

225. See ii.52a, iii.19. *Samyutta*, i.206; *Mahāvinyūtpatti*, 190; Windisch, *Buddhas Geburt*, 87 and the sources cited. On embryonic life, see the note on *prāṇa*, *Kośa*, iv.17a-b.

226. The intermediate being belongs (along with its subsequent life) to a single *nikāya*.

Intermediate existence and the following existence form only one existence (*nikāyasabbhāga*). Thus the actions of intermediate beings, maturing completely in the intermediate existence or in the following existence, are all "to be experienced in the present life."

This refers to the retributive result (*vipāka*); see ii.52a.

227. Literally: "this is projected by *upapadyavedanīya* action, action to be experienced in the following existence, after having been reborn [once]." Hsüan-tsang: "... by *upapadyavedanīya* action, etc." (Better: for an intermediate existence can be projected by an action to be experienced in a later existence).

228. The text has *yathā tathā ceti*. *Vyākhyā*: "Either by the mind which holds that killing is meritorious (*puṇyabuddhyā*), or by hatred, etc. The Persian (*pārasika*) who kills his father or mother believing that he is doing a pious act ... (see iv.68d). Hsüan-tsang: "Killing ... with a light or heavy mind." Paramārtha: (*i sbuai erh hsin* 以率爾心) (TD 29, p. 238c2).

229. According to the *Vimaya in Ten Recitations*, 51.1; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 593a15.

Those who insult their mothers are punished in this life, *Dīvyā*, 586.

230. Hsüan-tsang adds: "Such stories are numerous."

231. *Majjhima*, ii.220, *Aṅguttara*, iv.382: Can the action "to be experienced in this life" be transformed into action "to be experienced in a future life" (*saṃparāyavedanīya*) ... ?

The same problem is examined in the *Karmaprajñāpti*, Mdo, 82, 246b: "There are eight types of actions: to be experienced agreeably, disagreeably, in this world, later, to be experienced in a small manner, to be experienced gradually, ripe, and unripe. Can action to be experienced agreeably, through energy and effort, be changed into action to be experienced disagreeably? No, this is impossible ... Can unripe action be changed into ripe action? Yes and no. Some, in order to carry out this transformation, cut off their hair, their beard, their hair and beard, and torture themselves by different paths and bad penitences: but they fail. Others, through energy and effort, obtain the result of *Srotaāpanna* ... " "There are three actions: actions to be experienced in this life, in the next life, or later. Does it happen that one who experiences the first one also experiences the other two? Yes, when one obtains the quality of Arhat, the retribution of the other two actions occurs."

232. Hsüan-tsang translates: "The person who departs from the Path of Meditation," that is to say: "who departs from the result of Arhat," for this result marks the end of the Path of Meditation on the Truths.

233. That is to say, one who leaves the absorption in which he has "seen" the Truths (vi.28d).

234. *Vyākhyā*: In fact, action free from *vitarka* cannot have a retribution belonging to a lower stage including *vitarka* and *vicāra*.

235. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 598c7: *Dawmanasaya* arisen from the action of attention (*manaskāra*), including strong imagination (*vikalpa*), is abandoned through detachment: but the same does not hold for a retributive result.

236. *Cittakkhepa* = *ummāda* (*Anguttara*).

237. Paramārtha adds: "And there are other causes." Hsüan-tsang: "Trouble of the mind arises from five causes: 1. retribution, 2. fear, 3. attack of demons . . ."

238. *Upadrava* = attack of demons and the evil that results from it; compare *Jātakamālā*, 41.15. According to *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 658a11.

239. On the *amanuṣyas*, see *Kośa*, iv.75c-d, 97b, iii.99c-d; *Kāraṇaprajñapti*, p. 344 of *Cosmologie bouddhique*.

*Dīgha*, iii.203, *Milinda*, p. 207, *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, Para. 39. *Śikṣasamuccaya*, p. 351.

*Abhisamālarikāraloka* (ad *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, p. 383): *pretādār amanuṣyaḥ*.

*Pāṇini*, ii.4.23.

240. The *Vyākhyā* quotes the Sūtra: *Bhagavān Mithilikāyām (?) vibharati sma Mithilāmraṇane / tena khalu punaḥ samayena Vasiṣṭhasagotrāyā brāhmanyaḥ ṣaṭ putrāḥ kālagatāḥ / sā teṣāṃ kālakṛtāyā nagnonmattā kṣiptacittā tena tenānumbīdati . . .* And the rest up to the conversation of Vasiṣṭhī with her husband after the death of their seventh infant: "Formerly you were afflicted by the death of your sons; now you are not afflicted. This is without doubt because you have eaten your sons (*nūnam te putrās twayā bhakṣitāḥ*)."

*putrapautrasahasrāṇi jñātiasamghaśatāni ca /  
dīrghēdbhvaṇi mayā brāhman khādītāni tatbā twayā //  
putrapautrasahasrāṇāṃ parimāṇāṃ na vidyate /  
anyonyāṃ khādīyamānānāṃ tāsū tāsūpapatīṣu //  
kaḥ focet paritāpyeta parideveta vā punaḥ /  
jñātvā niḥsaraṇāṃ loke jātet ca maraṇasya ca //  
sābaṃ niḥsaraṇāṃ jñātvājātet ca maraṇasya ca /  
na focāmi na tapyāmi kṛte buddhasya śāsane //*

Read Vasiṣṭhī (and not Vasiṣṭha) in the nice piece where the Blessed One praises the universality of his preaching, *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, trans. Huber, p. 205.

241. The five fears are: *āṣṭvikābhaya*, *aślokābhaya* (= *akīrti*), *pariṣacchārādhyaḥbhaya* (= *sabbhāyāṃ saṃkucītya*), *marāṇābhaya*, *durgatibhaya* (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 386b21). See *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 46. The readings of the *Dharmasamgraha*, 71, are capricious.

242. *Dharmatābbhijñatvā*: "Everything that is impure (*sāsrava*) is suffering, conditioned things are impermanent, and the *dharma*s are unsubstantial."

243. According to the *Jñānaprasthāna*, TD 26, p. 973c2; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 609a1. In *Vibhaṅga*, 368, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha* are *kaśāvas*. But *Anguttara*, i.112, distinguishes *vanika*, *dosa* and *kaśāva*.

244. Color (*kaśāya*) is *rañjanabhetu*, a cause of coloring, like attachment (*rāga*) which, in fact, "attaches" and "colors" (*rañjayati*).

245. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 600a26; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 589c16; *Anguttara*, ii.230; *Dīgha*, iii.230; *Attasālini*, p. 89; *Netippakaraṇa*, 158.184. *Anguttara*, iii.385: *akāpam asukkaṃ nibbānam abhijjāyati*.

246. Compare *Yogasūtra*, iv.7.

247. This is the answer of the third masters, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 591a15.

248. The same action "projects" an existence and the intermediate existence which leads to it (iii.13a-b). There is no intermediate existence proceeding rebirth in *Ārūpyadhātu*.

249. The *Vyākhyā* quotes the Sūtra: *Asti karma suklaṃ suklaḥvipākāṃ tadvyatbā prathame dhyāne / evaṃ yāvad bhavāgre*.

250. See iv.1. *Vyākhyā: Saṁtānata etad vyavasthānam iti / ekasmin saṁtāne kuśalaṁ cakuśalaṁ ca samudācaratīti kṛtvā kuśalaṁ akuśalaṁ vyavahīryate*. On the consequences of this theory of mixing, *Anguttara*, i.249 (translated by Warren, p. 218).

251. By definition, absorption (*saṁādhi*), which is the opposite of evil (*akuśala*), does not exist in *Kāmadhātu*. It happens, only in *Kāmadhātu*, that one cuts off the roots of good through false views (*mādhyaḥṣṭi*); but one can never root out false views by Right Views (*saṁyādṛṣṭi*).

252. The Theravādins, *Kathāvatthu*, vii.10, maintain that "supra-nundane" actions have retribution.

253. The text has *mahatvāyāni śūnyatāyāni*, that is to say the *Mahāśūnyatārthasūtra* (*Vyākhyā*). *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 739b21: *ekāntasūklā ānanda aśaikṣadharmā ekāntānavadyāḥ ...* (*Majjhima*, iii.115 does not correspond).

254. *Prakarapa*, TD 26, p. 711c3; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 589c26. *sūkladharmāḥ katame / kuśalā dharmā avyakṛtāḥ ca dharmāḥ*.

255. The pure *dharmas* are not *Dhātu*, nor integral to the *Dhātus* (*na dhātur na dhātupatitāḥ*). On what engenders (*janayati*) and arrests (*virupaddhi*) the process (*pravṛtti*), see ii.6.

256. Each moment of the Path is a psychological complex that includes, among other mental states, *cetanā* or "volition." According to the definition, iv.1b, this *cetanā* is action.

The four *dharmakṣāntis*, vi.25c; detachment from *Kāmadhātu*, vi.49.

257. *Vyākhyā: Na hi tasya (kuśalasya) svabhāvaprabhānam iti / prāpticchedaḥ prabhānam / prabhānasyāpi kuśalasya saṁmukhibhāvāt / tadālabhanakleśasya prabhānāt tasya kuśalasya prabhānam bhavati / tadālabhanakleśaprabhānam ca navamasya tadālabhanakleśaprakārasasya prabhāne sati bhavati* *navamānantaryamāragacetanaiva kṛṣṇasūklasya karmaṇaḥ kṣayāya bhavati / tadā hi navamasya kleśaprakārasy prāpticchedevisaṁyogaprapṛtīr upadyate / tasya ca kṛṣṇasūklasya karmaṇo'nyasyāpi cānūrtāvyaḥkṛtasya sāsvasya dharmasya visaṁyogaprapṛtīr upadyate*.

258. Literally: "Action abandoned through Seeing is black; all other is black-white when it arises from *kāma*." Objection: One should say *kāmāvacaraṁ dṛgheyam kṛṣṇam*: "Action of *Kāmadhātu* which is abandoned through Seeing, is black"; in fact, there are actions abandoned through Seeing which do not have a black retribution, namely certain actions of *Rūpadhātu* and *Ārūpyadhātu*. Response: the qualifier *kāmaja*, arisen from *kāma* (that is to say from *Kāmadhātu*), refers to the first *pāda*.

259. According to the principle, *na dṛṣṭibheyam aklīṣṭam*, i.40c-d.

260. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 449c2; *Anguttara*, i.273; *Dīgha*, iii.220. *Suttanipāṭa*, 700; *Mahāvastu*, iii.397. *Moneya* is the quality of Muni or the action of a Muni (*muniā vā munikarma vā*; Childers (Supplement, p. 617) "conduct worthy of a Muni." *Rgveda*, x.136.3. Col. Jacob, *Concordance*, p. 748, for the value of *muni* in the *Upaniṣads* and the *Gṛā*.

261. *Mauma* is explained: *muner idam maumam*. *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 346, why the Buddha receives the name of *muni*: threefold silence, defined as here, or silence of *samāropa* and *apavāda*.

262. This does not refer to all bodily and vocal actions that an Arhat can accomplish, but to actions which are characterized as Arhat or *Aśaikṣa* (vi.45). The actions in question are by their nature *avijñāpti*, non-information: the silence of the body is thus *avijñāpti*-of-the-body characteristic of the Arhat. Actions which are *viññāpti* (*kāyavijñāpti*, *vāgviññāpti*) are necessarily impure (*sāsva*) and one cannot attribute the quality of *aśaikṣatva* to them. (See above).

263. *Paramārtha* differs: "Action of the body and the voice are abstention by nature. Action of the mind is exclusively *cetanā* (volition); as it does not include *viññāpti*, one cannot, by knowing through induction that it is abstention, say that it is silence."

264. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 454a16; *Anguttara*, i.272, *Dīgha* iii.219. *tīni soceyyāni kāyasoceyyam vacsoceyyam manosoceyyam*.

265. *Vivecana*, Hsüan-tsang: to arrest, to cause to cease. To arrest persons who believe that one obtains purity (*suddhidaṛśin*) only by virtue of not speaking (*tāṣṇāmbhāvamātra*) or through ablutions (*kāyamaḷāpakaṛṣaṇa*).

On "false silence" and the "silence of the Āryans," see *Theragāthā*, 650, *Suttanipāta*, 388, *Samyutta*, ii.273, *Āṅguttara*, iv.153, 359, v.266, *Mahāvagga*, iv.1.13; *Vanaparvan*, 42.60: *masuṇā na so munir bhavati*.

On ablutions, see *Theragāthā*, 236, *Udāna* i.9 (*Udānavarga*, xxxiii.14), *Majjhima*, i.39; Āryadeva, *Cūṭavāsuddhiprakaraṇa*.

*Kośa*, iv.86a-c (superstitions of the laity); v.7, 8 (*śūlavratā*).

266. *Samyutta*, TD 2, p. 94b16; *Dīgha*, iii.214, *Āṅguttara*, i.49, 52, etc.; *Samyutta*, v.75.

267. Bad volition, or bad action of the mind, is bad cultivation of the mind.

268. Mental action, *manasikarman*, is exclusively volition, *cetanā*, iv.1b.

269. *Vyākhyā*: *Daṣṭāntikāḥ sautrāntaikaviśeṣā ity arthaḥ*. See iv.78c-d where this doctrine is attributed to the Sautrāntikas.

This discussion is taken from *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 587a7.

270. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 437b24 and following; compare *Āṅguttara*, v.292, *Majjhima*, iii.207. Our Sūtra has: *saṁcetanīyaṁ karma kṛtvopacītya narakeṣūpapadyate / katham ca bhikṣavaḥ saṁcetanīyaṁ karma kṛtāṁ bhavaty upacītaṁ / iha bhikṣava ekatyāḥ saṁcintya trividhaṁ kāyena karma karoty upacīoty caśurvidhaṁ vācā trividhaṁ manasā . . . / katham bhikṣavaḥ trividhaṁ manasā bhavaty vyāpannacitto yāvaṁ mīthyādr̥ṣṭīkaḥ khalu bhikṣava ibaikatyō bhavaty viparī-tadarśī . . .*

This Sūtra does not mention any mental action apart from *abbhidhyā*, etc.; thus it is *abbhidhyā*, etc. which is mental action.

271. Compare *Majjhima*, i.35, 279; *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 790b18.

272. *Mīthyādr̥ṣṭi* is defined iv.78b-c. It is the *parama vajja*, *Visuddhimagga*, 469; it produces all bad *dharma*s, *Majjhima*, iii.52.

273. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 437b28, *Samyutta*, TD 2, p. 274a6; *Dīgha*, iii.269. See also *Manu*, xii.2-7.

274. Hsüan-tsang adds: "light greed, etc."

275. *Madyādivirati*, that is to say *madyatāḍānabandhanādivirati*; compare *Dīgha* iii.176. *Dānejjyādi* (*sbyin*, *mchod sbyin*); *adi* refers to *śāpanodvartanaviśama*(?) *bastapradānādi*. *Ijyā* is almost a synonym of *dāna*; Hsüan-tsang has *kung-yang* (供養 = *pūjā*; *śāpana* and *udvartana* can be acts of *pūjā*. *Mahāvīryūtpatti* (Wogihara ed.) 245, 378-379 (*śāpana*, *utsadana*).

276. *Priyavacanādi*; *adi* refers to *dharmaśāsanāmārgakathanādi*.

277. All of the following discussion is according to *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 635a17.

278. The *viññapti* (vocal action) by which I order a killing, *panaviññapti*, forms part of the preparation (*prayoga*) of this killing and is not considered as the deed itself. It is not *masuli viññapti*, the principal *viññapti*. The action of killing of which I am guilty and now endowed with is thus solely *avijñapti*.

279. *Paramārtha*: "done in person." Hsüan-tsang: "Six evil deeds are certainly *avijñapti*; these [six], accomplished in person, and adultery, are of two types."

280. Hsüan-tsang: "if there is death, etc." The same holds for stealing, etc., as for killing.

281. Abstinence from killing is a path of material action. When one undertakes the precepts (*samādanāśīla*), that is to say, the *Prātimokṣa* precepts, there is necessarily *viññapti* (the declaration: "I renounce killing"), for these precepts are always "undertaken from another" (*paraśmād ādīyate*) (iv.28). When one obtains a *Dhyāna*,—which supposes the abandoning, at least provisionally, of

the defilements of Kāmadhātu and of bad actions—one acquires the abstention from killing by this very fact, without any *viññāpti* being necessary; the same holds when one obtains the pure precepts (three parts of the Noble Path). This morality does not depend on being undertaken (*samādāna*); it results from the very nature of things (*dharmatā*): the possessor of a Dhyāna possesses the *aviññāpti* which is the abstention from killing.

282. At the moment when the chief or principle action is created, an *aviññāpti* arises which continues and which is consecutive to this action; furthermore one can, after having committed the action—after having killed the animal—commit actions analogous to this action—hitting the dead animal, cutting his flesh, etc. (*tasya karmapathasya anudharmam anusadṛśam karma*): each of these actions is consecutive action.

283. The description which follows is according to *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 583b12: "... if, with a mind to kill, he destroys the life of another (*prāṇātipāta*), the evil action of the body (*kāyaviññāpti*) and the *aviññāpti* of this moment, are the killing properly so-called ... "

284. Principle action (the killing) is the achievement of the result of the preparatory action; he who prepares the killing (*yo hi prayujyate*), but does not produce the killing (*maulam karmapatham na janayati*), receives the "result of the preparation," but not the achievement, or completion, of this result (*tasya prayogaphalam asti na tu phalaparipūrṇaḥ*).

285. *Vyākhyā*: Iha kaścī parasvaṁ bartukāmo mañcād uttiṣṭhati śastraṁ grhṇāti paragrhaṁ gacchati sūpto na vety ākramayati parasvaṁ spṛśati yāvan na sthānāt prayāvayati tāvat prayogaḥ / yasmin tu kṣaṇe sthānāt prayāvayati tatra yā viññāptis tatksaṇikā cāvijñāptir ayaṁ masulaḥ karmapathaḥ / dvābhyāṁ hi kāraṇābhyāṁ adattādānavadyena spṛśyate prayogataḥ phalaparipūrṇas ca / tataḥ param aviññāptikṣaṇāḥ prṛsthaṁ bhavanti / yāvat tat parasvaṁ vibhajate vikṛmāḥ gopayaty anukīrtayati vā tāvad asya viññāptikṣaṇā api prṛsthaṁ bhavanti.

286. *Marāṇabhava* is defined iii.13c-d.

287. Literally: "and that the killing is not destroyed."

288. Hsüan-tsang: *hsi* 息 = *uparata*, *nivṛtta*; Paramārtha: *wei she wei hsi* 未捨未息.

289. *Prayogaphala* = *maulakarmaṇ*. The pathway of the principal action thus takes place *prāṇino mṛtāvasthāyām*.

290. *Vyākhyā*: *Yathā parasvaṁ bartukamāḥ kāryasiddhaye parakīyaṁ bhṛtvā tena paśunā balīm kuryāt* ...

291. Saṅghabhadra (TD 29, p. 576a10) refutes these objections.

292. See *Atthasālinī*, p. 102.

293. One of the sources of the following definitions is the *Karmaprajñāpti* (Mdo 72) fol. 210a; see also *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 605c4.

294. This is the classic example. See the interesting story, Chavannes, *Cinq cent contes*, iii.287, and the references.

295. See above note 228. The *Karmaprajñāpti* attributes the killing to the parents to the Brāhmanas of the West called *mchu-skyed*. *Mchu* gives *oṣṭha*, *tunda* or *maghā* which is a Nakṣatra: perhaps Maghaja or Maghābhava.

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 605c16. There is, in the West, some Mlecchas called *Mu-chia* 目迦 who have this opinion, who establish this system: "Those who kill their decrepit and sick fathers and mothers obtain merit and not transgression. Why? A decrepit father has ruined organs and is no longer capable of drinking and eating; if he dies, he will obtain new and strong organs, he will drink anew warm milk; one who has sickness has many painful sensations: dead, he will be freed from them. Thus he who kills them does not commit any transgression." Such killing arises from ignorance.

Mu-chia = Maga, or more properly Magu and Muga under the influence of the initial labial [this

according to S. Lévi]. On the same Mages, see below note 302.

The Mahāyāna admits that one may kill a person who is going to commit a mortal (*ānantarya*) transgression, *Śikṣasamuccaya*, p. 168.

296. Compare *Jātaka*, Fausboll, vi.208, 210; Nariman in *Revue Histoire des Religions*, 1912, i.89 and *JRAS.* 1912, 255; J. Charpentier, in the *Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik*, ii. p. 145 (Leipzig, 1923), which compares the Kambojas, pious killers of *kṛpas*, *paṇāgas*, *bhēkas*, *kimīs* and *makkhikās*, to the Zoroastrians of *Vendidad* 14.5-6 and of Herodotus, i.140.

297. According to Hsüan-tsang, this is the opinion of certain Tīrthikas; according to Paramārtha, the opinion if the Tīrthika *P'm-na-ko* (Vinnaka?). Hsüan-tsang: "Serpents . . . harm humans; he who kills them produces great merit; sheep . . . are essential to nourishment: killing them is not a transgression."

On the killing of animals and the use of meat and fish, see 1. the Fifth and Sixth Pillar Edicts of Aśoka; 2. the "pure three," *adiṭṭha*, *asuta*, *aparisaṅketa*, *Majjhima*, i.368, *Anguttara*, iv.187, *Dulva*, III. fol. 28 (*apud* Rockhill, *Life*, p. 38 note); for fish only, *Mahāvagga*, vi.31, 14 and *Cullavagga*, vii.3.15 (schism of Devadatta); in *Dulva*, IV, fol. 453, Devadatta reproaches the Buddha for authorizing "pure" meat; *Religieux éminents*, p. 48, Takakusu, *I-tsing*, p. 46, 58, etc. The meat of humans, of elephants, etc., is forbidden; 3. E. W. Hopkins, "The buddhistic rule against meat," *J.Am.Or.Soc.* 1906, 455-464.

It is forbidden to cut off the leaves of a tree (above iv.35a-b), to trample down green herbs (*śiṇāni*), or to destroy "living beings having an organ" (*ekindriya jīva*). *Mahāvagga*, iii.1.

298. *Vyākhyā*: *Anyalābhayārthe parasyaṁ haranti yathābhavārikāḥ*.

299. The original is furnished us by the *Syādvādamañjarī* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 1900, p. 32) which shows the lack of authority of Brahmanical texts. These texts say: *na bhīṣyāt sarvabhūtāni*, but they order the killing of five hundred and seven animals in the *Asvamedha*; they say: *nānṛtaṁ brūyāt*, and then explain the five types of lies that are permitted; the same: *adattādānam anekadhā nirasya paścād uktam / yady api brāhmaṇo haṭhena parakīyam ādatte balena vā tatbāpi tasya nadattādānam yataḥ sarvaṁ idaṁ brāhmaṇebhyo dattam / brāhmaṇānāṁ tu daurbalyād vṛṣalāḥ paribhūṣate / tasmiñ apābaram brāhmaṇaḥ svam ādatte / svam eva brāhmaṇo bhūṅkte svam vaste evaṁ dadātūi*. Compare *Manu*, i.101 (*Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, 4.22.46). The reading *dharbalyāt* (*Manu*: *āṁśamśyāt*) is certain: *dmas pa*.

300. Hsüan-tsang: Persians praise *abrahmacarya* with their mothers, etc.

301. *Gosava*, transcribed by Paramārtha (*ch'ü-so-p'o* 瞿娑婆, translated by *ba lai 'brani*, "born of bulls."

The *Vyākhyā* has: *Tatra mohaprādhānyād upaiṣi mātram abrahmacaryārthe / upasvasāram upaiṣi vartate / upasvasāram upaiṣi bhaginim ity arthaḥ / upasagotrām upaiṣi samānagotrām ity arthaḥ / upabā (?) yojamānaḥ*. It is clear that Yaśomitra did not understand this Vedic text very well.

The helpfulness of M. Keith has permitted us to discover Gosava in the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, ii.133: *tasya vratam / upa mātarām iyād upa svasāram upa sagotrām viṣṭhā vindet tat tad viṣṭhetānūdaho ba lokam jayati*. Here we have Vasubandhu's source. M. W. Caland consented to explain and to complete the translation that he has given to this passage (*Jaiminīya* in *Auswahl*, p. 157). *Āpastambha Śrauta* xxii.13: *teneṣṭvā sarivatsaram paśuvrato bhavet / upāvahāyodakam . . .*; another Sūtra has *upanigāhya pibet*: M. Caland corrects *upanigāhya* to *upāvahāya*, "to lower." *Viṣṭha* would be "natural need," *viṣṭheta* would signify "to spread the legs." We would thus have: "In whatever place the need grasps him, he satisfies it." The end signifies: "He seizes the world of the bulls."

This translation is with reference to the Tibetan version. *Vidhi-mat* qualifies the water: one cannot translate "the ritual water." Better to understand this as "he who has undertaken the rite drinks the water . . ."



Hsüan-tsang: "Women and men undertake the vow of bulls (*govrata*); they sip water; they cut grass with their teeth; they either stay in one place, or they go about; without distinguishing who is their parent or who is distant from them, as they encounter them, they unite with them."

Paramārtha: "Furthermore, as in the Gosava sacrifice, the other women sip water, chew grass; men go about, taking their parent, or taking their daughter, aunt, elder or younger daughters, women of the same clan, etc."

302. This is the opinion of the Tīrthika P'in-na-ko (Paramārtha). Hsüan-tsang adds: "a ladder, a road, or a ship".

According to *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 606a16: "In the West, there are some Mlecchas called Mu-chia who have this opinion, who establish this system that there is no transgression in having intercourse . . . Why? Because their women are like dried beef . . ."

Compare *Dvyaśādhana*, p. 257 (xlvii. story of Dharmaruci): *pañbhāsamo matrgṛāmāḥ . . . tīrtbhāsamo 'pi ca matrgṛāmāḥ / yatraiva hi tīrtbe pītā snāti putro'pi tasmīn snāti . . . api ca pratyanteṣu janapadeṣu dharmatāvaiśā yām eva pītādbhigacchati tām eva putro'py adbhigacchati . . .*

303. This is the stanza: *na narmayuktam vacanam bhīnasti . . . Syādvādamatījari*, p. 32; *Mbh.* i.82.16, etc.; compare Gautama, v.24; *Vasiṣṭhasmṛti*, xvi.30. Max Muller, *India, What can it . . .* p. 272: venial untruths.

304. *Nānāvāsa* (translated literally by the Lotsava, *gnas sna tsbogs* and by Paramārtha, *pu kung chu* 不共住, translated by Hsüan-tsang as *chieb-t'an* 戒壇 "precept alter," which is elsewhere the equivalent of *sīmā*, see iv.39b) is explained in the *Vyākhyā*: *Nānāvāsam praviśatī māṇḍalam praviśatīy arthah / nānāvāsa hi tasmīn mahāsimāmaṇḍale bhavanti*.

305. For the Sanskrit sources, *A Fragment of the Sanskrit Vinaya*; *Bhikṣuṣūnikarmavācana*, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, Liii (1920). For the Pāli sources, see for example K. Seidenstucker, *Pali Buddhismism* (German Pali Society); Kern, *Manual*, p. 78.

One should understand that preparatory action lasts up to the last moment of the third *karmavācana*.

306. Paramārtha translates: "Until the moment when one says the four *nīśrayas* (i依), all *viññapti* and *aviññapti* dependent (i依) on this principal action,—as long as the series is not cut off,—is consecutive action." Hsüan-tsang is also obscure: *chieb* 至 (*yāvat*) *shuo* 說 (*aroc*) *ssu-i* 四依 (*catvāro nīśrayāḥ*) *chi* 及 (*ca*) *yu* 餘 (*śeṣa, anyā*) i依 (*nīśraya*) *ch'ien* 前 (*prādurbbhavantī*?).

*Vyākhyā*: *Catvāro nīśrayāḥ cīvarapiṇḍapātasāyāsanaḥpratyayabhāṣajalākṣaṇāḥ*.

307. Note of Saeki: A *paritṛyāga* thought is a *tatkaṣaṇasamutthāna* cause (iv.10) which is simultaneous to the deed itself.

*Paritṛyāga*, *yōn-su* 了所, translated by Hsüan-tsang as *wu-so-ku* 無所顧, "not to regard, to neglect," is a euphemism for "to destroy, kill." See below note 313. Compare *Atthasālinī*, p. 91: *gabbham . . . pāpakena manasānupakkhako hoti*, "to not be indifferent with regard to the embryo" that is, "to desire its destruction."

"Mind of violence," *parusacitta*; Paramārtha: *she* 澁, rough, harsh, uneven, *karkasā*; Hsüan-tsang: *ts'u* 羶 (*audārika*) as in *pāruṣya*.

308. *Adhiṣṭhāna* = *adhikarāṇa*, *viśaya*.  
*Atthasālinī*, p. 101.

309. *Vyākhyā*: *Nāmakāyādhiṣṭhānā mṣāvādādayo vāg nāmnī pravartata iti kṛtvā*. See *Vyākhyā* ad iii.30c-d.

310. See p. 643.

311. This refers to the principal action itself.

312. Paramārtha: "If a person has the intention 'I shall kill so-and-so'; and if, with respect to such a one, there is the notion of 'such a one'; and if he kills such a one and not another by error, then by

reason of these three factors the killing is the action itself."

*Saṃcintya* = *saṃcicca*, *Mahāvūyutpatti*, 245.68; Pār. iii. *Karmaprajñāpti*, Mdo 62, chap. xi. Buddhaghosa, *Atthasālinī*, p. 97 (= *Sumaṅgalavilasini*, p. 69); Sp. Hardy, *Manual*, p. 478; Bigandet (1914), ii.195. Five things are necessary for killing: *pāṇa*, *pāṇasatthiā*, *vadbhakacitta*, *upakkama*, and *marana*. The killing itself can be *sābatthika*, *ānatthika*, *missaggika*, *thāvara*, *vijjāmaya*, and *iddhimaya*. (See the translation of Maung Tin and Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Expositor*, 129: *vijjā* = art, *iddhi* = potency).

313. Hsüan-tsang: "There is killing even when there is doubt: a person, with respect to the object that he desires to kill, is in doubt: 'Is this a living being or not? And, if it is living, is it such a one or another?' then he makes the decision: 'Whether this is one or the other, I shall kill him': by reason of this *pariṇyāga* thought, if he kills a living being, he commits the action." Paramārtha: "... by reason of these three factors, there is the action (above, note 312). If this is the case, then a person can be in doubt and kill (=commit the transgression of murder): 'Is this a living being or not? Is this such a one or not?' This person, with respect to the object to be killed, is determined to kill: 'Whether this be one or the other, I shall kill him.' There is thus production of a *pariṇyāga* thought. If he kills, he obtains the transgression of killing."

The Tibetan gives us: "There is only a *pariṇyāga* thought" or better: "He has indeed a *pariṇyāga* thought."

We do not see how *pariṇyāga* differs from *māraṇa*.

314. The *skandhas* are momentary, that is, perish in and of themselves (*svarasena vinasvara*). How can their destruction be caused by an external cause? (See ii. trans. p. 244, and iv.2b.)

315. *Prāṇa* depends on the mind since it does not exist among persons who have entered into the two absorptions of unconsciousness (ii.42).

*Atthasālinī*, p. 97: *prāṇa* = *satta*, *jīvitendriya*.

316. An objection may be formulated against the first definition that there is no *āśvasopraśvaśa* during the first four periods of embryonic life. Thus killing an embryo during this period will not be an action in and of itself. Hui-hui quotes the *Wu-fen chieh-pen* (a Mahīśāsaka *Prātimokṣa*, TD 22, number 1422) which makes the embryo up to the forty-ninth day the *manuṣyavivraha* of Pārājika iii (See *Prātimokṣa of the Sarvāstivādins* by Finot-Huber, J.A.s. 1913, ii.477, and *Bhikṣuṃkarmavācāna*, p. 138).

317. In fact, there is no living being, *prāṇin*, that can be called dead.

318. *Vyākhyā*: *Pudgalapraśiṣṭadhaprakaraṇe*. This refers to the last chapter of the *Kośa*. (The passage referred to by Vasubandhu is translated by Stcherbatski, *The soul theory of the Buddhists*, p. 853; Hsüan-tsang's translation, TD 29, p. 152b.)

319. Quoted *ad* ii.45a (trans. p. 233) and *ciii*.3c.

320. *Mūlinda* pp. 84, 158; *Kathāvatthu*, xx.1. *Sutrakṛtāṅga*, ii.6, 26 (*Sacred Books*, 45, p. 414), also ii.2 (five types of killing). See above note 3. *Nirgrantha* = *nagnāṭaka*.

321. The Tibetan adds: "In the same way the sufferings of illness and the herbs which cause death are guilty" (?? *nad pa la gnod pa dan si ba na sman pa rnam*s. Reading doubtful). Not in the Chinese translations.

322. *Atthasālinī*, p. 97-98. *Mahāvūyutpatti*, 281.28-33: *adattasya pañcamāśakadeḥ steyacittena manuṣyagatipariṣṭhāsya tatsamijñāyā haramahāraṇayor dātenāpi. Bhikṣuṃkarmavācāna*, p. 137-8 ... *antataḥ phalatuṣam api parakṣyān nādātavyam kaḥ punar vādaḥ pañcamāśikam uttara-pañcamāśikam vā* ...

323. *Vyākhyā*: *Nānyatra samijñāvibramāt / yadi devadattadravyam haramūi yajñadattadravyam harati nādattādānam ity abhiṣprāyaḥ*. Correct: *anyatra samijñāvibramāt*. Compare p. 76, line 12, *anyatariññāt*; p. 65, line 4, *anyatra glānyāt*; Para. 4, *anyatābhīmāṇāt*, etc.

324. See iv.121, a different doctrine.

325. Opinion of the second masters of *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 585a7; an erroneous opinion, for, as they admit, the guardians of a Stūpa would not steal what belongs to the Stūpa.

326. *Vyākhyā: Parivartakam mṛtasya bhikṣoś cīvarādīdravyam (parivarteti, "to exchange," Cullavagga, vi.19?)*. According to the Tibetan, to take the goods of a dead person (*si ba's nor phrogs na*); according to Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang, to take the goods of a *hui-ch'uan* 迴轉, that is, of a *pratikṛānta* (*Mahāvvyutpatti*, 130.17).

327. The Saṅgha of the parish, Hsüan-tsang: *chieh-nei seng* 界內僧; Paramārtha: *chih pu kung chu jen* 至不共住人 = *nānāvāsagatāḥ*; Tibetan: *'tshams kyi nan du gtogs pa rnams = antapśimā-paryāpānnāḥ*.

328. *Atthasālinī*, p. 98. According to the Mahāyāna (i.e., the Yogācāra) quoted by Saeki, there are six prohibitions: 1. *aviśaya*, *agamyā*: males, and women such as one's mother, etc.; 2. *amārga anariga*: only the *yonimārga*; 3. *asamaya*: when the woman is having her period (*hui-hsia* 穢下), is pregnant, is nursing a baby, has undertaken the Upavāsa, or is sick; 4. *asthāna*; 5. "without measure," *mānam atikramya gacchati*; and 6. *ayoga*: "not conforming to the rules of the world."

329. Hsüan-tsang adds: "... and the rest to: protected by the king." See the classic list *Mahāvvyutpatti*, 281.251 (*pūtrakṣitā*, etc.).

330. *Mahāvvyutpatti*, 281.26-27: *praviṣṭaḥ sparśasvīkṣtau / prasrāvakarāṇe prasrāvakarāṇasya mukhe varcomārga vā*. Compare *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 76: *evam svastīṣv apy ayonimārgaṇa gacchataḥ*; *Suttavibhaṅga*, i.9.3: *aṅgaḥajena vaccamaggam ... passāvamaggam ... mukham ...*

331. Saeki glosses the *hui-ch'w* 迴處 (distant place, etc.) of Hsüan-tsang by *a-lien-jo* 迴轉 *aranyā*; Paramārtha: "place where one cultivates *brahmacarya*." "Open place" is doubtless *abhyavakāśa*.

332. *Vyākhyā: Garbhinīgāmane garbhoparodhaḥ / āpyayanti* (? see iv.103) *tanyopabbhogāvastha-putrikā strī / abrahmacarye hi tasyāḥ tanyam kṣīyate / bālakaṣya vā puṣṭaye taṣṭanyam bhavati*.

333. = *poṣadhikā*, iv.28 = *sārakkhā* of *Atthasālinī*, p. 98. Hsüan-tsang: "When the woman has undertaken the *upavāsa*." *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 76: *evam upavāsasthāsu ...* See the Sanskrit commentary on the *Uvāsagadasāo*, ed. Hoernle, p. 11, on the laws of marriage among the Jains.

334. Hsüan-tsang adds: "And vice versa. The same if one were to be mistaken with respect to the path, the time, etc."

335. *Vyākhyā: Anyasmin vastuni prayogo'bhīpreto'nyac ca vastu prībhuktam*.

336. The version of Paramārtha: "Lying is saying this discourse with another mind in order to explain the meaning" (although in the *kārikā* we have: "indeed lying to another ...").

337. Hsüan-tsang: To which time period does the expression "who understands the sense" (*arbhābhijñā*) refer to? Should we understand "he who understands at the present time [through *manovijñāna*] what he has heard?" Or should we understand: "he who is capable of presently understanding what he has presently heard [through the *śrotavijñāna*]?" What consequences do these two solutions lead to? In the first hypothesis, the sense of the discourse, the object of mental consciousness and vocal *vijñapti* [which the hearer misunderstands], would disappear at the same time as the auditive consciousness [which is mistaken], and the action will only be *avijñapti* [since the mental consciousness has not yet arisen]. In the second hypothesis, this objection does not hold, but as he does not understand the sense, how, at the moment when he understands, can he be said to be "capable of understanding?" The best explanation is that "he who is capable of understanding" is one in whom there are no causes of confusion, and in whom the auditive consciousness has already arisen. One should explain the text in a manner that does not lead to objections.

338. *Dīrgha*, TD 1, p. 50b27; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 861b20; *Anguttara*, ii.246, iv.307; *Majjhima*, iii.29; *Dīgha*, iii.232: *cattāro anariyavohārā: adīṭṭhe dīṭṭhavādūtā, assute sutavādūtā, amute mutavādūtā,*

*aviññāte viññātavādītā. Apare pi cattāro anariyavobhārā: adāṭṭhavādītā* . . . (Compare *Majjhima*, i. 135, quoted verbatim in *Vijñānakāya*, fol. 12b, which, like the Pāli sources, places *viññāta* after *māta*.)

Buddhism employs the traditional phraseology (*Upaṇishads*) and is at great pains to interpret it.

339. The *Vyākhyā* (with an unclear reading) gives Māhākīmātar. In *Saṃyutta*, iv.72, the hearer of this discourse is Mālunkya-putta (Mālunkya). Tibetan: *mchod byed kyi ma can*. Paramārtha: *mo-lo-chib-mu* 摩羅柁母, which supposes a reading Māhākīmātar; P'u-kuang: *man-mu* 曼母 (*man*: long hair, etc.) which gives Mother Mālā, or Mother Alakī, or even Mallikāmātar (*Mahāvinyūtpatti*, 240.14: *man-bua* 蔓華 = Mallikā; for the different Mallikās, see Kern, *Manual*, p. 40. Hsüan-tsang: *ta-mu* 大母 = "he who has for his mother the Great One (Mahallakīmātar?)." For *mchod byed kyi ma can*, compare Sarad Chandra Das: *mchod ldan ma* = *mabūla* (from *maha*, religious festival = *mchod*) [The remarks of S. Lévi and J. Przyluski have been used for this note.]

Majjhima, i.135, iii.261 adds *pattam pariyesitā anuvicariyā manasā (na upādāyisāmi na ca me tannissitā viññānā bhavissati)* to *dāṭṭham sutam mutam viññātam*.

340. *Saṃyutta*, iv. 72, only gives three synonyms: *atthi te tattha chando vā rāgo vā pemaṇ si / no hetam bhante*. The stanzas which follow (iv.72-76), which are *Theragāthā*, 794, are quoted by Saṃghabhadra, TD 29, p. 579a18.

Hsüan-tsang gives *ālaya* and *nikānti* in transcription (*ni-yen-ti*); compare *Dhammapada*, 411 and *Commentary* to 348 (Faussol, p. 413: *ālayam nikāntim ajjhesanam parivutthānam gāham parāmāsaṇam tanham*. Hsüan-tsang has *ṛṣṇā* in place of *rāga* and places *ṛṣṇā* after *preman*.

341. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang have only: *yan manaspratyakṣībhitam tad vijñātam*.

342. The *Yogācāras* (*Vyākhyā*): *Yat pratyakṣīkṛtam cakṛuṣā* . . .

343. *Vyākhyā*: *Pratyātam pratisamvēdātam sukhady asamāhitena cittena / adbhigatam samāhitena laukikenaive na lokottareṇa / laukikavyavahārādbhikārāt*. That which is known in pure, or supramundane absorption is not *viññāta*, but *jñāta*.

344. The problem discussed in this paragraph is also treated by Buddhaghosa (*Atthasālinī*, pp. 90-95). There are many points of contact between the two presentations: a monk can lie through his silence, and a possessor of magical powers can kill an embryo; thus one can commit transgressions of the voice and the body by means of the mind.

345. *Vācā parākrameta* = *vācā paramā mārjate*: when one kills by speech.

346. This is the story of the Daṇḍaka Forest, etc., empty of living beings through the anger of the Ṛṣis (*Majjhima*, i.378; *Upālisūtra*, quoted by Vasubandhu, *Vimśika*, 20, *Muséon*, 1912, i.) which proves the gravity of mental action (see below iv.105a-b), *Mūlinda*, p. 130. For the mention of this episode in the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna* and the references in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, see S. Lévi, "Pour l'histoire du *Rāmāyaṇa*," *J.As.* 1918, i.97. In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the Daṇḍaka forest was depopulated through the curse of the Ṛṣi Uśanas.

Vasubandhu, in *Vimśika*, 20c-d, proves that demonic beings would not intervene (see below note 348).

347. In fact, in the *Bhikṣupṛasāda*, the Vinayadhara asks (*anuśrāv*): "Are you pure?" (*kacci[s]-stha-parisuddhā*). If a Bhikṣu does not declare his transgression (*satiṃ āpattiṃ*) and by this very silence acquiesces (*adbhivāsayati*), he lies (*mṛṣāvādī bhavet*). Compare the *Prātimokṣa* edited by L. Finot, *J.As.* 1913, p. 476, 488 (with the reading: *tatrāyusmataḥ pṛcchāmi kacci sthāra parisuddhā*). *Mahāvagga*, ii.3.

348. "This is a difficulty to be resolved by the *Vaiśāṅghika*."

Saṃghabhadra explains: In fact (*arthataḥ*), the Ṛṣis ordered (*ajñāpitaras*) the killing. Some demonic beings (*amanuṣya*), knowing (*avetya*) their sinful intention of destroying living beings (*sattvaparityāga-pravṛtta pāpālaya*), came to the Ṛṣis. How did the Ṛṣis manifest (*vijñāpiti*) their

intention? By reason of their anger, they modified their bodies and their voices; if they cursed, there was certainly movement (*ceṣṭā*) of the body and voice. Some other masters say that all *avijjāpatti* of the sphere of Kāmadhātu does not depend on a *viññāpatti*. For example, the Five (*pañcaka*) in obtaining the result at the same time as the *Prātimokṣa* discipline (above p. 592): in this same way a bad *avijjāpatti* can arise without there being a *viññāpatti*. Would one say that the Five previously created *viññāpatti*? It would also be the same in other cases. So too in the case of the Rṣis. With respect to lying at the confession ceremony (*poṣadhamṣāvāda*), the fact that the guilty monk (*aparissuddha*) enters the assembly, sits down, and remains there as he should (*svam یریapātham kalpayati*), and says what he should say, signifies that there was for him a *viññāpatti* previous [to the moment when he acquiesces by his silence]. (*Vyākhyā*; Saṅghabhadra, TD 29, p. 580a7).

349. *Atthasālinī*, p. 99.

350. In *Atthasālinī*, p. 100, *pharusā vācā* is a curse or malediction, words "by which one does violence to oneself or to others" (*yāya attāmaṃ pi paraṃ pi pharusam karoti*). Buddhaghosa gives some examples of mental curses: a mother desires that an enraged buffalo crush the child that goes into the woods in spite of her prohibitions against him doing so, or that the house collapse on her children; the school master desires the death of his lazy students. In these cases, there is no *pharusā vācā*. But on the contrary, there is *pharusā vācā* when one says "Sleep well" to a person that one wants to assassinate.

351. *Manu*, xii.7: *anibaddhapralāpa*.

352. This monk is a *mūṣyājīvin* (iv.86b). *Mūṣyājīva* is defined by the *Vyākhyā* as *kubhāṇā lapanā nasmittikā nāispeṣikā*. Wogihara (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Leipzig, 1908) has a long note on these four terms and quotes the definition that the *Vyākhyā* gives here of the term *lapanā*: *lapanam karoti lābhyasasakāmataya sevābhidyotikam vācam niscārayatīty arthaḥ*: it would thus be appropriate to translate *lapanā* by "flattery," as do Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang. But the sources quoted by Wogihara (namely TD 26, number 1537, the *Dharmaskandha*, etc.) show that they refer to a monk who flaunts his own merits. See *Majjhima*, iii.75; *Vibhaṅga*, 352, commented on in *Visuddhimagga* p. 22 and following, JPTS. 1891, 79.

353. *Lauḷya* (*Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 69).

354. *Mahāvastu*, ii.355: *ye saṃgaṇikārāmāḥ ...*; *Dīvyā*, 464.19; *Majjhima*, iii.110; Childers, p. 447. The *Atthasālinī*, p. 100, gives the recitation of the battle of the Bhāratas and the kidnapping of Sītā as examples of *samphappalāpa*.

355. Tibetan: "... are endowed with *naiṣkramya*, are not endowed with *stegs-snags*"; Hsüan-tsang: "... come from out of *naiṣkramya*, are capable of producing *naiṣkramya*, do not prepare a defiled mind." Paramārtha gives the original of *stegs-snags* as *mūṣyā-rasa*. *Nekkhamma* is opposed to *saṃgaṇikā* in *Majjhima*, iii.110. See ii.p.

356. *Vyākhyā*: *Āvāha = dārikāyā dārakagrāhāgamanam*; *vivāha = dārakasya dārikagrāhāgamanam*; or rather, according to others, *āvāha = praveśanaka* (free union?), *vivāha = parinayana*. Compare Childers, *āvahana*, *vivāhana*, Senart, *Pīyadasi*, i.203 (marriage of a son or daughter)—*Mahāvastu* p. 223.246-7 (*āvāha = bag ma gton ba = to give a daughter in marriage; āvāha = bag ma len pa = to take a woman*); 281.261-262 (where the meanings are reversed).

357. *Atthasālinī*, p. 101: *aho vata idam mam'assā ti*.

358. The translation of Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang.

*So'bhidyān loka prabhāya vigatā'bhidyena cetasā babulaṇa vibarati / vyāpādaṇa styānamiddham auddhatyakauṣṭhyam vicikitsaṇa loka prabhāya śīrṣakāṇṭho bhavati śīrṣavikikitsa'o'kashanikāṭhi kṣaṇaṣu dharmeṣu / sa pañca nīvaraṇāni prabhāya ...* *Saṃyutta*, TD 2, p. 207b12. *Dīgha*, iii.49, *Majjhima*, iii.3, *Anguttara*, ii.210; quoted and commented on in *Vibhaṅga*, p. 252 where *abhidyā* is explained as *rāga sārāga*, etc. It results from this text that the term *abhidyā* is synonymous with *kāmacchanda*, the first *nīvaraṇa*. On the *nīvaraṇa*, see *Kośa*, v.59.

359. *Manu*, xii.5: *manasāniṣṭacintanam*.

360. *Atthasālinī*, p. 101: *apraṇāṣāya manopadosalakkhaṇo ... abo vatāyam ucchijjeyya vinasseyyā ti*.

361. *Atthikavāda* is opposed to *nāstidṛṣṭi* (*Majjhima*, i.515).

As the *Bhāṣya* shows, *mūhyadṛṣṭi* is the *dūṭṭhivipatti* of the *Puggalapaññatti*, a doctrine condemned in the Sūtra as belonging to Ajita Kesakambali (*Dīgha* i.55, *Majjhima*, i.515, TD 2, p. 109a22, *Jñānaprasthāna*, TD 26, p. 1027b17, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 505a6, treatise "Refutation of the *Pudgala*," trans. Hsüan-tsang, TD 29, p. 152).

Pāli sources, *Kathāvatthū*, xiv.8-9, whose commentary quotes notably *Majjhima*, i.388, and *Samyutta*, iv.307, where *śīlavrataparāmarśa* is designated a *micchādūṭṭhi* (*Kośa*, v.7) punished by hell or by an animal existence (The same in *Theragāthā*, 1091, *Commentary*, on the realm of rebirth of the person who believes that the doers of *karma* are reborn in heaven). But *Atthasālinī*, p. 358, distinguishes *micchādūṭṭhi niyatā* (= *nāstidṛṣṭis śubhāśubhe* of the Abhidharma) from the other *micchādūṭṭhis* (see below note 438), and, p. 101, teaches that it is solely through the negation of action, etc, that the *kammāpatha* of *micchādūṭṭhi* is realized, not by other wrong views (The *Expositor* translates: ... *kammāpathabbhedo hoti na aññādūṭṭhihi* "the distinctive stage of the course of action is reached by the views: there is no result ... and not by other views"; *kammāpathabbheda*, "realization of the deed itself," should be understood as *vacībbheda*, "words").

362. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 598a24. Why not consider volition, *cetanā*, as a deed in and of itself? *Cetanā* is action. What is called deed, is where the *cetanā* goes ... The same way that where the King goes is called the King's Road, but the King is not the road ... The *dharma* which coexists with the *cetanā* can serve as a road for the *cetanā* and will thus be called a road of action (=the deed itself). But in the case where one causes another to kill, much time can pass between the order to kill and the killing itself: thus if the *cetanā* for the killing has disappeared, how can one say that the *dharma* (the action of killing) was a road of the *cetanā*? Let us say, rather, that the *dharma* which can coexist with a *cetanā* is a road of action. But two *cetanās* do not coexist.

363. When preparatory action or consecutive action are themselves deeds (above p. 644), it is by virtue of their characteristics, and not through their connection with another action.

364. The roots of good cannot be cut off in a definitive manner (ii.36c-d, trans. p. 210).

365. *Jñānaprasthāna*, TD 26, p. 925a12; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 182b22.

366. Paramārtha: "the good (*śubha*) of Kāmadhātu obtained at birth."

367. *Vyākhyā*: *Anāsravālabhanā visabhāgadhātvalambanā ca yā mūhyadṛṣṭiḥ sā samprayo-gamātreṇa dharmesv anuśete nālabhanatāḥ / tasmād asau durbalā*.

368. *Vyākhyā*: *Evam tu varṇayanti vaiśbhāṣikāḥ*. By using the word *evam*, the author indicates that he approves of this.

369. Paramārtha: *Pi-p'o-she chia-lan-t'a* 毘婆沙伽蘭他. *Jñānaprasthāna*, TD 26, p. 925a18; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 182a16.

370. The MSS of the *Vyākhyā* reads *anusahagata* which the Lotsava translates literally: *phra mo dan lhan tu gyur ba*; Hsüan-tsang: *wei-chū-hsing* 微俱行, and Paramārtha: *ts'ui hsi beng sui* 最細恒隨; but *anusahagata* is explained by the *Vyākhyā* as *mṛdu-mṛdu* "weak-weak." In his discussion of the *pratyayas* (ii.61c), Saṃbhavadhara (TD 29, p. 440b3) criticizes the Sthaviras' doctrine of *anusahagatakuśalamūla* (*sui-chū-shan-ken* 隨俱善根); this is the Pāli term, *Samyutta*, iii.130, *Kathāvatthū*, p. 215. *Kośa*, ii. trans. p. 255.

371. See elsewhere ii.36c-d, p. 210.

372. On the expression *vyūṭṭhāna*, ii.44a-b, p. 227.

373. The person who has undertaken the precepts with a weak-weak mind loses the precepts when he loses (*tyāga*) or breaks (*samuccheda*) this weak-weak mind which is associated (*saṃprayukta*) with a weak-weak root of good (*Vyākhyā* and Hsüan-tsang).

374. *Vyākhyā*: *Acīropapaṇṇasya devaputrasya tṛiṇi cittaṇi samudācaraṇṭi kuto'haṃ kutoṇapaṇṇaḥ kena karmaṇā*.

375. See iv.80d. According to *Vibhaṅga*, 340, *āśaya* does not mean intention in general, but an attitude with respect to philosophical problems: to believe that the world is eternal ... to believe in the survival of the Tathāgata ... to grasp the Middle Way between *bhavadiṭṭhi* and *vibhavadiṭṭhi*.

376. The Bhadanta Ghoṣaka (gloss of Saeki). *Vyākhyā*: *Tatra viśeṣeṇa tārīkatvāt*.

377. *Jñānaprasthāna*, TD 26, p. 997a20, *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 767b28. The minimum number of eight organs (five organs of sense, plus *kāya*, *jīvita*, and *manas*) shows that the faculties of faith, etc., can exist in Pūrvavideha.

378. The term is explained in the *Vyākhyā* ad iv.100: *Satkāyadṛṣṭyādiṣu pañcaśu caritāḥ pravṛtto dṛṣṭicāritāḥ dṛṣṭir vā caritām asyeti dṛṣṭicāritāḥ / sa hy ūbhāpobasāmathyād anyam āstāraṇaṃ mārgāntaraṃ ca grāhyatūṃ samartho na tṛṣṇācaritāḥ*. *Nettipakaraṇa*, pp. 7, 109.

379. *Gūḍha* = *pracchanna* (*Vyākhyā*). Hsüan-tsang translates: profound (*shen* 深).

380. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 183a4.

381. *Vyākhyā*: *Pratisamdhātāni pratisamdhikṛtāni pratisamdhātāni / prātipādikadhātub / pratisamdhātānāy apare paṭhantī*.

382. Hsüan-tsang: It happens that, relative to cause and result, there either arises doubt: "Perhaps cause and result exist," or a right view: "Cause and result certainly exists, it is false that they do not exist." At this moment the roots of good arise again. When the possession (*prāpti*) of good is produced, one says that this person has again taken up the roots of good. Certain masters say that the nine categories successively arise again. But the [Vaiśhāṅikas] say that one again takes up at one and the same time all the roots of good: it is however later, and little by little, that they manifest themselves, in the same way that one gets rid of illness at one stroke, but one only gradually regains his powers.

383. The *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, p. 336, explains why: *ānantaryakārī ānantaryacūṭtenāviraḥito bhavati yāvan maraṇāvasthāyām na tac cittaṃ śaknoti prativimodayitum ... Kathāvatthu*, xiii.3.

384. *Madhyama*, 37.

385. *Hetubalena* signifies *sabhāga*hetubalena (ii.52a). This is the case where one spontaneously (*svayam*) adheres to false views. *Pratyayabalena*, that is to say, through the force of the words of another (*parato ghoṣa*); *svabalena* = *svatarkabalena*, through the force of personal reasoning. *Parabalena* = *parataḥ śrutabalena*.

386. See above note 375.

387. The *Samyutta*, v.206, distinguishes a *micchādiṭṭhika* from a *micchādiṭṭhikammasamādāna*. See iv.96.

388. See *Puggalapaññatti*, p. 21, the definition of *silavipanna* (*sabbam dussīlyam = silavipatti*) and *diṭṭhivipanna* (*sabbā micchādiṭṭhi = diṭṭhivipatti*). In the *Samādhiraṇa* quoted in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* viii.10, *dṛṣṭivipanna* = *kumārgaprapanna*.

389. The six masters (*fāstar*), examples of bad teachers (*ayathārtha*) (*Vyākhyā*, i. p. 8.7), are Pūraṇa Kāśyapa, Maskarin Gośālputra, Saṃjayin Varāṭputra, Ajita Keśakambalaka, Kakuda Kātyāyana and Nirgrantha Jñātiputra.

*Mahāvijyutpatti*, 179 (see the numerous Tibetan and Chinese equivalents in the editions of Wogihara and Sasaki); *Divyāvadāna*, p. 143 (Vairāṭṭputra, Keśakambalaka), Burnouf, *Introduction*, 162, *Lotus*, 450.

390. Absent in the two Chinese versions. See iv.99c.

391. One should exclude illicit sexuality always accomplished in person with a defiled mind.

392. One can criticize this redaction. Does it refer to actions committed in person? Then it is useless to specify that the murderer is of mistaken thought, that the robber is in the prey of desire, according to the principle *vyābhicāre hi viśeṣaṇam iśyate*. Does it refer to actions that one has committed by another? Then greed, wickedness, or false views can coexist with killing, stealing, etc. Response: It refers to actions committed in person, and if we specify it, this is not to specify in the true sense of the word, but only to explain what the two paths are. So be it, but there are also two paths in the hypothesis of the person who has a murder committed with a mind of greed. Response: Yes; this case should be mentioned; but the authors only intend to give an example.

393. *Vyākhyā: Yatra māraṇenaivāpaharaṇam sidhyati / tatra hi vyāpādaprāṇivadhādattādāna-karmapatha yugapad bhavanti.*

394. *Vyākhyā: Anyacittasya tu māraṇacittasya nāyam niyamah:* the restriction is not justified when it refers to a person who steals with a view to killing.

395. We have: lying, which is *paśuṇya* (malicious words) since the liar has the intention of dividing, and which are inconsiderate words since all defiled words are inconsiderate words (iv.76c-d). The same for injury. For lying, the mental path can be greed or wickedness; for injury, the mental path is wickedness.

It is the same words which are lying, malicious words, and inconsiderate words: the distinction of the three vocal paths is thus purely verbal, and not real. According to another opinion, the distinction is real, for one must distinguish three *viññaptis*. [The questioners are deluded, divided, etc.]

396. Volition cannot be found with a single path: this single path cannot be a mental path, since a good mind is always accompanied by non-*abhidhyā* and non-*vyāpāda*; it cannot be a material path included within the precepts, for the precepts include at the very least the renouncing of killing, stealing, illicit sexuality, and lying.

Volition cannot be found with five paths: this would suppose the four paths of the fewest precepts (Upāsaka, etc.), plus a good mental path; now non-*abhidhyā* and non-*vyāpāda* are inseparable.

Volition cannot be found with eight paths. In fact, the Bhikṣu with a bad mind or with a neutral mind possesses only seven good paths, and, when his mind is good, he possesses at least nine.

397. *Kṣayañāna* and *anutpādajñāna* are not *dr̥ṣṭi* (vii.1); thus the volition of this person is not accompanied by *saṃyagd̥ṣṭi*. There is no *rūpa* in the absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu, and, as a consequence, so too the precepts with the seven good bodily and vocal paths.

398. Hsüan-tsang clearly distinguishes the three cases: "When one undertakes the Bhikṣu precepts the five consciousnesses are good . . ." Saeki: right view is lacking because one has the five bad *dr̥ṣṭi*.

399. This is by way of example. There are also five paths when—with a defiled or neutral mind—one renounces the five transgressions.

400. "In fact," *sammukhībhāvatas* (*mñon sum du 'gyur ba*), *svayam* (*dños su*); "through possession," *samanvāgamāt*, *samanvayāt*, *prāptiṇaḥ*, *lābhatas* (*ldan pa'i sgo nas*, *ldan pas*, *brñed pas*; *ch'eng-chiu* 成就).

Beings in hell do not have any greed, for greed does not exist in hell; but they have not cut off the *prāpti* (ii.36b) of greed: they possess, in the past, the greed that they had in a past existence.

401. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 584b19.

*Naraka*: *nara* = man, *ka* = bad, *naraka* = a place where the wicked are born; or rather, *raka* = agreeable (compare *Dhātupāṭha*, 10.197), *naraka* = a place where nothing is agreeable (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 865b27).



402. *Nigraba*; Hsüan-tsang, *ma 罵*, to curse, injure; *Vyūṣṭipatti*, 255.4, *brgyad gag*; *Udānavarga*, xx.9.
403. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 865c13: In Saṃjīva hell (iii.99, *Lokaprajñāpti*, in *Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 324, *Mahāvastu*, i.10) the cold wind that "revives" the damned excites greed (*abhiḍhyā*); but there is not, for that, the path of action (=a deed) called greed.
404. There is no marriage in Uttarakuru, *Mahābhārata*, i.122.7.
405. We should say rather: *devo devaṃ na mārayati*, "a god does not kill a god," which implies the conclusion: gods cannot be killed (*avadhya*). In fact when their major and minor limbs are cut off, they regenerate themselves. But their heads, and their waists do not regenerate themselves when they are cut off: thus gods can be killed.
406. *Utpādita* signifies *vartamānaṃ adbhvānaṃ gamitam*; *nirodhiṭa*, *atītam adbhvānaṃ gamitam*. Problem discussed in *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 685a14.
407. The explanations of Vasubandhu reproduce, with only minute variations, the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 588c8.
- These three results have been defined ii.56 and following. How action, being past, can bear a result, see the "Refutation of the *Pudgala*" at the end of the *Kośa* and the important discussion in *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 316 and following.
- Everything that a person experiences does not have former action for its cause (*Majjhima*, ii.214). According to the Sūtra of Kāśyapa the Nude (same beginning as *Samyutta*, ii.18) which constitutes a chapter of the *Karmaprajñāpti* (Mdo. 62, 241a), suffering is produced by oneself (when one cuts his hair, his hand, etc.), by another (when another cuts his hand), by oneself and by another (when, with another, one cuts his hand), not by oneself or by another, but by causes and conditions: "when, for example, wind arises, rain falls, lightning flashes, or houses crash down, or trees are broken to pieces, or the tops of crags cast down: some have their feet cut . . . : suffering in this case is produced by causes and conditions. Oh Kāśyapa, all pleasure and all suffering are produced by oneself, by another, by self and another, by the seasons (*ṛtū*): . . . in winter great cold, in the season of rains great heat, and in winter cold and heat produce pleasure and suffering." But the problem is not resolved by these definitions: we know in fact that mental trouble (which is a painful sensation) arises from the trouble of the elements and is not from retribution, but that the trouble of the elements is retribution (iv.58). The same holds for sickness, etc. On *utuja* compare *Milinda*, p. 271, *Visuddhimagga*, 451, *Compendium*, p. 161 (which does not concern itself with the origin of suffering); *utupaṇṇāma* figures among the eight types of suffering, *Milinda*, 134-135. *Dīgha*, iii.139.
408. According to the commentary, the Sūtra indicates, by these three terms, preparatory action (*prayoga*), the action itself (*maula*), and the consecutive action (*prṣṭha*). This interpretation is not admitted by all the schools as we shall see below p. 670.
409. Rebirth in hell is given as an example of retribution; animal rebirth, rebirth in the state of *preta*, etc., are also retribution.
410. *Karmaprajñāpti* (Mdo. 72, fol. 206a): "... by strong killing, one is reborn among beings in hell; by medium killing, among animals; by weak killing, among the Pretas." Same doctrine in *Dasabhmaka*, ii (quoted in *Madhyamakāvatāra*, ii.7, translated Muséon, 1907, p. 290). Compare *Angutara*, iv.247: *pāṇātipāto bhikkhūve āsevito bhāvito babulikato nīrayasaṃvattaniko tiracchānayanisaṃvattaniko pīṭṭivisaṃvattaniko / yo sabbalahuso pāṇātipātassa vipāko manussabbhūtaṃ appāyukasāṃvattaniko hoti*; *Jātaka*, i. p. 275: *pāṇātipātakammaṃ nāma nīraye tiracchānayanīyaṃ pīṭṭivisaṃvattaniko asurakāye ca nibbatteti, manussesu nibbattatthāne appāyukasāṃvattanikaṃ hoti*.
- Feer, *Fragments du Kandjour* (*Karmavibhaṅga*); *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna* (Lévi, *Pour l'histoire du Rāmāyaṇa*, J.A.s., 1918, i.9) quoted in *Sikṣāsāmuccaya*, 69 and following; Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, i.198; etc.

On the quasi-impossibility of a human rebirth for a fool (*bāla*) "once he has been reborn in hell," the vexatious characteristics of this rebirth (caste, etc.) and the new transgressions that the former being in hell commits, see *Majjhima*, i.169 (*Bālapaṇḍitasutta*; see J. Przyluski, *Légende d'Aṇoka*, p. 120).

411. That transgressions reduce the length of human life and provoke the deterioration of plants, *Cakkavattisihanādasutta* (*Dīgha*, iii.70-71), *Lokaprajñāpti*, xi (translated in *Cosmologie boudhique*, p. 309 and following).

412. *Vyākhyā: Asanīḥ silāvṛtīṣṭīḥ / rajo dhūlīvṛtīḥ kṣāravṛtīḥ vā*.

413. Compare *Yogasūtra*, ii.34.

414. Vigor resides in the heart: *ojo hṛdayapradeśe bhavati*.

415. *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 201a15; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 604c3. These are three of the *mūhyāṅgas*, *Dīgha*, iii.254.

*Ājīva*, according to the opinion refuted iv.86c-d, is solely the means of existence, the manner of procuring a livelihood, clothing, etc.

416. See the *ājīvapārisuddhi*, *Visuddhimagga*, p. 22. *Dhammapada*, 244-245: *suññam abhīkena ... Mūhyājīva* is described in *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, p. 334.

417. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 605c14.

The superstitions of the laity are enumerated in the *Vyākhyā: Kautukamaṅgalatīṭhimubhūta-nakṣatrādīdyṣṭi*. Dict. of St. Petersburg, *kautukamaṅgala*. On the *maṅgalas*, see Childers; Ninth Rock Edict (Senart, i.203); *Suttanipāṭa*, 258; *Jātaka*, 87; Huber, *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, 302. *Mahāvīryūtpatti*, 266.19 *maṅgalapoṣadha*. Waddell, *Lamaism*, 392; Grunwedel, *Mythologie*, 47; *Lalitā*, 378.9, *maṅgalapūrṇa kumbha*.

The monk, who depends on others for food, etc., is obliged to cultivate *kubhaṇā lapanā naimittikā* *naiṣpeṣi* *kaṭṭā* and *lābhena lābhanisikkūṣā* which are also *mūhājīvas*. See iv.77b-c.

418. *Jvītopakarana*, *Mahāvīryūtpatti*, 239.32.

419. *Vyākhyā: Śīlaskandhikāyām iṣi śīlaskandhikānāṃ samnīpāte*: we should correct: *śīlaskandhānām ...* The *Śīlaskandhikā* is a collection of the *śīlaskandhas*. According to the Tibetan and Hsüan-tsang: the *Śīlaskandhasūtra*; Paramārtha: *chieh-chü-ching: Śīlasamnīpātasūtra*.

Saeki refers to the *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 131c23, which corresponds to *Samyutta*, iii.228 (the person who eats with his mouth down, etc.); but the text referred to here by Vasubandhu is a Sanskrit redaction of the *śīlas* of the *Brahmajālas* and the *Sāmaññaphala suttas* (*Dīgha*, i.6, 65; *Lotus de la Bonne Loi*, 465; Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, i.17; O. Franke, *Dīgha in Auswahl*, p.5). The text furnished by the *Vyākhyā* departs from the Pāli as do the Chinese versions of the *Dīgha*. Here it is at length:

*yathā Tridaṇḍīm<sup>a</sup> eke śramaṇabrāhmaṇāḥ śraddhādeyaṃ paribhūṇiṇi vividhadarśanasamārambhānuyogam anuyuktā vibharanti / tadyathā hastiyuddhe<sup>b</sup> śvayyuddhe rathayuddhe pattiyuddhe yaṣṭiyuddhe muṣṭiyuddhe sārāsayuddhe vṛṣabhayuddhe mabīṣayuddhe ajayuddhe meṣayuddhe kukkuṭayuddhe vartakayuddhe lābākayuddhe strīyuddhe puruṣayuddhe kumārāyuddhe kumārīkayuddhe udgṛaṇe udyūtibhikāyām<sup>c</sup> dbujāre balāgre senāvīyābe anikasāndarśane mahāsamājāṃ vā pratyasubhavanṭe eke / iṣy evamrūpāc chramaṇo vividhadarśanasamārambhānuyogāt prativirato bhavati // yathā Tridaṇḍīm eke śramaṇabrāhmaṇāḥ śraddhādeyaṃ paribhūṇiṇi vividhaśabdasraṇa-samārambhānuyukta vibharanti / tadyathā rathasabde pattisabde śaṅkhasabde bherisabde ādambarasabde nṛttasabde gūṭasabde geyasabde<sup>c</sup> acchaṭasabde pāṇisvare kumbhatāṇṇre . . . cītrākṣare<sup>c</sup> cītrapadavyatījane lokāyatapratīsamuyukte<sup>d</sup> ākhyāyikā vā śroṣum icchanti eke / iṣy evamrūpāc chramaṇo vividhaśabdasraṇasamārambhānuyogāt prativirato bhavati //*

a. On the *Tridaṇḍins* (*tedaṇḍika*, *tridaṇḍika*) see the list of heterodox comrades and ascetics in *Anguttara*, iii.276, *Majjhima*, 57, *Milinda*, 191, *Mahāniddesa*, 89, 310, 416; the notes of Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, i.22, Bendall, *Sikṣasamuccaya*, 331; Foucher, *Gandhāra*, ii.262.

b. MSS. *udgālavase utsatikāyām* (reading of the Cambridge MSS according to a communication of E. J. Thomas). Correction according to *Mahāvīryūtpatti*, 261.51 and 53. Compare *Prātimokṣa*, Pac. 48 - 50 = *Pāṭiyavāṇīka*, Finot, J.Ar. 1913, ii.512.

c. MSS. *sayyāsabde . . . kacīte cītrākṣa*. *Dīgha*, iii.183: *nacca gūta vādita akkhaṇa pāṇissara kumbhathūna* (*Jātaka*, v. p. 506, vi. p. 276: *kumbhathūna, thūnika*; *Mahāvastu*, ii.150, iii.113: *kumbhatūni, tūna, tūnika, thūnika*; *cakrikavaiṭṭikānaṭanartakaṭṭamallapāṇisvarikā* § DA21 *sobbhikā langhakkā kumbhatūnikā . . .*).

d. Read *pratisamīyuktā* (?).

420. Parallel to action, that is to say, which are neither pure, nor neutral. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang, according to the definition of ii.52, translate: "Later *dharma*s, parallel, equal or superior."

421. *Vyākhyā*: That is to say the *dharma*s associated with the mind and the *dharma*s disassociated from the mind (*jāti*, etc.); see ii.35. According to *Vibhāṣā* (TD 27, p. 43c25) the *sababbhū*s are concomitant (*anuvartin*) *rūpa*s and *viprayuktas*.

422. *Prabhā* is thus both the result of disconnection and the result of virile activity.

423. There should be a resemblance between the *sabbhāgetu* and its result, which is *niṣyandaphala*. But a bad *dharma* differs from a neutral *dharma* (in the class of defiled-neutral, *niṣvṛtāvyaḥṛta*, *dharma*s), since it includes retribution. But both are defiled (*kleśa*), and this constitutes their resemblance.

424. Or a past action. Past *dharma*s, arisen after this action, and which are its retribution, are its retributive results; the *dharma*s which it draws forth (*ākṛṣṭa*), whether these *dharma*s have arisen at the same time as it or immediately after it, are its result of virile activity; all the *dharma*s which have risen with it or which, arisen afterwards, are now past, are its results of predominating influence: all the parallel *dharma*s, arisen after it and now past, are its outflowing results. In this same way past and future *dharma*s constitute four results of past action.

425. Disconnection is neither *saikṣa* nor *asaikṣa*. See vi.45, ii.38a.

426. The result of virile activity to be abandoned by *bhāvanā*: some good *dharma*s which are produced upon leaving (*vyūthāne*) the Pure Path.

427. Paramārtha: *ayogavibhūta* = *fei-li-tso* 非理作; Hsüan-tsang: *pu-ying-tso* 不應作.

428. According to the *Vyākhyā*, *ayoniśomanaskāra* = *ayonyā anyāyena kleśayogena yaḥ pravṛtto manaskāraḥ*.

429. According to *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 98a11 and following. Same doctrine in *Yogasūtra*.

430. Paramārtha. "Through the retribution of a single gift of food in a past time, I attained rebirth seven times among the Thirty-three Gods; seven times I was a Cakravartin king and now I have been born into a rich family of the Śākya." Hsüan-tsang, whose text is more developed, also has seven heavenly rebirths and seven human rebirths as a Cakravartin.

According to the *Vyākhyā*, Aniruddha's gift was made to the Pratyekabuddha Tagaraśikhin (one of the Pratyekabuddhas of *Majjhima*, iii.69, *Jātaka*, 390, *Dhp.* 355); according to *Theragāthā*, 910 (see trans. p. 329), it was made to Upaṇiṭṭha who receives the epithet of Yasassin: Upaṇiṭṭha and Yasassin figure elsewhere as distinct Pratyekabuddhas in the list of the *Majjhima*.

431. Hsüan-tsang: "Furthermore, certain ones say . . ."

432. Paramārtha: As a painter designs, by means of a *rūpa*, the image of a person and fills it up by means of numerous *rūpa*s.

433. *Vyākhyā*: If a person possesses all the organs (*sakalendriya*), and if another person does not take into consideration the diversity of actions which "fills" (*paripūraka karmān*), for the eye and the other organs are the result of an action "which projects existence" (*ākṣeapapakarmaphaka*):

"The six organs (*ṣaḍāyatana*) are projected (*ākṣiyate*).” But color (*varṇa*), shape, etc., are the result of the action of re-filling.

434. Hsüan-tsang: "It is not only action which projects and fills an existence, but also all the *dharmas* which embrace retribution. But, by reason of the capital importance of action, one only speaks of action. However these *dharmas*, when they do not coexist (*saha*) with action, are capable of filling but not of projecting, because their force is small. Two categories: Not projecting either of the two absorptions . . . " Sensation and the other mental states associated with *cetanā*, volition, which is action, are projected along with it.

435. *Vyākhyā: Tadākṣepakeṇa karmaṇā sabhāvāntya'pi prāptayo na tenaiva saphalāḥ*. See *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 97b3, the opinion of Ghoṣaka: the *prāptis* are not capable of drawing out the *sabhāgatā*, etc.

Hsüan-tsang adds: "The other *dharmas* embracing retribution project and fill."

436. Same doctrine in *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, i. para. 4, 6, etc. In the Pāli sources, as here, *āvaraṇa* is what hinders entry into the Path, which makes a person be *abbhavya*. The three *āvaraṇas* are named in *Anguttara*, iii.436, *Vibhaṅga*, 341, but associated with three other *dharmas* (*asaddho ca hoti accandāko ca duppañño ca*). [The *āvaraṇas* of *Saṃyutta*, v.77, *Dīgha*, i.246, are some of the obstacles in the *Vimaya*, the *nīvaraṇas* (see *Kośa*, v.99).]

By *kleśa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa*, the Mahāyāna does not designate the obstacles to *bhavyatā*, the quality of being able to enter into the Path, but the obstacles to deliverance to the mind. The same in *Kośa*, vi.77, where the mind is "covered" by an *āvṛti*, except the mind of the Arhat; *Yogasūtra*, iv.30.

The *karmāvaraṇa* of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 280, etc. is the *karmāvaraṇa* of the Abhidharma; the *akṣaṇas*, to which the four paths are opposed, partially correspond to *vipākāvaraṇa*. (*Mahāvinyūtpatti*, 120.83; TD 17, number 756 and other sources, *Religieux Eminent*, 70, *Cinq cents contes*, i.32, 231, etc.).

437. Compare the defilements of *Visuddhimagga*, 177.

438. This is the order of the *Vibhaṅga*, p. 378; in *Mahāvinyūtpatti*, 122, the killing of an Arhat proceeds patricide; in *Dharmasamgraha*, 60, the wounding of the Tathāgata proceeds schism.

i. *Suttanipāta*, 231 (*Khuddakapāṭha*, vi.): six *abhiḥhānas*; *Anguttara*, i.27: six things impossible to the Āryan, namely: 1. *māruḥhāta*, 2. *pīṭuḥhāta*, 3. *arabantaḥhāta*, 4. *lobhuppāda*, 5. *samghabbheda*, and 6. *aññasatthu-uddesa* [which doubtless signifies "to recognize a master other than the Buddha"].

ii. *Anguttara*, iii.436, enumerates six things which make a person *abbhavya*, incapable of entering into the Path . . . Namely 1 - 5 of the preceding list, plus *duppañño hoti jaḍo ekaṃsūgo*.

iii. *Cullavagga*, vii.3.9: *idariṃ devadattena paṭhamam ānantarīkakkammāni upacitam yaṃ duṭṭhacittena vadhakacittena tatbhāgatassa rudhiram uppāditaṃ*; vi.17.3, the five *ānantaryas* of the classic list enumerated together with the rape of a Bhikṣuṇī, the quality of animal, etc.

iv. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, 1028 (*Atthasālinī*, p. 358) defines the six *dharmas* which necessarily cause a bad rebirth (*micchattaniyata*, see *Kośa*, iii.44c-d): *pañca kammāni anantarakāni yā ca micchādīṭṭhi nīyata* "the five *ānantarya* actions and false *nīyata* view." The *Puggalapaññatti* defines as bound for hell (*nīyata*): *pañca puggalā anantarikā ye ca micchādīṭṭhikā* = "the five guilty of *ānantarya* and persons with false views."

What does "false *nīyata* view" mean?

The *Atthasālinī* explains: *micchādīṭṭhi nīyata* *ti abetuvāda-akiriyavāda-natthikavādesu aññātarā*: "one or other of the assuredly wrong views of those who do not believe in cause, deny the efficacy of action, are nihilists" (Maung Tin and Rhys Davids). Let us translate rather: "False *nīyata* view is one of the views of the negation of cause, negation of action, negation." (See *Majjhima*, iii.78). This refers to the false view (above p. 657) which, to the exclusion of other false views, constitutes the action called false view. *Atthasālinī*, p. 101: *natthikābetuakiriyadīṭṭhihi eva kammapaṭhabbhedo hoti na aññādīṭṭhihi*. [Among the other false views, for example *sakkāyadṛṣṭi*.]

Thus false view properly so-called is *niyata*, which, in the *Kośa*, uproots the roots of good (*nāstidṛṣṭi*, iv.79). "False *niyata* view" signifies "false view which embraces *niyama*, certitude, that is to say *micchattaniyama*, certainty of perdition," for him who adopts it: according to the Abhidhamma this disbeliever is bound to fall away, but we have seen (iv.80d) that the doctrine of the Abhidhamma differs.

v. *Vibhaṅga*, p. 378, enumerates the five *kammāni ānantarikāni*. 439. "Bad realms of rebirth, etc." *Et cetera* refers to the actions which produce the state of non-consciousness (ii.41b-c), a birth as Brahmā (iv.44b-d, vi.38a-b), a birth as a eunuch or an androgyne. All persons who enter the Path obtain deliverance after at most seven more births (vi.34a-b); thus a person who has done an action producing an eighth existence (*aṣṭama bhava*) cannot enter the Path (See *Suttanipāṭa*, 230).

440. We can understand: "... the realm of rebirth where these are produced is the human realm of rebirth ...; the guilty one is a male or a female, not a eunuch, nor an androgyne."

441. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 619a15. Why the name "*ānantarya*?" For two reasons (*pratyaya*): (1) these five transgressions are so called because they are not retributed either in this life, or in later life, but only in the next existence; and (2) because they are retributed only in hell and not in any other realm of rebirth. There are two reasons by which an action is *ānantarya*: (1) because it does harm to benefactors, and (2) because it harms the field of merit. Two conditions are required in order that there be mortal transgression: (1) preparatory action and (2) consummation of the result; even though one may have done a preparatory action, if the result is not consummated, there is no mortal transgression; and even if the result is consummated, if there was no preparatory action, there is no mortal transgression ... (Compare *Kathāvatthu*, xiii.3).

442. Compare *Atthasālinī*, p. 358. Certain persons guilty of *ānantarya* transgression immediately fall into Avīci Hell, *Kośa*, iii.12d (Māra); Devadatta and four others, *Mūlinda*, p. 101, Kern, *Manual*, p. 36.

443. Not in Uttarakuru: *niyatāyuskatvāt prakeṭiṣṭatvāt tatra śāsanābhavāc ca*.

444. See above note 441. The body (*āmbhāva*) of someone blind from birth is incomplete (*vikala*); but what is referred to here is the *vaikalya* which renders a person incapable of salvation. Furthermore, someone blind from birth is loved by his parents.

445. *Vyākhyā*: *Śrūyate yathā kaścid eva viśiṣṭāśva ājāneyo mātaram na gacchatīti vāsasā mukham pracchādya mātaram gamitāḥ / tena paścāj jñatvā svam āṅgajātam utpātītam ity evam ājāneyo'svaḥ paṭubuddhiḥ / asy ānantaryam syād ity abhiṭprāyaḥ* / The *Vibhāṣā* recounts this story in different words. It translates *ājāneya* by *ts'ung-hui-lung* 聰慧龍 (a *nāga*). Parmārtha and Hsüan-tsang have only *ts'ung-hui* 聰慧. See *Mahāvīryapatti*, 213 (*liang* = good).

446. Hsüan-tsang puts these definitions in the *Kārikā*.

447. *Anupakaramadharmāno hi tathāgataḥ* (Compare the phraseology of the *Cullavagga*, vii.3.10). *Vyākhyā*: *aparopakaramamaraṇadharmāna ity arthaḥ*.

448. According to *Vibhāṣā*, p. 313bl.

449. *Itivuttaka*, 18: *āpāyiko nerayiko kappāṭ saṃghabbedako ... saṃgham samaggaṃ bhūvāna kappam paccati. Anguttara*, iii. 402 ... *āpko Devadatto nerayiko kappāṭṭho atekiccho ...* and v.75 (=Cullavagga, viii.5.4) ... *saṃgham bhetvā ... kappāṭṭhiyam kibbisam pasavati / kim pana kappāṭṭhiyam kibbisam ti / kappam Ananda nirayamhi paccatīti āpāyiko nerayiko ... saṃgham samaggaṃ bhetvāna kappam nirayamhi paccatīti*.

This stanza of the *Itivuttaka* is discussed in *Kathāvatthu*, xiii.1. The Rājagirikas believe that it refers to one entire [great] *kalpa* (*sakalam kappam*); Buddhaghosa understands it as referring to a twentieth part of a [great] *kalpa* [an *antarakalpa*, which is the normal duration of a lifetime, *āyukappa*, in Avīci Hell, see *Kośa* iii.83b].

The *Vibhāṣā* (TD 28, p. 183c16, p. 601c6) mentions numerous opinions. Some believe that, by *kalpa*, the Blessed One means to speak of forty small *kalpas* (*antarakalpa*), which make up one *kalpa* of dissolution (*vivarta*) plus an empty *kalpa*, or a *kalpa* of creation (*saṃvarta*) plus a *kalpa* of duration (*Koṣa*, iii.90b); others understood it as a "great *kalpa*" (eighty small *kalpas*); others as a "small *kalpa*." Furthermore, there is a *Vinaya* text predicting that Devadatta will be reborn among human beings when human life is 40,000 years in length. *Kalpa* can thus be understood as referring to the period of increase or decrease of human life: that is one half of a small *kalpa* (see iii.92a-b). According to the *Milinda*, 111, Devadatta committed the crime of schism at the end of the first of the six parts of the present *kalpa*; he will spend the other five in hell, and after he is delivered from hell, he will become a Pratyekabuddha.

The sources of the Mahāyāna, quoted by Saeki, also merit study.

450. The *Vyākhyā* commenting on the *Bhāṣya* gives the words: *bhikṣur bhinatti... dṛṣṭicariṭaḥ*... Paramārtha reads *bhikṣur dṛṣṭi-su-caritaḥ* (*chien-hao-hsing* 見好行) *bhinatti anyasmin deṣe bālān*, and his version of the *Bhāṣya* opposes a monk of bad practice (*mūḥyācarita*) to a monk of right (*samyak*) conduct.

451. Only the Bhikṣu, for the Buddha is a Bhikṣu and the schismatic sets himself up as his rival.

452. *Tṛṣṇācarita*, see above p. 167.

453. Hsüan-tsang: "He only divides the Pṛthagjanas, not the Āryans because these directly see the Dharma. According to certain masters, the possessors of *ksānti* can no longer be divided. In order to unite these two opinions, the author says: "the fools."

"Dharma" refers to the *āgamadharma* and the *adhigamadharma* (viii.39a-b), Scripture, and the *bodhipāṅśikadharma*s.

*Kṣānti* is the second of the *nirvedhabhāgīyas*, or preparations for entry into Seeing the Truths, vi.18b. The possessor of *ksānti*, even though a "fool" (*pṛthagjana*), is considered to be "similar to one who has Seen the Truths" (*dṛṣṭ*

454. The subject of the preceding phrase (100a-b) is the schismatic: "It is a Bhikṣu, a heretic, who is moral, who divides, in a place where the Buddha is not to be found, fools." The author continues: "Accepting another master, another path, it is divided; it does not pass the night [in this state of division]." "It" refers to the Saṅgha, a Saṅgha composed of fools.

Paramārtha: "By whom (*kiyatā*) is the Saṅgha divided? At the time when it admits another master-path, it is already divided (*i-p'o* 已破)..."

On schism, see the references in the article "Councils," in Hastings' *ERE*, iv. p. 180b. The Pāli definition of schism, of different types of schisms, *Cullavagga*, vii.5, *Mahāvagga*, x.1.6; 5.4, *Anguttara*, i.19. *Prātimokṣa*, Finot, *J.A.s.* 1913, p. 22. Traditions relative to the council of Vaiśālī (*āśāṣakappa*), *Muséon*, 1905, p. 277, 318. The episode of Devadatta, Rockhill, *Life*. Edict of Sārnāth, ed. Oertel, *Ep.Indica*, viii. p. 166.

455. *Vyākhyā*: *Na vivasaty asau na tān rātrīm parivasatūy arthaḥ*.

456. This schism receives the name of "breaking the Wheel" because it is the cause of the breaking of the Wheel.

457. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 602c12.

458. See *Mahāvīryūtpatti*, 276.14-15 (*karmabhedavastu*).

459. See *Divya*, 150, among the works that the Buddha should accomplish: ... *tribhāga āyusa utsṛṣṭo bhavati / sīmābandhaḥ kṛto bhavati / trāvakayugam agratāyām nirdṣṭam bhavati*.

460. Joy at the beginning, fear and anguish at the end.

461. Hsüan-tsang translates *p'ao* 胞, pustule, blister. The Tibetan translates *doṣa* as *skyon*. In *Samyutta*, i.43, brigands are the *arbhuda* of the world. *Samantapāsādikā*, pp. 294, 295, 307: ... *sāsaṇassa abbudam ca malam ca* ... (References of Morris, JPRS. 1886).

462. *Vyākhyā: Sīmāyām: abaddhāyām iti maṇḍalasīmāyām / ekasyām hi sīmāyām prthakkar-makaraṇāt saṃghadvaiddham bhavati / nanu ca prakṛtisīmāsti grāmanagarādi / satyam asti / tu satyām sā prakṛtisīmā vyavasthāpyata iti / tasyā api bandho vyavasthāpyata eveti vedīavyam*.

463. Śākyamuni, when he was a Bodhisattva, once divided the followers (*pariśadbhedā*) of a Rṣi, who possessed the five *abhiñās* (*Vyākhyā: Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 603b28). This is in direct contradiction to *Milinda*, 161, according to which it was not a past action of the Bodhisattva which provoked the schism of Devadatta. There exists an old formula: *tathāgato abhejjapariso*.

The Buddha has not "escaped" the retribution of his former actions, *Divya*, 416: "Have you not learned these words of the Muni that the Jinas themselves are not freed from their actions?" The Blessed One, on his alms round, was wounded in the foot by a thorn, and declared: *ita ekanavate kalpe śaktyā me puruṣo hataḥ / tatkarmanṇo vipākena pāde viddho'smi bhikṣavaḥ* (*Saddarsana-saṃgraha*, ed. Suali, p. 26). On the rock that wounded the Blessed One on the foot, see Chavannes, *Religieux Eminents*, 155; *Fa-hien*, Legge, 83. The Blessed One suffered in the back because he has once broken the backbone of a dishonest wrestler, *Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins*, in Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, ii.424. Compare *Milinda*, 134, 179.

According to *Majjhima*, ii.227, the Tathāgata has only pure and agreeable sensations (*anāsava sukha vedanā*): "If beings experience pleasure and pain by reason of their former actions, then the Tathāgata has formerly accomplished good actions since he now experiences such pure and agreeable sensations. If beings experience pleasure and pain by reason of the creative action of God (*issaranimmānabettu*), then the Tathāgata has been created by a benevolent God ..."

464. According to the *Vyākhyā*, one should understand *upakārikasetrasya nirākṛteḥ*.

465. *Nirākṛti* = *parityāga* (see above p.650). How fathers and mothers are benefactors, *Divya*, 51, *Avadānaśataka*, i.194, 204 (*āpyāyikau poṣakau saṃvardhakau stanyasya dātārau* ...); *Itivuttaka*, p. 110.

466. They are "fields of meritorious qualities" either because they are the support of meritorious qualities (*guṇānām āśrayatvāt*), or because, by reason of their qualities (*guṇaiḥ*), they are a field: all seeds of merit (*puṇyabīja*) sown in this field bear a great fruit.

467. The Sthavira does not admit this case: "If the embryo is alive, it does not fall; if it falls, it is because it is dead; for a living being cannot pass through all the filth ...". But it is reported in the Sūtra that Kumārakāśyapa (*t'ung-tzu chia-yeh* 童子迦葉) was born in this manner. Since the second woman placed the embryo into the gate-of-birth and breathes (*bsi* 吸) it up to the womb, one cannot say that the embryo passes through filth. Or rather she drinks it ... (*Saṃghabhadra*).

468. *Vyākhyā: Sarvamātryogyesu kāryesu draṣṭavyeṣu abhiṣṭrāyo mātṛkalpatvāt*. Hsüan-tsang: "One verifies that all the offices [proper to a mother] are in the second mother."

An *āpyāyikā* is a *kadāvāhikā*, the one who guides the pregnancy to its conclusion; a *poṣikā* (*gso-bar byed-pa*) is a *stanyadāyikā*, the one who gives the milk; a *saṃvardhikā* (*skyed-par byed-pa*) is an *audārikābharakalpikā*, the one who regulates the assimilable food (trans. of P. Cordier). Or

rather, according to another interpretation, *āpyāyikā* = *stanyadbārikā*, nourishment; *poṣikā*, because she gives solid food; and *saṃvardhikā*, because she bathes the child and removes harmful foods (*viśamaparibhāra*). (*Vyākhyā*; above note 465).

*Divya*, 303, has *āpyāyitāḥ poṣitāḥ saṃvardhitaḥ*.

*Āpyāyikā* = *nu zboldud* and *nu zho ma blud* (*Mélanges Asiatiques*, viii.149); *āpyāyana* = *yons su rgyas bya*, *Mahāvryūpatti*, 197.130.

469. This problem is discussed in the *Kathāvatthu*, xx.1, and in the *Karmaprajñāpti*. The Uttarāpathakas believe that a person becomes an *ānantarika* (or *anantarika*) by the non-intentional (*asamācicca*) killing of his mother, etc., given the gravity of the *anantariyavattbus*. Compare *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, i.1.2, ii.6.26 (Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, ii.242.414).

470. See Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, no. 399 (taken from the *Shih sung Lü*, the Sarvāstivādin *Vinaya Pīṭaka*, TD 23, number 1435). Let us translate "laundryman"; Chavannes reads "dye." The text has *dhāvaka* which the *Vyākhyā* explains as a *rajaka*.

471. Paramārtha: If this is the case, how does the *Avadāna* say: "Go away! Say to Śikhaṇḍin . . ." Hsüan-tsang: If this is the case, how does one explain why the *Yü* (= *Pi-yü-ching* 譬喻經 = the *Avadāna*) say: The Buddha said to Śikhaṇḍin: "You have committed two mortal transgressions . . ." The *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 619c26 also attributes this declaration to the Buddha and continues: "How can Śikhaṇḍin, by destroying a single life, commit two mortal transgressions? He commits only one mortal transgression, since the benefactor or father and the field of meritorious qualities or Arhat exist in one person. The text should say: "You have committed a mortal transgression by reason of two causes, patricide, and the murder of an Arhat," and it says "two transgressions," in order to blame Śikhaṇḍin by reason of the two transgressions. According to other masters, even though there is only one mortal transgression, the retribution of suffering is double."

*Vyākhyā*: *Rauruke nagare Rudrāyaṇo nāma rājā Śikhaṇḍinā nāma putram abhiṣicya pravrajitāḥ / pravrajyārhattvaṃ adbhigatavān / sa Raurukābhyāsam āgatavān / punā rājam ākāṅkṣatāy āmatyaprakramītena tena Śikhaṇḍinā rājñā svapitā mārītāḥ / tena tu māryamā-nāvasthāyām sa mārako manuṣya ukto gaccha Śikhaṇḍinā brūhi*.

In *Divya*, 567 (compare the *Vinaya* of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, TD 23, p. 874b27 and following, and especially p. 879c1 and following: quoted by Lévi, *T'oung Pao*, (series 2) viii (1907), p. 109, and Huber, *BEFEO*, 1906, p. 14), there are many such assassins. In TD 4, number 203, King Udasena (?), an Arhat, was killed by a Caṇḍāla on the order of his son Rājasena (Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, iii.131). The Jains have analogous stories (*Māhārāṣṭri Erzählungen*, p. 33).

472. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang have *ta* 打, to strike.

473. Hsüan-tsang differs:

Can he who does the preparatory actions of a mortal transgression, a preparatory action not susceptible of being arrested (*ch'uan* 轉, *nivart*), become "detached" and obtain a result?

104c-d. There is no detachment, no obtaining of a result, for one who does a determinant (*tiṃg* 定) preparatory action of a mortal transgression.

If this should necessarily be accomplished, there is certainly detachment in the course of the preparatory action of a mortal transgression. In the course of the preparatory action of other bad actions . . .

474. This point of doctrine is discussed in *Kathāvatthu*, xiii.3. The Uttarāpathakas deny that an instigator of patricide can enter the Path.

475. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 621b15: "In the murder of some living beings is it possible, in the course of the preparatory action (*prayogāvasthāyām*), to enter into the Path? Some say: yes, in the case of the



murder of animals, but not in the murder of humans. Some say: also in the murder of humans, excluding only those who have done the preparatory action for a mortal transgression. Consequently they say: one can do preparatory action for murder and in the meantime obtain Seeing of the Dharma . . ."

The *Vyākhyā* quotes the *Chekāvadāna* as an example. Through fear of Virūdhaka (=Viṣṭabha, Kern, *Manual*, 40) a certain Śākya named Cheka took refuge in the forest and lived off meat along with his children. The Blessed One, who was then living for three months among the Thirty-three Gods, descended in order to convert him and make him obtain the state of Srotaṣpanna. From that time onward Cheka was no longer "touched" by the killing of the animals who continued to die in his traps and nets.

476. A mother is one hundred times more venerable than a father (Roth and Böhtlinck, *s. voc. śatagūṇa*).

477. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 601a10. *Majjhima*, i.372 (in the language of the Nirgranthas, *daṇḍa* is the equivalent of *karman*).

478. In the case of the Daṇḍaka Forest, which was made empty through the anger of the Ṛṣis; see above note 346.

479. Compare *Majjhima*, ii.265.

480. *Vyākhyā*: *Narake'vaśyam upattiyā tāni tatsādrīṣyāt tatsabbhāgāny ucyante / na tu tatrān-antaropattiyā / anyathā hy ānantariyāny eva syur ity apareṣām abhīprāyaḥ / anantarabhāvitve'pi na tāny ānantariyāny eva sambhavanti atulyakālavipākavād itī prathamapāṣṭikānām paribhārah.*

481. Compare *Mahāvīyutpatti*, 123. Conjecture of Wogihara: *upānantariya* "an almost mortal transgression," "a minor mortal transgression" (*mthsams med pas dan ñe ba = bsiao wu-chien tsui* 小無間罪).

The MSS of the *Vyākhyā* have *arhantiyā*; Minayev-Mironov, *arhatyā*; Wogihara, *arhantiyā*. In *Cullavagga*, vi.17, *bhikkhunīdāsaka*.

*Mahāvīyutpatti*: *niyatābhūmisthitasya bodhisattvasya māraṇam (ñes pa'i sa la gnas pa); Vyākhyā*: *niyatāpatitābodhisattvarāraṇa*. The *ñes gnas* of our Kārikā is glossed by *ñes par rtogs pa*.

*Mahāvīyutpatti*: *saṅghāyadvārāharāṇa*. *Bhāṣya*: *saṅghāyadvārābhārika* "steal the Saṅgha's gate of revenue," explained in *Vyākhyā*: *akṣayanīvyapahāra* "to steal mortemain goods" (*akṣayanī* is known through inscriptions); one of the Chinese versions of the *Mahāvīyutpatti*: to steal the *ch'ang chu* 常住 or perpetual property. Takakusu, *I tsing*, p. 193. Vasumitra explains: *mukhāyadvārābhāriketi* यान् मुखोपबhogikāṇā yena saṅgho jivikāṁ kalpayati tasyāpabhāra itī (*Vyākhyā*).

On *stūpabhedaka*, see *Mahāvastu*, i.101, *Nettiṭṭipakarāṇa*, p. 92 and the remarks of Hardy, p. xxv.

482. Quoted in *Vyākhyā*, vi.36a-c. See above p. 623.

483. This line is quoted in the *Vyākhyā* ad iii.41a-d (p. 197 of *Cosmologie Bouddhique*), in order to explain the expression *saṁnikṣṭabodhisattva*, "the near Bodhisattva," that is to say "near to Bodhi," *asamābhisaṁbodhi*. "Predestined" = *ñes par rtogs pa* (*niyatāpatitā?*).

On the Bodhisattva and his career, see *Kośa*, ii.44a-b; iii.14, 21, 28, 41, 53c-d, 85, 94, 96d, vi.23c-d. 24a-b), vii.34.

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 886c22. As long as the first *asamīkhyeya kalpa* has not been completed, the Bodhisattva, even though he accomplishes diverse difficult and painful tasks, is not capable of knowing with certainty that he will become a Buddha. When the second *asamīkhyeya kalpa* has been completed, the Bodhisattva knows with certainty that he will become a Buddha, but he does not yet

dare to proclaim without fear (*vaiśāradya*) the words: "I will become a Buddha." When the third *asamkhyeya kalpa* is completed, when the Bodhisattva has cultivated the actions which produce the marks, he knows with certainty that he will become a Buddha, and he proclaims without fear the roar of the Son of the Master . . . When he cultivates the actions which produce the marks, he abandons five bad things and obtains five good things: 1. he abandons the bad realms of rebirth and is always reborn in good realms of rebirth; 2. he abandons humble families and is always reborn in wealthy families; 3. he abandons non-male bodies and always obtains a male body . . .

The marks are explained in the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, viii, in *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Camb, Add. 1702, 138b-141b (*lakṣaṇānūvyañjanapāṭa*). After *sūddhābhyāśayabhūmi* (see Hastings, ERE, art. "Bodhisattva," and S. Lévi, *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, Introduction), all the preparations for Bodhi (*bodhisambhāra*) produce (*nirvartaka*) the major and minor marks. This preparation is of two natures: distant, as long as the major and minor marks are not obtained (*yo'pratilabdheṣi vipākato lakṣaṇānūvyañjananeṣu*); and near, from the instant when, for the first time, the marks are obtained and as long as they more and more purify and perfect themselves . . . The marks are the results of diverse good actions (*vicitrakarmābhisamānskāraphala*), as is explained in the *Lakṣaṇasūtra*: because he is solidly installed (established?) (*pratiṣṭhita*) in morality, patience, and generosity, the Bodhisattva obtains the *supraṭiṣṭhāpādatva* mark . . . (According to *Lakṣaṇasūtra*, *Dīgha*, iii.146, the mark appears only in the Bodhisattva's last rebirth.)

484. Vyākhyā: *Mahāsālakulaja iti mahāprakāraṅkulaja ity arthab / kṣatriyamahāsālakulajo yāvad grhapatimahāsālakulaja iti mahāgrhapatikulaja ity arthab. Mahāvvyutpatti*, 187.6. *kṣatriyamahāsālakulam . . . 9. uccakulam . . . 11. nīcakulam*. See Childers and the *Dict. of St. Petersburg*. Paramārtha translates simply: "great family"; Hsüan-tsang transcribes the word *sāla*; the Chinese and Tibetan versions of the *Mahāvvyutpatti* and the Tibetan translation of the *Kośa* have: "a family similar to the great *Sāla* Tree."

485. *Mahāvvyutpatti*, 245,957-969: *na kuṇḍo bhavati . . . na vikalendriyo bhavati*.

486. Vyākhyā: *Kadathanā mahāparibhāvapūrvikā vibhāṇā / yayoh kāyavācoḥ pravṛtṭyā parasya dūḥkhabhāvanānye bhavataḥ / tadepekṣayā tannigraho yantranety ucyate (?)*.

487. The Bodhisattva is a *sattvadāsa* in five ways. *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, xix.19: . . . *kṣamo bhavati paribhāṣanātādanadānam / nīpuno bhavati sarvakāryakaraṇāt*. Compare *Śikṣāsāmmuccaya*, p. 143.

488. Comparison of the Bodhisattva and a dog, *Śikṣāsāmmuccaya*, p. 35.

489. Paramārtha, in the second *pāda*, repeats the word Buddha: *tui-fo fo-ku-i* 對佛佛故意 = *buddhapratyakṣaṇa buddhacetanah*; and translates the *Bhāṣya*: "In what period does he cultivate these actions? In the period when the great Masters are present (*mahāśāstrīṣaṇimukhibhāvākāle*), because the volition [in these actions] has the Buddha for its object."

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 887c5. Are the actions which mature in the marks *śrutamaya*, *cintāmaya*, or *bhāvanāmaya*, i.e., do they come from out of the teaching, out of reflection, or out of absorption? They are solely *cintāmaya*. Why? By reason of the special importance (*prādhānya*) of this type of action (of action arisen from reflection): the action that issues from out of the teaching exists only in Kāmadhātu . . . Some say that the action that matures in the marks issues from out of both the teaching and reflection, but not from absorption. In what place is there produced an action which matures in marks? Only in Kāmadhātu, only in the human realm of rebirth, only in Jambudvīpa, only with a male and not a female body, etc. In what time period? In the period when the Buddhas appear (*utpāda*); and not in a period empty of Buddhas, for the special volition (*cetanā*) and resolution-vow (*pranidhāna*) [which create this action] do not bear on any other object.

490. *Aṣṭaśāstrikā*, p. 336: the Bodhisattva is reborn in Jambudvīpa and generally in Madhyadeśa.

491. This refers to the *kalpas* (great *kalpas*, *mahākalpas*, *Kośa*, iii.84a) which a Bodhisattva should normally endure beyond the three *kalpāsamkhyeyas* which form the bulk of his career: in the course of these one hundred *kalpas*, he truly merits the name of Bodhisattva and realizes Bodhi (*Mahāvastu*, iii.249: *te bodhinī kalpaśatena samudānenti narottamā*). Often these hundred *kalpas* are neglected and it is said Buddhahood is obtained in three *kalpāsamkhyeyas* (iii.94b-c), that is to say, in the course of three *asamkhyeyas* (or *asamkhyas*) of *mahākalpas*. *Asamkhyeya*, "incalculable," is a set number, calculable, but enormous, the value of which varies according to the mode of computation (the fifty-ninth value of a series 1, 10, 100 ... or of a series: 1, 10, 100, 10,000, 10,000 x 10,000, ... *Kośa*, iii.94).

It is believed that this theory replaced that of the *asamkhyeyakalpas*, incalculable *kalpas*, an expression that remains along with the new computation *kalpāsamkhyeya*, *Religieux Eminents*, p. 150, etc. Any *kalpa* is without measure (*aparimīta*) and yet the *kalpas* are numerous (*Mahāvastu*, i.78, compare *Samyutta*, ii.181 and following). In the Abhidharma, *asamkhyeyakalpa* signifies one quarter of a "great *kalpa*," the period of creation, duration, destruction, and chaos.

In the Pāli sources, the career of the Bodhisattva is four *asamkhyeyas* and one hundred thousand *kalpas* long (Childers, *sub voc. asamkhyeya*; *Cariyapitaka*, i.1; *Jāṭaka*, i. p. 2; *Anguttara*, commentary in PTS. 1883, p. 98; *Nettipakaraṇa*, p. 161; *Visuddhimagga*, 302). The *Sārasaṃgaha* (first chapter, ed. Neumann, 1891, p. 12) distinguishes Bodhisattvas in which wisdom, faith, or energy predominate: their careers are of four, and sixteen *asamkhyeyas* (plus 100,000 *kalpas*) respectively.

To the classical references given in *Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 264, we should add that of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, viii, where two theories are presented; the second, according to this work, is the theory of Vasubandhu: 1. The career of the Bodhisattva lasts three *asamkhyeyas* of *kalpas* (*kalpāsamkhyeya*, not *asamkhyeyakalpa*). The first includes the career of the Bodhisattva from the preparatory stage (*saṃskārābhūmi*) up to the first stage properly so-called; the second, from the second stage up to the seventh; the third, from the eighth stage up to entry into the stage of the Buddhas (*buddhabhūmi* = *samantaprabhā*). 2. But, in fact, we have a *kalpāsamkhyeya* for the *saṃskārābhūmi*; two for the *abhimuktīcaryābhūmi*, three for the first stage properly so-called (*pramuditā*) and three for each of the ten stages. Having carried out his career for thirty-three *kalpāsamkhyeyas*, the Bodhisattva arrives at the stage of the Buddhas: ... *samantaprabhām buddhabhūmim āśādayatīty evaṃ trayastrīṃsatā kalpāsamkhyeyair buddhavarāṇ prāptīyata ity āryavasubandhupādāh*.

492. The future Śākyamuni, by purifying his energy as explained in iv.112a, in other words, by a great effort of energy (*vīryarāmbha*), obtained the completion of his perfection (*pāramitā*) of energy and of his other perfections in ninety-one *kalpas*.

The *Mahāvastu* (iii.249) is in agreement: *vīryakāyena saṃpanno ... nava kalpāni sthāyesei vīryeṇa puruṣottamāh* / The same for TD 15, number 643 translated by Przyluski, *J.As.* 1914, ii. p. 566 (very interesting).

According to certain Mahāyāna authorities (quoted by Saeki and which should be studied), the future Śākyamuni skipped over forty *kalpas*: eleven by feeding the tigress, eight by extending his hair into filth (*Divya*, p. 252), nine by praising Puṣya, and twelve by searching out a half stanza in peril of his life.

493. Compare *Samyutta* iv.324. The *Vyākhyā* summarizes the Sūtra: *Asībandhakena grāmaṇyā nirgranthaśrāvakeṇa bhagavān uktāh / kim anarthāyāsi bho Gauṣama kulānām pratīpanno yas tvam iārṣe durbhikṣa iyatā bhikṣusamighena sārḍham aśanivād usādayan bhikṣam aśasi / sa bhagavatābbhīṭāh / ito'ham grāmaṇi ekanavataṇi kalpam upādāya samanussamarāmi ...*

One should explain: *ekānavateḥ pūraṇam kalpa ekanavataḥ*.

There are numerous passages where the Blessed One appears to limit his experience in the world to ninety-one *kalpas*, for example *Majjhima* i.483; in this period Vipasyin reigned, *Dīgha*, ii.2, *Divya*, 282, whose advent marked the end of the third *asamkhyeya* in the career of Śākyamuni (above iv.110b-c).

494. The former Masters, *pūrvācāryas*. According to Saeki, add: "among the Sautrāntikas."

The four defects (*doṣa*) are: a bad realm of rebirth (*duṛgaśidoṣa*), mediocrity of family (*akulmatādoṣa*), incomplete organs (*vikalendriyatādoṣa*), female sex (*stribhāvadoṣa*). The two qualities (*guṇa*) are: remembrance of past existences (*jātiśmaratāguṇa*), and the quality of not regressing or of ceasing (*anivartakatāguṇa*).

Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang specify that the first cosmic age (*kalpa*) signifies the first *asamkhyeya*.

On the animal rebirths of the Bodhisattvas and his transgressions, see vi.23.

495. How should one understand these one hundred merits? The *Vyākhyā* furnishes three explanations.

a. Fifty volitions (*cetanā*) are produced when the Bodhisattva produces an act of attention having the Buddha for its object (*buddhālamkāra*); fifty other volitions when the Bodhisattva thinks: "May I too become a Buddha! (*aham apūṭham syām*)."

b. The Bodhisattva has thoughts of compassion (*karuṇācitta*) with regard to the forty-eight parts of the world (twenty places in Kāmadhātu, sixteen in Rūpadhātu, four in Ārpyadhātu, plus the eight cold hells): the same number of volitions are associated with these thoughts: plus a forty-ninth volition which has the Buddha for its object: "In the manner in which he liberates beings"; plus a fiftieth thought: "May I liberate them in the same way!" By repeating these fifty volitions, the Bodhisattva has one hundred merits.

c. The renouncing of killing is undertaken in a fivefold mode (see below iv.123a-b): purification of the principal action; purification of the preparatory and the consecutive actions (*sāmantaka*, iv.68a); *vīṭarkānupaghāta*, the renouncing is not troubled by the [three bad] *vīṭarkas*; *smṛtyanu-parigrhātva*, the renouncing is maintained by the memory of the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṅgha; and *nirvāṇapariṇāmitatva*, the merit of the renouncing is applied to the obtaining of Nirvāṇa. These make five volitions when the Bodhisattva renounces killing, fifty volitions for all of the ten renouncings, and one hundred volitions by repeating the first fifty volitions (*Vyākhyā*).

Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 591a6): One hundred merits, that is to say, one hundred volitions (*cetanā*). At the moment when he is going to produce an action producing a mark, the Bodhisattva first produces fifty volitions which purify the receptacle of the body; then he produces the action which brings forth the mark; later, he produces fifty good volitions which strengthen and perfect the action so that it obtains fullness (*paripūṭi*). The fifty volitions have the ten pathways of action for their object: there are five volitions for each one of them: 1. *prāṇātipātāviraticetanā*; 2. *samādāpanācetanā* (*Mahāvastu*, 245, 428); 3. *samuttejanācetanā* (*tsan-mei* 讚美, compare 245, 429); 4. *anumodanācetanā*; and 5. *pariṇāmanācetanā*: the volition to renounce killing, to make others undertake this renouncing, to praise them and to preach to them, to rejoice that this is accepted, and to apply the merit acquired to the acquisition of Nirvāṇa. According to other masters, there are, for each pathway of this action, five good volitions, weak, etc., corresponding to the five *dhyānas* (?). According to other masters, each of the pathways of this action has: 1. *prayogapariśuddhi*, 2. *maulakarmapathapariśuddhi*, 3. *prṣṭhapariśuddhi*, 4. *vīṭarkānupaghāta*, and 5. *smṛtyanu-parigrhātva*. According to still other masters, all the actions which mature in marks are from new, extraordinary (*wei-ts'eng-hsi* 未曾習) volitions, having the Buddha for their object: when one hundred such volitions are realized together, the Bodhisattva is adorned [with the mark] (*upasobhita*?).

496. See ii.56b. Paramārtha attributes this second opinion to the Vaibhāṣikas. Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 591a18) presents five opinions; the *Vibhāṣā* (TD 27, p. 889c25) presents eleven.

497. These are the numbers in the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 892c5. In the *Mahāvastu*, "Śākyamuni remembered having honored and served eight thousand Buddhas by the name of Dīpaṅkara... three hundred thousand Śākyamunis, and thus following throughout these pages (157 and following)." Barth, *Journal des Savants*, August 1899.

498. Paramārtha: *mo-shih-shih* 末世時 = *lokāntakāle*; Hsüan-tsang: *mo-chieh* 末劫 = *kalpānte*, that is, *apakaśakalpa*: in a period when lifespan diminishes in length (iii.92).

At this period, the future Śākyamuni was a *kumbhakārakumāra* by the name of Prabhāsa (*Vyākhyā*).

The *Mahāvastu* knows of a Śākyamuni who lived an infinite number of incalculable (*asamkhyeya*) *kalpas* (i.47), also from Kapilavastu, and who received alms from our Śākyamuni, then a merchant (*prathamā prapñidhi tadā āsi*).

499. Example: Śibi.

500. Example: the Bhikṣu Kṣānti who was tortured by King Kali [= Kalābu] (*Ta-chih-tu lun*, TD 25, p. 89b13); this is the Rṣi Kṣānti [Kṣāntivādin] of the *Sūtrālamkāra* (Huber, p. 325, 383), the hero of *Jātaka*, 313 (*Visuddhimagga*, 302), *Jātakamālā*, 28, *Avadānakalpalatā* 38, Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, i.161, Przyłuski, *Aṣoka*, 358, Watters, i.227.

According to *Mahāvastu*, i.170, the future Śākyamuni was free from desire (*vīsarāga*) after the time of Dipaṅkara.

501. This story is related in *Avadānaśataka*, 97 (ii.176) and in *Romatic Legend*, p. 14 (with some variants), where the Buddha was named Puṣya. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang give Tiṣya in transcription; our Tibetan version has *skar rgyal* which Dr. P. Cordier, (according to *Aṣṭāṅgahrdaya* 2.1.38) translates as Puṣya. In *Mahāvastu* we have *rgyal* = Puṣya (the Nakṣatra) (165.6) = Tiṣya (the Cakravartin), (180.54); 47.17, Tiṣya (the Śrāvaka) = 'od ldan with the gloss *pu śa (sus) dan (ma)* 'dom na *skar rgyal du gdags*: "being exhorted by Puṣya (?), he is called *skar-rgyal*" (?). In the *Mahāvastu*, iii.240.6, Puṣya received a prophesy from Tiṣya. According to *Romatic Legend*, Tiṣya came four *kalpas* before Puṣya, ninety-five *kalpas* before Śākyamuni.

502. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang translate: "Having entered into the absorption of *tejodhātu*" (*buo-chieh-ting* 火界定: this is the expression from which Eitel derives *agnihāvasamādhi*). The Chinese interpreters most often employ the formula *buo kuang ting* 火光定, "fire light *samādhi*" (Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, iii.155, 264), which would correspond to *jyotisrabhasamādhi*.

This refers to that manifestation of *rddhi* by which a saint makes his body incandescent, emitting flames and smoke, *Mahāvastu*, 15.14: *dhūmayati prajvalayaty api adyathāpi nāma mahān agniskandhaḥ* (See *Digba*, iii.27; *Kośa*, vii.48 and following on *rddhi*). The power of the ascetic over the elements, the water element and the fire element, is acquired by a meditation in which he considers this element. This is how the explanation of Childers (*sub voc. tejo*) explains *tejodhātum samāpajjivā* = "having entered into *jhāna* by *tejokasina*" (on the *keṭṭhāyatanas*, *Kośa*, viii.36) which Senart (*Mahāvastu*, i.556) compares to that of Beal: "causing their bodies to ascend into space and emit all sorts of brilliant appearances." This person, having entered into *dhyāna* through the contemplation of fire (*tejokasina*), is able, in the course of the *dhyāna*, to create flames, etc. In *Dīpa*, p. 186, we have the fight of Svāgata—proclaimed by the Buddha as "the best in the practice of the fire absorption," *tejodhātum samāpadyamānānām agrah* (*Anguttara*, i.25)—with a Nāga "enflamed" by anger. In a great number of sources the "samādhi of fire" or *tejojjhāna* accompanies Nirvāṇa (*Udana*, viii.9; Przyłuski, *Légende d'Aṣoka*, p. 26, *Mahāvastu*, v.200, *Mahāvastu*, i. 556, etc.).

503. Paramārtha: "in the Ratnagiri cave"; *Avadānaśataka*: *himavantaṁ parvatam abhirubhya ratnagubhāṁ pravīṣa*...

504. The MSS of the *Avadānaśataka* gives: *Puruṣaṣṭabha stutulo nyo mahāstamaṇaḥ kutuvāḥ* // which Speyer corrects to: *puruṣaṣṭabhāsty anyas tulyo mahāstamaṇas tava*.

Paramārtha: *pa jen teng tsun yu san (erh) teh* 何人等尊三(二)德. The Tibetan version finishes with *ga la yod*, which gives *kutap*.

finishes with *ga la yod*, which gives *kutab*.

*Vyākhyā: Na divi bhūvī ceti vistarab / divi bhūvī ceti uddesapadanyāyēnoktam // nāsmīn loka na vaiśravaṇālaye na marubhavane dīvye sthāna īti tadvyākṛtyartham nīrdeśapadbāni / asmin loka īti manuṣyaloke / vaiśravaṇālaya īti cāturmahārājikasthāne / marubhavane īti marudbhavane trāyastṛmśabbavana īty arthaḥ / dīvye sthāne yāmādbisthāne // lokadhātvantareṣv api tatsadṛṣṭyaśābhāva-jñāpanārtham āha na dikṣu vidikṣu ceti // attha na śraddhīyate / caratu kaścīd vasudhām imān kṛtsnān sphūṭān babusattvādhyāsītām . . . svayaṁ pratyaवेक्षतām ity abhīprāyaḥ /*

505. It is through *saṁādhi* and *prajñā* (=dhi) that the results or fruits are acquired. In the Abhidharma, the Bodhisattva remains a Prthagjana up to the moment when he sits down under the Tree (iii.41). The various schools are not in agreement with respect to this as one can see in the treatises of Vasumitra and Bhavya. According to the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the Bodhisattva, from the first stage on, abandons erroneous views (*satkāyadrṣṭi*, *śūlavrata*, and *vicikīṣa*).

506. *Vajropamasamādhi* (vi.44d) is an absorption through which the candidate for the state of Arhat breaks his last bonds and obtains Bodhi, which consists of *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayajñāna* (the knowledge that the defilements are destroyed, and the knowledge that they will not arise again). *Vajropamasamādhi* confers the quality of Buddhahood on a Bodhisattva: for a Bodhisattva only acquires the state of Arhat after having fulfilled the *pāramitās* (see vi.24 and ii.44a-b, trans. p. 227).

Hsüan-tsang adds: "taking place on the *vajrasana*," or *bodhimanda* (Minayev, *Recherches*, 177), as described in *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 156a3. The *Kośa* speaks of it iii.53b.

507. On the Chinese translations of the word *pāramitā*, see Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, i. p. 2. Etymology, Candrakīrti in *Madhyamakāvatāra*, i.16a-b (trans. Muséon, 1907, p. 29), F. W. Thomas JRAS, 1904, 546.

508. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 496c26; *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 656c20, p. 581c5; *Mahāvīryūtpatti*, 93. *Dīgha*, iii.218; *Āṅguttara*, iv.241: *dānamāyaṁ puññakiriyavattbu, silamayam, bhāvanāmayam*.

Rhys Davids, in *Dialogues*, ii.347-348, examines the place of *dāna* in Scripture; the *Āṅguttara*, "which contains a good deal more of the milk for babes than the other three of the great *Nikāyas*," devotes a *Vagga* to charity, which does not figure among the "wings of Bodhi," and which is ignored in *Dhammapada*. But the teaching of *dāna*, by definition, is addressed to the Upāsakas; see above p. 598 and p. 697; nevertheless *dāna* is useful for Nirvāṇa, iv.117d.

Praise of a gift of rice, *Mahāvagga*, vi.24.5, of a gift of a *vihāra*, *Cullavagga*, vi.1.5.

509. Hsüan-tsang: Or rather *puñyakiriyā* signifies "to make *puñya*," that is, "the preparatory action of *puñya*" (*puñyaprayoga*). The word *vastu* signifies support (*āśraya*, *adhiṣṭhāna*): giving, the precepts, and meditation are the *vastu*, the support of the preparatory action of *puñya* with a view to the realization of giving, the precepts and meditation.

510. In *Kathāvatthu*, vii.4, the Theravādins maintain that *dāna* is solely that which is given.

511. By giving one renders homage to the Caityas, and to beings in Nirvāṇa (*parinirvṛta*).

512. The Chinese translators have: "the good *skandhas* of this moment give . . ." The bodily and vocal action of giving is *rūpa*; the mind and mental states are the four non-material *skandhas*.

513. *Mahābhoga* and elsewhere *udārabhoga*: "great joy from food, from clothing, etc.," or "joy from great objects of joy (*kāmaguṇa*). See *Āṅguttara*, iv.393.

514. The house is only non-modified (*nirvikāra*) grasses; it is not a transformation of the grasses. *Maya* has a different value in *frutamayi prajñā* (vi.5c).

515. *Kathāvatthu*, xvii.11, the Uttārāpathakas maintain that the giver (*dāyaka*), not the field, "purifies" the gift.

*Karmaprajñāpti* (Mdo 62, fol. 246b): "There are four gifts: that which is pure from the fact of the giver, impure from the fact of the recipient, and the rest as in the *Samgūḍiprayāya*." This is the text quoted by the author of the *Kathāvatthu* (*Dīgha*, iii.231; *Anguttara*, ii.80; *Majjhima*, iii.256 [*dakkhiṇāvibhaṅgasutta*]).

See iv.121c-d.

516. *Dīgha*, ii.357: *sakkaccam dānam, sahatthā, cūṭikatam, anapaviddham dānam*.

On the "treatises on giving, on the precepts and on heaven," see above p. 598. An example of *dānakathā*, *Anguttara*, iv.393; the *Vimānavatthu* belongs to this literature (Minayev, *Recherches*, 165). *Divyāvadāna* xxxiv is Mahāyāna (thirty-seven qualities of the gift: *kāle . . . satkṛtya . . .*).

517. That it is the intention that is important, and not the object given, see for example Huber, *Sūtrālamkāra*, p. 122, Minayev, p. 167 at the bottom: "The poor, who have faith . . ."

518. *Anguttara*, iii.50: *manāpadāyī labhate manāpam*.

519. This is the Sūtra quoted in *Kośa* iii.41 at the end. Compare *Majjhima*, iii. 255: *viracchānagate dānam dattvā satagunā dakkhiṇā pāṭikanikētabbā, puthujjanadussile . . . sabhassagunā . . .*

520. Here Vasubandhu mentions the sixth and the seventh "material meritorious work" (see above p. 561). We have: 5. *āgantukāya gamikāya vā dānam dadāti / idam pañcamam . . . 6. . . glānāya glānopasthāpakāya vā dānam dadāti . . . 7. . . yās tā bhavanti sūtakilā vā vātalikā vā varṣalikā vā tadrūpāsu sūtakilāsu yāvad varṣalikāsu bhaktāni vā tarpyāni (tarpanāni) vā yavāgūpānāni vā tāni saṅghāyābhiniṛbhṛtya anuprayacchat anuprayacchati / idam ārya asmākam anārdyagātrā ana-bhivṛṣṭacivarāḥ paribhujya sukhāni sparśāni vibharantu / idam Cunda sapṭamam aupadbhikam punyakriyāvastu*. According to Saeki, *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 428a1 differs slightly.

Hsüan-tsang has: "In the seven *aupadbhikapunyakriyāvastus*, it says that one should give to the *āgantuka*, the *gamika*, the *glāna*, the *glānopasthāyaka*, and to the *upadbhivārika* (*yu-an-lin-ch'ang* 園林常); that he should warm him who is cold." Hsüan-tsang thus enumerates the five beneficiaries of the *āyayikapāṇḍapāṭas* (*Divya*, 50, Burnouf, 269; Sixth Edict, Buhler, *Beitrage* 269): the monk who arrives, who departs, who is sick and the infirmary attendant (list of the *Mahāvagga*, viii.15.7, compare *Anguttara*, iii.41) and the *upadbhivārika*, the "verger, the guardian of the Vihāra," concerning which we have insufficient information. (*Mahāvijyūtpatti*, 273,12, *ch'ang-t'ang-shih* 掌堂師); *Divya*, 54, 542; Śarad Chandra Das, *dge skyos*; S. Lévi, "Quelques titres énigmatiques . . ." *J.Ar.* 1915, ii.193).

Our texts concern themselves very little with the poor. We can mention the *Avadāna* of the Nirvāṇa of Mahākāśyapa: " . . . In the streets of the village, the unfortunate were afflicted and enfeebled. He always had compassion on the poor and helped them. Now this multitude of miserable ones have lost their protector . . ." (Przyluski, *Légende d'Aśoka*, p. 232).

521. An allusion is made to the bear, Huber, *Sūtrālamkāra*, p. 383. The *Vyākhyā* explains that the bear saved a person *guhām pravīṣya gātroṣmaṣūṭāpanayena*; according to the *Vibhāṣā* (TD 27, p. 592b3): "It is told that a person searching the woods became lost in the snow . . ." *Mṛga* is the animal who had a person who was annoying him cross a river, *uhyamānanadyuttāranena . . . upakārin*.

522. *Majjhima*, iii.253, or *Gautamīśūtra* (*Samghabhadra*, xxiii.4, fol. 86), is difficult to interpret. Mahāprajāpati offers a set of robes to the Buddha who refuses: "Gautami, give to the Saṅgha; by giving to the Saṅgha you will honor me and you will honor the Saṅgha." From this text and the passage where the Saṅgha (the four pairs of eight "persons," Arhat . . . Srotaāpanna-

phalapratiṭṭhāna) is defined as the field of merit par excellence (*Dīgha*, iii.255, *Suttanipāṭa*, 569, etc.), certain masters conclude that a gift to the Saṅgha is meritorious, but not a gift to the Buddha. Saṅghabhadra refutes this theory. [The Buddha is the best field, *Majjhima*, iii.254; *Kośa*, vii.34; *Divya*, 71, Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, i. 394. But see in Vasumitra-Bhavya-Vinītadeva (Wassilieff, 251, 283) the opinion of the Mahīśākas (a gift to the Saṅgha is very fruitful, but not a gift to the Buddha; the cult of Stūpas is only a little fruitful), and the opinion of the Dharmaguptakas (a gift to the Buddha is very fruitful, but not a gift to the Saṅgha). A related problem: does the Buddha form part of the Saṅgha?]

When one takes Refuge in the Buddha and the Saṅgha one takes Refuge in the *śaikṣa* and *asaikṣa dharmas* which form the Buddha and the Saṅgha (see *Kośa*, iv.32). Now one cannot give to *śaikṣa* and *asaikṣa dharmas*, but only to "persons" (*puṇḍala*): thus a gift to the Buddhas and the Saṅgha do not bear any results. A thesis discussed in *Kathāvatthu*, xvii.6-10, and *Saṅghabhadra loc. cit.* [The Saṅgha in the proper sense of the word, *paramārthasaṅgha*, is the *dharmas* of the Saints and the eight persons which serve as their receptacle: one takes Refuge in the *dharmas*, but one gives to "persons".]

523. According to *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 723a4. See the meager presents that makes novices Arhats in *Divya*.

*Majjhima*, iii.257: *yo vūtarāgo vūtarāgesu dadāti . . . taṃ ve dānaṃ āmisadānaṃ vipulaṃ ti brūmi.*

524. A Bodhisattva's gift has perfect Bodhi and the good of all beings for its purpose.

525. *Dīgha*, iii.268, eight *dānavatthus*: 1-4 are formulated as in our text: 5 and 6 differ (*sāhu dānaṃ ti dānaṃ deti / ahaṃ pacāmi ime na pacanti . . .*); 7. *idaṃ me dānaṃ dadato kalyāṇo kittisaddo abbhuggacchati*; 8. *cātālaṃkāracittaparikkhārattham dānaṃ deti.*

The list of the *dānavatthus* of *Āṅguttara*, iv.236, gives us numbers 5 and 6 of our list: *dinnapubbam kaṭapubbam piṭṭupitāmahehi na arahāmi porāṇaṃ kulavamsaṃ hāpetum ti dānaṃ deti / . . . datvā . . . saggalokaṃ upapajjissāmi . . .*

526. Paramārtha: *yū i chih chi ch'in chin jen* 於已至及親近人 "... gifts to the *asanna* and to those near." Hsüan-tsang: *sui chin i chih, fang neng shih yū* 隨近已至方能施與 "accordingly as one approaches, one gives." *āsaṃja = upagantvā* (*Jātaka*, v. p. 342). Commentary of the *Āṅguttara*, iv.236 (Siamese edition): *āsaṃja dānaṃ detūti patvā dānaṃ deti āgataṃ disvāva taṃ mubbutaṃ yeva nisīdāpetvā sakkāraṃ katvā dānaṃ deti.*

527. Commentary on the *Āṅguttara*: *bhayaṃ ti ayam adāyako akārako ti garabābhayaṃ apāyabbhayaṃ vā.*

528. This second list is quoted *Vyākhyā*, ad. iii.41, at the end.

529. According to Saeki: *sama* signifies that which produces a heavenly rebirth; *viṣama*, that which produces a bad realm of rebirth.

530. Hsüan-tsang translates: "He makes beings produce the pure *dharmakāya*." Paramārtha: "He produces the *dharmakāya*." See above p. 601.

531. Hsüan-tsang: All the mental projections: "I should do this and that; I shall do this and that." Note of the editor: "This is distant preparatory action."

532. Compare *Milinda*, 193, on lying which is serious or light by reason of its object (*vatthuvāsena*); in this same way killing is unimportant when the animal is small, *Atthasālinī*, p. 97.



533. According to Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang: "The Sūtra says that there are two types of actions, *kṛta* action and *upacita* action." According to Saeki, this Sūtra is the *Karmavipākavibhaṅgasūtra* (?) (*yeh-pao ch'a-pieh ching* 業報差別經). See *Kōsa*, v.1.

Majjhima, iii.207: *saṁcetanikaṇi . . . kammaṇi katvā . . . kiṃ so vediyati*. *Anṅuttara*, v.202: *nāhaṃ saṁcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ kaṭānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisaṃvidātvā vyantibhāvaṃ vadāmi*. *Dīvyā, paṭsim: na karmāni kṛtāny upacitāni pṛthivīdhātavaṃ vipacyante*; *Kathāvatthū*, xv.11; *Madhyamakavūṭṭi*, p. 303.

For the Vedāntic theory, see the sources given in G. A. Jacob, *Vedāntasāra*, Bombay, 1911, p. 160 (*saṁcītakarmaṇ* = *upacitao*, *kriyamāṇāni karmāni ārabdhaphalāni karmāni*).

534. See above, p. 625.

535. *Samcintya* = *saṁcicca*, *Mahāvūṭṭi*, 245.68. *Manu*, xi.90, prescribes penitences for the involuntary murder (*akāmatas*), which greatly resembles *asamcintya*, of a Brahmin. Voluntary murder is inextinguishable.

536. *Vyākhyā: Nābuddhipūrvam na sahasakṛtam iti / atha vā nābuddhipūrvam kṛtam idam kuryām ity asamcintya kṛtam / tan nopacitam / avyakṛtam ni tat karma / na sahasā kṛtam iti buddhipūrvam api na sahasā kṛtam / yad abhyāseṇa bhāṣyākṣepaṇ mṛṣāvādādyanuṣṭhānaṃ kṛtam tad akusalam na punar upacitam*: "Or rather one should understand: *abuddhipūrvā* action,—the action that one does without deciding 'I shall do that,'—is not accumulated, for this action is morally neutral. Action done in haste, if preceded by a decision, is not accumulated, for example, lies uttered by verbal habit in the enthusiasm of discourse. It is though *bhāṣyākṣepa* that the author of a treatise repeats, in a stereotyped enumeration, words which are not justified in such a place. (See ii. trans. p. 263).

The *Vyākhyā*, presenting the characteristics of good action which is accumulated, says: *evam kusalam api yojyam iti / katham saṁcetanātah / samcintya kṛtam bhavati / nābuddhipūrvakṛtam bhavati / tadyathā avyakṛtacūṭṭena pāsānaṃ dadāmiṣu suvarṇapindam dadyāt kṛtam tan na punar upacitam / avyakṛtam hi tat karma / na sahasā kṛtam / yathā bhāṣyākṣepāt satyavacanam / kṛtam tat kusalam na punar upacitam*.

537. Compare *Anguttara*, i.249; above note *ad* iv.50.

538. There is *pāpassa kammassa samatikkamo*, "passing beyond transgression," through abstinence (*virati*) is the undertaking of the precepts), and through meditation on compassion (*mettā*), *Samyutta*, iv.317.

*Prātimokṣa* (Finot, *J.As.* 1913, ii.16): "He who remembers a fault should disclose it; being disclosed, he will become tranquil . . . *āviṣektvārya phāsaṃ bhavati* . . . (see above iv.39, note 174, and on lying through silence, iv. note 347). *Pātimokkha*, in *Vinaya Texts*, i.2 and *Callavagga*, ix.14 (*Vinaya Texts*, iii.305, note 1). Confession in the Mahāyāna, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, 1.x.

*Dīvyā, paṭsim*: "Recognize your transgression (*atyaṃam atyaṃato deṣaya*); this action will be reduced, destroyed, annihilated (*apy evaitat karma tanutvaṃ pariṣayaṃ paryādānaṃ gaccheta*) [*Majjhima*, iii.247: *yato . . . accayam accayato dīsvā yathādharmmaṃ paṭikarosi tan te mayam paṭisaṅghāma*; *Digha*, i.85; *Anguttara*, i.238, Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 299; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ii.66, etc.]. By recognizing his transgression (having insulted an Arhat whose qualities he ignored) the *vaijāṇṭyākāra* of *Dīvyā*, 54-55, avoids hell, but nevertheless is reborn fifty times as the son of a slave.

*Śikṣāsamuccaya*, 160 and *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, v.98 quoting the *Caturdharmakāśāstra*, the four dharmas by which the Bodhisattva triumphs over transgressions done and transgressions accumulated: *vidāṣaṇāsamsudācāra* (repentance), *pratipākṣāsamsudācāra* (the practice of good), *pratyaṇāpattibala* (undertaking the precepts or *virati*), *āśrayabala* (taking Refuge in the Buddha, etc.). Analogous doctrines, *Subhāṣitasamgraha*, ed. Bendall (*Muséon*, 1900) at the end.

*Theragāthā* 872 = *Dhammapada* 173: *pāpaṃ katam kusaleṇa piṭṭhīyati*.

Only *tathāgataprasāda* can wash away "the bad *dharma*s which Māra has planted in the Buddha" (read with the MSS *buddhāvaropitānām akusalanām dharmānām ... prakṣālanām*); the faith (*śraddhā*) and devotion (*bhakti*) of Māra with respect to the Buddha washes away all of his perfidies (*vṛjina*), *Divya*, 359, Przyluski, *Légende d'Apoka*, p. 358.

539. See above pp. 561 and 563.

540. We have seen (iv.73) that the Buddha accepted beforehand all gifts made to Caityas.

The merit of gifts made to the Buddha and the Saṅgha is contested by many sects, see above note 522.

On the cult of the deceased Buddha, *Milinda*, p. 100-101, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix.36.

The place where the *Prajñāpāramitā* is taught becomes like a *Caitya* (*cāityabhūtaḥ kṛtaḥ*), because the worship that one renders to it is a cause of the accumulation of merit (*vandanādinnā punyopacayahetuvāt*) (*Abhisamayālaṅkāraśāloka ad Astasāhasrikā*, p. 57).

541. *Vyākhyā: Śatrur ayaṁ na tāvaṁ mriyata ity anayā samjñayā.*

542. The Nirgranthas think that a gift made to thieves, etc., bears bad results. But we do not admit that the quality of the field renders the result agreeable (*iṣṭa*): it makes the result important, eminent (*viśiṣṭa*) in its type (*Vyākhyā*). In *Majjhima* i.379, the Buddha counsels Upālī to continue his generosity to the Nirgranthas; but he refrains from planting his gifts in a bad field. According to *Mūlinda*, 258 (which quotes *Majjhima*, iii.257), even a monk (*ramaṇa*) who has "totally fallen" (*suvipanna*) and who is of bad morals (*dussīla*) purifies the gift: for one can wash himself in dirty water.

543. Hsüan-tsang: *mo-tu-chia chu*, 末度迦種 Paramārtha: *p'u-t'ao* 蒲桃 = grape.

544. Bad *rūpa*: actions of the body and voice.

545. The text describing the one hundred merits which produce the marks (above p. 692) are given in the *Vyākhyā*; the interpretation (which we place within parentheses) is according to TD 28, p. 933b16, Dharmatrāta's treatise, quoted by Saeki. *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 889c22: *prayogapariśuddhi*, *maulapariśuddhi*, *prsthapariśuddhi*, *vitarkānupaghāta*, and *smṛtyanupariṣṭhāva*.

546. The enumerations of the *bhayas* are numerous; we obtain our text by combining *Anguttara*, ii.121 and iv.364 (*Dharmasaṅgraha*, 71).

547. "Good absorption signifies the mental (*caitta*) *dharma* called absorption and the five *skandhas* which coexist with this *caitta*. It is called "absorbed," because the mind which is good, but not associated with the *caitta* called absorption, is not *bhāvanā*, impregnation or meditation: without doubt this mind impregnates the mental series, but not to the same degree as does absorption. It is called "good," because the absorption of defiled *dhyānas*, associated with enjoyment (*āsvādanā*) (viii.6), does not constitute *punya* *akriyā* *vastu bhāvanāmaya*. *Bhāvanā* is equivalent to *vāsanā*.

548. See *Samyutta*, iv.312, on the inefficacy of funeral rituals; *Anguttara*, v.271, the realm of rebirth of an assassin who gives alms.

549. Ekottara TD 2, p. 656a7; Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 825c13. *Catvāraḥ pudgalā brāhmaṇaṃ puṇyaṃ prasavanti / apratiṣṭhīte prthivīpradeśe tathāgatasya śāriram stūpaṃ pratiṣṭhāpayati / ayaṃ prathamah pudgalo brāhmaṇaṃ puṇyaṃ prasavati / cāturdśe bhikṣusamghe ārāmaṇaṃ nirvāṭayati /*

*ayanā dvitīyāb ... / bhinnam tathāgata[sya] śrāvakasamgham pratisamādhātī / ayanā tṛtīyāb ... / maitṛisābhagatena cūṭenāvāreṇa asapatnena (MSS. sampramēna) avyābādhena vipulena mahad-gatenāpramāṇena subhāvitenaikāṁ dīṣam adhimucya sphaṛitvopasamīpadya vibharatī ... ayanā caturthāb.* See Mahāvīyutpatti, 69, (editions of Wogihara and Sasaki), and the Daśabhūmaka quoted in the Madhyamakāvātara, 55, 391, trans. Museum, 1907, p. 53; same variants.

*Āṅguttara*, v.76: *bhinnam pana bhante samgham sammaggaṁ katvā kiṁ so pasavatī / brahmanā Ānanda puññam pasavatī / kiṁ pana bhante brahmanā puññan ti / kappam Ānanda saggamhi modatī.* There then follows the six *pādas* of *Itivuttaka*, 19: *sukhā samghassa sammaggaṁ ... sammaggaṁ katvāna kappā saggamhi modatī.*

550. Saṁghabhadra (TD 29, p. 549c9) attributes this opinion to other masters.

551. According to a gloss of Saeki, the Sautrāntikas or the Mahāsāṁghikas. Saṁghabhadra (TD 29, p. 549c21): "There are other masters who say ..."

552. In *Suttanipāta*, 502, a gift to an Arhat produces rebirth in heaven with Brahmā.

Paramārtha corresponds, in the main, to the Tibetan. He translates 124c-d: "Four action are called Brahmin merits, because, for one *kalpa*, they produce the happiness of heaven." He also enumerates the four actions (TD 29, p. 252a8).

Hsüan-tsang reverses the text of Vasubandhu. After having enumerated the four actions of the Sūtra, he continues: What is the measure of this merit? The Kārikā (124c-d) says: "To produce birth in heaven for one *kalpa*, etc., is the measure of Brahmin merit." The *Bhāṣya* says, "The former masters say: The merit that makes one dwell in heaven for a *kalpa* ..."

... In another school, there is a *gāthā*: "A person of faith, of right views, who cultivates the ten excellent practices (*cārīṣa*), who engenders Brahmin merit dwells happily in the heavens for a *kalpa*." The *Vaiṣṇāṣikas* say that the measure of this merit is that indicated for the action that ripens in marks. The Kārikā has the word "etcetera" in order to indicate the variety of opinions.

553. *Vyākhyā*: This merit is called *brāhma*, Brahmin, because it is the merit of Brahmās (*brahmaṇām*): the word Brahmā signifies, in this expression, the Brahmapurohitas, since the Brahmapurohitas live a *kalpa*; since, in another Canon, we read these two *pādas*: *brāhmaṇaṁ puñyaṁ prasavatī kalpaṁ svargesu modatī*. This merit is thus called Brahmin because [for its duration], it is like (*sadharma*) that of the Purohitas.

In *Majjhima*, ii.207, *mettā* is *brahmānaṁ sabhavyatāya maggo*.

How should one understand the retribution of Brahmin merit which lasts a *kalpa*? Saṁghabhadra explains (TD 29, p. 594c14): a person detached from Kāmadhātu (*vīṭarāga*, *virakta*) who practices the four Immeasurable Meditations is reborn among the gods of a higher sphere and experiences a happiness which lasts one life of a *kalpa*. A person not detached from Kāmadhātu who builds a *stūpa*, who constructs an *ārāma*, who reestablishes concord within the Saṁgha, and who, on many occasions, cultivates the preparatory action of compassion and the other Immeasurable Meditations—we say preparatory action, for in order to practice the Immeasurable Meditations themselves, one must enter into Dhyāna, which supposes detachment from Kāmadhātu—this person also, as if he were to practice the fundamental (*maula*) Immeasurable Meditations, produces a heavenly (*svargika*) happiness lasting for one *kalpa* (*kalparamāṇa*). But is it not said above that, in Kāmadhātu, there is no retribution for a good action which lasts a *kalpa*? There is no good action which lasts only an instant, which could, as is the case for certain bad actions, produce a life one *kalpa* in length: this is why we do not express ourselves in this way. But when many volitions are produced which bear on the same object (construction of a *stūpa*, etc.), they produce in succession a heavenly result which lasts one *kalpa*: one dies in heaven in order to immediately take up a birth there again. There is thus no contradiction in speaking of a happiness lasting a *kalpa*.

The *Vyākhyā* summarizes this doctrine without naming Saṁghabhadra and ends with the words: *brhat puñyaṁ ity āpare*.

554. *Anguttara*, i.91; *Itivuttaka*, 98 and 100: *dvemāni bhikkhave dānāni āmissadānāni ca dhammadānāni ca*. *Dharmasamgraha*, 105, adds *maṣṭrīdāna*. Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, 196. *Dīgha*, iii.191, *āmisānuppadāna*.

555. *Vyākhyā*: *Akiliṣṭadesanā* = *akiliṣṭacittasamatthāpīṭa desanā*.

556. Compare *nirāmiṣadhammadeśaka*, *Mahāvinyūtpatti*, 30.37.

557. In *Mahāvastu*, i. 34, *puṇyabhāgiya sattva* = a being susceptible of acquiring merit; in the same way *phalabhāgiya* = a being susceptible of acquiring the results. (Compare *Nettipakkaraṇa*, 48).

Here *puṇyabhāgiya kusala* = *puṇyabhāgiya bhūta*. Or rather *puṇyam bhajata iti puṇyabhāgiya / puṇyabhāgiya eva puṇyabhāgiyam* / *svārthe kṛpratyayaḥ*.

558. *Mokṣabhāga* is opposed to *saṃsārabhāga*; or rather *mokṣabhāga* = *mokṣaprapīṭi*; thus *mokṣabhāgiya* = *mokṣaprapṛtyanukūla*.

On *mokṣabhāgiya*, see *Kośa*, iii.44c-d, vi.24, vii.30; *Dīvyā*, 50.7, 360.1 (devotion, even though small, has Nirvāṇa for its result), 363.28; *mokṣabhāgiya*, *Karunāpūṇḍarikā*, 78.14.

*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 34c28: "In what period are the *mokṣabhāgiya* roots planted? In a period when the Buddhas appear: it happens, in fact, that the Buddhadharmā exists in order that one be able to plant these roots. According to other masters, even when the Buddhadharmā is absent, if one encounters a Pratyekabuddha, one can plant them. What body must one have in order to plant these roots? A male or a female body. On what occasion or by what cause does one plant these roots? By reason of giving, by reason of the precepts, by reason of hearing; but the cause is not required. Why? By reason of the variety of "intentions" (*āśaya*). There are some persons who, by giving a mouthful of food or a toothpick, plant these roots, for example, Candra, etc. These persons, after having given, say: "I desire (*pranidhi*) that by reason of this I may obtain deliverance." There are some persons who even though they have given without reserve (*wu-che* 無遮) to a great Saṅgha (compare *Tākakusu*, *I-tsing*, p. 40), do not plant these roots, like Wu-pao-o 無暴惡 (Acaṇḍa, Araudra?), etc.; these, after having given, desire riches, etc., in a future life, not deliverance. In the same way there are certain persons who after having undertaken the Upavāsa for a day and a night, after having recited one stanza of four verses, plant these roots; whereas there are others who undertake the *Prātimokṣa* for the whole of their life, who recite the Tripitaka, but who do not plant them. It all depends on the ardor of their inclination for Nirvāṇa and on their disgust with existence.

559. Hsüan-tsang: Good *mokṣabhāgiya* is the good which certainly produces Nirvāṇa as its result. The person in whom it has arisen is said to have within himself a *dharma* of Nirvāṇa.

560. The same idea in the Mahāyāna, for example *Madhyamakāvatāra*, vi.4-5: *prthagjanatve'pi nīśamya śūnyatām . . . tanūruhotphullatannā ca jāyate / yat tasya sambuddhādīyo'sti bhīma*.

561. The *khalabīla* is a hole hollowed out in order that grain be deposited in it. *Khala* is the area for thrashing grain: *Amarakośa*, 3.3.42. Paramārtha: *ti-k' an-ch'e* 地坎拆 = a hole or a crack in the earth, a fissure.

562. *Dīgha*, iii.251 (*cha nibbedhabhāgiyasaññā*), 277 (*nibbedhabhāgiyo samādhi*, compare *Kośa*, viii.17). In the same sense *nibbedhika* is frequently encountered in the *Anguttara*; in the *Visuddhimagga*, there are eighty-eight *nibbedhabhāginī paññā*, and fifteen *nibbedhabhāgiyam sīla*. *Nettipakkaraṇa*, in *passim*. In the *Dīvyā* four *nirvedhabhāgiyas* are distinguished (compare 50.8 and 166.15).

563. In the Śāstra "writings" or "scripture" do not signify writings in the worldly sense of the word (*akṣaracibmaṁ puṣṭakādau*), but the action by which writings are written. In the same way, *mudrā* does not signify the seal having a mark, letter or other sign on it (*akṣarānakṣaracibma*), but the action by which the seal is carved (*khanyate*). (*Vyākhyā*). The *Vibhāṣā* (TD 27, p. 660b23) gives calculation as an example.

564. *Mahāvvyutpatti*, 218.2-4: *līpi mudrā* (*shou-suan* = 手算 *bastagaṇanā*, the "handrechen" of Schiefner) *saṁkhyā* (*shu-mu* 數目) *gaṇanā* (*shu-mu* 數目 and *suan* 算). *Dīvyā* (3.18, 26.12, etc.): *līpi saṁkhyā gaṇanā mudrā uddhārā nyāsa nīkṣepa*, and then the eight *parīkṣās*. *Mahāvastu*, ii.423: *lekhā līpi saṁkhyā gaṇanā mudrā dbāraṇā* . . .

The list of the *Brahmajāla*: *muddā gaṇanā saṁkhyāna kāveyyo* . . . is explained by Buddhaghosa, Rhys Davids (*Dialogues*, i.22), O. Franke (*Dīgha* in *Auswahl*, 18-19). On *kāveyya*, also see Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Theragāthā*, 1253.

565. Compare *Vibhaṅga*, *hīna majjhima paṇāsa*, p. 17 *et passim*.

566. *Prakarāṇa*, TD 26, p. 716a5: "What are the *sa-uttara dhammas*? Conditioned *dhammas*, space, and *apratīsaṁkhyānirodha*." Same terminology in the *Abhidhamma*, *Vibhaṅga*, p. 19 *et passim*.



